

THE REVOLUTION AND THE EMPIRE
... BEING THE MEMOIRS OF ...
.. CHANCELLOR PASQUIER ..

1814 - 1815



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MEMOIRS OF CHANCELLOR PASQUIER

VOLUME III

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A HISTORY OF MY TIME

MEMOIRS
OF
CHANCELLOR PASQUIER

EDITED BY
THE DUC D'AUDIFFRET-PASQUIER

TRANSLATED BY CHARLES E. ROCHE

THE REVOLUTION—THE CONSULATE—THE EMPIRE

VOLUME III 1814-1815

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MEMOIRS OF CHANCELLOR PASQUIER

CHAPTER I

The Bourbon monarchy beset with difficulties—At home: ill-concealed hostility between the officers and the *émigrés*; clashing interests; national properties—Abroad: laborious reconstitution of Europe; Bernadotte in Sweden; Murat at Naples—What was to be the influence of the French Cabinet in the concert of the great powers?—Napoleon a source of anxiety—Organization of the Chambers—M. Beugnot, Director of Police; ordinances respecting the observation of the Lord's Day, religious feasts, and processions—The Legion of Honor and the Royal Order of Saint-Louis—Changes made in the public service; the Abbé de Montesquiou seeks to check the movement; influence acquired over him by M. Royer-Collard; the latter's views in 1814—Spirit of the statesmen of the time—After holding aloof from public affairs for twenty-five years, M. Dambray accepts the office of Chancellor—He reorganizes the Council of State—The Council of Ministers assumes the name of *Conseil d'en haut*; decrease of its responsibility as a body; each one of the ministers works individually with the king—The enmity existing between M. de Blacas and the Abbé de Montesquiou divides the ministry into two camps—Reorganization of the Council of State; the *auditorat* suppressed—M. de La Valette is denied the title of honorary Councillor of State; his hostility towards the Bourbons is thereby further increased—M. Pasquier succeeds in having M. Corvetto retained as a member of the Council of State—Composition of the Chamber—M. Lainé appointed its president; he becomes a power.

VANQUISHED on the 10th of August, 1792, immolated on the 21st of January, 1793, the Bourbon monarchy had returned after twenty-two years, which had seen a republic,

a directorial government, a consulate, and an empire. It came back, not in a blaze of glory, since not a single victory had, in the past twenty years, been won either by it or in its name, but bringing with it the blessings of a necessary peace. Peace abroad, peace at home, was all that was expected of it; but, for this dual peace to be lasting, it must be an honorable one. No longer could any ambitious day-dreams be indulged in; no more was one to revel in the enjoyment of the brilliant victories which had become so dear to the French heart. Care must be taken the while to respect the memory of them, and to be considerate in the treatment of those who had risen to an illustrious and glorious prominence, all the more precious in that it alone had survived the shipwreck. Fate and the force of circumstance were cause that these memories, while so dear to the large majority of Frenchmen, were a matter of pain to the king, the royal family, and almost all those who had returned in their wake.

The situation was a delicate one, for hardly any one dared to give frank expression to his natural sentiments. Some there were who, in spite of the caution enjoined by policy, necessarily found their prestige dimmed. Accustomed as they had been for fifteen years to hold first rank both in the army and at Court, they now found themselves forced to share power with men, the greater number of whom had so far remained unknown to fame, and who suddenly assumed an attitude characterized by a superiority which displayed itself with an ease belonging only to a possession of long date. It not unfrequently occurred that the most illustrious among generals heard people ask who they were in the *salons* of the Tuileries. These names, which had so often resounded in the bulletins of the *Grande Armée*, were known in Vienna, in Berlin, and in the many capitals through which their bearers had passed as conquerors. On

the other hand, those who in their own country, in its very capital, involuntarily put this slight upon them, were forever indignant at heart at the consideration and respectful treatment which it was policy to show to the men of the Empire, and which seemed to the returned Royalists excessive.

They were required, without any transition whatever, to do honor to and to recognize as their equals those whose names they had for so many years pronounced only with hatred or contempt. It was sought to make them accept celebrity acquired in so short a space of time and while serving a cause most odious in their eyes, as the equal of that which had run through the course of centuries, and which had been associated with all the glories and triumphs of the monarchy. Herein lay insurmountable incompatibilities. These concessions, which had to be made, were obtained with difficulty; but, after all, they were granted from within the higher ranks of society. Political necessities were understood in that quarter, and people were willing to resign themselves to make some few sacrifices; but, the lower the social scale, the more were people tenaciously and keenly sensitive in such matters. There was an ever-present and ill-concealed feeling of antagonism between the throng of officers who had won their promotion in the wars of the Revolution and the noblemen of all ages who were in so great a hurry to wear their old epaulets once more, or to procure fresh ones.

Hence it was unavoidable that many interests should clash. Doubtless, no better move could have been made than to confirm, as had been done in the charter, all sales of national domains, and to declare the titles to them unassailable; but if, on the one hand, the question was thereby determined from a legislative point of view, on the other, it was not settled socially, and two classes of owners, one of

which had ousted the other, were thus brought face to face. This was doubtless not an entirely new situation in France, as it had been in existence since Napoleon had authorized the return of the *émigrés*, but there was this great difference that during the preceding reign the *émigrés* had merely been admitted into the country by virtue of an act of mercy, and as pardoned individuals, while, under the Bourbons, they came as vanquishers, and what had formerly been laid to their door as a crime, was now evidently looked upon as a claim to distinction. How, indeed, could the *émigration* be made a subject of reproach to any one *émigré*, when the *émigration* was again taking possession of the throne? Was not the principle which had once more placed the crown upon the brow of the former sovereigns equally applicable to those who had lost their all through having remained faithful to that principle? It was but natural that there should be those who believed they had good reasons for indulging in hopes, while there should also be others who lived in a state of fear. They watched each other with an anxious and jealous eye, and the enmity which smouldered in their innermost hearts seemed to be but waiting for an opportunity to burst into flame. All of this was inevitable. It was the consequence of a restoration. But, with the exercise of some little skill, these feelings might be tempered and modified, and thus would be avoided the jeopardizing of that domestic tranquillity, the necessity for which was so potent.

Nor were there lesser difficulties to cope with abroad, and they were just as serious. The great powers were about to make partitions of territory, not only among themselves, but also among the states which had followed their fortunes; a balance of power must be re-established; Europe remained to be reorganized in its entirety, and, unfortunately, the spirit which seemed to preside over this reorganization was

one of hatred against France. The oppression endured during the past few years afforded her former rivals pretexts of which they did not fail to take advantage, and it was greatly to be feared that they would persist in seeing, in the France of Louis XVIII., the France which but recently knocked at the doors of all Europe. At the congress, resolved upon by the Treaty of Paris, and which was to be held in Vienna, serious difficulties, aside from those contingent upon the partitioning of Europe, were likely to arise.

Of the two soldiers who had risen from the ranks of the French army to ascend the steps of the throne, the one still reigned in Southern Italy; the other, as hereditary prince, was waiting for the time, close at hand, when the crown of Sweden would fall to his lot. He was one of the members of the coalition; he had fought in person, and his presence at Leipsic contributed to the victory. Added to this, Sweden, which had called him to her of her own free will, was one of the powers which had subscribed to the Treaty of Paris. In spite of his shortcomings towards his allies during the French campaign, in spite of the rights of the prince whom he was about to dispossess, and whose chief fault lay in having openly displayed in favor of the principle of legitimacy a devotion which was not yet seasonable, Marshal Bernadotte, hereditary prince of Sweden, occupied a position hard to shake.

The dominions of Murat, whose principal title to consideration was that he had married a sister of Napoleon, had at one time belonged to the House of Bourbon. Would not the idea suggest itself of restoring them to their former possessors? Would that not be the just and wise consequence of the French Restoration? On this point the most divergent opinions were about to join issue. Murat, in recent times, had acted in such a manner that he had, more espe-

cially in France, silenced the voice of his partisans and given a favorable opportunity to all who sought to come forward in support of the rights of the former Neapolitan dynasty. Hence he must turn for his chief support to Vienna, for there was a likelihood that Italy would be withdrawn from French influence at whatever cost.

All these conflicting interests afforded plenty of food for anxiety to the French Cabinet. What influence was it about to wield in the important discussions about to be engaged in? Was royalty again to assume the important position it had in days gone by occupied in Europe? If its importance was not admitted beyond dispute, it was greatly to be dreaded that wounded national pride would turn against those whose presence had not been a guarantee against such contumely. The sovereigns who had made and willed the Restoration were interested in maintaining it. They were bound to be consistent in their acts, and could not deny to the princes, whom they had again placed on high, the means of maintaining themselves with honor in their reconquered positions. Nor must it be forgotten that Napoleon, relegated to the Isle of Elba, was there at the very gates of France and of Italy. He still preserved very dangerous partisans in both countries, and he was, for a few of them, the object of the most blind devotion. On both sides of the Alps the hearts of the soldiers were his. In Italy, his sister was still reigning at Naples. With such support, with a character like his own, with a soul of his mould, was it to be credited that he was sincere in his resignation, and was it not rather to be dreaded that in proportion to the injury done to him, in proportion to the depth of his fall, he would all the more nourish the thought of retrieving the fact, and of avenging his wrongs? There could be no doubt but that he would be on the lookout for every mistake committed, that he would be watching every opportunity, fully determined not

to allow a single one to escape. Would the royal government be able to steer past all these shoals, and overcome all the difficulties of such a complicated and delicate situation?

The month of June was principally taken up with organizing the two Chambers, and with the discussion of the rules and regulations necessary to insure the strict regularity of their debates, and the relations they were to have in common. Much time was given to the drafting of measures to be submitted to them. Those relating to financial matters were urgent, for the true situation of the arrears was not fully known, and the needs of the new public service and the extent of its expenditure were not easy to determine. The question of the *droits réunis* (taxes on intoxicants, playing-cards, etc.), in connection with which *Monsieur* had made such unfortunate promises on his return to France, which pledges it had since been necessary to recall by ordinances, still remained to be settled by way of legislation, and it was to be feared that, even while retaining the levying of these taxes, the changes to be introduced would greatly diminish the revenue derived from them.

Public attention was for a moment diverted by the acts of the Director-General of Police. He began with a circular dated June 2d; this document was unworthy of the talents of M. Beugnot. A sentence of it has been remembered, wherein he compared the action of the police to the drop of oil which is poured into the works of a complicated piece of mechanism. "It is in a similar fashion," he said, "that this drop of oil must gently find its way among the complex wheelworks of the social system, so as to render smoother its movements," etc. This expenditure of wit failed in its object; but, five days later, the Director-General ventured on a far more serious document. He issued an ordinance for the proper observation of Sundays and feast-days. Its object was doubtless a laudable one, but it

was, to say the least, untimely, and could from several points of view be charged with illegality. Justifying his action by the former decisions of supreme courts and by a certain regulation issued in 1782, which, as he rightly argued, had been confirmed by two laws passed in the Year X., he therein enjoined, with the utmost strictness, the cessation of all work and the closing of shops on Sundays and feast-days, threatening violators with certain police measures, without prejudice to their being prosecuted in courts of law. Dancing and public games were prohibited, subject to the same penalties; with regard to the exceptions which it had been necessary to make regarding the sale of eatables and of several things necessary towards the preservation of life and health, they were enumerated with minute care.

Assuredly, M. Beugnot, when adopting this measure, and undertaking its execution, had not followed his own impulse, and had yielded to the desires of the royal family; but he had been greatly to blame for not making it felt that there should not be such great haste to run counter to habits already long established. He should especially have set himself to demonstrate that it was more than doubtful whether the right existed to impose on the citizens, by means of a simple police order, obligations which the legislative authority could alone create. Now, all the regulations, decisions, and even laws which he invoked were either inapplicable or formally repealed by later laws. Such a line of action could not fail to rouse the indignation of the public mind, for not only did it run counter to popular usages, but it even went so far as to offend the upper classes in their established and cherished opinions. It was plain that the drop of oil had failed in its mission. Opposition was shown to M. Beugnot's order, and protests made themselves heard, the virulence of which became increased by a second ordinance issued on the 10th of June, in con-

nection with the Corpus Christi procession. It was ordained that all citizens should drape their houses in the streets through which the Blessed Sacrament would pass. This was raising a tremendous issue with regard to the freedom of worship guaranteed by the Charter. Could a Protestant be compelled to perform a deed, which supposed a sort of participation in a form of worship not his own? On this occasion, M. Beugnot had gone still further back in quest of his authorities, for, in his preamble, he invoked ordinances and regulations rendered in 1702 and in 1720. At once there were no limits to the apprehensions which evil-intentioned persons sought to give strength to. This first step, they argued, was clearly the precursor of what was to follow, viz. the ancient régime was again to be brought back in what was called its "purity."

No sooner was the Chamber of Deputies constituted, than it was called upon to consider petitions against the abusive exercise of power ascribed to the ordinance regarding the observation of Sundays and feast-days. This abuse of power was duly admitted both in the reports and in the debates to which it gave rise. The only excuse which could be found for the Director-General was his good intentions and the mistake which he had made in believing that the laws of the Year X., which he had quoted, were applicable. As a final result, the ordinance quickly became a dead letter. Nevertheless, it remained the starting-point for the most deplorable prejudices.

Next, a decree of the government substituted the profile of Henry IV. for that of Napoleon on the decoration of the Legion of Honor. Of all the kings of France he remained the most popular. His name and his memory have ever been invoked wherever it has been found necessary to win the affections of the masses. There still remained in existence the Order of Saint-Louis. It might, perhaps, have been

wise to avoid creating a sort of rivalry, by merging it into the Legion of Honor, but this would have been asking too great a sacrifice of the House of Bourbon, and I do not think that any one would in those days have been found who would have ventured to make such a suggestion. It was thought that the remedy to the inconveniences arising from the simultaneous existence of the two orders, was to be found in a liberal distribution in the army of decorations of the Order of Saint-Louis. As a result, it soon became rumored that the Legion of Honor was no longer to be anything but a civilian order. This idea was still further strengthened by the choice made by the provisional government of M. de Pradt as Chancellor of the order. It became necessary to make an official denial in the columns of the *Moniteur* in regard to the unfortunate rumor I have just recorded. It was all the more desirable not to wound the army on a point so sensitive to its *amour-propre*, from the fact that there was no lack of other motives for its discontent. Thus, the *gardes du corps* assumed their duties on the 26th, and the sight was witnessed of a large number of new officers entering upon active service, at a moment when a large number of old officers were being placed on the retired list. The only concession made was that all officers of high rank were allowed to draw their pay up to September, 1814.

Many were the changes made during these days in the personnel of the public service, such as prefects, sub-prefects, mayors, and other administrative functionaries. The Abbé de Montesquiou showed as much caution as he could in the carrying out of this programme, and I must do him the justice of saying that nearly all the men of any talent, or who enjoyed a good name, found in him a zealous defender. Still, his hand was but too often forced by the princes and their counsellors. I may mention as an instance

of the pressure brought to bear on him the disgrace of M. de Bondy. He kept him for several months at the prefecture of Lyons, in spite of the outcry made by the hot-headed Royalists of that city, but he was compelled to yield. At the same time, he was made to accept the services of incapable men, whose worthlessness soon became felt. I have already stated that among his qualities could not be reckoned the talent of judging men well. He was surrounded by a crowd of place-hunters, and, in spite of his intelligence, it was not always the most worthy who met with the highest favor. There clung to him from his old habits of the Court and of *grand seigneur* an extreme weakness in the face of long and persistent obsequiousness.

Happily, there were two men who stood the highest in his confidence — M. Royer-Collard and M. Becquey. I have told the origin of their footing of intimacy. It cannot be denied that both were men of exceptional merit. As to the influence which they must have wielded in those days, it should not be judged from what M. Royer-Collard has since said and done; he was then altogether different from what he became two years later. His royalism was aggressive against the Revolution and its works. His animosity, fed and fanned by the part he had so long enacted, was not free from prejudices concerning such persons as had, in those times, made a name for themselves. This feeling is all the more to be noted from the fact that M. Royer-Collard always preserved a great distance between himself and the Court, and the usages and manners prevailing there, which oftentimes offended his *amour-propre* all the more from the fact that the contrast between them and his very simple habits was great. Constitutional ideas had made but little progress in his mind. He spoke very lightly of the freedom of the press, which afterwards became so dear to him, and had no hesitation in saying to those who enjoyed

his intimacy, that he hardly considered it compatible with the restoration of our ancient monarchy. The proof of what I here state is given by the draft of the press law, whereof I shall soon have to speak, and which he drew up together with M. Guizot, who had been placed by him near the Abbé de Montesquiou, as Secretary-General of the Ministry of the Interior. Neither had M. Guizot in those days any very fixed ideas on this point, and it cost him but little to draw up the arguments on which the Abbé de Montesquiou based his speech on this occasion. Why wonder at these rapid and great changes in the manner of thought and deed? There had been such an upsetting of ideas for the past twenty-five years, and, under the imperial régime, the habit had been so entirely lost of giving any attention to certain subjects, people had so lived in a state of submission to the views and will of the government, that some time had to elapse ere one could resume the habit of thinking for oneself, and to fully and conscientiously account to oneself for one's own opinions.

Matters were still more strongly emphasized in this respect at the Ministry of Justice. The Chancellor, M. Dambray, had brought to it, in most perfect good faith, and even with a sort of *naïveté*, all the views of the ancient régime. This régime should, he thought, be promptly reverted to, for it was, from his point of view, the only natural and logical order of things. This conviction revealed itself in all his actions as well as in all his words. Such was plainly the idea which presided over the organization of the Council of State, and over the manner according to which he constituted it. Of all the undertakings of the period, none was more badly carried into execution. Coming from M. Dambray, this might be a cause for some surprise, for no *avocat général* had made in so short a time as himself such a brilliant reputation in the Parlement of Paris.

His gentle and simple manners had, at the same time, something magisterial about them, and, at the time I entered upon my judicial career, nobody entertained any doubt that he was destined to attain the highest dignities. He did not emigrate, but, as his opinions were at variance with those current at the time, he remained aloof from all that was going on about him, and led a retired life on his Normandy estate. His marriage with the daughter of M. de Barentin (Keeper of the Seals under Louis XVI., and, at the death of M. de Maupeou, recognized as Chancellor by the princes whom he had followed into exile) had contributed to attach him still further to the cause of royalty. When the Imperial Government made its appearance, he resisted pressing invitations made to him to resume his place in the magistracy. Napoleon would have quickly raised him to the highest rank. He continued to live in seclusion. Convinced that he would never again in his life be called upon to take a part in any affairs of weight, he had given up all studies and occupations calling for any effort of serious application. His time was henceforward divided among the caring of his vast estates, the amusements of a country life, and, — must it be said? — to the reading of novels, from which he derived great enjoyment. Thus were spent twenty-five years of his existence. It has been said of certain persons that they had forgotten nothing and learnt nothing; it might with justice have been said of him that he had learnt nothing and forgotten much. There remained to him of his former self only a spirit of equity and judicial habits, which always came to the surface on every occasion when he found himself called upon to decide any purely litigious matter. To this must be added a great suavity of manner and a kindliness ever ready to make itself manifest when not checked by some political consideration.

The preamble of the ordinance reorganizing the Council of State, while brief, was most remarkable. It was stated therein that the king, having had submitted to him the rules adopted by his predecessors for the organization of their Council, had recognized that it would be difficult for him to devise a better system; but that, nevertheless, considering that it was in some respects advisable to simplify this system, it was requisite to bring it into harmony with the changes that had occurred in the form of government and in the habits of the nation, hence he decreed and ordained what followed, and so on.

A more unfortunate basis could not have been taken as a starting-point, as the ancient Council of State of the kings of France had nothing in common in points of the highest consequence with the one now in question, since the existence of the legislative Chambers deprived it of the most important of its prerogatives, that of being the only body to which the king submitted his edicts, declarations, and, finally, all his legislative acts, which were to be debated upon previous to their being promulgated. Moreover, this former council, under the name of *Conseil des parties*, filled the functions of the *Cour de cassation* in the matter of all appeals made to the king against the decisions of the supreme courts. These appeals, as it is well known, were the subject of ceaseless disputes between the parlements and the royal government. Now, this portion of the judicature, so poorly organized in those days, had since, owing to the creation of the *Cour de cassation*, been placed on a perfect footing. The Chancellor affected to be ignorant of this. Basing his argument on maxims of the past, he looked upon the right of *cassation* (annulling the finding of a court) as in a way inherent to the sovereign's very person, and did not consider that it could not be legally exercised, except by a body over which the sovereign was always sup-

posed to preside. He secretly nourished the idea of re-establishing in this connection the ancient order of things. Hence he was careful to style the Council of State "Privy Council," or *Conseil des parties*.

Later on he risked a move which left no doubt as to his intentions. He just as little understood the institution of the *Comité du contentieux*, which he nevertheless retained. The jurisdiction of the Council over the *contentieux* (matters in dispute) of the administration being a very extended one, and being far more frequently exercised at a great distance from the parties interested, it had been found necessary to make them feel secure that matters would be most seriously and thoroughly gone into. Hence the *Comité du contentieux* had until then been entrusted only with the preliminary examination of certain matters, a report on which was then made by one of its members to the Council of State in full session. This constituted within the body itself a sort of appeal against the decision of the committee. This appeal was *de facto* suppressed, it being argued that the decision of the Council of State could be supplanted by the king's direct sanction, to which it was taken care to have recourse on every opportunity, and the committee, presided over by the Chancellor, thus possessed among its attributes the right of rendering a decision as well as of making preliminary investigations. The same took place with regard to nearly all matters dealt with by the other committees, and which were, with but a slight difference, the same which came within the jurisdiction of the Imperial Council of State. The meeting of the Council, as a whole, thus became so perfectly useless that, with the exception of its inaugural sitting, which was presided over by the king in its accustomed room in the Tuileries, I do not think that the Council again met together as a body for a single time as long as M. Dambray was in power.

It remains to be stated that the new organization of the Council of State afforded the opportunity of defining by the same ordinance the status of the Ministerial Council, which was styled *Conseil d'en haut*, and in which the princes of the blood royal and the Chancellor alone were absolutely privileged to sit. The ministers, who nevertheless belonged to it, could only take their seats whenever it pleased the king to notify them previous to each sitting. They were in this respect placed on the same footing as the ministers without portfolio and the Councillors of State, whom the king could likewise summon at will. This was another of the customs of the old régime, but it had this result, a very unfortunate one in a constitutional government, that it destroyed all collective responsibility in the ministry, since the king could render a decision on the propositions submitted to him by each of his ministers individually, without the others being heard. This result was doubtless most agreeable to those directly interested, as each and every minister was desirous of acquiring the greatest possible amount of independence in his ministry; such was indeed the governing motive of ministerial action during the royal government of 1814 and of the first three months of 1815.

This reciprocal independence went on growing imperceptibly, and, outside of certain general matters which were taken up by the *Conseil d'en haut*, each and every minister acquired the habit of submitting his labors to the king in person. This most frequently took place of an evening, and each one obtained the king's sanction for the most important measures, without his colleagues being made cognizant of them. This state of things, it must in justice be said, was modified by a restriction all the more worthy of being recorded, for the reason that it was the one of the causes of the discord which was not long in disrupting

the ministry. Alone, one of the ministers had assumed the right of being present at these private conferences; it was M. de Blacas. His title of Minister of the Household, the habit he had acquired for several years past of never leaving the king's side, and, above all, the strong liking the king entertained for him, rendered this privileged situation almost a normal one. Alone, one of his colleagues ventured to attempt to shake off a yoke which was galling to all. He failed to do so. It was the Abbé de Montesquiou. As a result of his attempt, an open and declared hostility arose between M. de Blacas and himself. It was on this occasion that he allowed himself to say to the king: "Your Majesty should not forget that if the French people have never cavilled at their kings having mistresses, they have never been able to endure a male favorite." The favorite remained, and it took far more powerful efforts, and far more serious circumstances, to oust him.

This quarrel having become known, each one took the side of the man whom he thought the stronger of the two, or of the one with whom he was generally of the same opinion. M. Beugnot and the Minister of War went over to M. de Blacas; the Baron Louis and M. Malouet, to the Abbé de Montesquiou. M. de Talleyrand, who could not endure the latter, and did not any the more like M. de Blacas, remained in a state of neutrality, as did also the Chancellor and M. Ferrand; the latter, however, inclined somewhat towards M. de Blacas. If I mention M. Ferrand, it is because he was almost constantly invited to the Council, and because his secret labors with the king, as Postmaster-General, gave him great influence. *Monsieur* was rather favorably disposed towards the Abbé de Montesquiou; M. de Blacas had for a long time been accustomed to hold his own against him. The two other princes scarcely busied themselves with anything but army matters; as, moreover,

they travelled through the provinces during the greater portion of the year, their influence was never felt to any great extent in the Council.

The persons selected to form part of the new Council of State were such as might be expected from the system which had presided over its formation. The number of councillors for ordinary purposes was reduced to twenty-five. This might have sufficed, especially with the assistance of the councillors extraordinary, among whom were all the directors-general of departments, seven in number, who could take part in the debate, and vote. But it would have been necessary that those elected should have been really competent in dealing with public affairs. Now, out of the twenty-five, eleven or twelve had been drawn from the Council of State of 1789 and from the magistracy existing previous to the Revolution. Several of them had doubtless enjoyed an honorable reputation, and had ever proved themselves in those days to be men of talent; but their long estrangement from public affairs, and, as far as the greater number of them went, their advanced age, rendered them unfit for work, which they could only have engaged in with success after a deep study of the laws passed and the regulations issued for the past twenty-five years. Their principal duty lay in the application of laws and regulations with which they had not the slightest acquaintance. They would have found their appropriate place among the honorary Councillors of State; but it was sought to grant them salaries, which this position would not have entitled them to, and moreover, among the honorary councillors, the number of whom was limited to twenty-four, there were already fifteen of like origin and in a like position. It will be seen therefrom how considerable had been the weeding out among the members of the Imperial Council of State. Sight must not be lost of the fact that this body enjoyed the reputa-

tion of numbering among its members the most able men of the country. It must fain be admitted that there were not a few of these men of talent, whose services the royal government could hardly avail itself of. The *auditeurs* were suppressed. This suppression was ill-conceived; it deprived the government of the advantage of having at its disposal a certain number of poorly paid positions, with the aid of which it could give satisfaction to many families, by supplying a career for their sons; but the title of *auditeur* was an imperial conception, and royalty was only too glad to get rid of it.

I did not stand very high in M. Dambray's favor, and my suggestions carried no weight with him; hence it was that I failed completely when presenting a claim which I had greatly at heart; it had been stated that the councillors who had acquired the title of life councillor in the last council were to receive the title of honorary councillor, with a pension equal to the third of their stipend when actively engaged. The title of life councillor belonged *de jure* to every Councillor of State who had sat uninterruptedly for five or six years; at the expiration of that time, letters-patent could not be denied them. M. de La Valette had been Councillor of State since the early days of the organization of the Council, and as, in his capacity of Postmaster-General, he had never absented himself from Paris, he had sat uninterruptedly to the end, in other words, during eleven or twelve successive years. The letters-patent of Councillor of State were therefore his incontestably, but he had never thought of claiming them. This fact was seized upon as a pretext for refusing him the honorary title. "Let him show his letters-patent," it was argued; "they alone can establish his right." In vain did I speak to the Chancellor, and hand him a memorandum wherein the rights of M. de La Valette were clearly established; it was all useless. M. de La

Valette had married a niece of the Empress Joséphine; this was, although no one dared say so openly, the reason for an ostracism which could not be removed.

This act of injustice was a crying one. M. de La Valette enjoyed the best of reputations, and the many services he had rendered, especially to several *émigrés*, had won him many friends; the wrong done him was therefore felt by a number of persons. With regard to him, his hostility became from that day unrelenting towards the royal government, and it made our intercourse very constrained. In the course of the discussions which frequently arose between us, my endeavors to bring him back to more moderate sentiments, to restore a little calmness to his mind, were all in vain. I can remember some strong language which escaped his lips in one of those talks, which always came to an end without our being able to agree. In order to make him accept the present with composure, I had tried to recall to his mind all the acts of temerity, all the follies which he himself had admitted having seen in the latter days of the imperial régime. "Yes," was his answer, "we have just left behind, I admit it, a government of giants, and we have endured all the inconveniences consequent thereon; but, was it for all that necessary that we should fall into the clutches of a government of pigmies?"

I was more successful as regards my former colleague, M. Corvetto. He was a Genoese. He was about to leave France, and greatly desired bearing away with him the title of honorary councillor. I was dining with him one day at the house of M. de Sémonville, whose position was already that of a man high in favor. He had just obtained one of the most coveted of places, that of *grand référendaire* of the Chamber of Peers. He enjoyed the confidence of the Chancellor and that of M. Ferrand. "Why," said I to him, "would you not make an attempt to keep in France a man

of worth such as M. Corvetto? All that is required is to retain him in the ordinary service of the Council of State. You are familiar with his great ability, his lights, his acquirements, and to what a degree he is a man of honor. From what I hear, it is proposed to eliminate from the Council a large number of the most able men, of the best workers. I know full well that many objections may justly be raised against several of them; but there cannot be any against this man. Nothing blamable can be imputed to him throughout the whole course of the Revolution, to which he has remained absolutely foreign, and he might be of the greatest use, now that there is a scarcity of tried talents." M. de Sémonville grasped my idea, and promised me to leave no stone unturned in order to have it bear fruit. And he indeed showed a lively interest in the matter, and thus M. Corvetto remained a Councillor of State for ordinary purposes. They were very glad to have him at hand in 1815.

It was on the 5th of July that the first draft of any law was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. It was time that it should be furnished with some occupation, and to thus dispose of the many propositions which were beginning to be thrust forward. It was indeed difficult that the freedom and publicity of debate which the Charter had restored to that Chamber should not bring about, at least in the first moments, a somewhat disorderly line of action. Men pass with difficulty, without falling into some excess, from a régime of absolute restraint to the enjoyment of full and entire liberty. The Chamber was hardly constituted when there appeared at once propositions with regard to the unequal distribution of the taxes, the excesses of the press, the form of government, the civil list, and the observation of Sundays and feast-days. It was proposed to draw up an address to the king, with the object of entreating him to

make known the actual condition of the kingdom in regard to its most important and delicate particulars. The departments which had most suffered from the evils of war claimed indemnities. It was asked that an account should be rendered of the taxation which had been illegally established.

These ideas were all brought forward, doubtless with the best of intentions, but without in any way taking into account the situation of the government and the impossibility for it to satisfy so many demands at one and the same time. It is, nevertheless, fair to say that, upon the whole, it would have been difficult to meet with an assembly more wise, better disposed, and animated with a better spirit. Brilliant talents did not abound in it; this is not to be wondered at, as the part which it had to play during the Empire was hardly one which would call them to the Chamber; but there was no lack of enlightenment. The reports and the debates which have come from out of it during the course of that session are there to bear witness to it. It, moreover, enjoyed the advantage of being well presided over by a man who inspired it with confidence. Among all the candidates submitted to him for this presidency, the king had made choice of M. Lainé; this honor was due him as *rapporteur* of the committee which had drawn upon his head the strongest animadversion on the part of Napoleon, and as having taken a prominent part in the movement of the city of Bordeaux in favor of the Duc d'Angoulême. From that time the development of his fine talent and the brilliant portion of his career began.

It was then the custom originated that the president should sum up every debate; this greatly contributed to the influence M. Lainé enjoyed as long as his presidency endured. The custom disappeared almost entirely with him.

CHAPTER II

The Abbé de Montesquiou's proposed press law meets with strong opposition in the Chamber of Deputies; it passes after an animated debate—Other labors of the session; propositions submitted to the Chambers; measures presented in the king's name—When giving a general exposé of the situation of the kingdom, the Abbé de Montesquiou indulges in palpable exaggeration—Financial reforms instituted by M. Louis—The Chamber grants him a surtax of fifty centimes—His excessive retrenchment in the war budget causes discontent in the army; his parsimony is equally fatal to the service of the *ponts et chaussées*—He succeeds in getting his budget accepted—Movement in favor of the restitution of the properties of the *émigrés*—Pamphlets—The Mathéa petition—M. Ferrand's arguments in favor of a measure bearing on the restitution of the unsold properties of *émigrés*—They are refuted by the *rapporteur*, M. Bédoch—After a lengthy debate, the measure passes subject to considerable amendments—M. Dambray presents another measure having reference to the *Cour de cassation*—A vigorous onslaught made on it by the *rapporteur*, M. Flaugergues—Closing of the session—Marshal Macdonald proposes to grant compensation to the *émigrés*—The new Council of State enters upon its duties—M. Pasquier participates in its labors—Strange words spoken by *Monsieur* in his presence—The Legion of Honor falls into disrepute—Visit of the princes to the departments—The Duc de Berry's trip attended with but little success—M. Pasquier goes on a tour of inspection through the provinces—Organization of the staff of the *ponts et chaussées*—Disadvantages of the too great freedom of action allowed the heads of departments by the government of the Restoration—During his trip, M. Pasquier studies public feeling in the provinces—He confides his impressions to M. de Montesquiou.

It was the Abbé de Montesquiou who inaugurated the debates of the Legislative Chamber, by submitting a measure with regard to the press. With this measure began the discussions which are still going on on this point. Nearly all the arguments which have since been repeated were then

brought forth. It must be admitted that ideas favorable to the full and entire freedom of the press existed then only to a restricted extent; they had vanished during the long silence imposed by the imperial régime, and so the debate dealt merely with the greater or lesser extension of repressive measures. The Abbé de Montesquiou contended that in certain cases preventive measures should be had recourse to, for, he argued, the mischief done by reprehensible writings can perhaps not be undone, and this is the case wherever they are rapidly disseminated. This led directly to the censorship of newspapers, and he would truly have encountered little opposition, but he sought to extend the right of censorship even to writings of small volume. He proposed to grant full and entire freedom only to works of over thirty sheets, to pastoral letters, to catechisms, to legal documents, and to the publications of learned bodies.

With regard to journals and periodicals, they were subject to censorship and to the formality of royalty's assent. The police proscriptions concerning the press had much in common with the regulations laid down in the decree of 1810. A most severe disposition was added to the obligation imposed by this decree, that of compelling all printers and booksellers to procure a license. It was stipulated that the license of any printer or bookseller convicted of violating the laws and regulations should be cancelled. This supererogatory penalty, left to the discretion of the administration, and added to the one which the tribunal could and should inflict for violations of the law, is certainly one of the most outrageous which can be conceived, as it goes so far as to deprive a man of his trade, take away his livelihood and, in a word, accomplish his ruin. Still it would not seem that its full extent was seen at the time; it had less difficulty in passing than the censorship, and it presses to-day with all its weight on the printing and pub-

lishing trades. It must be added that the final clause of this law stated that it would be revised in three years' time, in order to introduce such amendments as experience had demonstrated the necessity of. This most wise disposition contributed greatly towards having the others adopted, without too great an opposition being raised. They might be looked upon as merely temporary, and it was hard to refuse the government assistance of such a nature, considering the circumstances in which it was placed.

I have stated that the measure had been drawn up by the Abbé de Montesquiou, aided by M. Royer-Collard and M. Guizot. It had met with little opposition in the ministerial council. M. de Talleyrand expressed strong disapprobation of it in society, but that would not prove that he strenuously opposed it in the council. It met with a lively opposition in the Chamber of Deputies, and the committee entrusted with its preliminary examination proposed its rejection through its *rapporteur*, M. Raynouard. The debate over it was a long, lively, and animated one. The Abbé de Montesquiou invoked maxims which were in closer communion with the royal government prior to 1789 than to the one instituted by the Charter. He nevertheless carried his point, and the measure was passed by a majority of fifty-seven votes out of two hundred and seventeen. The minority numbered, therefore, eighty votes. The Chamber of Peers showed less opposition than the Chamber of Deputies; it made some slight changes in a couple of clauses; these were adopted without any difficulty by the Chamber of Deputies, and the law was finally promulgated during the course of the month of October. It had taken up the time of both Chambers for a space of over three months; the debate produced a great impression on the public mind. M. Benjamin Constant must be mentioned in the first rank of the literary men who fought the government. It was then that

began the spread of that mass of satirical writings with which France became flooded, all of which presented the men in power as bent upon bringing back the days of darkness and of ignorance. The success attained by these writings was great, and public opinion shared their fears and their angry sentiments.

It must, nevertheless, be recognized that besides this unfortunate press law, the labors of the session were of real value. The highest administrative and financial questions were dealt with, and almost invariably ably solved. A cursory examination of the propositions submitted by the government or originating with the Chamber of Deputies, will astound one by the immense amount of labor which they involved. The ministry which was called upon to do the greatest amount of work, and to which indisputably belong in this respect the honors of the session, was the Ministry of Finance. M. Louis was endowed with an activity of mind and a vigor of resolution which rendered him eminently fit to carry the burden placed upon his shoulders.

The propositions laid before the Chamber called for important modifications in the registry dues and in the collection of the duties on intoxicating liquids, and for fresh regulations with regard to inter-departmental commerce, the free exportation of manufactures, the rights claimed by owners of wines, the wiping off of the king's indebtedness abroad, the law of the 16th of September, 1807, with reference to the *Cour de cassation*, a rural code, the propriety of begging the king to establish courts and tribunals, ministerial responsibility, the advisability of looking into the source from which came petitions before considering them, the free cultivation of tobacco, the free exportation of merino yarns and fine wools, the necessity of calling for an account of the expenditure and income of the Legion of Honor and to provide for the deficit existing in its finances,

the help to be granted to the Spanish refugees, and a petition to be submitted to the king, begging for a law relative to the intermarriages of brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law.

The proposed measures presented to the Chambers in the king's name, in addition to the press law, can be approximately summarized as follows: a bill for the creation of a new system for liquidating the exigible debt, and thus enhancing the nation's credit; measures regarding naturalization, the system of accounting of the *communes*, the restitution of the unsold properties of *émigrés*, the exportation of cereals, customs duties, intoxicating liquors, the importation of iron of foreign manufacture, tobacco, the observation of Sundays and feast-days, the civil list and the Crown lands, the debts contracted abroad by the king, the franchise of the port of Marseilles, the *Cour de cassation*, the maintaining of divers indirect taxes, the debts of the colonists of Santo Domingo, and an extension of time to be granted to military men for the payment of their debts. When the amount of work involved in the consideration of so many measures is taken into consideration, and when there is added thereto the discussing of a number of petitions, some of which are of great importance, one is compelled to admit that no assembly employed its time to better purpose, and displayed as much activity and laboriousness as the Chamber of 1814.

The session opened with a general statement as to the situation of the kingdom, which was made by the Abbé de Montesquiou at the sitting of the 12th of July. This piece of work, which showed talent in its preparation, erred in that it lay too great a blame on the foregoing administration, and in exaggerating in many respects the censure which it deserved. It amounted to an indictment of the Revolution and of the imperial régime. The royal government was doubtless entitled to set forth the actual

state of the country; but, in exaggerating the wrong-doings of its predecessors, it gave offence to many more than it gave pleasure to. Exaggeration was plainly manifest in the budgetary statement. The Abbé de Montesquiou declared that the amount of the state's liabilities had increased during the past thirteen years by 1,645,469,000 francs, whereof 1,305,460,000 remained to be wiped out. The accuracy of these figures was at once contested by the preceding Ministers of Finance, who announced their intention of proving the falsity of them, and M. Louis himself was compelled, when, on the 22d of July, he brought down his proposed measure on the budget and developed his statement, to adhere somewhat more closely to the truth. This statement was embodied in his report to the king. A reference was embodied in it to an expenditure of 1,308,156,500 francs, made by the preceding government over and above the natural and legal resources of the budgets; but as a portion of this expenditure had, as a matter of fact, been wiped out by funds which were available, and which had merely been diverted from their primitive destination, such as those, to quote an example, derived from the *domaine extraordinaire*; as another portion of it was to be met with securities which could be realized, and as, finally, a third portion was not exigible, and called merely for the payment of interest, the sum which remained to be liquidated did not amount to more than 643,940,000 francs. The difference between this result and the one reached by the Abbé de Montesquiou was great. He was, and with a good show of reason, greatly displeased at the readiness with which the Minister of Finance had exposed him.

The dominant idea of M. Louis, when framing his budget, had been to restore, or rather, to create the credit of which Napoleon had never known how to avail himself, and of which he had never even seemed to have felt the impor-

tance. In order to attain this object, it was, first of all, necessary to meet all the engagements and pay everything that was due. Debts about which there could be no dispute had repeatedly been repudiated; those which had been admitted had been liquidated with a closeness which, in a thousand instances, had amounted to injustice. M. Louis, not content with being just, wished to be generous in the admission and settlement of claims. In order to meet all the obligations consequent upon such loyal behavior, it became necessary to husband every resource, and to gather into the treasury all available funds. The strictest economy was commanded. But it is allowable to say that he went too far in this direction. As he was unable to wipe off immediately a sum of some 650,000,000 francs, the only resource open to M. Louis was to take deferred annuities and hand over to his creditors. He did not seek to compel them to accept a consolidation in government annuities, but he hoped to bring them to ask for this method of payment, of their own accord. With this object in view, he got himself authorized by the budget law to pay off claims passed on by himself as minister, either in treasury bonds, payable to order in three years, and bearing interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum, or in consolidated annuities bearing an interest of five per cent, at the option of the creditors of the state. Payment and redemption were secured by the sale of timber belonging to the state and the *communes*. The system was a complicated one. As the carrying out of it became interrupted by the events which happened during the course of 1815, it is difficult to form an opinion as to the greater or less success reserved to it. To secure its carrying out, M. Louis did not scruple to ask, in the first place, that both the assessed and indirect taxes of 1813 and 1814 should be maintained; he then asked that for 1815 the land taxes and those on personal property should be

collected as to principal and surtax, in accordance with a scale which fixed this surtax at sixty centimes. The burden thus imposed was truly an exorbitant one; hence a lively debate arose over it in the Chamber. Many were the demands that the figure of sixty should be reduced; some even went so far as to insist that it should be reduced to thirty; finally, it was fixed at fifty.

M. Louis felt aggrieved over this slight check,¹ to which he was, however, compelled to make up his mind. It made a difference of some seventeen millions in the revenues he had calculated upon. They were still considerable, and there was plenty to provide with handsomely for the public departments. It is herein that he acted most wrongly, and that he committed a political error of the highest import. With his ardent desire, with his firm resolution of retaining the free disposal of the sum which he calculated upon using to send up the quotations of his bonds, he entered upon a persistent war against all the budgets of the other ministries, and forced his colleagues to altogether unreasonable reductions of expenditures, some of which were even to the highest degree impolitic. This was particularly so in the case of the army. The operation of making an army pass from a war to a peace footing is ever one which requires the most delicate handling. To proceed with it in a reason-

¹ His ill-humor was so violent and so poorly concealed that when the reduction to 0 fr. 50 was decided upon, he at once arose from the ministerial benches, left the Chamber, and sought his official residence, on reaching which he told everybody that his system had been destroyed, that doubtless, also, the whole of his budget would be rejected, and that, after all, it was just as well. The Abbé de Montesquiou, who had remained at his post, and who had borne the brunt of the rest of the debate, came to him two hours later to inform him that the budget of which he had so despaired had been voted, and that its other clauses had not met with any serious opposition. It was with great difficulty that M. Louis could be appeased, that he was persuaded that all was not lost, and that the position was still an excellent one. Men of such a character, whatever way their worth may be, are hardly fit to retain the control of affairs for any length of time.

able manner would have required at least two or three years; it was the only way of bringing about the transition without danger. M. Louis sought to accomplish it all within the year, and his tenacity of purpose won the day over the weakness and indifference of General Dupont. Hence the officers who were no longer on the active list were placed on half-pay. Their discontent was all the greater as the larger number of them were actually reduced to a state bordering on destitution. There were hardly any of them whom the disasters of the last campaign had not reduced to the necessity of contracting debts which they could not liquidate. It was even urgent to grant them a delay by law, in order to shelter them for a while from the proceedings instituted against them by their creditors. Is it then to be wondered at that these men so readily lent themselves to abetting an enterprise which bade fair to restore to them their former well-being?

The parsimony of M. Louis, although it did not have the same disastrous consequences in all the departments of the administration, yet did much harm in all of them. In the one under my charge its evil effects are still felt by the country. The highways and the bridges were in a very dilapidated condition, especially in the departments which had been the scene of war. This was not the time to economize with regard to keeping them in repair. Basing my demands on the lowest calculations, I had asked for eighteen or nineteen millions to meet this expenditure; he declined to grant me more than fourteen. I protested against an appropriation so out of proportion with the requirements; the Abbé de Montesquiou, who shared my views, supported my demands, but we had to content ourselves with a promise that next year all I should ask for would be granted. Meanwhile, the most urgent repairs were not made, or were made in most imperfect fashion.

The following year the country was made to bear the burden of a fresh invasion; then followed the financial loads which were imposed on the country. For several years, therefore, the appropriation for repairs remained about such as M. Louis had fixed it in 1814. To the palpable evil done by such blunders must be added the unfavorable feeling created towards the royal administration. Work was retarded in all directions, and this contrasted greatly with the activity characteristic of the foregoing administration.

The real triumph of M. Louis occurred in connection with the law regarding intoxicating liquors; he succeeded in keeping it in force. Such is the name given to the right of inspection over vine-growers, owners of vineyards, and wholesale and retail wine-merchants. This right, which has always been the object of strong protests on the part of the parties interested, is, nevertheless, the surest basis for the collection of the dues, and all methods which it has been attempted to substitute for it have always carried with them a more or less considerable falling off in the revenue. A lively battle was waged over the matter, and for several days the issue remained in the balance. Success was principally due to the cleverness and ability developed in the course of the debate by M. Bérenger, director-general of indirect taxation. M. Louis owed him a great deal in this instance. The passing of this law on intoxicating liquors put an end to the many embarrassments caused by *Monsieur's* rash promises on his return to France.

To conclude the summary of the work of the session, it remains for me to speak of two measures, the one having reference to the restitution of the unsold properties of *émigrés*, and the other to the reduction in the number of the members of the *Cour de cassation*. I have spoken of the attempts made, of the ideas sown in the public mind, in

the early days of the Restoration, in connection with the sales of national domains. The expectations of those who flattered themselves that they were about to see the properties of *émigrés* restored to their former owners, were disconcerted by the Declaration of Saint-Ouen and the promulgation of the Charter. But very soon the partisans of this idea took heart anew; two pamphlets made their appearance, their authors being M. Dard and M. Falconnet. M. Dard had intitled his: *De la restitution des biens des émigrés considérée sous le triple rapport du droit public, du droit civil et de la politique*. That of M. Falconnet bore the title of *Lettre à Sa Majesté Louis XVIII. sur la vente des domaines nationaux*. In the latter, the sale of the properties of the clergy was attacked simultaneously with that of the properties of the *émigrés*. These two publications caused a tremendous stir, as much from the actual fears engendered as owing to the advantage which those who were interested in propagating them knew how to derive therefrom. A petition was presented to the Chamber of Deputies in the name of Mme. Mathéa; she denounced both publications, and craved for a law that should protect her against the eviction with which she thought herself threatened, together with all those who like herself possessed properties having formerly belonged to *émigrés*.¹ This petition furnished the subject of a somewhat lengthy report, wherein it was, first of all, admitted that the two publications which had given rise to the reclamation of Mme. Mathéa had been disseminated through the departments, and had penetrated even into the rural districts, where they had sown broadcast ele-

¹ Some rather well-founded doubts were expressed at the time as to the actual existence of this Mme. Mathéa; it is very likely that it was a name taken at random, and one behind which the actual authors of the petitions saw fit to screen themselves. This circumstance gave rise, later on, to the motion which was made that means should be devised to trace the origin of petitions.

ments of discord; the *rapporteur* enumerated all the acts, inclusive of the Charter, which guaranteed the inviolable possession of the so-styled national properties to their actual owners, and drew the conclusion from the ensemble of these acts that the fears of Mme. Mathéa were groundless; he moved to pass to the order of the day. This motion was adopted, and the report was ordered printed, each member of the Chamber to receive six copies of it. This constituted at one and the same time a legal confirmation of the rights of the purchasers, and an expression of the sentiment of the Chamber. I can never forget that on the day on which this decision was reached, I met M. de Bonald in the Place Louis XV.; he had just come from the Chamber, and he said to me in an affrighted manner: "Do you know what they have just done?"—"No."—"Why, they have declared themselves in favor of the confirmation of the sale of the properties of the *émigrés*!" I did not reply, astounded as I was that a man of so superior a mind should have been able to entertain any doubts in this respect and be surprised at a similar result.

A short time after, there was presented to the Chamber a measure having reference to the restitution of the unsold properties of *émigrés*. The measure was an eminently just one, but it was spoilt and envenomed by the arguments employed by M. Ferrand. Nothing more unreasonable could be conceived; it was a plea, not only in favor of the *émigrés*, but in favor of the *émigration*. The following sentence, which has remained graven in the memory of all, was to be found in it in connection with the *émigrés* and the well-intentioned men who had nevertheless remained in France: "Owing to the force of misfortunes and of upheavals, all of them are again in the same position, some, after having ever followed a straight course without deviating therefrom, others after having more or less wandered through the revo-

lutionary phases in the midst of which they were situated"; further on, he gave it clearly to be understood that happier times were in store, when it would be possible to do still more towards remedying the unfortunate condition of the *émigrés*, and when one would succeed in gradually diminishing the painful exceptions imposed by the stress of the present state of affairs.

No sooner had the measure, according to custom, reached the *bureaux* (committees) of the Chamber, than there came from all of them a general outcry against its preamble; several members, indeed, were of opinion that the suppression of the preamble should be pronounced by means of a formal declaration; but as there was no legal method of reaching this result, the *rapporteur* of the special committee was instructed to express its most positive disapprobation. This was accordingly done in severe terms by M. Bédoch, who took good care to state that in thus expressing himself, he was obeying an *unanimous* order. The refutation of M. Ferrand's ideas filled four long columns of the *Moniteur*; it teemed with the most caustic expressions. Among other passages, I will quote the following: "Would it not indeed be more imperative to recognize the bonds which have existed between events in most diametrical opposition to each other, and to recognize, for instance, that the most serious outrages have perhaps been nothing else but the necessary consequences of primary and imprudent resistance to the popular will?" Further on: "We will enquire of M. Ferrand whether those who have shed their blood in the service of their country, if the honored victims of their love for their country or their king, if those who have had the courage to face danger, and whose generous efforts had for object to divert the fury of the storm, or to arrest the progress of evil, if these zealous functionaries, if these upright members of the magistracy, defending at the cost

of their freedom and their life the principles of justice and of sound morality, if the thousands of citizens commendable by their virtues and their talents, thrust into dark cells, or dragged to the scaffold, have followed a less straight path than those who severed all connection with their country, even with just cause?"

With regard to the visions of a more auspicious future which M. Ferrand had endeavored to conjure up in the minds of the *émigrés*, the *rapporteur* expressed himself in the following terms: "As all properties are inviolable in conformity with the terms of the Charter; as a just equilibrium must ever be preserved between the public revenues and expenditure; as taxation will always be regulated and determined in proportion to the needs of the state, the hope cannot be reasonably entertained of witnessing the coming of a time which will allow of the diminishing of the exceptional positions made mention of in the measure under debate. Why, then, raise in certain breasts hopes which can never be realized? Why instil groundless fears into the minds of others?" Still further on, he summed up as follows: "But, gentlemen, the statement made by M. Ferrand is not the expression of the king's will; let us say so frankly: the minister has substituted the bitterness of his personal resentful feelings for the sentiments of the monarch." This distinction was doubtless just, wise, and politic, but it did not undo the harm done by M. Ferrand.

It was impossible that it should be considered otherwise than an excuse made out of complaisance, in order to cover up a grave bit of imprudence. The only way of dissipating these bad impressions would have been for the king to have shown sufficient courage to exclude M. Ferrand from his councils; but such a resolution was incompatible with the sentiments which were in the ascendant about him, and far from taking so salutary a step, he was soon seen granting

fresh marks of favor and of confidence to the man who had so poorly served him.

Everything in the committee's report breathed the distrust with which it had been inspired by the preamble; even the title of the proposed law was modified; the government had made use in it of the word *restitution*, which the committee refused to accept, and the draft which was finally agreed upon bore: "Draft of a law relating to the unsold properties of *émigrés*." A lengthy debate ensued, which lasted over eight sittings, and I do not think that any more lively discussion occurred during the course of the session. The measure was passed by a very large majority, with a notable portion of the amendments suggested by the committee. Among the additions which it proposed, there was one which was rejected; it was of the highest importance, for its object was to lay down that at no future time and under no pretext could any compensation be granted to the former owners of properties which had been sold. This stipulation was excessive; on the one hand, it forbade a sort of restitution which it was feasible to make without any inconveniences arising therefrom, to wit, that of movable effects which had come into the possession of the state; on the other hand, it disposed peremptorily of a most delicate question. At a time when all the former creditors of the state were being satisfied to the extent of one-third of their claims, was it fair to deny the *émigrés* for all time the right of laying claims to a similar settlement? Was it fair to say that no compensation whatsoever could ever be granted to those who had been despoiled? On the contrary, was it not allowable to entertain the belief that this compensation might at some future time come to be looked upon as a measure of placation commanded by an enlightened policy? This idea had been dwelt upon by several speakers, and the proposition which was made during

the same session regarding this in the Chamber of Peers by Marshal Maedonald, went to prove sufficiently that much benefit was to be derived from such an act of national generosity. M. Lainé left the presidential chair to oppose the proposed additional clause; he did so with strength and with talent, and he demonstrated that the attempt to thus pledge the future was beyond the powers of the Chamber. His opinion carried the day; it was one of his first great triumphs as a speaker.

The law regarding the *Cour de cassation* was the last which occupied the attention of the Chambers. The Chancellor had drawn it up, together with the preamble wherein was to be found a sentence which once more recalled the former *Conseil des parties* of the king. It was concluded therefrom that he wished to reinstate it, together with its attributes of bygone days, and that it was his intention that the *Cour de cassation* should be, under a new name, nothing but this precious Council, the principal merit of which was doubtless in his eyes that it would be under the immediate control of the Chancellor. The measure was, in consequence, considered and judged from this point of view only, and M. Flaugergues, to whom it fell to speak in the name of the committee, made a vigorous onslaught on it. He displayed all the talent with which he was endowed, to bring into relief everything that could cast suspicion on the intentions of M. Dambray. For instance, the Chancellor had attempted to preserve to the eminent dignity with which he was invested, and this was natural enough, a right which had so far been that of the *grand juge* (Chief Justice); to wit, that of presiding over the full court, or over such of its sections as it might please him to select. But he had also proposed that the findings of the section of the *requêtes* should no longer be explained in a preamble, and he had introduced in the last clause a proviso conceived as follows:

"Everything concerning the order of the service of the *Cour de cassation*, which it shall be considered necessary to change or modify, shall be provided for by administrative regulations."

M. Flaugergues, in his indictment of the measure (for it is hard to give any other name to the report which he read), devoted himself to demonstrating that by the combination of these three dispositions, the Chancellor was reserving to himself the means of bringing the *Cour de cassation* under his immediate control; in a word, to transform it into nothing less than the old *Conseil des parties*. It cannot be denied that his deductions were most cleverly presented, and that they might almost be accepted as conclusive demonstrations. I am nevertheless convinced that he credited M. Dambray with views more positive than he was able to conceive. However this may be, the committee's intention was to allow the Chancellor to preside only over the united sections of the court, and that only in such cases as provided for by law. It re-established, in regard to the section of the *requêtes*, the obligation of justifying its findings, and deprived the Chancellor of the faculty of providing by administrative regulations for all cases mentioned in the draft of the law. The report of M. Flaugergues was attacked by two or three members; this afforded him the opportunity, in summing up at the close of the debate, of setting forth with fresh strength the facts and principles he had laid down. The following passage of his speech is to be commended: "If a choice had to be made, I should still prefer the independence of the judicature to that of the legislative power. Public freedom would at least find a pledge of security in independent tribunals. If you make them subject to the influence of the executive authority, all equilibrium is destroyed."

The law was passed almost in the shape desired by the

committee, and the Chancellor was permitted to preside only over the united sections of the Court. M. Dambray was greatly displeased with the Abbé de Montesquiou, because the latter had not spoken in defence of his prerogative of presiding at will over each and any section of the Court. And indeed the Abbé had held aloof, and rightly, I believe.

Whatever wisdom the Chamber had displayed in the decision it had come to, it had not been able to prevent the spreading of regrettable impressions among the public. The number of malcontents, of evilly intentioned men, far from diminishing, kept ever increasing, in spite of the apparent or actual successes obtained by the government during the course of the session, which came to an end on the 30th of December, 1814. As president, M. Lainé delivered a sort of allocution at its last sitting; he cleverly reviewed the ensemble of the Chamber's labors; he congratulated it on its zeal, on the excellence of its sentiments, and on the wisdom to which its views had testified. Among the sentences most worthy of attention in this speech, the following one must be recorded: "If, gentlemen, you have so far not redressed any great grievances, your sense of justice has at least reserved unto itself the faculty of seconding the noble voice which has made itself heard in the Chamber of Peers." This was an allusion to the amendment to the proposed law on the unsold properties of *émigrés*, the rejection of which he had brought about, and to the proposition of Marshal Macdonald.

In the debates which had taken place in the Chamber of Peers with regard to the law concerning the properties of *émigrés*, several speakers had been of the opinion that, while respecting accomplished facts and pledges given to irrevocable acts, they should apply themselves to the redressing of wrongs which it was impossible not to deplore. The Duc de Choiseul had been the first to speak in this sense.

Marshal Macdonald, in a proposition which he unfolded on the 10th of December, set forth most skilfully and with consummate discretion the means which seemed to him most proper towards attaining so desirable an object. A work of this magnitude overtaxed considerably his talents as a writer and his acquaintance with the law, but the credit of having undertaken it, and of having become its mouthpiece, still clings to him. He had taken up the matter at the request of M. de Sémonville, with whom he was on an intimate footing; he had married a daughter of his wife.

The purchasers of national properties once reassured, it could not be concealed that the position of the former owners, set face to face with that of the new ones, would, for some time to come, be a source of hatreds and dissensions throughout the country; it behoved the government to satisfy the evicted owners within such limits as the state could possibly undertake. The marshal proposed to appropriate for their behalf three hundred millions of two and two and a half per cent *rentes*. He went on to show how this outlay would, according to all appearance, entail no burden on the public treasury, which would soon be compensated by an increase of the value of the national domains by the quantity of transfers which would occur, and which would naturally increase the amount of registration fees.

When referring to the domains of national origin, he had carefully separated those derived from the sale of the properties belonging to the clergy. With regard to those, he had not scrupled to declare that "the will of France, the examples set by history and those set by modern Europe, the assent of the Supreme Pontiff, and the consent of the most sapient ecclesiastics placed them in a category which did not call for any special legislation." He had even gone so far as to say that "while wishing that the day should

come when the places of worship should be surrounded with greater magnificence, there was doubtless no one to be found in the Chamber who would hesitate even nowadays to come to the assistance of the tax-payer by means of the national concession made to the treasury of properties of this kind, had the prodigality of previous governments but left to it the faculty of so doing. There was indeed some rashness in this assertion; but what was at the same time very skilful and perfectly fitting, considering his personal position, was the fact of having joined to his proposition in favor of the *émigrés* an analogous proposition in the interest of the endowed members of the army, whom the fate of battles had, during the past two years, deprived of the results of their labors, of the reward of the blood they had shed. He claimed this favor on behalf of the recipients of dotations; those of the first class received four thousand francs; the second, two thousand francs; the third, one thousand francs; and the fourth, five hundred francs. The Chamber ordered that this interesting work should be printed, and appointed a committee to study it; it adjourned the debate on this subject to its next session, and it commissioned its president to present himself before the king, and beg him to be pleased to cause his ministers to collect all necessary information to enable it, when it again met, to settle the question with a full knowledge of the facts. This step of Marshal Macdonald was, generally speaking, fully approved of by the public, and I have been all the more careful to refer to all its details, as it will perhaps be found interesting to compare them with what was done regarding the same matter in 1825.

It was during the course of the legislative session that the Council of State entered upon its duties, when it at once betrayed its embarrassment and its lack of experience. People had been accustomed to seeing business promptly

disposed of, and were disagreeably impressed with the delays which were henceforward to be endured. As Director-General of *ponts et chaussées*, I belonged to the committee which felt this inconvenience more particularly; it was the committee of the interior (home department); M. Royer-Collard and M. Becquey were members of it; it was there that our intercourse began to become somewhat intimate. They were far less assiduous than myself; the duties of the branches of the public service entrusted to them, and to which they were entirely new, left them little leisure. The Abbé de Montesquiou had committed the mistake of giving the presidency of this committee to M. de Ballainvilliers, *intendant* of the province of Languedoc previous to the Revolution. He had since, owing to the protection of M. de Calonne, whose niece he had married, got himself attached to the Council of the Comte d'Artois; he was the chief of it during the *émigration*; never was there a greater sinecure. Nevertheless, on his return to France, *Monsieur* was very anxious that M. de Ballainvilliers should hold a post of importance. So here he was president of the committee before which came the most business, and where a precise knowledge of the laws and regulations in force for the last twenty years was most requisite. He had not the most elementary notion of them, and his incompetency was rendered still more striking by pretensions for which there was no justification.

The recollection of the years I had spent in the former Council made it all the more unpleasant for me to serve under such a president; nevertheless, the acquirements which I brought to the work, and the occasional services which I was able to render, secured for me, in a very short time and at little cost, a certain amount of reputation in the new government. The son of M. Dambray, who was attached to the committee as *maître des requêtes*, was con-

tinually sounding my praises, and the father, who readily fell in with his son's ideas, soon declared that I was one of the most useful members of the Council. Hence I found myself, so to speak, reinstated, if not in his good graces, at least in the esteem and consideration of those who had shown me the greatest distrust, and when I went to Court, it frequently happened that *Monsieur* spoke to me in a kindly fashion, which was sometimes akin to confidence. Thus it was that, speaking with me one day about the new form of government granted by the king, he went so far as to say to me: "People have got what they asked for, and it has been necessary to give this form of government a trial; but the experiment will soon be over, and if, in the course of a year or two, things do not go smoothly, there will be a return to the natural order of things," — which meant the old régime. If I place these words on record, it is because *Monsieur* doubtless spoke in the same strain to many others besides myself, and hence the opinion soon prevailed that he would have none of the Charter, and that he was fully determined upon recalling it, as soon as the opportunity for so doing presented itself. It is unnecessary for me to point out all the harm produced by such an impression. It is, however, only fair to remark that in other respects the prince spared no efforts to attain a certain amount of popularity. He showed a particular solicitude for the welfare of the National Guard, of which he had been appointed colonel-general. His affable and gracious manner stood him in good stead in this connection. He had attached to himself, in the capacity of major-general, M. Allent, a *maître des requêtes*, and a former officer of engineers, whom I have already mentioned as holding a similar position under Marshal Moncey at the time of the surrender of Paris. It was with him, I believe, that the happy idea originated of entrusting the protection of the king's person

to the National Guard alone, on the anniversary of his entry into the capital. Such a favor, so well and so appropriately bestowed, produced the best effect.

There were few abuses which in those days caused such pain to the men who had played an honorable part in preceding years, the military men especially, as the lavishness with which the crosses of the Legion of Honor were distributed. They saw in this the decrease, not to say the debasement, of the value of a reward to which they had been accustomed to attach the greatest prestige, and which had been won, by the greater number of them, at the cost of their blood and of deeds of valor. The several ministers conceived the idea of having a considerable number of crosses placed at the disposal of each of them, for the purpose of distributing them as they saw fit among the officials under them. Then was witnessed the sight of nearly all the heads of departments, and even simple clerks in the ministerial offices and in the various departments of the civil service, receiving this mark of distinction. It was especially during the journeys of the princes that this abuse was indulged in in the most outrageous fashion. The decoration became the reward of the obsequious servility and importunities of men of no standing. In the branch of the public service whose head I was, for instance, whereas engineers-in-chief of the first order did not obtain the cross which was the object of their desires, it was freely given to young men who had barely entered into the corps, and whose only title to it was that they had come across one of the princes on his travels, and had ridden by the side of his coach.

The effect produced by the journeys of the princes was not everywhere as favorable as had been expected; the most serious objection to them was that they brought into play ancient pretensions to which the Restoration had given a

fresh lease of life, and which France was far from inclined to admit. Generally speaking, the Duc d'Angoulême was well received; the regularity of his life, the simplicity, not to say the timidity, of his manners, and his kindly treatment of all, secured to him the greater number of suffrages. This was not the case with the Duc de Berry. He was oftentimes gruff, and did not show sufficient discretion in his utterances. Several regrettable incidents occurred in the eastern provinces which he had been commissioned to visit. On his return, the king felt it incumbent to censure him severely about his behavior. The Abbé de Montesquiou told me in connection with this that, after such an experience, the duke would no longer be entrusted with similar missions; and indeed, even after the Hundred Days, I do not believe that he was ever charged with any other than to preside over the electoral college of the department of the Nord. This untoward result was all the more to be regretted from the fact that he had been depended on to act on the minds of the soldiery; had he but known how to restrain himself, he would have been fully competent to favorably influence them, as he possessed a resolute mind and manner. His excessive love of pleasure did not permit of his posing as a moralist; this was in itself sufficient to ensure him a welcome from military men. Several very happy expressions of speech are attributed to him. On one occasion he stood facing a regiment of the Guard, which he had been told was deeply devoted to Napoleon. "And so you were greatly attached to that man?" he said to the soldiers nearest to him. "Yes, Monseigneur," replied one of them. "And why so?"—"He led us so often to victory!"—"What of it! Who would not have done as much with such men as you?"

It fell to my lot, during the month of September, to visit a portion of the provinces through which he had travelled;

so I was enabled to judge with my own eyes of the impression which he had left behind him, as well as of the frame of mind of a notable portion of France. As Director-General of *ponts et chaussées*, I went on a tour of inspection through Champagne, Picardy, Flanders, and Normandy.

I have already said how greatly I was pleased with the service entrusted to me, and I was determined to devote the most assiduous care to it. It had always been the object of Napoleon's particular attention; the impulse he had given to it needed only, in order that it should endure, to be somewhat fostered and kept up. Accustomed as I had been under the imperial régime to the activity which was exacted of all heads of great departments, I lost no time in making myself familiar with all that was to be under my superintendence, both as regarded men and things; it did not take me long to become fully informed.

The personnel of the *ponts et chaussées* was not one easy to organize. The large diminution of France's territory threw a large number of engineers out of work, many of them most able men. Were they also to be placed on half-pay, or should the opportunity be seized of dismissing the least capable of them? It was my opinion that it would be contrary to the best interests of the royal government to inflict such a blow on men worthy of consideration, who had many friends, and who were highly thought of by the public. The economizing of two or three hundred thousand francs did not seem to me to compensate for the inconveniences to result from such a drastic measure. I therefore applied myself to make throughout the kingdom a redistribution of positions, in order that almost all should find employment. All would therefore have gone well in this direction but for the reduction made in my appropriation by M. Louis.

Within these narrow limits, I remained the absolute

master of the position allotted to me, and my doings were untrammelled by any interference. It may be thought that it was most agreeable for me to dispose of everything as I saw fit. Nevertheless, the enjoyment of so great an independence produced an altogether contrary effect on my mind; the same took place with all those nearest in official rank to me. In former days the work of the Director-General of *ponts et chaussées* was one to which the Minister of the Interior devoted the greatest attention. The Emperor was in the habit of presiding over the councils wherein were discussed any matters of special importance, and at which the distribution of the appropriation was decided upon; he frequently summoned to these councils engineers of the highest rank, who discussed the various plans in his presence, and reported on the progress of the works with which they had been charged. And now there was a transition from such a régime to one of utter indifference. The liberty of action allowed one was consequently more than balanced by a diminished importance, by the loss of the advantage which men ever prize so highly; to wit, the one of knowing that their labors are passed upon and appreciated at their full value by the chief of the state, in a word, by the man whose mere approval is often the greatest of rewards. It was not long ere each one did with as little trouble as possible to himself the work entrusted to him. As for myself, although endowed with a good deal of activity, and anxious as I was to reap golden opinions in my new position, I must fain admit that I would have done more and better work under the preceding government; I frequently postponed to the following day that which in former days I would have brought to an issue on the very day. Nevertheless, I think I am entitled to say that the department of the *ponts et chaussées* was far from being the one where this disadvantage made itself most felt.

The council of the *ponts et chaussées* was for the greater part composed of able men; by listening to their debates, it was always an easy matter for me to follow the most appropriate course, although I had no technical knowledge of the work. There is, in this connection, a truth which it will be found hard to digest, and yet I have heard it frankly confessed to by engineers of the highest merit: it is that an engineer, whatever his talents, makes a poor director-general of *ponts et chaussées*. He is too easily led away by the desire of acquiring fame, by the enjoyment he finds in carrying out beautiful and great undertakings; he thus neglects matters of utility, and the expenditure would rarely be in fair and wise proportion to the results. Moreover, there can be no body in the bosom of which hatreds, dissensions, and rivalries do not spring up. An engineer-director would necessarily take sides; he would have his friends, but likewise his opponents, and it would be hard for him not to show favor to the former at the expense of the latter.

I began my tour of inspection by following the banks of the Seine, the Marne, and the Oise, in that portion which had been the scene of the war. I gave on the spot all orders necessary for repairing the bridges that had been destroyed, and to which there had so far been substituted the poorest of temporary constructions; next, I decided upon visiting the Saint-Quentin Canal and the ports on the British Channel from Dunkirk to Havre. My journey through Champagne and Flanders made me realize how deep-rooted were the memories of the imperial régime. Either owing to the military spirit reigning in these provinces, or on account of the manufacturing interests which dominated all others, it is certain that one could everywhere feel that the people were ill-disposed towards and distrustful of the royal government. The manufac-

turers were in dread of English competition, with which they thought themselves threatened, and they saw with much vexation that the outlet for their goods was entirely closed in Belgium and across the Rhine.

The military men, who had returned to their homes in great numbers, were the centre of a keen interest, and all their grievances were poured into the ears of willing listeners, who extended to them all their sympathy. This state of affairs was everywhere to be met with; I came across it the whole length of my journey. I expressed myself as follows on the subject, in a note which I handed to the Abbé de Montesquiou: "It is important to point out, especially when one has been familiar with the spirit prevalent in France eight or ten months ago, that the army, which was formerly the dread of families, has become beloved and popular since the placing of men on the retired list, while furloughs and desertions have brought back to the bosom of their families a considerable number of officers and soldiers who do not cease celebrating his (Napoleon's) valor and great deeds, and who do not tire of dwelling on his dangers and his sufferings. The army has become the object of a lively sentiment of admiration, even of affectionate regard. There is a continual talk about its rights; all favors not bestowed on men not having belonged to it seemed to it wrongly bestowed. The people associate themselves with its glory, which has become national property; the attachment for it grows daily; with this sentiment is coupled a profound hatred of the foreigner." (This latter feeling was in particular the case in the northern provinces through which I had travelled.) "Inconsequential as it may seem, people, while experiencing all the blessings of peace, argue as if they desired war. The soldiers, thus flattered in their passions, become all the more difficult to handle and to please; they complain bitterly on the slightest pretext, are

forever discovering that they are not being kept faith with, and that the promises made them are not fulfilled. There is consequently no limit to their jealousy in the matter of every favor granted to others than themselves." This picture was drawn at the end of October; in other words, five months before Napoleon's return to France.

The town of Saint-Quentin, where I made a stay of several days, was one of those in which I was better enabled to study the dispositions of the manufacturing class. It is necessary to point out that this class owed the great development of its industries to the continental blockade, which had proved the ruin of maritime cities; more than any other measure, the blockade had contributed towards influencing the city of Bordeaux's determination to desert his cause, and to throw itself into the arms of the Duc d'Angoulême. At Saint-Quentin, as well as in the towns pursuing the same industries, the prevailing feelings were entirely different. At Péronne and at Amiens, better dispositions existed. On my entering Normandy, a still greater change made itself apparent. There, the interests of maritime trade exercised a most pronounced influence; the city of Havre especially was overjoyed at the new order of things, its port was filling up with ships, and commerce was brisk. There was no longer any fear of seeing fortifications built on the land side. The transformation of a town into a fortified one is always one of the greatest injuries that can be done to a commercial centre; the fortifications which the preceding government had had in view would have necessitated the sacrifice of the finest estates in the environs, for they were to spread over the whole slope of Ingouville. A feeling which was out of harmony with the leanings of the royal family and the Cabinet of the Tuileries, rose strongly above all the good dispositions of the population of Havre. This was a deeply rooted hatred of

England, fanned by the return of the sailors who had been prisoners, and by the recital of their long endured sufferings and the brutal treatment they had received on the English hulks.

I returned to Paris along the valley of the Seine; I visited Louviers on my way, where I had to settle several matters in dispute; there the spirit of the manufacturing population was better than at Amiens and Saint-Quentin. On my return, I laid a summary of my observations before the Abbé de Montesquiou, who appeared greatly impressed with them, but what could he do? Even supposing that there should be in the government of the day a few ears willing to listen to warnings, there was no one sufficiently enlightened to draw conclusions therefrom. I had dwelt in a particular fashion on the attitude and the position of the clergy and the old nobility. As regards the clergy, its conduct was in appearance more prudent than that of the nobility, but it was beginning to be bruited abroad that certain priests, especially in Picardy, were taking advantage of the power conferred upon them by the confessional to instil uneasiness into their penitents' minds with regard to the possession of estates derived from the sale of domains which had belonged to *émigrés* or to the clergy.¹

This is how I expressed myself with regard to the nobility: "France, from what has come under my notice, is monarchical in its sentiments towards the personality of the king, but democratic in its tastes and inclinations. Thus, so far from the old nobility having regained the slightest influence, it is, on the contrary, the object of

¹ To the alarm caused in those days by the behavior of the clergy, must be added the news of the reinstitution of the Jesuits by the Pope. It was already a matter of notoriety that they had secretly established themselves in France, in particular in Picardy and in the diocese of Lyons, and no doubt could be entertained that their influence would make itself felt against all interests born of the Revolution.

marked distrust. So many interests are actually dependent on the abolition of the privileges which it formerly enjoyed, on the possibility of each and all obtaining all government offices, whatever rank one belongs to, that the prejudice most deeply rooted is that the nobility is desirous of seeing the return of old rights incompatible with the aspirations of the social system of the day. Now, there is no lack, among the old nobility, of men who by imprudent utterances, still more than by any acts of theirs, justify suspicions and fears which one should seek to dissipate. It is therefore sad, but true to relate, that since the Restoration the nobility has rather lost than gained ground in the public mind. Following upon the criminal deeds of violence of the revolutionary party, its condition excited both pity and love; but no sooner did the idea get abroad that it was inclined to abuse of its power, than everything underwent a change. Time, much time perhaps, is necessary to counteract this evil; I believe that it is important to study it well, in order to bring to it such palliative remedies as it is susceptible of receiving."

CHAPTER III

Death of M. Malouet, Minister of Marine; M. Ferrand succeeds him temporarily—Incapacity of General Dupont as Minister of War. Soult takes his place; his character, his extortions in Spain—M. Beugnot's incapacity in the police department. He asks advice of M. Pasquier, who is very reserved with him—*Monsieur* and M. de Blacas transfer him to the Ministry of Marine—M. d'André appointed Director-General of Police—This selection made at the suggestion of M. Fouché, who wields great influence with the government—His ability wins a certain number of Royalists over to him; he ingratiates himself with M. de Blacas—Marshal Soult organizes the council of war, has a monument erected to those who fell at Quiberon, and attaches a chaplain to the Ministry of War.—The case of General Exelmans—Pamphlets: *Le Nain jaune*—The confusion existing in the administration patent to every one—M. de Montesquiou resolves upon laying before the king the true state of affairs—He wishes to confer previously on the matter with MM. Royer-Collard, Becquey, Guizot, and Pasquier—His ministerial position is so greatly jeopardized that he is not able to carry out this plan—The expiatory ceremony of January 21st—The secrecy surrounding the search for the remains of Louis XVI. and Marie-Antoinette arouses suspicion—Their ashes transferred to Saint-Denis—Unfortunate speech of the Bishop of Troyes—M. Pasquier meets M. d'André at the residence of the Minister of Finance—The new police director's feeling of security in connection with the Isle of Elba—The Abbé de Montesquiou reorganizes the University—The presidency of the Royal Council of Public Instruction given to Mgr. de Bausset—M. de Fontanes superannuated; his discontent—MM. Molé and Pasquier join the Council of the University of Paris—The subject of reform gives rise to a fresh conflict between MM. de Montesquiou and de Blacas.

A CHANGE had taken place in the Cabinet during my absence; its consequences were very serious, as it introduced bad feeling into it and divided it. M. Malouet, Minister of Marine, had succumbed to a lengthy illness in the first days of September. For some time past his intel-

lect had weakened; he had committed more than one blunder during his short incumbency, if nothing else than the negotiation undertaken with Santo Domingo on the most fatal and most badly chosen premises. He had re-established class distinctions among the inhabitants, according to their degrees of color. To temper what might seem too severe in this distinction, he had promised equal rights with the whites to all men of color who should render themselves worthy of this favor by their good behavior. Such was the prospect he held out to a population composed entirely of negroes and mulattoes! It was by such means that he hoped to decide Santo Domingo to once more place itself under the ægis of France!

Still, the death of M. Malouet was a misfortune. He was an upright man, and an enemy to all intrigue; in the Council, he was always to be found on the side of conciliation and moderation. The question of finding a successor to him was an embarrassing one; the portfolio of Minister of Marine was temporarily given to M. Ferrand, the Postmaster-General. It would have been hard to discover a man less acquainted with all matters appertaining to the navy; this did not weigh with him, and he accepted the burden, in spite of his advanced age and infirmities. It was he who organized the cruiser service which was to watch the Isle of Elba, and he can assuredly not be charged with having erred by excess of precautionary measures in this connection.

It was, however, necessary to emerge from the provisional state, and to seize the opportunity to make other changes which were beginning to be considered indispensable. General Dupont, in spite of the most unfortunate complaisances, was being forsaken even by those who had forced them from him, and who were responsible for all his blunders. The army was in a state of discontent; every-

body was uttering complaints, discipline was becoming relaxed, and symptoms of insubordination were cropping up in all directions. In spite of all this, if the Court folks were to be believed, the weakness and the thoughtlessness of the Minister of War were alone to blame for this state of affairs, as he knew neither how to ensure obedience or respect for himself. The true reasons were the large number of military men placed on half-pay; the inactivity suddenly imposed on so many gallant officers; the privileged corps which constituted the king's new household; the promotions and honorary distinctions lavished on young men, the most of whom had never been under fire, and whose only merit was derived from their birth or from some potent influence which they had been able to invoke for their benefit.

It is necessary to have enjoyed as good an opportunity as I did to study closely these corps, to form a fair idea of the abuses which had quickly made their appearance among them. The one with which I was better acquainted had been disorganized in a lesser degree than the others; it was the company of *mousquetaires* commanded by General de Nansouty. He was too good a soldier not to resist any disorganization, as far as it lay in his power to do so; but who could fight successfully against persistent solicitations, when every door was thrown wide open to them, and when resistance found no support?¹

General Dupont was the first to be made to bear the

¹ When this company of *mousquetaires* was organized, it was amusing to witness the care which it became necessary to bestow on it, to put it in condition not of manœuvring, but of simply marching. Its headquarters were at the Arsenal. There, instructors had to begin teaching them the very elements of drill. Several of these improvised officers could hardly keep their saddles. M. de Nansouty, who was at that time in very bad health (he died in the following month of February), was hardly in a condition to leave his room; he frequently showed me the reports sent to him, and could not refrain from indulging in the bitterest jests about them.

penalty of numberless errors which he had not had the courage to prevent. Much labor was expended in seeking for his successor, but finally *Monsieur* carried the day, and got Marshal Soult accepted. No selection could have caused greater surprise. The Marshal was doubtless one of the most able men of the army, but he was turbulent and ambitious; his mad attempt to ascend the throne of Portugal, at the time when Napoleon had entrusted him with the command of the army, which, after the re-embarkment of the British at Corunna, was to make the conquest of that country, was still fresh in everybody's memory. He had succeeded, while in Spain, in preserving discipline and in amply providing for the corps under his command, but he had at the same time signalized himself by outrageous acts of extortion, which were the source of the enormous fortune with which he was credited. Lastly, his vulgar manners and his lack of education should have militated against his being acceptable to the prince, whose confidence he had nevertheless been able to captivate. He had succeeded in doing so with the assistance of M. de Bruges, to whom he had promised to take sides openly with the most zealous portion of the Royalist party. "A man of this stamp and of such firmness of purpose," said *Monsieur*, "is required, to influence the army and to keep it in the path of duty." And *Monsieur* succeeded in instilling this belief into the king's mind. There remained the Ministry of Marine, where the *ad interim* state could not be suffered to last any longer. M. Ferrand's desire to retain the portfolio was not able to withstand another combination which carried the day. It was beginning to be noticed that M. Beugnot was

I can recall his anxiety, when it became necessary, on the occasion of the ceremony of the 21st of January, to send his company to do escort duty on the Saint-Denis road, as well as his great joy when he learnt that all his command had returned without any misadventure and in tolerably good order.

little fit to be at the head of the police; the predictions which I had made to M. de Blacas in this connection had not taken long in being confirmed. He was himself daily more and more convinced of his lack of aptitude for the duties which had fallen to his lot; of this I can have no doubt, for he frequently breakfasted at my house, when he would find solace in telling me of his anxieties and tribulations; he even went so far as to ask me for advice, which I was always careful to withhold from him, alleging as my reasons for such reserve that when once a man had lost the thread of such affairs, it was difficult for him to well understand them. Once only did I venture to ask him if he was fully informed of what was going on in the Isle of Elba. I was astounded at the little importance he attached to this dangerous quarter, as well as at the paucity of means he made use of to exercise surveillance over it. Herein assuredly lies the most grievous mistake of his administration as Director-General of Police. He can say, in order to justify himself, that his successor took even less precautions in this direction than himself. He was absorbed in the intrigues of the Tuileries, and was continually beset with them; there was nothing more amusing than to hear him tell how, in the midst of this constant worry, he did not know whither to turn. Never did a man, at all events, show more goodwill and intelligence in doing the honors of his own personality. In a word, he did not in the least care for his post, and would only be too happy to exchange it for another. M. de Blacas, with whom he was still on an intimate footing, together with *Monsieur*, whose goodwill he had been able to retain, placed him at the head of the Ministry of Marine.

M. d'André was thereupon appointed Director-General of Police. M. de Blacas had much to do with his selection; he was doubtless a man of parts; of this he had given proof

in the Constituent Assembly; he was, moreover, adroit and a successful intriguer, but he was already old and his lights were considerably dimmed. He had been out of France the whole of the time the *émigration* had lasted, and was acquainted neither with the men nor with the things he was about to have to deal with. As it was a question of watching closely the men of the Revolution and of the Empire, there was no wisdom in appointing to such a duty a man who knew nothing about them except what he had gleaned in the newspapers. A strange circumstance in connection with the selection of M. d'André, was that his name had been suggested by M. Fouché, who had known him at a time when he was in Poland, as the accredited agent of the pretender, who had since become Louis XVIII. M. Fouché made a show of sounding his praises on every occasion, and was wont to speak of him as a man who could render the best of services to the Bourbons. This was true with regard to the moderation of his ideas, and of his complete absence of prejudice against individuals; but that was about his only quality, and others were required in the position to which he had been called.

How did it happen that M. Fouché had so soon reached the point of wielding the influence which I am crediting him with? This indeed requires some explanation. I have stated that his conduct in the Senate had been stamped with ability, at the time of the discussing of the question relative to the extent of power to be allowed *Monsieur* as *lieutenant-général* of the kingdom. On the following days he had shown the good sense of remaining in the background, and finally, when the king's entry took place, he quickly retired to his country seat. His friends were careful to draw attention to his politic behavior, which bore good fruit, especially with *Monsieur*. The men who surrounded him cared little at heart about a man's antecedents,

provided only he would think as they did, and place himself at their disposal. It was therefore a settled matter among certain Royalists who prided themselves on their liberal views, that M. Fouché was the most able man produced by the Revolution, and that if his services could not be availed of openly, it was advisable and wise to have him as an ally, and to profit by his counsels. It was then that M. de Chateaubriand made use, in a pamphlet entitled *Réflexions politiques*, of this remarkable sentence on a repentant regicide: "He leaves the class of guilty men to enter that of the unfortunate ones." And it was doubtless with M. Fouché in view that he wrote the following sentence, a strange one when coming from his pen: "We openly meet them, we speak to them, we enter their houses, we sit at their table, and we warmly press their hand without shuddering!" It is true that this sentence was eliminated from the second edition of this pamphlet, which was published after the second Restoration.

It must now be easy of comprehension how it was that M. Fouché had found the most zealous and accommodating mediums for transmitting memoranda and bulletins to *Monsieur*. If it is true, as he has asserted, that he availed himself of this facility to tell the prince some very plain truths, he doubtless knew enough to tone them down with others which would give pleasure. Now, it can be asserted that he was not scrupulous as to the governmental principles which should be adopted and carried out. To make use of the men of the Revolution, even the most notorious, to do with and by them all that was wished,—such was his policy; he cared but little to exercise power, provided it was abandoned to his friends, who would doubtless not be long in transferring to him the best part of it. He had managed to enter into correspondence with M. de Blacas. The latter, who had heard that Napoleon had found it to his advantage

to receive letters from many private sources, thought he could derive some advantage in a like manner. Hence he welcomed from M. Fiévée letters which their writer has since published. M. de Blacas was unaware that it was necessary to possess a deep knowledge of men and things prior to exposing oneself without incurring too great a danger, to receive impressions given in the dark and resting on allegations it was impossible to verify. This is how M. Fouché had prepared unto himself the secret means which enabled him to set forth in good time the merits with which he credited M. d'André, and which later on elevated him also to the very high position which he occupied for a few brief moments.

The ordinance announcing the ministerial changes appeared in the beginning of December, and created no little excitement in the public. It created almost a revolution in the Council. The influence of the Abbé de Montesquiou was appreciably diminished, while that of M. de Blacas was much increased thereby.

No sooner had he taken possession of his department, than Marshal Soult hastened to respond to the expectations he had caused to be conceived, and to do honor to his engagements. He organized a war committee under himself; all its members were appointed by the king. It was composed of five most distinguished lieutenants-general, and he took care to have its presidency allotted to M. de Bruges. This choice was a strange one. The apparent mission of the committee was to enlighten the Minister of War regarding the most delicate questions; yet the highest position attached to it was given to a man who had never served in the army; this was the man placed over generals of high reputation, such as MM. de Latour-Maubourg and Rutý.

Next, the *Moniteur* laid before the public a letter written

by the new Minister of War to the Prefect of the department of Finistère, relating to the erection of a pyramidal monument on the spot where the victims of the Quiberon expedition had fallen; another monument was to be erected in the *chartreuse* of Auray, where their remains had been laid to rest. A subscription was simultaneously opened to meet the expenses of this pious undertaking. Nothing could be more just or more honorable than the idea of doing striking homage to so many victims of their devotion to religion and the Royalist cause; I will go further and say that it was an imperative duty for the princes to render this homage to the memory of their heroic partisans, who had been massacred pitilessly; but this display of zeal for royalist and religious ideas was so little in harmony with the character and antecedents of the Marshal, that if on the one hand it won him the good graces of the Court, on the other it aroused in the public an ironical astonishment, which became all the greater when it was learnt that he was establishing a sumptuously fitted up chapel in his official residence.

The new Minister also showed a lack of moderation in the case of General Exelmans. A letter had been found on the person of an English traveller, written by the General to the King of Naples, Murat, whose aide-de-camp he had formerly been. This letter was an improper one to write, and contained a tender of his services which it might be considered wrong to express. The Minister had submitted a report of the matter to the king, and had begged the authority to arraign the General before a court-martial. The king, taking into consideration the high reputation of this beloved and well thought of officer, whose services had been of a distinguished order, contented himself with having him summoned to the presence of the Minister, who was to impress upon him that he had committed a mistake,

point out to him that His Majesty was inclined to be indulgent towards him, and urge upon him to be more circumspect in future. Either Marshal Soult considered this admonition insufficient, or M. Exelmans, during the interview, had let some unfortunate utterances escape his lips, and had gone on making reprehensible overtures, for the result was that he placed him on the retired list, and commanded him to go and take up his residence at Bar-sur-Ornain, where he would receive his half-pay.

The General did not obey; his wife was on the point of being confined; he was without means, and had no other domicile than the one in the capital; he claimed that as he was no longer on the active list, the Minister could not exercise any authority over him. After repeatedly and vainly calling upon him to yield, the Minister instructed the commandant of the city to execute his orders, and to resort to force if necessary. Gendarmes were therefore dispatched to the domicile of the General, who easily eluded them; but a thorough search was made of his residence, and his wife took care to complain of the ill usage which she claimed to have been made to endure. She embodied her complaint in a petition which she caused to be presented to the Chamber of Deputies. Her husband did the same on his part, with the result that the *Corps législatif*, the capital, France, and the army were stirred up over this scandalous affair, each one taking what seemed to him to be the right side; indeed, the consensus of opinion was not favorable to the government.

Nevertheless, a report on the two petitions was laid before the Chamber, together with an *exposé* of the facts and merits of the case, wherefrom it was deduced that the General, who was not spared, should have obeyed. The Chamber passed to the order of the day in the matter of his petition, and returned his wife's to the Minister. The

Minister thereupon decided upon convening at Lille a court-martial, upon whom he cast the responsibility of passing on the doings imputed to General Exelmans. The latter, careful not to deny the jurisdiction of a court-martial, which was to be presided over by General d'Erlon, immediately proceeded to Lille. He was acquitted on all charges on the 24th of January. So all this noise ended in a judgment which placed the government in the wrong. Nothing was less proper to place authority in the ascendant, as had been the hope of Marshal Soult.

Everything was taking a bad turn; public opinion was in the unfortunate position wherein all actions are misunderstood or wrongly interpreted, when the most fair measures serve only to embitter the mind. These dispositions were exploited with the most perfidious art by a number of pamphlets and fly-sheets, which, in spite of the censorship recently established by law, were produced with incredible activity, and were seized upon with avidity. It would be a mistake to believe that such weapons are to be disdained. A publication that was almost a periodical one, published under the title of *Nain jaune* (Yellow Dwarf), did more harm than the others. Its object was to cast ridicule on the men who had recently come into power; sarcasm was expended on these old ghosts, these antiquated champions of monarchical ideas, who, having come post haste from the recesses of their provinces, encumbered the *salons* of the Tuileries in their ancient uniforms, and celebrated the usages of bygone days, anxious to bring back the régime and the fashions of the reign of Louis XV. The Order of the *Eteignoir* (Extinguisher) was invented on their behalf; this ludicrous idea was greatly applauded, and the Order was lavished upon all whom it was sought to discredit. Caricatures soon appeared in support of this scathing irony. All have seen, all remember, one dedicated to the *Voltigeurs*

de Louis XV. (Louis XV.'s light infantry). Such means of injury are to be carefully taken into account; however futile an appearance they may present, they exercise considerable influence on the mind in troublous times. The *Nain jaune* was edited under the ægis of the Duc de Bassano; the materials for it were gathered in his *salon*, which was looked upon as the headquarters of all who had remained devoted to Napoleon. The principal contributors to the pamphlet were M. Arnault, of the *Académie française*; a young man named Harel, *auditeur* to the Council of State, and sub-prefect at Soissons at the time of the invasion; and one Bory de Saint-Vincent, in spite of his being employed in Marshal Soult's office; then followed a number of writers, all the Duke's protégés.

All thinking men were impressed by the confusion reigning in the administration, the little authority of the king's government, and the fatal consequences likely to result from the prolongation of such a state of things. The Abbé de Montesquieu, fully alive to the fact, resolved upon laying the truth before the king. But as, while calling attention to the evil, it was necessary to have at the same time a remedy to propose for it, he was desirous of conferring on this point with a few reliable persons to whom he could speak without restraint. His choice fell upon MM. Royer-Collard, Becquey, Guizot, and myself. It was his desire that this conference should remain a secret, so it was decided that the assembling of its members should take place at a dinner at M. Becquey's; if I am not mistaken, the day selected was one in the first fortnight of January. We were surprised, on the arrival of the Abbé, to see that he looked embarrassed and out of temper; he soon gave us the key to this, when he informed us that far from being in a position to lay wholesome truths before the king, his ministerial position had been in jeopardy for the past

three days. He had badly concealed his disapproval of Marshal Soult's entry into the Council; M. Beugnot was also no favorite of his, and he had gone so far as to hint that he thought him altogether out of place in the Ministry of Marine. Finally, the lack of harmony between himself and M. de Blacas had not ceased growing apace. The latter had undertaken to oust him, and he had done his best to decide the king to give his portfolio to M. de Chateaubriand. This selection was assuredly one of the oddest that could be imagined, nothing having, so far in the career of M. de Chateaubriand, led one to believe that he had the necessary qualifications for managing public business, while his merits as a literary man did not give the slightest indication of those necessary in the governing of a great country. I am strongly inclined to believe that Louis XVIII. was impressed with this truth, and that this impression prevented the success of the intrigue.

In the main, the king would have liked to be rid of the Abbé de Montesquiou, who, through his incessant quarrels with M. de Blacas, disturbed the harmony which above all he was desirous of witnessing. The Abbé felt none the less hurt and greatly discouraged. He felt more inclined to hand in his resignation than to defend his position, or to venture on the bold exposition of the state of affairs which he had prepared with our aid. It was with some trouble that we persuaded him to remain at his post for a little while longer. Such was the sole result of the conference, but it taught us that the rift in the government was even wider than we supposed, that each and every minister was working on his own lines, without troubling himself about his colleagues, without sequence and without any concerted plan. The Abbé concealed nothing from us in his irritation. So we parted somewhat sorrowfully; as for myself, it was the first serious warning which disturbed the peaceful state in which I enjoyed living.

The ceremony of the 21st of January took place for the first time at Saint-Denis; it had been preceded by a search in the old cemetery of the Madeleine, in the Rue d'Anjou, with the result of finding the remains of Louis XVI. and Marie-Antoinette. The greater portion of them was consumed by the lime into which they had been cast. The result of this search, which had been presided over by the Chancellor, assisted by M. de Blacas, *le bailli* de Crussol, M. La Fare, Bishop of Nancy, the Duc de Duras, the Prince de Poix, and M. de Brézé, was recorded in an official report most carefully drawn up, which could leave no doubt as to the genuineness of these melancholy relics. Nevertheless, there were people who pointed out that none of the local authorities had, as it would have been proper to do, been present at the operation; neither the mayor, the prefect, nor the presidents of the supreme courts had been invited to participate in it. The enemies of the government drew therefrom the conclusion that it had been sought to get rid of over-scrupulous witnesses, as the Court party was fully decided upon finding remains at all hazards.

Their removal to Saint-Denis took place with great pomp; a large concourse of people assembled along the road, while in the church the ceremony was both imposing and touching. The king did not attend, in conformity with the requirements of etiquette; but *Monsieur* and his sons, the old Prince de Condé and his son, the father of the Duc d'Enghien, the Duchesse d'Angoulême, the orphan of the Temple, were present, as also the members of the Orleans family.

The Bishop of Troyes, formerly Abbé of Boulogne, had been selected to pronounce the customary oration; he delivered one that was both unfortunate and lacking in tact. He indulged in a profusion of anathemas, leaving no doubt in the minds of his hearers that he had poorly digested the

sublime lessons embodied in Louis XVI.'s will. It was with the object of avoiding a like mistake that it was most appropriately ordered that for the future the reading of the will of Louis XVI. should take the place of the funeral oration on the day commemorating his demise.

On that same 21st of January, I could not say nay to M. Louis, who was most desirous that I should go and dine at M. d'André's with a few of his intimate friends, as M. d'André, he informed me, had expressed a great desire to have a talk with me about police matters and in regard to the best course for him to follow towards shouldering the burden over which he was already beginning to be alarmed. I had not the slightest intention of undertaking the responsibility of giving advice, which, I knew beforehand, would not be followed. I consequently went there, fully prepared to remain on the defensive; I experienced no difficulty in following this course, as the information which M. d'André asked of me never went deeply into matters. I saw that he was surrounded by the wrong men, that he was placing confidence in persons whom I knew to be unworthy of it; now, there is nothing more difficult than to get a man to retrace his steps when he has once entered upon the wrong path. I spoke to M. d'André about the Isle of Elba, just as I had done to M. Beugnot; as in the case of the latter, his mind was perfectly at ease in this connection. It would have been necessary for me, in order to disturb its security, to have adduced positive facts, while my fears had no other source than my reason and experience. I have since learnt that M. d'André's feeling of security was so great that he considered he was doing an act of economy in not disbursing the small sum devoted by his predecessor to the all-important surveillance of the Isle of Elba. The two or three detectives stationed there were consequently recalled. After the Hundred Days, he begged all those who

were aware of this circumstance — I was of the number — to remain silent about it, so the secret of this blunder was kept to the day of his death.

In order to complete what I have said about organization at home, it remains for me to speak of the Abbé de Montesquiou's doings with regard to the University. It might perhaps have been wiser to preserve a little longer the organization given to it by the Imperial Government; but, since it was thought proper to recast it, it must be admitted that the new system had its good side and that it was sufficiently liberal. It was noticed with some alarm that the presidency of the Royal Council of Public Instruction was conferred upon a bishop. Yet no happier selection could have been made, as it had fallen upon M. de Bausset, the former Bishop of Alais; but there was some disadvantage, in appearance at least, in placing a priest at the head of public instruction, in a country where the freedom of worship is one of the fundamental principles of the constitution.

The position of *grand maître* was abolished. M. de Fontanes, who had in a most distinguished fashion discharged the duties appertaining to it, was superannuated; several honors were conferred on him, together with a large retiring allowance, but he nevertheless was most displeased; his many friends in the University shared his discontent. It was well known what zeal he had shown in co-operating by all means at his disposal towards the Restoration, and how his pen had been placed at the service of the provisional government; those, even, who had not approved of his conduct at the time, took a delight in dwelling on the way in which all these services were now rewarded. Those who took a particular interest in him deplored what they styled a monstrous act of ingratitude.

The appointments to the Royal Council and to the other

posts, which were made simultaneously, met with public approval for the most part; I must state that they gave the Abbé de Montesquiou an opportunity, of which he eagerly availed himself, to bring forward a man who, owing to the signal favors he had enjoyed at the hands of the Imperial Government, enjoyed little consideration in the eyes of the Court. M. Molé and I were appointed members of the Council of the University of Paris, and next, of the council general of the department of the Seine. It was a very humble but none the less adroit way of again taking one's place in public affairs.

The new organization of the University involved an increased expenditure. It was the Abbé de Montesquiou's desire to grant considerable retiring allowances to M. de Fontanes, and to those who, like him, were about to be deprived of their positions; he wished also to abolish a tax of twenty francs imposed on the pupils of colleges and of private boarding-schools in favor of the University. This tax pressed heavily on them, and its suppression would have afforded great satisfaction. But all this would result in a deficit of one million, and the budget did not afford any means of covering this amount; he thereupon conceived the idea of taking this amount from the Civil List. This would doubtless have been a noble use for the king to make of the funds at his disposal; no other could have called forth more gratitude; but he had induced the king to devote the money to this use without informing thereof the Minister of the Household, to whom appertained the administration of the Civil List. He probably feared to meet with an insurmountable opposition in this quarter. Whatever foundation existed for this fear, he had acted wrongly; M. de Blacas, it must be admitted, had a right to take offence at his conduct.

In the whole of this affair the Abbé de Montesquiou fol-

lowed the advice of MM. Royer-Collard and Guizot, both of whom were fond of acting in a peremptory fashion. The preamble of the ordinance was drawn up by M. Guizot, whose patience was put to a severe test, as he was made to begin it over again six times. This document, like all those of the period, carried with it the fault of being both unjust towards, and bitter against, the preceding government.

CHAPTER IV

Foreign affairs—Meeting of the Congress of Vienna—M. de Talleyrand accredited to it as plenipotentiary—The discouragement he affects previous to his departure—Entangled condition of his private affairs—His painful position at the Tuileries—He seeks to retrieve his fallen fortunes by some brilliant deed, and imposes himself on the Bourbons by his success—Arrival of the princes in Vienna—The French diplomats coldly greeted—The protocol of the 22d of September—Talleyrand defines his position clearly at the conference held on the 30th—His interview with Alexander—The declaration of the 8th of October causes a postponement of the general meeting—The four allied powers paralyzed by a lack of union—How was Prussia to be reconstituted?—Prince Repnin's proclamation—M. de Talleyrand firmly takes the part of Saxony—In the space of two months he attains a preponderating position in the congress.

It had been stipulated in the Treaty of Paris, on the 30th of May, that a congress was to be held in Vienna. It now becomes my task to speak of affairs abroad, and of the assembling of the congress, at which questions of the gravest import to France's future were to be dealt with.

It had been settled that the plenipotentiaries of all the powers which had taken a part in recent events should meet on the 1st of August, in order to bring to completion the dispositions of the Treaty of Paris, and make provision for a partition of a portion of the territories wrested from the French Empire. It was agreed upon in London, in the month of June, whither the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, together with the Austrian Premier, had gone immediately upon leaving Paris, that the meeting of this congress should be postponed to the 1st of October. This postponement was necessary in order that each one

should have time to frame his demands, those he was prepared to endorse, and, finally, to come to a determination with regard to the political system which it suited him to countenance.

It had repeatedly been said that France would take no part in the congress. Her sense of dignity, no less than her paramount interests, rendered it obligatory upon her that she should not only be represented at it, but that she should do all that lay in her power to make her voice heard. Amid the many questions to be discussed, it was impossible that some should not arise, the solution of which would be of the highest importance to France. Hence the Cabinet of the Tuileries promptly resolved upon sending a plenipotentiary to Vienna. No other selection could be made than that of M. de Talleyrand; he alone, from the part he had played in diplomatic affairs for the past fifteen years, from his intimate intercourse with the sovereigns and their chief advisers during the negotiations which had resulted in the Restoration and in the Treaty of Paris, was in a position to fill the highly delicate rôle reserved to France's diplomatic representative. He did not indulge in any illusions regarding the obstacles of every nature he would have to encounter, and, either from fatigue or from ill-humor, he showed himself but little satisfied with his appointment to this mission, and but little eager to fulfil it. I saw him two or three days previous to his departure, and I was struck by his state of discouragement.

"I am probably," he said to me, "going to play a very sorry part. In the first place, what kind of a welcome am I going to receive? Shall I ever get a hearing? Following upon the convention of the 30th of May, the allied sovereigns made the King of France bind himself not to interfere in the partition they should see fit to make of the territories wrested from Bonaparte. If it is their intention that this

engagement shall be strictly adhered to, I shall be present there only as what is altogether wrongly styled *ad honores*. I may occasionally part my lips, for form's sake, but no heed will be paid to the words issuing from them. On the other hand, I shall be blamed at home for everything that will not turn out as one would have wished. I do not enjoy the confidence of these folks; for the past five months they have taken no pains to conceal this fact from me. Under such circumstances, the best thing for a man to do, were it only possible, would be for him to stay at home."

Such a speech from M. de Talleyrand, whatever may be thought of its sincerity, is none the less remarkable. The key to his future conduct is therein to be found. As for myself, I am certain that he was at heart very glad to go to Vienna, and that his plans were all but fully matured, but he did not wish any one to have the slightest suspicion of this, as he was desirous, in case of non-success, of having ready excuses. What he said about his position was true in many respects. It cannot be denied that it had become a painful one, both at the Court of the Tuileries and in the Council. After having been the guiding spirit, after having directed everything during the stormy days of the month of April, he had seen himself, no sooner was the crisis past, all but set on one side. Not only had his influence on the action of the government been almost null, but he had been denied the few favors he had thought himself entitled to ask on behalf of the men in whose welfare he was more particularly interested. I can remember that he was unable, in spite of his most pressing entreaties, to obtain a prefecture for M. de Rémusat, who had given him the strongest proofs of devotion in the hour of danger.

A like position would have been a hard one, even for a man less entitled to believe that he had some claims to the good-will of his sovereign, and it must have seemed intol-

erable to one like M. de Talleyrand. He could not do otherwise than seize the opportunity now presented of extricating himself from it. It would either help him to get himself looked upon in a more favorable light, or to become so useful as to compel people to reckon with him once more. If he followed the latter course, it behoved him, on his arrival in Vienna, to devote himself to France's true interests; if he did not succeed in securing their full triumph, he could at least save all that was to be saved. He would thus become to so great an extent the man whom his country needed that it would be impossible not to accord him the consideration to which he laid claim. If he adopted this course, he had merely to study the personal leanings of the House of Bourbon, and bring them to the fore on every opportunity; he might perhaps derive greater benefit from such obsequiousness than from the services he had previously rendered, and which were so little taken into account. To this must be added that M. de Talleyrand's finances were not in a good condition, just at this juncture. He had met with heavy losses in the closing days of the Empire; the failure of the house of Simon, of Brussels, had alone deprived him of four millions, not to speak of a considerable amount, which he had, I hardly know under what circumstances, received from the town of Hamburg, a restitution of which Napoleon had compelled him to make. His financial embarrassments were so great that had the Duc de Rovigo not caused his mansion in the Rue de Varenne to be purchased of him at a very high figure out of the Emperor's private treasury, it would have been difficult for him to meet certain most serious engagements.¹

¹ The mansion was accepted in payment of the sum alleged to have been fraudulently received from the town of Hamburg; it was worth more. With the surplus, which was handed over to M. de Talleyrand out of the Emperor's treasury, he was enabled to purchase his house in the Rue Saint-Florentin.

M. de Talleyrand reached Vienna at the end of September, together with M. de Dalberg, M. de La Tour-du-Pin, French Minister at the Hague, and Count Alexis de Noailles, attached to him at his request, with the title of minister plenipotentiary. He felt perfectly secure that none of these personages would be in his way, and that not one of them would venture upon thwarting him in the slightest degree in his line of action.

The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia had made their entry on the 27th of September; the Kings of Denmark and of Würtemberg had preceded them; the King of Bavaria, the Duke of Brunswick, the Elector of Hesse, and the Grand Duke of Baden arrived on the following day. Hence, the several sovereigns could dictate daily to their plenipotentiaries the language they were to hold and personally defend their rights and claims. Lord Castle-reagh, three other plenipotentiaries, and the Duke of Wellington did not make their appearance until January. All the powers, all the states of Europe, were, under one pretence or the other, represented in Austria's capital. Murat had two representatives; the Pope had sent Cardinal Consalvi with the title of legate. I do not believe that there was ever so numerous a diplomatic assemblage, nor one at which such complex and varied interests awaited a solution. There were ninety-three ministers plenipotentiary or simple plenipotentiaries of recognized sovereignties, while the number of deputies who were to present claims numbered seventy-seven.

The début of the French plenipotentiaries was even still harder than it had been possible to anticipate. It is a fact that for the first two or three weeks they were made to endure, in addition to repeated signs of ill-will on the part of the most powerful of the foreign cabinets, all the unpleasantness of an ill-concealed unpopularity. Much

had to be done to emerge triumphant from so humiliating a position; credit must perforce be given to M. de Talleyrand for having accomplished the task in the most brilliant fashion, for, at the close of the congress, he was at the head of the most influential of them all. How did such a change come about?

I do not pretend to write the history of the Congress of Vienna. This would in itself be a work of magnitude, altogether out of proportion with the space I could give to it in a narrative wherein I have to deal in a cursory fashion with so many different events and periods. I will consequently tell what is absolutely necessary to facilitate a proper understanding of the spirit in which France participated in the negotiations, and how her interests were understood and upheld by the man entrusted with their defence.

As early as the 22d of September, in other words, previous to the day named for the opening sitting of the congress, the plenipotentiaries of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain, to wit, MM. de Nesselrode, de Metternich, de Hardenberg, de Humboldt, and Lord Castlereagh, met, and had embodied in a protocol the rules they intended should govern the debates and resolutions of the congress, or rather, the part which they had resolved upon allowing France and Spain to take in them. Taking the Treaty of Paris as their starting-point, and justifying their action by the terms of the secret article wherein it was stated that the partitions to be made of the territories over which the King of France had renounced his sovereignty should be settled at the congress, on bases agreed upon among themselves by the allied powers, they had deduced therefrom as a consequence, which was natural enough, that these powers should assume the initiative in the debate, and that they possessed the right of laying down *as bases* the arrangements entered into between themselves.

In order to adhere more exactly to this line of action, the allied plenipotentiaries agreed that they would only enter into conference on this point with the two other Courts until they had finally, and to their mutual satisfaction, settled each of the three questions bearing on a partition of territory in the matter of the Duchy of Warsaw, Germany, and Italy.

They had, moreover, divided in two categories the questions which were to be dealt with at the congress. The first contained all the questions styled *European*. The preliminary work concerning these was to be entrusted to a committee composed only of the representatives of Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, France, and Spain, the two last powers, however, subject to the restriction already mentioned. The second category comprised everything connected with the federal part of Germany; this subject was to be dealt with by another committee, open only to the representatives of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, and Würtemberg.

It will be seen from this that the numerous plenipotentiaries whom I have enumerated were by this arrangement excluded from any active participation, that the greater part of them were reduced to play the rôle of mere solicitors, as when once the two committees had reached a decision, it is not plain how it would have been possible to obtain that it should be amended in the slightest way. A most plausible pretext had been discovered to put them on one side, viz.: how, it was argued, would it be possible to reach any solution with a throng of men governed by ideas and interests so utterly at variance? How would it be possible to balance and count votes in an assembly wherein the mandatory of the most insignificant German prince might take his seat by the side of those speaking in the name of Austria or of France? Thus, in spite of the

promises first made, no general meeting of the plenipotentiaries ever took place. As a final result, in lieu of a congress composed of all the European states, there was simply a committee of the great powers, which dealt with all questions, merely asking the other powers to signify their adhesion to such of its decisions as interested them individually.

On the 30th of September, M. de Metternich invited M. de Talleyrand, and Spain's plenipotentiary, M. de Labrador, to *be present* at a preliminary conference, for which the ministers of Russia, Great Britain, and Prussia were to meet at his house. At this conference, he was made acquainted with the protocols drawn up on the 22d, and both he and M. de Labrador were requested to sign a declaration sanctioning the dispositions embodied in them. It was easy matter for M. de Talleyrand to discern that this project had for its purpose to render the four allied powers absolute masters of all the doings of the congress, since France and Spain, admitted for form's sake only, to the committee of six which was to decide on everything beforehand, would forever be in a minority of two to four. Sustained by M. de Labrador, M. de Talleyrand declined to accede to the request preferred, on grounds most cleverly deduced; he objected to the qualification of allies still indulged in mutually by the four powers, maintaining that it was altogether without justification, since the signing of the Treaty of Paris. If indeed it was desired to have recourse to it, it was impossible not to give it equally to the eight signatory powers of the treaty.¹

With regard to the idea of settling everything offhand, so to speak, previous to the opening of the congress, it

¹ These powers were the following: Austria, Spain, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden.

seemed to him an altogether strange one. Why should the congress not meet without further delay? What were the obstacles in the way of proceeding? M. de Talleyrand was, in the interests of France, perfectly right in seeking to hasten the assembling of a body, in whose midst it was impossible for him not to secure many friendships and even to form a party in his favor.

It was an easy matter to raise strong objections to his arguments; each party set forth its particular reasons; one of them was, above all, a serious matter for France and Spain. No thought could be entertained of admitting anybody whatsoever without a scrutiny of credentials. Now, did any proper understanding exist as to the bases on which credentials should be accepted as valid, and might this not give rise at the very outset to discussions which it would be well to avoid, or at least to relegate to the future?

The name of the King of Naples having been uttered, M. de Talleyrand enquired which was the one referred to. M. de Humboldt rejoined that several powers had recognized Murat, and had guaranteed him the possession of his dominions. Talleyrand replied that those who had given him this guarantee had no authority to act thus, and consequently could not do so. M. de Labrador spoke in a like sense, and peremptorily. Thus originated a discussion on one of the points which the House of Bourbon had most at heart to carry. All felt that it was the interest of none to prolong it, that they were not sufficiently prepared for it, and that it was best to part; so the conference was adjourned for a couple of days.

In the interval, M. de Talleyrand addressed to the ministers of the five powers a note wherein he laid down that the eight signatory powers of the Treaty of Paris seemed to him, owing to this very circumstance, and in default of

any other mediator, fully qualified to constitute a commission to prepare for the congress the questions which it should decide upon before all others, viz., the formation and composition of the several committees. He added that the competency of the eight powers could not go beyond this; that, inasmuch as they did not of themselves constitute the congress, but merely a portion of it, they would manifestly be guilty of an usurpation, if they of their own accord attributed to themselves powers appertaining to the congress alone. With regard to the difficulties attendant upon the assembling of the congress, he argued that they were not such as would pass away with time; nothing was therefore to be gained by postponing it.

Assuredly the minor powers should not be permitted to interfere with Europe's general arrangements, but could the idea be seriously entertained that they would claim the right to do so? M. de Talleyrand stood on firm ground, when maintaining that the eight powers which had signed the Treaty of Paris, and had consequently all equally provoked and stipulated the holding of the congress, enjoyed an equal right to participate in the preparation of its labors. By defending this thesis, he was securing as partisans and getting the support, not only of the three powers whose rights he was upholding simultaneously with those of France, but nearly all the other members of the congress, who all were interested in not admitting the supremacy which the four powers, attributing to themselves alone the title of allies, sought to arrogate to themselves.

The day on which M. de Talleyrand dispatched this note was that of his first conference with the Emperor Alexander, a report of which he immediately forwarded to the King of France. This report, doubtless so indited as to redound to the credit of the negotiator, and to flatter Louis XVIII. and the royal family, can nevertheless be looked

upon as correct in so far as the substance is concerned. It ran as follows:—

“The Emperor, on greeting me, took me by the hand, but his manner was not characterized by his customary affectionate courtesy; his words were few, his demeanor grave, and perhaps even solemn. I plainly saw that he was about to play a preconceived part. ‘And first,’ he said to me, ‘how are matters in your country?’—‘As well as Your Majesty can desire, and in a better condition than there was reason to anticipate.’—‘The public spirit?’—‘It improves daily.’—‘As to liberal ideas?’—‘They have nowhere made more progress than in France.’—‘But, the freedom of the press?’—‘It exists, with the exception of some few restrictions imposed by circumstances; they will be removed in a couple of years, and, until then, they will not stand in the way of the publication of all that is good and useful.’—‘And the army?’—‘It is heart and soul with the king; 130,000 men are under the flag, and, at the first call, 300,000 more will join it.’—‘And the marshals?’—‘Which of them, Sire?’—‘Oudinot.’—‘He is devoted to the king.’—‘And Soult?’—‘At first, he displayed some little spleen; he has been appointed governor of La Vendée, where he is behaving admirably, winning affection and golden opinions.’—‘And Ney?’—‘He somewhat regrets the loss of his endowments; Your Majesty might lessen these regrets.’—‘And the two Chambers? It seems to me that there is friction!’—‘As is always the case with deliberative assemblies: ideas may differ, but at heart they are one; and, where a difference of opinion arises, that of the government always prevails by a large majority.’—‘Still, there is no harmony, is there?’—‘Who can have so badly informed Your Majesty? When, after a revolutionary period of twenty-five years, the king finds himself in the space of a few months as firmly established as if he had never left French soil, what more

positive proof can be asked that everything is tending to one goal?' — 'How do you stand personally?' — 'The confidence and the kindness shown me by the king exceed my expectations.' — 'Now, let us speak of the business we have in hand; matters have to be settled here.' — 'This depends on Your Majesty; all things will be promptly and happily disposed of, if Your Majesty brings to their settlement the same nobility and grandeur of sentiment as in the case of those of France.' — 'But all must be satisfied.' — 'And each one must obtain his rights.' — 'I intend to hold to what I possess.' — 'Your Majesty can surely not wish to hold to what does not legitimately belong to you.' — 'I have come to a perfect understanding with the great powers.' — 'Does Your Majesty number France among them?' — 'Yes, assuredly; but if you do not admit that each one is to be satisfied, what do you lay claim to?' — 'I place right in the first rank, convenience next.' — 'The convenience of Europe represents right.' — 'Such language, Sire, is not your own; it is foreign to you, and your innermost heart disowns it.' — 'No, I repeat it, the convenience of Europe represents right.' Thereupon I turned towards the wainscoting near which I stood; I rested my head on it, and, striking the woodwork, I exclaimed: 'Europe! Europe! unhappy Europe!' Again turning to the Emperor, I asked: 'Is it to be said that you have accomplished its ruin?' He replied: 'Rather war, than give up what I possess.' I let my arms drop to my side, and in the attitude of a bowed down but decided man, who seemed to say, 'The blame of it will not be imputed to us,' I preserved silence, which, for a few instants, the Emperor did not break; then he again said: 'Yes, rather war.' I persisted in my attitude. Then, throwing up his hands, and gesticulating as I had never seen him do before, and in such a way as to recall to my mind the closing passage of *l'Eloge de Marc-Aurèle*, he shrieked out rather

than said: 'It is time for me to go to the theatre; I have promised the Emperor to go, and so I am expected to be present.' Thereupon he moved away; then, having opened the door, he returned towards me, flung his arms about me in a tight embrace, saying the while in a tone which was not natural to him: 'Farewell, farewell, we shall meet again.'

"During the whole of this conversation, of which I am only able to give Your Majesty the most salient portion, Poland and Saxony were not once mentioned, but only referred to in a circumlocutory manner; for instance, the Emperor had in his mind Saxony when saying, 'Those who have betrayed the cause of Europe.' This remark afforded me the opportunity of replying: 'This is, Sire, a question of dates,' and to add, after a slight interval, 'and the effect of the embarrassments into which they may have been plunged by circumstances.'

"Once did the Emperor use the word *allies*; I took up this expression just as I had done at the conference, and he put its use down to force of habit."

It would be hard to determine which are the most curious in this report, the questions or the answers. It will be seen that in many respects the Emperor possessed data about France which were, unfortunately, but too accurate. As regards M. de Talleyrand's replies, if all are not equally sincere, they are always both precise and adroit, and such as the situation enjoined upon him to make. But I am greatly mistaken if the wainscoting scene, together with the recital of the attitude he assumed, and his gestures, will not be considered as savoring too much of a comedian's antics. I cannot help finding in them a lack of gravity altogether to be regretted; high minds do not thus reveal themselves when debating affairs of paramount importance.

M. de Talleyrand's narrative closed as follows: "Your Majesty will perceive that our position here is beset with

difficulties, which are liable to increase daily. The Emperor Alexander is giving free rein to his ambition, which is fanned by M. de La Harpe and Prince Czartoryski; Prussia is hoping for a large increase of territory; pusillanimous Austria simply indulges in a shameful ambition, but she shows complaisance in order to obtain support. These are not the only difficulties we have to contend with. There are still others which find their source in the engagements which the heretofore allied Courts entered into at a time when they did not anticipate crushing the man whose downfall has been encompassed, and when they flattered themselves upon concluding with him a peace which would enable them to imitate him.

"Now that Your Majesty, once more seated on the throne, has called to your side justice, the powers for whose benefit these engagements have been entered into will not relinquish them, while those who perhaps regret being bound cannot find a way of withdrawing from them. This is, I believe, the case with England, whose minister is weak. Your Majesty's ministers are therefore likely to encounter obstacles such as will compel them to give up all hope of accomplishing anything except saving their country's honor; but we have not yet reached this point."

All the foregoing was written on the 4th of October. There is not a single expression in this dispatch which does not deserve to be carefully weighed. In their ensemble is to be found an *exposé* of the general state of affairs, and a very clear insight into all M. de Talleyrand's views, which views he had doubtless induced the king to adopt previous to his departure from Paris.

The note addressed to the plenipotentiaries of the four allied powers was doubtless a source of embarrassment to them, for the conference agreed upon did not take place on the appointed day; it was again and again postponed. In

order to extricate themselves from the dilemma in which they were placed, without openly breaking with any one, a middle course was, as is almost always the case, determined upon. On the 8th of October there was issued a declaration made in the name of the Courts which had signed the Treaty of Paris. It was already a good deal for M. de Talleyrand to have obtained that the first official document making its appearance in the congress should emanate from the plenipotentiaries of these eight Courts; this was equal to a setting aside of the sort of jurisdiction which the four Courts styled allies had sought to attribute to themselves. This declaration bore, that after a mature consideration of the situation and the duties imposed on them, the undersigned plenipotentiaries had concluded that there was no better way for them to fulfil them than, in the first place, establishing confidential intercourse between the plenipotentiaries of all the powers, by suspending the general meeting, until such time as the questions to be dealt with should have reached a sufficient degree of maturity.

The actual opening of the congress was therefore postponed to the 1st of November. The grounds on which this postponement was made could but be favorable to the wishes of M. de Talleyrand, to whom it gave time to better feel his way, to direct his efforts towards winning support, and to study the means by which the system he had resolved upon should prevail. How did it then happen that he had so promptly succeeded in obtaining this first concession? Here is the key to it. In spite of their apparent harmony, the four Courts agreed on one point only, to wit: the desire of concentrating in their hands the direction of affairs, and especially limiting France's participation in them to the smallest extent. France, in spite of her reverses, in spite of all that had been wrested from her, remained the constant object of their jealousy and distrust; they had but one

thought, which was to keep her isolated, and enclosed within the most narrow bounds possible. The Emperor Alexander, deeply stirred by the disappointments he had suffered on leaving France, and imbued with the ideas which his conversation with M. de Talleyrand has made known, shared the prejudices of his allies. But, outside of this common standpoint, the views and pretensions of each power were entirely different. A most serious divergence of opinion existed in regard to the most important of all the questions which the congress had to settle, and it was impossible not to perceive it at a glance. Russia and Prussia went hand in hand in this connection. For the present, Austria and England did not openly join issue with them, but their jealousy of Russia was cause that their opposition would soon burst forth. This opposition, it was likely, might in time go as far as an open rupture if some powerful influence did not interfere which would compel either one of the parties to yield, or at any rate to discuss matters with a view to coming to an understanding. What other influence could make itself thus felt but that of France? Might not M. de Talleyrand, by suggesting the idea, and by fostering it with art, soon succeed in being in demand with those who had seemed the most inclined to keep aloof? Then it would happen that it would fall to his lot to pronounce clearly against the various systems constituting the bone of contention. I am about to dwell more particularly on the system which he had resolved upon.

All difficulties centred in the new organization to be given to Prussia. It was unanimously admitted that it was necessary to secure for her an intrinsic strength in proportion to the one which the allies whose effort she had shared in the recent struggle would acquire; she had suffered so greatly in the terrible conflict which Europe entered upon with Napoleon, she had shown so much energy in the recent crisis,

and she had finally made so many various sacrifices, that it seemed but fair to compensate her liberally. There were three ways of attaining such a result. It could be done by restoring to her a large portion of Poland, by fixing her eastern limits on the banks of the Vistula, by considerably extending her territory in Germany as far as both banks of the Rhine, or by concentrating her possessions to a greater extent. In order to carry out this scheme it would be necessary to give her the whole of Saxony, in which case she would receive but a slight increase of territory in Poland and in the direction of the Rhine. To see her aggrandized in the direction of the Vistula, was the desire of Austria and of England; but Russia was far from consenting to this plan, and showed herself decided upon retaining nearly all that had constituted the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

The Emperor Alexander had indeed for a while been tempted to acquire unto himself the glory of reviving the old kingdom of Poland, and of granting it its independence after having been its legislator; it would even seem that this idea had taken a firm hold upon his mind; but he was dissuaded therefrom by the most enlightened of his counsellors, M. de Pozzo among others. They pointed out to him that his Russian subjects would never forgive him for thus giving up the conquests and the increase of territory which his predecessors, and especially the great Catharine, had taken such pains to secure, and which had cost such labors and so much blood. In Russia, as in all countries swayed despotically, there is a certain class of discontents which the sovereigns cannot afford to despise.

There remained, therefore, for Prussia the resource of aggrandizing herself with the whole of Saxony, or of falling back on the Rhenish provinces. She greatly preferred getting Saxony, and she presented a formal request in this

sense in a note addressed on the 9th of October to M. de Metternich, and on the 10th, to Lord Castlereagh. She was right in attaching great importance to such an acquisition, as it would connect all her other possessions, which would, in one direction, rest on the sea, and in the other, on Bohemia, an excellent military position to secure. But this is precisely what Austria could not see without the liveliest displeasure. She was least of all anxious to have for immediate neighbor, on one of her most important frontiers, the strongest military power of Germany. She would indeed consent to this power receiving considerable increases of territory, but she wished them to be derived either from Poland, as constituting a means of separating Russia from Germany, or from the Rhenish provinces. This combination, by scattering the elements of Prussian strength, would, to a great extent, paralyze them.

England, in certain respects, entered into Austria's way of thinking, with the exception that she only opposed Saxony's incorporation with Prussia, in so far as it might be considered as a measure devised to reduce her, by forcing her to accept an undefended frontier on the Poland side, to a state of absolute dependence opposite Russia; and she declared that if such was to be the consequence of the arrangement, she would never consent to it. She was therefore desirous that the acquisition of Saxony should not debar Prussia from recovering all her former Polish possessions. Moreover, so far from contesting it, she went so far as to admit the right of disposing of Saxony as of a conquered country. Austria was not opposed to this on principle, but she did not dare declare herself as openly; she urged Prussia to content herself with a portion of Saxony, the portion left to the King of Saxony to be wedged in between Prussia and Bohemia.

The Cabinet of Vienna was also, like England, greatly

alarmed about Russian aggrandizement in Poland. The intentions and fears of these two powers were recorded in two notes transmitted to Prussia during the course of the month of October. The question of the aggrandizement to be granted to this power, gave rise to two others, both of an extremely delicate nature, to wit, that of the preservation or the destruction of the kingdom of Saxony, and that connected with the consent or refusal to be granted to the almost entire preservation by Russia of that portion of Poland which had formerly constituted the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, of which she was now in possession.

The entire month of October was spent in preliminary debates, without resulting in any *rapprochement* of opinions or of opposite intentions. The 8th, the day fixed for the opening of the congress, was reached without any further progress having been reached than on the first day. Prudence counselled that so significant a fact should be concealed from the public. On the 1st of November there appeared a fresh declaration, whereby the plenipotentiaries of the eight powers which had signed the Treaty of Paris announced that a committee of three had been appointed to scrutinize the credentials of the plenipotentiaries of the other powers. The idea of a general meeting of the congress was by the fact completely discarded, being looked upon by the preponderating cabinets as altogether impracticable. The only point on which the eight powers had succeeded in coming to an agreement was their competency to debate and settle all matters among themselves.

M. de Talleyrand had once more made a most important step forward. If, on the one hand, he had failed to obtain that the eight powers should resolve themselves in all matters into a committee which should submit to the congress as a whole the questions it was to decide, if he had not been able to prevent that their union should not be

considered necessary, at all events he had secured France's admission into the committees of the four powers styled allies. He shared with them the authority which they had sought to attribute to themselves to the exclusion of all others. He no longer had any interest in disputing it. What I have said previously regarding the need which each of these powers might feel of securing support, sufficiently explains the facilities he had encountered in his work; they were furnished him in a special manner by two of them, who thought they could safely rely on his co-operation.

Notwithstanding the two Austrian and English notes I have just referred to, and which were an answer to Prussia's note, Russia took upon herself, early in November, to indulge in an act which caused a great sensation in Vienna, not to say throughout Europe. A proclamation made its appearance, addressed to the Saxon authorities by Prince Repnin, wherein it was stated that pursuant to a convention entered into between Russia and Prussia, with the consent of Great Britain and Austria, the administration of the kingdom of Saxony was to be handed over to Prussia. This proceeding had evidently for object to pave the way for the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia; the proclamation, if I am not mistaken, stated so formally.

It must be pointed out that after the victory of Leipsic the King of Saxony had been prohibited from residing in his capital, and had been compelled to go into retirement at Friedrichsfeld. Just at the time this declaration was published, France had resolved upon her course, M. de Talleyrand having determined to take sides with Austria. On the 2d of November, he caused to be distributed among the members of the congress a memorandum having reference to the fate of Saxony and of her sovereign. He based the latter's rights on the time-honored possession of the House

of Saxony; the sovereigns, he contended, ought to respect these old-time institutions which the revolutionary spirit had so long trampled under foot. As to the advisability of incorporating Saxony with Prussia, he contested it, and went so far as to express a fear that such action would tend to irritate Germany, and stir up a fresh revolution. He called to the aid of his arguments the beautiful maxim that an act of injustice makes a bad foundation, and that the political world in thus building was but encompassing its own ruin. He concluded with the following sentence, in referring to the troubles which would be engendered for Germany, were so outrageous a spoliation tolerated: "Would France remain a quiet spectator of these disturbances? It is rather to be believed that she would profit thereby, and it would perhaps be wise for her to do so."

Such language was assuredly not wanting in energy and boldness. When M. de Talleyrand arrived in Vienna, people were far from believing that he would be in a position to thus speak out within two months. At the sitting of the committee held on the 8th, at which he succeeded in bringing up the question of Poland, he demanded point blank that the whole of ancient Southern Prussia to the Vistula should be restored to the King of Prussia. This was the most direct attack which could be made against Russia. Austria, for her part, did not consider Galicia secured to her if she did not obtain possession of Cracow and of the circle of Zamosc to the banks of the Neva. She also contended that Prussia should possess Thorn and extend at least as far as the Warthe.

Thus the Emperor Alexander saw his pretensions regarding Poland contested; he was alone with Prussia against all the other powers, for the secondary powers of Germany were naturally with Saxony. They were anxious that the example of such an usurpation by the strongest should not be given once more at the expense of the weakest.

It does not behove me to enter into detail of the many parleys and the many diplomatic incidents which filled the three succeeding months.¹ I must content myself with saying that M. de Talleyrand constantly enacted the principal part in them, and that the striking change which resulted therefrom in his position, and which, in the eyes of most people, redounded to his greater honor, did much towards enhancing his reputation for ability. But I am of the opinion that, discarding the opinions generally accepted, we must state what we believe to be the truth, in order to make posterity rise superior to the illusions against which contemporaries cannot sometimes guard themselves. It behoves one to supply them with the means of passing judgment with impartiality. I will therefore say freely what I think of the course then taken by M. de Talleyrand, and from which he reaped so much success, and over which I witnessed his pride. I will show whither this course led him, the perilous engagements into which he was forced to enter, and how he found himself compelled, in order to be consistent, to give the sovereign whose representative he was the most false notions, together with the most fatal counsels.

¹ I make no mention, as this could only be done in a detailed history of the congress, of a number of commissions or committees which were appointed to examine and discuss special questions. This was a good and useful manner of giving occupation to a number of plénipotentiaires, and appeasing their regrets in regard to a general meeting which was not to take place. There was a committee on German, another on Swiss, affairs; a statistical commission to estimate in a precise fashion the population of the countries wrested from Napoleon and his allies; a commission to deal with the slave trade; another to discuss the free navigation of rivers; one to determine precedence among European powers and their diplomatic agents; one to deal with the pretensions of the Infanta Marie Louise, Queen of Etruria; one for the affairs of the King of Sardinia; one with regard to the Duchy of Bouillon; and so forth.

CHAPTER V

The Emperor Alexander's ambitious designs relative to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw threaten Europe with a fresh war—General Ricard sent to Vienna—Should not the French plenipotentiary have shown himself in favor of the arrangement which, abandoning Saxony to Prussia, brought the latter's sovereign to the banks of the Rhine?—M. de Talleyrand prefers to uphold the cause of legitimacy, and to join the alliance of England and Austria—Cleverness displayed by him in attaining his object—New basis of understanding submitted by Russia—The treaty of the 3d of January, 1815; its preamble—Did France derive any benefit from the treaty?—Her new allies put forth all their energies towards embroiling her with Russia—Prussia finally obtains a portion of Saxony—Letter from Talleyrand to the king, wherein he raises numerous objections to an alliance with Russia and to the projected marriage between a grand duchess and the Duc de Berry—The Emperor Alexander's overtures rejected.

ENGLAND and Austria's plan, taken as a whole, could very well be maintained. To throw back Russia as far as possible from Germany, and, in order to attain this result, to give considerable extension to Prussia in Poland, was a policy which could easily be justified. It will readily be understood that in such a contingency Saxony could easily be saved; Prussia having once obtained satisfaction in the direction of the Vistula, it would not be a difficult matter to get rid of her pretensions regarding Dresden. But, was there a way of compelling the Czar to renounce the conquest he had made of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw? For the fact must not be lost sight of that Prussia had, by the Treaty of Tilsit, renounced all claim to the provinces of which it was composed. Was it to be expected that Russia, following upon the part she had played in the recent campaign,

when she had single-handed, by her resistance in 1812, shaken the colossal power of Napoleon, when she had, since then, constantly led the armies of Europe, would consent to reap no benefit from the prodigious efforts and immense sacrifices she had made? What way was there of compelling her to it if she remained obstinate in her demands? Would war be declared against her? Both against her and Prussia, who had plainly become her ally? Would, in view of this dispute, the risk be run of setting Europe aflame once more? There may have been some talk about it; M. de Talleyrand made a show of believing in it; he even went so far as to request his Court to dispatch to him a general with whom he might discuss the part which France might take in the hostilities. And indeed General Ricard was dispatched to him; yet I have no hesitation in saying that no such thought ever seriously entered the head of any truly political mind.

The universal state of exhaustion was too great, and the danger of a new crisis was too plainly evident, to allow any one to brave it except under the pressure of the most absolute necessity. Whatever may have been said or written, Poland, *i.e.* the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, would remain in Russia's possession, since she was so determined; there remained then of England and Austria's entire plan only this: "Saxony must not be given to Prussia; it is preferable to bring the latter's frontier to the banks of the Rhine. She will add strength to the barrier which we are erecting against France, and she will become her enemy from the mere fact that her frontiers will adjoin hers, and for the reason that she will never be able to lose sight of the fact that the provinces handed over to her in this direction will forever be coveted by France."

The question being thus presented, could anything be imagined more contrary to the interests of France? Was

that the plan which her plenipotentiary should endeavor to have prevail? Should he not, on the contrary, wish that the House of Saxony should receive as compensation for the kingdom of which it was to be deprived the provinces which it was intended to give Prussia on the Rhine? Would not this new state necessarily become France's ally? It would, so to speak, have been in the light of an annex to France, who, no longer having any point of contact with Prussia, no cause for jealousy or rivalry now existing between these two powers, nothing would have henceforward prevented them from contracting as close an alliance as the general policy of Europe might suggest or command. Prussia, rendered strong and compact through such a combination, would, north of Germany, have been in the first line of defence opposite Russia, and might, in case of need, receive the support, not to say the assistance, of France; while if Austria had entered into this quite natural line of action, then Europe, and Germany in particular, would have been secured, in so far as the nature of things permitted it, from those terrible invasions from the north, which there was only too good cause to dread.

Did M. de Talleyrand choose to remain blind to the advantages offered by such an organization of the European power? Why did he misappreciate the true interests of his country? Let the reader well bear in mind what I have said concerning his position and his dispositions at the time of his leaving Paris. Beyond any doubt he was then most fully informed of what was going on among the four allied cabinets, and he must have discussed matters with the king. Now, who could deny that the idea of supporting, when defending the King of Saxony, the principle of the inviolability of rights derived from an old-time possession, would be particularly dear to a sovereign house whose restoration was of so recent a date? Hence had M. de

Talleyrand adopted and defended it, together with all its consequences, without any restrictions. Thus France entered into the plan of England and of Austria, while detaching herself from that of Russia. She got rid of a matrimonial alliance with which she was being importuned, between the Duc de Berry and a grand duchess, sister of the Emperor Alexander. Lastly, by yielding to Austria's wish that the kingdom of Saxony should be preserved intact, by uniting with her in defence of the legitimacy of an ancient family, she would have the game in her own hands when the time came for her to be asked to sacrifice King Murat and to recognize the rights of a branch of the House of Bourbon to the kingdom of Naples.

With regard to this last-named point, I will not deny that it would have been advantageous for France, again placed under the sceptre of the Bourbons, to obtain this restoration; I believe that all efforts should have tended towards such a consummation; but was this advantage to be purchased at the cost of such sacrifices and such dangerous complaisances? Was it not plain that Murat, whom there was so great haste to overthrow, had no root at Naples, that sooner or later his kingdom would feel the necessity of once more uniting itself to Sicily, and recall its former masters, who were still the objects of a special affection on behalf of the people?

If M. de Talleyrand was mistaken as to the object to be attained, he did not err in regard to the means resorted to by him to attain the one he had selected; his perseverance, his adroitness, I will go so far as to say even his audaciousness, were sustained to a most remarkable degree during the whole of the time the conflict lasted. Thus far, nothing during the course of the month of November indicated that any one of the four great powers showed the slightest disposition to make the smallest concession of any of its

pretensions. The Emperor of Russia was the first to make, in the beginning of December, a conciliatory overture, and he announced, jointly with Prussia, in a note addressed to M. de Metternich, that if the whole of Saxony was ceded to Prussia, and the town of Mayence declared a fortress of the Germanic Confederation, — that is, not belonging to Austria, — he would renounce the possession of Thorn and Cracow, and consent that these towns should form, together with the territories which should be assigned to them, independent and essentially neutral commonwealths.

Prince de Metternich replied to this note on the 10th. He expressed disapproval of the idea of making independent towns of Cracow and Thorn, as they would not fail to afford to the Polish malcontents asylums where they could forever hatch disturbances and plots. He asked that they should be made subject to the authority of both Prussia and Austria; he next expressed a wish that it might be possible to secure to Prussia the line along the course of the Warthe, and for Austria that of the Neva. He did not insist on these lines as a condition *sine quâ non*. He put forth the idea that everything that Prussia could obtain in Poland, over and above this, would constitute a real amelioration of the general situation. With regard to Saxony, he did not oppose her being wholly incorporated with Prussia because of the development it would give that power, but because, in the first place, it presented an obstacle to a much-to-be-desired union between Austria and Prussia; again, because the principles of the Emperor his master, the closest family ties, as well as all connections attendant upon neighborhood and frontier existing between Saxony and Austria, were a bar to it; and finally, because France, having pronounced against such a union, together with all the princes of Germany, it followed therefrom that Austria and Prussia's joint determination to carry into effect and to sustain it

would tend to restore to France the protectorate over Germany, just wrested from her.

The Emperor of Russia having declined to listen to these arguments and persisting in his refusal to cede the line of the Warthe and of the Neva, the negotiations became all the more acerb and difficult. Nevertheless Alexander, while insisting on retaining his Polish possessions, had made known his intention of forming therefrom a separate kingdom, over which the emperors of Russia were to reign as over the Russian Empire, but which should be governed by laws and by a constitution of its own. The announcement of such an intention was a step towards conciliation; a pretence was made of seeing in it a proof that it would not be impossible to obtain a little later on the total renunciation of his claims to Poland. In his note, M. de Metternich had not neglected to ask that the Emperor of Russia should enter into positive engagements concerning the constitution to be granted Poland. He had furthermore called for the free navigation of the Vistula. Whatever may be thought of all these more or less well-founded conjectures, the Emperor Alexander did not neglect the advantages which would be secured to him in other respects by the great concession he intended making to the Poles; towards the middle of December, he dispatched to them his brother Constantine, charging him with the mission of announcing to them that a separate political existence was to be secured to them, and to urge upon them to arm in order to defend it in case of need.

The proclamation which the Grand Duke Constantine issued on his arrival at Warsaw seemed therefore to be the forerunner of a rupture. M. de Talleyrand, for his part, made a more pronounced stand, and took a decisive step. On the 19th of December, he addressed to M. de

Metternich, as president¹ of the union of the eight powers, a note wherein he declared that "it was the wish of the king his master that the work of the Restoration should be accomplished throughout all Europe as well as in the case of France; that the spirit of the Revolution should be repressed everywhere and once for all; that every legitimate right should either be preserved or re-established; and that the vacant territories should be divided in conformity with the principles of the political equilibrium. The disposal it was intended to make of the kingdom of Saxony would be pernicious as a precedent, and all the more so through its influence on the equilibrium of Europe, in the first place, by creating against Bohemia too great an aggressive strength and by thus threatening the security of all Austria; next, by creating in the bosom of the Germanic body, and in the case of one of its members, an aggressive strength out of proportion with the power to resist it of all the others. The opinion of France," he added, "is nevertheless not against a portion of Saxony being ceded to Prussia; it seems to her that Austria has, in her notes, laid down the fair extent of this cession."

Thus, France was supporting Austria, not only as regards the principle which she invoked, but as regards all her combinations as to the means of execution. This note is one of the documents of which M. de Talleyrand was most proud; it would seem, indeed, that it had great success at the time. Nevertheless, if it is read with attention, it is illogical. In order that every legitimate right should be treated as sacred, as he pretends, it would have been requisite to undo all that had been done under the influence and by the power of Napoleon; it would have been necessary to call to account the kings of Bavaria and of Würtem-

¹ This presidency had been conferred on him by common agreement in the last days of October.

berg for all the usurpations whereby they had benefited. It would have been necessary to restore to Venice its independence, and especially not to violate that of the state of Genoa, in favor of the King of Sardinia. Finally, it would have been necessary to openly take the part of the family of Gustavus Adolphus, to whom France was slightly more indebted than to that of Saxony. In regard to the latter, what was the significance of so readily depriving her of a portion of her territory? Wherein did the right to despoil it exist more for a part than for the whole? The assertion that Prussia, aggrandized by Saxony, would acquire a power of aggression out of proportion with the power of resistance of the other states, was altogether inaccurate. She would, on the contrary, at most, have been placed in a situation which would have supplied her with the means of being on an equal footing with them. By constituting her as it was intended to do, it would be exceedingly difficult, not to say impossible, to attain such a result.

Towards the end of December, Russia caused to be handed to the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, and Prussia, a project embodying several articles, and containing, she argued, the proper bases for tightening the bonds uniting them and bringing about a final peace. This document reveals in most precise fashion the position and the respective pretensions of the powers; it shows, in the Emperor Alexander, a sincere desire to conciliate all interests: —

1. Russia to cede to Austria all that the latter had lost in Poland through the Treaty of Pressburg;
2. A line of demarkation to be drawn in Poland between Prussia and Russia, such, almost, as was established afterwards, less the territory of Thorn;
3. Cracow and Thorn to be declared independent towns;
4. The remaining portion of the Duchy of Warsaw to belong to Russia;

5. Free navigation of the Vistula ;

6. The Emperor of Russia pleads with his allies on behalf of their Polish subjects, that provincial institutions be granted them. (This intercession, which assumed the garb of a potent protection granted to all Poles, was well calculated to win their affection, but must have given great displeasure to Austria) ;

7. All contracting parties to mutually guarantee to each other their Polish possessions ;

8. The cession of Saxony to Prussia. Dresden not to be fortified ;

9. Creation of a separate state, with a population of 700,000 souls, on the left banks of the Rhine, which would include the Duchy of Luxemburg together with the towns of Treves, to be given to the King of Saxony ; Luxemburg to be a *place* of the Confederation ;

10. Mayence to be in the same category ;

11. The Germanic Confederation to be based on principles which will add strength to the general union.

Had France been wisely counselled, she would have demanded a considerable increase in the strength and population of the new state which it was intended to create on the banks of the Rhine in favor of the King of Saxony. It was so plainly manifest that its interests in this direction were of paramount importance, that M. de Metternich, when rejecting Russia's proposition, did not hesitate, when giving a few days later as one of the reasons which had influenced his sovereign's determination, that "the translation of the King of Saxony to the Rhine would weaken the system of defence combined between the Austrian, Prussian, and German monarchies, as the king would be entirely subordinate to the foreigner."

M. de Talleyrand should have requested M. de Metternich to have shown a little more discretion in the publicity which was given to this manner of looking at the question ; but he had never been less than at this very moment inclined to run counter to the wishes of the cabinets of Vienna and of London, with whom he had just concluded a treaty of the highest importance, and on which it is all the

more incumbent upon me to dwell for a while, in that its consequences were of the utmost gravity. The spirit of this treaty, which was signed on the 3d of January, is sufficiently indicated in its preamble, conceived as follows:

“The high contracting parties, convinced as they are that the powers, who have met to bring to completion the dispositions of the Treaty of Paris, must be maintained in a state of perfect independence and security, in order to be able to faithfully and in a manner becoming their dignity discharge so important a duty, considering in consequence as necessary, owing to the pretensions recently put forth, to provide for the means of repulsing any aggression to which their several or individual possessions might be exposed, out of hatred to the propositions which they might consider it their duty to make and to support of a common accord, on principles of justice and equity; and, having no less at heart to bring to completion the dispositions of the Treaty of Paris in a way most in conformity with its true object and spirit, have with this end in view resolved to conclude among themselves a solemn convention and a defensive alliance,” etc.

Then followed the fifteen articles of the treaty. In the first, the reason of the alliance was specified and developed, as declared in the preamble; it is laid down in the second that this reason could alone bring forth the existence of the present alliance, the application of which was thus restricted to circumstances produced by the congress. Then followed, in the succeeding articles, the dispositions relating to the means of defence, which were to be furnished respectively by the allied powers. They were held, in regard to everything concerning the execution of the Treaty of Paris, to act in concert and with the most perfect disinterestedness, with the object of assuring its execution, pursuant to the true spirit of the treaty. If consequent upon and out of hatred

of the propositions they should make and support of a common accord, the possessions of any one of them should be attacked, then they would hold themselves attacked as a body, to make common cause, and mutually render aid to each other to repel aggression with all the forces subsequently specified. These forces were to amount in the case of each one of them to 150,000 men; of which 120,000 were to be infantry, and 30,000 cavalry.

England, being unable to furnish this contingent in English troops, was to be allowed to furnish it in foreign troops in her pay, or to pay annually to the attacked power a sum of money calculated on the basis of twenty pounds sterling per infantryman, and of thirty pounds sterling per cavalryman, to the full extent of the stipulated assistance. Should it be found that the stipulated help was not in proportion to the exigencies of circumstances, the high contracting parties reserved the right of coming to a mutual understanding, within the shortest possible time, with regard to a new arrangement determining the additional amount of aid in proportion with what would be considered necessary. Should war break out from foreseen causes, peace would only be signed by common accord. The high contracting parties reserved unto themselves the right of inviting any other power they might see fit to accede to the treaty at such time and under such conditions as they might agree upon among themselves. Indeed, in a separate article, they agreed there and then to issue such an invitation to the King of Bavaria, to the King of Hanover, and to the Prince Sovereign of the United Netherlands. Reasonable conditions were to be made to them regarding the quota of aid they were each to furnish. Finally, the last article stipulated that the convention now entered into should remain secret and not be divulged by any of the contracting parties without the explicit consent of all the others. The confessed

necessity of gathering so great an assemblage of forces, and the terms of the preamble of this treaty, show sufficiently that the alliance was directed against Russia and subsidiarily against Prussia. The attacked power, under the circumstances laid down, could likewise only be Austria. Thus, the alliance was entered into for her special benefit.

Here was France uniting with her two natural enemies, for her history is there to prove that England and Austria have been so almost unceasingly, and against whom then was she entering into this alliance? Against two states from whom she had personally nothing to fear, with whom she did not have any point of contact, whom it would be easy for her to convert into two firm allies, as they mutually had no interests which clashed. But what was perhaps still more remarkable, here was the House of Bourbon, after a restoration of barely nine months, joining a league against the sovereign who had most contributed to re-establish her, was the first to conceive it, alone persistently adhered to it in the most critical moment, and this league was formed in favor of the power which was its most constant enemy, who up to the very last sought to maintain the crown on the head of Napoleon, the husband of an arch-duchess of Austria!

Had political exigencies demanded such a sacrifice, had the interests of the state imperiously commanded it, the condition of a prince who found himself reduced to such straits was to be pitied; but if they did not exist, what was to be thought of the intrigues which compelled her to bow to such a necessity? Well then, if there is a thing which is plain to my mind it is that this treaty of the 3d of January, which M. de Talleyrand has prided himself on having inspired, was of no service to France, and was the work of a far more able policy than that of the French plenipotentiary. I say that it was of no service, for England and

Austria knew full well that they were not going to war with Russia; they were quite determined that no cause for war should arise. I will demonstrate this further on; what they really desired was to bring France to break off entirely with Russia; France once having entered upon this course, every move she made would contribute to such a result and render impossible any *rapprochement* between the cabinets of St. Petersburg and of Paris.

Could there indeed be any doubt that, in spite of the pledge of secrecy, it would always be an easy matter, whenever it should be seen fit to do so, to bring the treaty of the 3d of January to the notice of the Emperor Alexander? Such a view was doubtless very machiavellian, but it was a sound and consummate one, for England and Austria had to fear nothing so much as the union of France and Russia; they were aware that once firmly united, there was nothing which these two powers could not undertake, and that the first result of their union would be to restore France to the rank which was hers and from which she had fallen, owing to recent reverses. The House of Bourbon would have found in a Russian alliance the only guarantee perhaps which might shield it from the dangers with which it was still threatened; this is just what Vienna and London wished to prevent; this is what the Tuileries would not see; herein, to my mind, is M. de Talleyrand to be censured. Sight must not be lost of the fact that the House of Bourbon had come to England in a frame of mind which made it easy to lead it astray in this respect; the duty of a faithful minister was therefore to discourage, rather than to encourage, such a policy.

I have stated that Austria and England were fully aware that they would not go to war with Russia, and that they were determined to do all in their power to avoid such a war. Indeed, as early as the 12th of January, M. de Met-

ternich communicated to the Minister of Prussia a counter-plan, wherein all pretensions to the line of the Warthe were renounced by Prussia, while those to the line of the Neva were renounced by Austria, and whereby it was consented that the Duchy of Warsaw should be retained by Russia almost in its entirety. The only remaining point at issue was with regard to which part of Saxony should be left in the possession of the King of Saxony, and which other should be handed over to Prussia, who was, moreover, to be tendered ample compensation on the banks of the Rhine. The Emperor Alexander thus became personally disinterested and unconcerned. It was more than likely that his advisers would make him understand that it was not his policy to run the risk of a rupture for the sake of a matter which did not concern him, and for a cause which he supported from generosity only. What did it matter to him whether Prussia was more or less compact? Germany, who was more especially interested therein, had rejected the propositions he had made with a view to the peace of Europe; France, who should have supported him warmly, was opposing him desperately. It would amount to actual madness to compromise himself any further for the execution of a plan which those most interested in it knew not how to appreciate. Hence it was not long ere a *rapprochement* was come to. There was no longer any dispute except as to a few minor details, such as the extent of the territories to be added to Prussia both in Westphalia and on the banks of the Rhine, and principally on the greater or lesser quantity of *souls* (this was the expression used), which should be given in Saxony to the King of Prussia, or left to the King of Saxony. The matter for debate being thus circumscribed, extended over the whole of January. The Emperor Alexander finally consented to cede to Prussia the town of Thorn, and so everything connected with the main point of

the agreement was settled among the five powers in the first days of February.

There remained to obtain the consent of the King of Saxony to all the sacrifices demanded of him. This was no easy matter, and he remained obdurate for a long time. An end had been put to the sort of reclusion in which he had been kept, and he had, in response to an invitation, gone to Pressburg. However great his repugnance to yield might be, he was not in a position to resist, and his adherence was to be secured as a matter of course. The kingdom of Saxony, reduced to about 1,300,000 souls, was maintained. Such was the great triumph won by M. de Talleyrand, at a cost already sufficiently indicated!

"When not consenting to the kingdom of Saxony being reduced to less than 1,500,000 souls, it would have been necessary to protest," he wrote to the king; "by protesting, one would have compromised the principle of legitimacy, which it was so important to defend, and which we only saved by a miracle, so to speak; one would have by the mere fact given Prussia two millions of subjects, which she could not have acquired without constituting a danger for Bohemia and Bavaria; the captivity of the king would perhaps have been prolonged indefinitely; this sets him free. . . . Saxony, in spite of our not having been able to obtain all that we should have wished on her behalf, remains a third-class power. If it is an evil that she does not get a few hundred thousand souls more, this evil is comparatively slight, and may perchance be remedied; whereas, if Saxony had been sacrificed in the face of Europe, not wishing or not able to save her, the evil would have been great indeed and fraught with the most dangerous consequences. It was above all important to save her, and the glory of having done so belongs to Your Majesty alone. There is no one who does not feel and say that all this

has been secured without our falling out with any one, while even securing support in regard to the Naples affair."

Inasmuch as this passage contains the whole justification of M. de Talleyrand's line of action as drawn up by himself, I have seen fit to give it in full.¹ But he scored yet another triumph, which I must place on record. He succeeded in setting the king completely at ease with regard to the proposed matrimonial alliance between the Duc de Berry and a Russian grand duchess. I have already stated how greatly the Emperor Alexander had this alliance at heart. During his stay in Paris, he had several times broached the matter to M. de Talleyrand, who had, in those days, shown himself greatly in favor of it. He had even gone so far as to commission the Duc de Richelieu to formally propose it to the king.

The king, without entering into any positive engagement, had sent a courteous reply; but, in order to avoid giving a positive answer, had fallen back on the pretext that the matter should be dealt with at Vienna, together with all the other matters to be decided there. The time had now come for him to make up his mind. M. de Talleyrand, in this instance acting consistently with the political system to which he had bound himself, and feeling, moreover, perfectly assured that he would be pleasing the king by supplying him with reasons or excuses in support of the

¹ In after years, M. de Talleyrand, in view of the circumstances and of the persons, adduced arguments of an entirely different nature in defence of the course he had determined upon on this memorable occasion. I have heard him give himself great credit, when speaking to the Duc de Vicence, for his persistency in defending the person of the King of Saxony, Napoleon's last faithful ally in 1813. To others who deplored with bitterness the concessions which France had been compelled to make in regard to the provinces on the Rhine, he said that nothing would be more simple and more natural, the first time a war broke out, than to take back from Prussia the provinces ceded to her; whereas, had they been given to the King of Saxony by way of compensating him for the loss of his former dominions, it would be difficult and cruel indeed to despoil him of them.

refusal which he had in store, had no hesitation in writing the following letter to him on the 25th of January. I can guarantee the genuineness of its text, which I now give. It is easy, when reading it, to form an idea of all that must have preceded it. Numerous parleys had taken place, and much correspondence had been exchanged in the matter. Previous to his departure, M. de Talleyrand had made himself cognizant of the sentiments of the king and of the royal family.

“SIRE, — It seems that General Pozzo di Borgo is to leave hence some time this week, to return to Paris. He has probably received orders from the Emperor Alexander with regard to the marriage. I now believe it my duty to place before Your Majesty a few considerations regarding a matter so serious and so delicate in so many respects.

“It is Your Majesty’s wish, and rightly so, that the princess, whoever she is, to whom the Duc de Berry shall give his hand, shall only enter France as a Catholic princess. This is, on the part of Your Majesty, an absolute condition, and it cannot be otherwise. As most Christian king and the Church’s eldest son, you cannot in this regard carry condescension any further than Bonaparte himself was prepared to do, when he was a suitor for the Grand Duchess Anne’s hand. Should this condition be agreed to by the Emperor Alexander, Your Majesty, assuming that you had pledged your word, would assuredly not entertain the thought of taking it back; but it would seem that the Emperor, without showing any desire of opposing a change of religion on the part of his sister, is anxious that it should not be imputed to him that he had brought about this change, as might be thought, were the matter made the subject of stipulation. He is desirous that it should appear as the result of a personal determination of the princess alone, when once she shall have become subject to other laws, and that consequently this change shall be subsequent to, and not precede, the marriage; it is therefore his desire that his sister should enter France with her chapel; he, however, consents that the pope, who is to accompany her, shall wear lay dress. His motives for insisting on this are his own religious scruples, as he is deeply attached to his creed, and

dreads giving offence to his subjects in so delicate a matter. By the mere fact of persisting in such dispositions, he will himself release Your Majesty from any engagement you may have entered into, and will supply you with the means of withdrawing, if he puts off assenting to the condition laid down by you regarding the marriage; now, I will frankly say to Your Majesty that everything that tends to release Your Majesty in this connection appears to me a consummation greatly to be desired.

“Eight months ago, when, in the midst of the rejoicing provoked by the present and better hopes which were being indulged in as to the future, it was nevertheless impossible to look upon it with a feeling of security undisturbed by any fears, a family alliance with Russia might have appeared, and did appear to me personally, as presenting advantages, the utility of which would outweigh considerations, to which, under altered circumstances, I should have given the first place and looked upon as decisive.

“But to-day, that Providence has consolidated the throne which has miraculously been raised up again, nowadays, that it is surrounded and guarded by the veneration and love of the people; now that the coalition is dissolved, that France is no longer dependent on foreign help, while, on the contrary, foreign powers are beginning to look up to her for assistance, Your Majesty, when coming to a determination, is no longer compelled to sacrifice to the necessity of conjunctures any of the conveniences essential to this sort of alliance, and is free to consult them only.

“The Grand Duchess Anne is reputed to be, of the five daughters of the Emperor Paul, the one whom nature has endowed with most beauty, a precious and most desirable quality in a princess whom the course of events may call to ascend the throne of France, for no other nation more than the French people wishes to be in a position to say of the princes whose subjects they are:—

‘Le monde, en les voyant, reconnaîtrait ses maîtres.’

“The grand duchess appears to have been most carefully brought up. It is said that she unites with her physical advantages a kindly disposition. She is twenty-one years of age, which disposes, in her case, of the frequently fatal consequences of a too early marriage. She was originally destined to be the wife of the reigning Duke of Saxe-Coburg, previous to Bonaparte suing for her hand. It only de-

pended on the latter to have married her, for it is a certain fact that Russia asked for nothing better than to give her to him, had he been able to wait and desirous of so doing. I do not know if from these two circumstances, any kind of objections can be derived against the union of this princess with the Duc de Berry, but I must say that I should greatly prefer that they should not have existed, if the marriage were, after all, to take place. But, considering what was the condition of the intellectual faculties of Peter III., the grandfather of the grand duchess, and of Paul I., her father, impressed as I am by the examples of the late King of Denmark, of the reigning Duke of Oldenburg, and of the unfortunate Gustavus IV., I consider this deplorable infirmity as a fatal appanage of the House of Holstein, and I cannot lay aside the fear that it might be transferred by marriage into the House of France, and perhaps to the heir of the throne.

“The position in which the grand duchess would find herself, not merely of abjuring her religion, but of abjuring it in such a fashion that it would be impossible to attribute her abjuration to other than purely political motives, would supply an objection which seems to me not without force, as it would invariably tend to foster among the people the sentiment of religious indifference, which is the malady of the times wherein we live.

“As marriage binds not only the principals but likewise their families, the *convenances* among the latter are first to be reckoned with, in the case of the marriage of private individuals, and all the more is this the case when it comes to those of kings or princes who are likely to mount the throne. That the House of Bourbon should ally itself with families its inferiors, is unavoidable, as Europe does not possess any that are its equals. I should therefore not raise the objection that the House of Holstein, in spite of its occupying the three northern thrones, is comparatively new among kings. But I will say that when the House of Bourbon honors another with its alliance, it is better that it should be one which considers itself honored, than one which would lay claim to being its equal, under the impression that nobility and antiquity of origin can be balanced by extended possessions. Of the four sisters of the Grand Duchess Anne, one has married an archduke, and the three others, petty German princes.

“Is Russia, who has failed to place any of her princesses on a throne, to see one of them called to that of France? Such a prospect would, I venture to remark, be too much good fortune for her, and I should not care to see the Duc de Berry thus united by close family

ties with a number of princes occupying the lowest rank in the class of sovereigns.

"Russia, when establishing her princesses as she has done, has especially sought to reserve unto herself pretexts and means of interfering in the affairs of Europe, to which she was almost an unknown quantity a century ago. The effects of her interference have sufficiently made felt the dangers of her influence. Now, how greatly would this influence not increase, were a Russian princess called to mount the throne of France?

"A family alliance is not, I am aware, a political alliance, and the one does not necessarily lead up to the other. The projected marriage would assuredly not result in France's looking with favor upon the ambitious views and revolutionary ideas which fill the mind of the Emperor Alexander, and which he seeks to veil behind the specious appellation of liberal ideas. But how could one prevent other powers from taking a different view, becoming distrustful, the bond existing between them and ourselves becoming weakened, or even hindering them from entering into any union with ourselves, and Russia taking advantage of this state of affairs be able to carry out her views?

"Such are, Sire, the objections which arise, so it has seemed to me, against a union between the Duc de Berry and the Grand Duchess Anne. I have thought it my duty to lay them unreservedly before Your Majesty, but I have nowise exaggerated them. Your Majesty will in his wisdom judge if they are as weighty as they seem to me.

"I must add that it seems to me consistent with the grandeur of the House of Bourbon, especially at a time when all its branches, after having been tempest-tossed at one and the same period, have together recovered their own, that it should not, to perpetuate itself, seek alliances out of its own circle. I hear much that is good spoken of a young princess of Sicily, the daughter of the Prince Royal. Portugal, Tuscany, and Saxony likewise present others, from whom Your Majesty might make a selection. I have the honor to submit a list of them herewith.

"If the impossibility of coming to an understanding on the matter of religion should cause the negotiations concerning the marriage with the grand duchess to miscarry, or should Your Majesty see fit to cease entertaining any idea of it, I would entreat Your Majesty to so manage matters that the affair should not be irrevocably decided until such time as we shall have concluded those which occupy us here; for, if the Emperor Alexander has shown us so little good-will, in spite

of the hope of such an alliance for his sister, however flattering such a hope may be to him, what might we not expect from him, once this hope gone?

“ I have the honor, etc.,

“ *Signed: LE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.*

“ VIENNA, January 25th, 1815.”

Never did courtier make a greater abuse of flattery, at the risk of the most dire consequences. All his assertions, conjectures, and suppositions, presented with infinite art, were contradicted by the past or were soon to be so by the course of events. How could M. de Talleyrand write to Louis XVIII., in January, 1815, the following sentence: “ Now that the coalition is dissolved, France is no longer dependent on foreign help, while, on the contrary, foreign powers are beginning to look up to her for assistance!” M. de Talleyrand’s triumph was complete. How could it be otherwise? He was empowered to transmit a positive refusal to the Emperor Alexander.

But the principal affair interesting the French Cabinet, the one of the greatest importance to it, was not yet formally settled by the course adopted in regard to Saxony. Much remained to be done in order to secure the expulsion of King Murat. M. de Talleyrand had most wisely separated his case from that of Sweden; he had been able to make the Tuileries comprehend that the success of the pretension most likely to be viewed with favor should not be compromised by confounding it with the one which was not likely to be so well entertained. It has been seen how he flattered himself with having acquired rights to the complaisance of Austria, and yet he did not find M. de Metternich as compliant as he had supposed; it thereupon became necessary for him to have recourse to all his adroitness to secure the support of England. This country certainly owed some little support to a sovereign who was seeking to

recoup the losses which he had incurred merely because of his fidelity to the engagements he had entered into with her.

Of all the ministers having a seat at the congress, Lord Castlereagh was at that time the one with whom M. de Talleyrand had the most perfect understanding. He had not shown himself too averse to the idea of an article of the treaty couched somewhat as follows: "Europe, in congress assembled, recognizes His Majesty Ferdinand IV. as King of Naples; all the powers mutually bind themselves not to support, either directly or indirectly, any claim opposed to his rights. But the troops (this was a consideration for the engagements entered into by Austria, and which were then still unknown) that the powers foreign to Italy and allies of the aforesaid Majesty shall set in motion in defence of his cause, shall not pass through Italian territory."

CHAPTER VI

The Duke of Wellington arrives in Vienna, bringing valuable support to the French plenipotentiaries — A letter from Murat to Napoleon intercepted — Austria still inclined to give support to the King of Naples — M. de Talleyrand wins the British plenipotentiaries over to his side — Lord Castlereagh incites the emperors of Austria and Russia against Murat — Fresh interview of M. de Talleyrand with the Emperor Alexander, who complains of the non-fulfilment of the treaty of the 11th of April, inveighs against Murat, and promises his support towards expelling him from his kingdom — Lord Castlereagh leaves Vienna entirely won over to the French policy — Murat's comminatory note to the Austrian Chancellor — No one at the congress gives Napoleon a thought — Murat's letter, communicated to the congress by the Duke of Wellington, reawakens fear — General Pozzo suggests that Napoleon be transported at a great distance from Europe — This ill-advised conduct arouses Napoleon to action — Blunders of the royal government — The Emperor lands in the Gulf of Juan — Carelessness of the police of the Bourbons — Mistake made by the Minister of War, who was gathering troops in the South, heedless of the spirit animating them — Effect produced in Paris by the Emperor's landing — Alarm spreads rapidly — The government convokes the Chambers — An army corps formed in Franche-Comté under Marshal Ney — Napoleon's march; he arrives at Lyons — Military plot in the North; its failure — Treachery smouldering everywhere — Marshal Soult surrenders the Ministry of War to the Duc de Feltre — The Duc de Berry assembles an army in Burgundy, while the Duc and Duchesse d'Angoulême seek to stir up the South.

WAS M. de Talleyrand disinterested in the zealous efforts he displayed for the reconstitution of Saxony and again setting Ferdinand IV. on the throne of Naples? The contrary has been repeatedly asserted. It is nevertheless true that he brought into play all the resources of his intellect to secure the success of the latter as well as the former negotiation.

The arrival of the Duke of Wellington, on the 1st of February, a few days after the affairs of Saxony had been settled, was of material assistance to him. The duke, on his way through France, had seen the king, who had welcomed him with such honorable distinction that his *amour-propre* had derived much gratification therefrom. It was an easy task for M. de Talleyrand to circumvent him and get him to fall in with his views. The duke depicted in bright colors France's condition, saying that the king was greatly beloved and respected, and that he was acting with consummate wisdom; he was less outspoken in regard to the army, from a political point of view. The words of the Duke of Wellington contributed greatly to give weight to M. de Talleyrand's utterances.

The Duke of Wellington was all the more inclined to act in concert with France's representative in the Naples affair, from the fact that one of the king's ministers (M. de Blacas, if I mistake not) had communicated to him, during his stay in Paris, a letter of Murat's, which had been intercepted between Naples and Elba. This letter clearly proved, in spite of his treaties with Austria, that an understanding still existed between himself and Napoleon.

A discovery so prone to act on the mind of the Duke of Wellington just as he was coming to take the place at the congress of Lord Castlereagh, compelled to return to London for the opening of Parliament, was a piece of good fortune for M. de Talleyrand. Lord Castlereagh, who was leaving on the 15th of February, was extremely anxious that Murat should be expelled, and was determined to spare no efforts to get the British Cabinet to countenance such a consummation. Nevertheless, this expulsion could not yet be considered a settled matter; it was necessary, and this was no easy task, to secure the consent of Austria, who had entered

into formal engagements with Murat,¹ and who was no-wise desirous of seeing the House of Bourbon regain so important a footing in Italy. She had already succeeded in securing the expulsion of that house from Tuscany, by curtailing to the smallest possible limits the rights of the Queen of Etruria, and reducing her possessions to the little principality of Lucca. She was on the point of installing in Parma the Archduchess Marie-Louise, Napoleon's consort. It would have therefore greatly suited her to leave at the extremity of the "Boot" an ephemeral power, which the slightest happening might destroy, perchance to her advantage. In order to give a full idea of the difficulties inherent to this affair, it is best to borrow the very language of M. de Talleyrand. The following is the narrative he made, on the 15th of February, just as Lord Castlereagh was leaving, of all his endeavors to bring it to a successful issue, and of the support afforded him by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Castlereagh. This narrative contains

¹ These engagements were not fully known until M. de Talleyrand succeeded in procuring in Vienna, together with a copy of the treaty entered into at Naples between the Emperor of Austria and Murat, on the 11th of January, 1814, a copy of the secret and additional articles bearing a like date, and even of a supplementary article which had been signed by Prince Metternich himself, at Chaumont, on the 3d of March, 1814. Haughty Austria could hardly have descended to greater complaisance with the object of purchasing the help of a crowned soldier. Not only did she recognize and guarantee all his rights over what he possessed, but she admitted that he might lay claim to certain rights over Sicily, since she accepted his renunciation to them. In addition, she guaranteed to them, when peace should be finally settled, an acquisition of territory with 400,000 souls, to be detached from the Roman States. Lastly, she even resigned herself to complaisances in matters of detail; for she presented to him the Farnese properties in Rome, and the freeholds he owned in the Kingdom of Naples. This was the purport of the supplementary article signed at Chaumont. I must recall the fact that over and above the great political considerations which at the time guided Austria in her conduct in this matter, that M. de Metternich perhaps bore a recollection of the intimacy which had existed, during his stay in Paris, between himself and the Queen of Naples, Napoleon's sister. The article signed at Chaumont has almost the character of an act of gallantry.

some most piquant and instructive particulars regarding other matters, among them the formal breaking off of the negotiations anent the marriage of the Duc de Berry.

"I have spent," wrote M. de Talleyrand, "the past eight or ten days in inflaming Lord Castlereagh's mind on this question, and if I have not brought him to adopt a decisive course of his own accord, I have succeeded in making him desire almost as keenly as ourselves the expulsion of Murat, and he leaves, fully determined to spare no efforts to decide his government to co-operate towards it. Two things embarrass him: the one is how it will be possible to openly declare against Murat, without seeming to violate the promises made to him (this is what Lord Castlereagh styles not compromising his character); the other, how to determine the means of execution in such a manner as to ensure success, in case of resistance, without jeopardizing any interests or running counter to prejudices, and without exciting the fears of any one. He has promised me that three days after reaching London he will dispatch a courier bearing the decision of his Court; and, as he is in full accord with our reasons, he anticipates that it will be a favorable one. What I wish is that, without entering into discussions all tending to weaken the main object, the Duke of Wellington be empowered to declare that his Court recognizes Ferdinand IV. as King of the Two Sicilies. It is in this sense that I entreat Your Majesty to be pleased to speak to him in Paris.¹ In the last days of his stay in Vienna, Lord Castlereagh most obligingly consented to the steps I begged him to take in furtherance of the matter. He spoke against Murat to the Emperor of Russia, whom he saw together with the Duke of Wellington. He said to the Emperor of Austria: 'Russia is your natural enemy;

¹ He was, on his way to London, to pass through Paris, and M. de Talleyrand had begged the king to treat him with every show of good-will.

Prussia is devoted to Russia. There is only one continental power upon whom you can depend, and it is France. It is therefore to your interest to be on good terms with the House of Bourbon, and this you cannot be if Murat is not expelled.' The Emperor of Austria replied: 'I am well aware that all you tell me is true.' Lastly, he said to M. de Metternich, upon whom he called with the Duke of Wellington: 'You are going to have a heated discussion over the Naples affair, and you must not build any hopes on eluding it. This matter will come before the congress, let me warn you. Hence you had better take steps in consequence; if necessary, send troops to Italy.' Each of them told me separately that this declaration had thrown M. de Metternich into a *profound state of despondency*. These are their very words, and Your Majesty will better understand M. de Metternich's despondency, when you will have read the secret articles of the treaty into which he has entered with Murat, a copy of which I have the honor of enclosing to you. It can be conceived that he should under certain conditions have guaranteed to him the possession of the Kingdom of Naples; but that he should have so far degraded himself as to insert in this treaty a clause whereby Murat is generous enough to *renounce his rights to the Kingdom of Sicily, and to guarantee such kingdom to Ferdinand IV.* is a thing which seems incredible, even when proved.

"Your Majesty will probably learn, not without some surprise, that the attachment to the principle of legitimacy enters but little into the dispositions of Lord Castlereagh, and even the Duke of Wellington, in regard to Murat. It is a principle which influences them to a slight extent only, and which they even do not seem to comprehend in all its bearings. It is the man far more than the usurper whom they detest in Murat. The principles followed by the English in India make them strangers to any exact notion

regarding legitimacy. Nothing more greatly impressed Lord Castlereagh, who above all things desires peace, than my declaring to him that peace would be an impossibility were Murat not expelled, in view of his existence on the throne of Naples being incompatible with the existence of the House of Bourbon.

"I have also seen the Emperor of Russia. It was on Monday morning, the 13th inst. It was merely my intention to mention the Naples affair to him, and to recall to his mind the promises he had made to me in this connection, but he took the opportunity of speaking to me about many other matters, an account of which I must render to Your Majesty. I must beg Your Majesty will allow me to make use, as I have done in several of my other letters, of the dialogistic form.

"I had begun by saying to the Emperor that I had for some time past abstained from intruding upon him, out of consideration for his many affairs and even for his pleasures; that the latter having come to an end with the carnival, and the others having been settled, I was desirous of meeting him. I added that the congress itself had no longer but one matter of the highest importance to settle. 'It is the Naples affair you refer to?' 'Yes, Sire,' and I reminded him that he had promised me his support. 'But you must help me.' — 'We have done so, as far as it depended on us. Your Majesty is aware that as we could not entertain the idea of a complete restoration of the Kingdom of Poland, we have not opposed Your Majesty's views with regard to your private arrangements, and Your Majesty has surely not forgotten that the Englishmen were, at the opening of the congress, rather ill-disposed in this connection.' — 'You mean as regards Switzerland's affairs?' — 'I am not aware that we have opposed Your Majesty in the Swiss affair. We were instructed to make all our efforts tend to calm all

passions; I do not know to what an extent we have succeeded, but all our endeavors have been in that direction only. The Bernese were the most wroth; they had lost the most and had most claims to prefer. They were tendered an indemnity which they looked upon as altogether insufficient; we induced them to content themselves with it. I only know that they claim the whole of the bishopric of Bâle and that they are determined not to accept any less.' — 'And what are you prepared to do in the case of Geneva?' — 'Nothing, Sire.' — 'Ah!' (This in a tone of surprise and reproach.) — 'It is impossible for us to do anything: the king will never abandon French subjects.' — 'Can nothing then be obtained from Sardinia?' — 'I am absolutely ignorant as to this.' — 'Why do you cede the Valtelline to Austria?' — 'Nothing has been decided concerning this, Sire; the affairs of Austria having been badly managed. . . .' — 'Tis her own fault,' said the Emperor. 'Why does she not employ able men?' — 'Austria having been prevailed upon to make sacrifices which must have cost her a great deal, I consider it but in the natural order of things to humor her, especially in matters of little consequence.' — 'The Valtelline formed part of Switzerland, and it was promised that it should be restored to her.' — 'The Valtelline has been separated from Switzerland for eighteen years past; it has never known the régime under which Your Majesty would again place it. To give it back to the Grisons, to which it formally belonged, would be destructive of its happiness. It would therefore seem to me proper to form a separate canton of it, were Austria not to get it.' — 'That can be arranged. And what do you intend to do for Prince Eugène?' — 'Prince Eugène is a French subject, and as such cannot ask for anything; but he is the son-in-law of the King of Bavaria; he became so in consequence of the position occupied by France and the influence wielded by

her. Hence it is only fair that France should seek to secure to him by reason of that alliance that which it is reasonable and feasible he should obtain; we therefore wish to do something for him; we desire him to be a prince holding an appanage from the House of Bavaria, and that in consequence the king should receive an increase of territory out of the distribution of countries still to be disposed of.' — 'Why not give him a sovereignty?' — 'Sire, his marriage to a princess of Bavaria is not a sufficient reason. Prince Radziwill is a brother-in-law of the King of Prussia, and he has no sovereignty.' — 'But why not give him Zweibrücken, for instance; it is little enough.' — 'I beg Your Majesty's pardon; the Duchy of Zweibrücken has always been looked upon as something considerable; moreover, what still remains available hardly suffices to do honor to the engagements already entered into.' — 'And the marriage?' — 'The king has done me the honor of informing me that he still greatly desires it.' — 'So it is with me,' said the Emperor; 'my mother likewise desires it; she mentions the subject to me in her last letters.' — 'The king,' I said, 'awaiting as he is an answer from Your Majesty, has rejected other propositions made to him.' — 'I have likewise rejected one, but I was rejected at the same time. The King of Spain asked for the hand of my sister, but withdrew his suit upon learning that it was an absolute condition that she should have her own chapel.' — 'Your Majesty will see from the conduct of His Catholic Majesty what His Most Christian Majesty is held to.' — 'I should like to know how the matter really stands.' — 'Sire, the last instructions I have received are in conformity with what has been told Your Majesty by General Pozzo.' — 'Why do you not execute the treaty of the 11th of April?'¹ — 'As I have been away from Paris for five

¹ This is the Treaty of Fontainebleau concluded with Napoleon. The sums stipulated on behalf of himself and his family had not been paid.

months, I do not know what has been done in the matter.' — 'The treaty has not been executed; we must demand its execution; this is for us a point of honor, and we can nowise desist from the assertion of our rights. The Emperor of Austria lays as much stress on this as myself, and you may rest assured that he is offended at its not being executed.' — 'Sire, I will report what you do me the honor of saying, but I must point out that in the state of ferment in which we are now in those countries which border on France, and in particular Italy, there may be some danger in supplying weapons to persons whom one has cause to suspect as disposed to indulge in intrigues.'

"Lastly, the conversation once more centred in Murat. I briefly spread before him all the reasons of right, of morality, and of propriety which should unite Europe against him. I separated his position from that of Bernadotte, which particularly affects the Emperor, and, in support of what I said I quoted the *Almanach royal*, which I had just received. He begged me to send it to him, adding: 'What you have just said to me gives me the greatest pleasure; I was dreading the contrary, as was also Bernadotte.' The Emperor then referred to Murat in terms of the utmost contempt. 'He is,' he said, 'a scoundrel, who has betrayed us all. But,' he went on to say, 'when I enter into any affair, I like to feel sure that the means exist to bring it to a happy termination. If Murat resists, he will have to be driven out by force. I have mentioned the matter to the Duke of Wellington; he thinks this will require a large amount of troops, and that if it comes to sending them round by sea, considerable difficulty will be encountered.' I replied that I was not asking for soldiers (for I know they would have been refused me), but one solitary line in the coming treaty, and that France and Spain would take care of the rest, whereupon the Emperor said to me: 'You shall have my support.'

"During the whole of this conversation the Emperor remained distant in manner; but on the whole I was more pleased than discontented with him.

"Lord Castlereagh has also spoken to me with some warmth about the treaty of the 11th of April, and I entertain no doubt but that he will mention the matter to Your Majesty. This affair has recently taken a fresh lease of life and is to-day on everybody's lips. I must inform Your Majesty that it frequently crops up and in an unpleasant manner. Its influence makes itself felt in the question of the *Mont-de-Milan* (pawnbroking establishments), which interest so many of the subjects and servants of Your Majesty.

"Nevertheless, the idea has suggested itself to me that Your Majesty might rid yourself of what is most onerous in the execution of the treaty of the 11th of April, by means of some arrangement with England.

"In the first days of my stay here, Lord Castlereagh expressed a wish that France would, from now on, renounce the slave-trade, in which case she might receive certain compensations. Pecuniary compensations are, generally speaking, more readily given by England than any others. I thought at the time that it was necessary to elude this proposition without peremptorily rejecting it, reserving the faculty of giving it consideration later on. Recently, when speaking of Murat and of the position which one could not help reserving to him, if, Europe having once pronounced adversely to him, he submitted to her decision, Lord Castlereagh did not hesitate telling me that England would willingly undertake to secure an existence to Murat by allotting to him a sum out of the British Treasury, in the case of France consenting to renounce the slave-trade. Should such an arrangement be considered practicable, I have no doubt that it would be an easy matter to get included in

the payments to be made by England the pensions stipulated by the treaty of the 11th of April.

"This arrangement, in view of the passion of the English for the abolition of the slave-trade, would certainly have the advantage of binding England closely to our side in the Naples affair and stimulate her to second us in every possible way.

"It remains to be seen, whether in the present condition of our colonies, France, in renouncing the slave-trade, for the four years and three months she has still to engage in it, would be making a sacrifice greater or lesser than the advantage to be derived from the arrangement whereof I have just spoken; this is what I beg Your Majesty will be pleased to have looked into, in order to be able to make known your intentions on this point to Lord Castlereagh, who will probably not fail to speak of it.

"I should have wished that the treaty of the 3d of January, which, the congress once over, will cease to be in force, should have been prorogued for a more or less lengthy period, if only by virtue of a common declaration to that effect. His Lordship saw difficulties in the way of this, the character of M. de Metternich not inspiring him with any confidence; but he assured me that as soon as the treaty had expired, the spirit which had inspired it would still exist. He is, above all things, desirous of not giving umbrage to the other continental powers, which does not prevent him from desiring that a great intimacy should be established between the two governments, and that they should not cease to understand each other, with a view to peace and the preservation of rights. In a word, he left Vienna in a frame of mind which I must give praise to, and in which he can only be strengthened by all that he will hear from the lips of Your Majesty."

After laying this document before my readers, it is

needless for me to enter into any further particulars regarding the proceedings of the congress up to the time of the landing of Napoleon in France. Moreover, I have only sought to deal with what specially concerned France, and in no way to show how other interests were satisfied or sacrificed. All the doings of the congress have been published; there but remains for me to mention an incident of some importance. On the 23d of January, King Murat committed the incredible imprudence of causing his plenipotentiary to hand a comminatory note to M. de Metternich. In it he complained that France had so far not recognized him as the sovereign of Naples, and this, when in his quality of Austria's ally he was included in Article I of the Treaty of Paris. This note met with a most unfavorable reception, and led Austria to increase to 150,000 men the army she kept in Italy. To this precautionary measure M. de Metternich added the one of notifying M. de Talleyrand and the Duc de Campo-Chiaro that the Emperor his master was resolved to treat as an enemy any power which should dispatch troops to Italy. It will be seen that he intended to remain master of the position at all cost. M. de Talleyrand, as it has been shown, had most cleverly met this difficulty half-way, since his proposition in regard to the kingdom of Naples embodied the restriction that he should not be attacked by way of Italian territory.

It may perhaps be asked of me how it was possible that during the entire course of the debates of this congress, at which were assembled Europe's leading politicians, nothing should have been said or done in reference to Napoleon and the Isle of Elba. "Why do you pass over in silence what must have been said or done regarding such an important matter?" will be enquired. It would seem, indeed, that all were equally afraid to broach the subject; yet every one felt that the situation resulting from the treaty of the 11th

of April could not endure; the discussion of the matter was evidently being postponed until the congress should reach the end of its labors, and, although the matter was referred to in private conversations, no positive result was thereby reached. Murat's letter, submitted by the Duke of Wellington, had reawakened fears.

There was thereupon much talk about coming to some determination, and as to the urgency of taking steps in the matter. General de Pozzo, whose perspicacity was sharpened by his hatred of Napoleon, loudly proclaimed that some great calamity would shortly occur, were the affair not dealt with in a trenchant fashion, and that the only way of assuring the peace of Europe was to transport Napoleon as soon as possible to some spot whence it would be impossible for him to carry on the dangerous correspondence which was certainly his principal occupation. I even believe that, with the accord of the Duke of Wellington and M. de Talleyrand, he then and there suggested that Napoleon should be transported to St. Helena. Was this brought to the knowledge of Napoleon, and did it assist in shaping the determination he came to in the course of March? He was certainly cognizant of the differences that had arisen in the bosom of the congress, and he reckoned greatly on the discords which he expected to see break out among the sovereigns; but, when indulging in conjectures most flattering to his imagination, it was necessary for him to wait until these discords should explode. His resolution was arrived at with a suddenness and a precipitation which gave the idea that some determinative reason must have arisen to cause him thus to act. He had plenty of means at his disposal to know what was taking place at Vienna, if only through Murat's envoys, whose presence was so strongly opposed by France. He must have once more sought to make common cause with him. What is certain is that,

when the news of the departure from the Isle of Elba reached Vienna, M. de Metternich, in his vexation, not to say his fright, could not refrain from unsparingly reproaching General de Pozzo, whom he charged with being the cause of this calamity, of having even rendered it inevitable by his indiscreet utterances and the violence of his propositions, of which Napoleon had, as a matter of course, been informed, and which had necessarily driven him to extreme measures. M. de Pozzo protested, saying that what had happened was bound to occur sooner or later, and it was better that it should take place now, because the evil was less irremediable.

It is at all events certain that the line of action followed in regard to Napoleon was stamped with singular *mala-droitness* and imprudence. The French Government in particular, and it was the one most interested in this matter, committed a blunder for which there was no excuse; I refer to the one already pointed out by the Emperor Alexander in the course of his conversation with M. de Talleyrand, and concerning which it would seem that England also expressed herself with displeasure. It had been seen fit not to pay any of the sums annually due to Napoleon and his family, pursuant to the treaty of the 11th of April. Still, the King of France had agreed to this treaty. If any thought was being entertained of changing his place of residence, of transporting him to a distant land, it was necessary to impress him with a complete sense of security and to scrupulously fulfil all the conditions of the treaty.

If I have sufficiently made known the progression of the royal government during the past nine months, it is not necessary that I should dwell in detail on the consequences of the errors into which it fell. Like all weak powers, it had sought to conciliate all interests by petting them, and had nevertheless not been able to avoid sacrificing a consid-

erable number of those whom it should have respected the most. Governed by the need of showing certain preferences, the royal government thought to see its way out of its embarrassments by multiplying the abuses which rendered more people discontented than it satisfied. It was especially in the matter of self-love that it had given cause for irritation to many; the Court had denied itself no act of maladroitness. The women of the old régime had spared no pains to let those who came to share their rank and honors see that this participation in them seemed to them out of place, and that there were distances which could never be bridged over. And yet the first Revolution was there to show the potent influence exercised in France by such an opposition of interests, however slight in appearance.

In spite of all these faults, the government of Louis XVIII., it must fain be admitted, had not only been most easy-going, but had caused fresh hopes to dawn on France. Personal and property rights had been respected, and the nation was indebted to it for the long unknown sweetness of full liberty. It reigned supreme regarding speech, writings, and actions; but this was a blessing which people enjoyed without being grateful to the prince who granted it, and which was received as the exercise of a right to which the government had to submit. The weak spot of the royal government lay in the poor idea it had given of its strength and ability, and nowhere had this idea taken deeper root than in the army. He who knew the sentiments of the army could not feel any surprise if, given a favorable opportunity, hostile projects and endeavors issued from its midst. And yet, few persons went so far as to realize that the danger was close at hand.

It was learnt, during the forenoon of the 5th, that Napoleon had landed in the Bay of Cannes, in Provence. I will

not repeat here the oft-told circumstances of his departure from the Isle of Elba, his journey across sea, his arrival on the coast of France, his extraordinarily audacious and rapid march into the interior, at the head of a handful of soldiers. History has seldom preserved the recollection of any more rash enterprise, more cleverly carried out, and crowned with such striking results. But at the same time, no success has ever more clearly demonstrated the carelessness, the lack of all precautionary measures on the part of those who should have unceasingly guarded against the peril which threatened at any moment to arise from that quarter. Thus, the police was totally in the dark as to the preparations being made in the Isle of Elba, and had taken no steps to be kept informed of them. The Minister of Marine had not properly organized a cruiser service between that island and the French coast. The Minister of War had neglected placing in the towns general officers selected from among those most in disfavor with Napoleon. It would have been easy to place under their command troops chosen with care and likely to inspire the government with confidence. All this was so simple, so clearly indicated a course, that the excessive indifference, which was cause that the slightest precautions had been neglected, passes all understanding. It must be believed that those whose duty it was to take them had not credited the possibility of such a desperate attempt. And truly, it had been dreamt of so little, that it had not been feared to form a body of troops with headquarters at Grenoble, and composed with as little heed as if it was to have been sent to the banks of the Rhine or on the Belgian frontier. It has, in this connection, been sought to impute treacherous intentions to Marshal Soult, but I find no reason to believe such to have been the case. The assembling of these troops had been made at the request of M. de Talleyrand, with a view of supporting the policy he

was following at Vienna against King Murat, and to place France in a position to take, if necessary, action to dethrone him. M. de Talleyrand had preferred this request on the 19th of February, which he justified by Murat's military movements in Italy; it had been renewed in a second dispatch sent by General Ricard, on the 23d. The assembling, which was at first to be carried out with a certain amount of secrecy, was subsequently to be made with some show of ostentation, in order to do away with the idea which M. de Metternich affected to spread as to the nullity of the French forces. Marshal Soult is, to my mind, sufficiently exonerated on this score, which does not prevent the remarking that one of the first consequences of the movement which he caused to be executed, was that of bringing into Grenoble the regiment of M. de La Bédoyère, which, as is well known, was the first to go over to Napoleon.¹

The first result produced in Paris by the news of Napoleon's landing was a state of stupefaction; it was next sought to deceive oneself as to the extent of the danger; so little was needed, it was argued, to thwart an attempt resting on such a feeble support. People were, moreover, most favorably impressed by the departure of *Monsieur* for Lyons. He started on his journey on the night of the 5th, accompanied by the Duc d'Orléans. An order was dispatched to Marshal Macdonald to take command of the troops in that city and to organize its defence, should the enemy wend its way so far. But all illusions were quickly dissipated, and the situation appeared in all its awful reality. It was a hidden wound, the depth of which was seen in its reflection. People argued that it was impossible that Napoleon should enter upon such an undertaking if he did

¹ With the exercise of a little more care in ascertaining the sentiments of the officers to whom preference was shown, it would have been discovered that M. de La Bédoyère, when freely unbosoming himself, displayed in favor of Napoleon a warmth of feeling which bordered on fanaticism.

not feel sure that he possessed powerful and secret means of success. On the other hand, people asked themselves where the royal government would find a head strong enough to cope with him, to thwart the rapidity and the vigor of his conceptions? And then, whom could one trust? Where was either zeal or devotion to be found? People reviewed the blunders committed for the nine months just passed, and the consequences likely to arise therefrom, while the government, as will be seen subsequently from the avowals which escaped its lips, was far from toning down these impressions.

As to the persons who were from their experience in a better position to know Napoleon, his resources of mind, his cleverness in profiting by the slightest advantage, they said to themselves that if he was not crushed in the first week or so, he would necessarily end in triumphing. Such was my personal conviction, and also that of M. Molé, with whom I had at the time frequent opportunities of conversing. We both of us held as an assured fact that if success were equally balanced for only a few hours between him and the first bodies of troops he should meet on his march, all would be irrevocably lost, and in spite of the attachment which M. Molé had for so long felt towards him, in spite of the favors he had received and those which he might still expect from him, he did not hesitate, I can assert, to look upon this event as the greatest of misfortunes. He foresaw, as well as I did, a general war follow in the wake of Napoleon, and he entertained no doubt that in the case of the issue being once more unfavorable to him, that one might look forward to the total ruin of France, her parcelling, her being rent asunder, and perhaps the entire partition of her provinces!

These melancholy and natural conjectures had not penetrated to the masses; the uncertainty which still hovered

over events did not permit of any one allowing his fears or hopes to come to the surface. At the Tuileries and in the *salons*, a pretence was made of looking upon the event as a fortunate one, because it would put an end to an existence incompatible with the public peace. The government was far from sharing in this blindness, and its deeds are here to show to what a degree it viewed the danger as a serious and imminent one. As early as the 7th, there appeared in the *Moniteur* a proclamation convoking the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies. All members of both Chambers were ordered to assemble at their usual place of meeting, as soon as the proclamation should come to their knowledge. The preamble pointed out the urgency of thwarting, by prompt and wise measures, the guilty hopes of those who should not fear to maliciously and treacherously disturb the happiness and peace which the nations enjoyed. Another ordinance proclaimed Napoleon Bonaparte traitor and rebel, in that he had invaded the department of war with an armed force, and enjoined upon all governors of provinces, commanders of troops, National Guards, even civil authorities and simple citizens, to hunt him down and to forthwith bring him before a council of war, which, after identification, should pronounce against him the full penalty of the law. Soldiers and employees of every rank, who had accompanied him in his escape, were to be considered guilty of the same crimes, and similar penalties were to be enforced in their case. The following were likewise to be prosecuted and punished as accomplices in and abettors of an act of rebellion: all civil and military functionaries, etc., even simple citizens who had tendered him any assistance, and lastly, those who, by words uttered in public places or meetings, by the posting of placards, or by printed publications, should take part, or induce citizens to take part, in the rebellion or abstain from opposing it.

These were indeed feeble weapons with which to combat an insurrection already almost triumphant. Other measures were likewise resorted to which might prove more efficacious, if the loyalty of the troops could but be reckoned upon. In addition to the defence which *Monsieur* and Marshal Macdonald intended to organize at Lyons, army corps were hurriedly gathered at all points whence it was supposed it would be easiest and most advantageous to set them in motion. The most important of these corps was the one formed in Franche-Comté, the command of which was given to Marshal Ney, governor of the division. He had been hastily called for this purpose while on his estate near Chartres; on his way through Paris he had seen the king, whom he strongly assured of his loyalty. There is no reason for surprise at the confidence shown him at that time by the government, for no one, as I have already related, had contributed in a greater degree to wrest from Napoleon the abdication of Fontainebleau; but the government was not aware that this man, one of iron on the field of battle, was weak when it came to taking a political resolution, or how easy it was to induce him to adopt the most opposed views. Many people have believed that he was one of those who had felt bitterness at the treatment vouchsafed them at Court; I assert nothing on this point, nor with regard to the influence exercised over him by his wife. She had, I think I have previously mentioned, greatly contributed, in the preceding month of April, to excite him against Napoleon, and, for some time past, if any faith is placed in the most accredited versions, she had continually complained to him of the mortifications she was made to endure every time she appeared at the Tuileries. She had reckoned, more than any other, on being shown certain marks of preference to which she might consider herself entitled, either because of the attachment her mother

had ever shown to Queen Marie-Antoinette, or because of the services her husband had rendered in the early days of the Restoration. In addition to this, her aunt, Mme. Campan, who like the mother of Mme. Ney had been a lady of the bedchamber to the late Queen Marie-Antoinette, had met with but a poor reception at the hands of the royal family, which had preserved too strict a recollection of her political opinions in 1789, and not a sufficient one of the services which she had at the time endeavored to render to her mistress. I am merely recording here rumors which were, unfortunately, too much on everybody's lips, and to which are to be opposed the formal denials of persons intimately acquainted with her and fully in a position to know the truth.

Must I speak of the efforts which were made to influence public opinion, of the loyal addresses of all bodies, even of regiments which poured in from every direction? He who has passed through the long days of a revolution, when he has seen thrones fall and rise, many forms of government succeed each other, knows full well that there never has been any lack of addresses, either just before a downfall or on the day after a triumph; he would indeed show excessive simple-mindedness were he still to attach the slightest importance to them. There are, however, deeds, and even words, that history is bound to record, because in them are to be found precious confessions and a true picture of certain situations, which it is fit to note. In this category is to be classed all that was said and done in the Chamber of Deputies, and more especially when it met in sufficient numbers to allow of the king appearing before it. But it is necessary, ere limning this scene, to follow the course of events preceding it.

Up to the 10th, the information regarding Napoleon's progress was not very definite, in spite of the active use of

telegraphic communication. All that was known was that *Monsieur* had reached Lyons on the 8th. Had any faith been placed in the reports forwarded by the administrators of the departments between Lyons and the place of landing, one would have believed that the body of soldiers accompanying the Emperor was falling off rather than increasing in numbers, and that his march bristled with difficulties. I have met more than one individual who sought to persuade himself that Napoleon had merely passed through French territory on his way to Italy because he thought that this country would be more easily stirred up. Such a fairy tale was not worth refuting. The only thing known with certainty was that he had avoided following the road through Provence, whose hostile dispositions he had experienced on his way to Elba, and had directed his steps towards Grenoble via Sisteron and the hill roads. He had reason to anticipate a warmer welcome from Dauphiné than from Provence. Great was therefore the anxiety to hear the news from Grenoble. The town was sufficiently well fortified for him not to be able to pass its gates unless they were thrown open to him.

All were reasoning on this hypothesis, when a telegraphic dispatch dated the 10th, 8 A.M., brought the news to Paris that Bonaparte had probably slept at Bourgoin the night before and that he would doubtless make his entry into Lyons in the evening. This information was published in the *Moniteur* on the 11th, together with a foot-note stating that neither telegraphic dispatch nor letter made known that Grenoble had opened its doors. No further particulars had come to hand on the 12th, but everybody was struck by the account of an incident related in the following terms: "Paris, March 12th, 4 A.M.—Three officers of the royal *chasseurs à cheval* have just called on Monseigneur the Duc de Berry. They have been sent by Colonel Lion and the

officers of the regiment to inform His Royal Highness that they were unaware, until they reached La Fère, of the venture into which it was being sought to make them participate, that they met at Compiègne, where they spoke their mind to General Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, that immediately thereupon Colonel Lion had taken command of the regiment, had sounded to horse, and again taken the road to Cambrai, the regiment's garrison town. These officers are a major, a *chef d'escadron*, and a captain."

Nothing could instil greater alarm than the announcement of an attempt indicated in such vague terms, but the object of which seemed most serious, since it had aroused the indignation of the colonel and officers who denounced it. The movement of General Desnoëttes and that of the troops which he had for a while induced to follow his lead, were doubtless concerted with that of Napoleon, and if his intercourse with the army had reached thus far, what might not be expected? Nothing could be more natural than this supposition, and yet I have since acquired the certainty that it was groundless. A plot altogether foreign to Napoleon's was for some time past in process of hatching in the garrisons of the north of France, and principally in the Lille garrison. Generals d'Erlon and Lallemand, who commanded the troops in that city, were, together with General Desnoëttes, the only known chiefs of it; but many others assuredly took part in it. As to d'Erlon and Lallemand, the orders they had given to the garrisons of Guise and La Fère having been brought by the officers who called upon the Duc de Berry, the Minister of War, Soult, immediately sent Marshal Mortier to Lille with the mission to arrest them; they were so arrested, and remained in prison until after the 20th of March.

In spite of the dark mystery in which this abortive enterprise remained enveloped, it became known that noth-

ing less had been contemplated than to march to Paris, carry off the king and all the royal family, and transport them, it was said, across the border. But how could such a plan have been conceived without some understanding with at least a portion of the Paris garrison? This probability, which it was almost impossible not to admit, was sufficient to take hold of the firmest minds, and encourage a belief that every treachery that might be anticipated was now to be dreaded. These apprehensions were strengthened by Marshal Soult's dismissal. The suspicions already entertained about him thereupon assumed a consistency which in the eyes of many was tantamount to evidence. His place was filled by the Duc de Feltre, who, although he had been, while the Empire lasted, perhaps Napoleon's most devoted minister, had, since the Restoration, showed profound loyalty to the House of Bourbon; the marriage of his daughter with a nephew of the Abbé de Montesquiou had doubtless powerfully contributed towards his adopting this cause, and he could give no more striking proof of his devotion to it than by accepting the portfolio of Minister of War under circumstances so fraught with peril.

On the 12th, the Duc d'Orléans reached Paris. He had been dispatched by *Monsieur* to announce that it had been found impossible to defend Lyons, which had perforce been abandoned to the enemy. He came to take the king's orders. "Public opinion," quoth the *Moniteur*, when announcing his arrival, "cannot be imposed on by the enemy's rapid progress. He weakens it by his haste; in no quarter does he display actual strength; there is no indication whatever that his troops have become swollen in numbers, while to arrest his march, our troops are pouring in from all directions on the several points to which they have been dispatched." It would have been wiser to have remained silent than to print words so clearly contradicted by facts.

What had then become of the troops of Grenoble and of Lyons? And, if they had not thrown in their lot with Napoleon, how was it that it had not been possible to fight him for the possession of the latter city?

A royal proclamation next announced that measures had been taken to stop him in his march from Lyons to Paris. All the troops constituting the Paris garrison and the garrisons of the surrounding towns, including the former Imperial Guard, which Marshal Oudinot was sent to bring from its cantonments in Lorraine, were destined to form an army to be commanded by the Duc de Berry, who was to lead it to the front.

The Duc d'Angoulême had left Paris, together with the Duchesse, for Bordeaux, which was getting ready to give them the most brilliant reception. It was natural that they should give this pleasure to the residents of a city which had so well deserved of them, and which had declared themselves truly attached to the royal family. This explains how the Duc and Duchesse d'Angoulême found themselves in the south of France at the time, a circumstance which was not without its importance, and which even had a potent influence on the spirit of the provinces constituting that portion of the kingdom.

Immediately upon hearing of the landing, the king had sent orders to the Duc d'Angoulême to wend his way from Bordeaux to Toulouse, thence to the Rhone, and to place himself at the head of all available forces, with the object of operating against Napoleon. He lost not a single moment in obeying this command, but the ex-Emperor was making such rapid strides that there was no longer anything to be done when the duke reached the department of the Gard.

CHAPTER VII

Napoleon at Lyons; his success henceforward assured—The ministry in a state of confusion—The royal government's last hope centres in Marshal Ney's army—The feeling among the masses: the Emperor's return causes the liveliest fears in nearly every direction—The ministry uselessly compromises the royal dignity by its tardy avowals—*Exposé* of the situation laid before the Chamber of Peers by the Chancellor—M. Lainé's speech in the Chamber of Deputies; Louis XVIII.'s speech; oath taken by the princes of the blood—M. Lainé's allocution—M. de La Fayette once more enters into the political arena—The party led by MM. B. Constant and Lainé think of him as a member of the Cabinet—Presentation of addresses to the king—An attempt to conceal, by means of mendacious reports, the progress of Napoleon—The National Guard well disposed; ardent zeal of the youths of the schools—M. Fouché baffles the police agents sent to arrest him—On learning of Marshal Ney's defection and of the mutiny of the Guard, the king resolves upon flight—The Court in a state of complete dejection—M. de Montesquiou considers the cause of the Bourbons forever lost—Preparations for the king's departure—They are made so precipitately that many important memoranda and documents are left behind in the ministerial offices, and even in the king's closet—M. Louis abandons fifty millions in the coffers of the treasury—Flight of the king—Paris on the 20th of March, 1815—M. Pasquier's interview with M. de La Valette—Last measures taken by the government of Louis XVIII.; adjournment of the Chamber—M. Cambacérès augurs badly of Napoleon's venture—Veyrat, the detective, again makes his appearance.

For those who no longer indulged in any illusions, the occupation of Lyons was practically equivalent to a decisive event. The Emperor was now in command of a real army. Could the thought be seriously entertained that the troops about to come face to face with him would dare to resist him? Would French soldiers discharge their muskets at each other? Together all of them had met on many a

battle-field, and they looked upon each other as brothers. Civil war would therefore seem to them a monstrous thing. It was certain that Napoleon would not retreat, and as he exercised over his troops an ascendancy more potent than the marshals who were advancing against him, it was easy to foresee that the soldiers would flock under his eagles; that the officers would be carried away by their example, in spite of any temptation they might feel to remain loyal to the Restoration.

As to the chiefs themselves, people remembered what had happened when Marshal Marmont had sought to hand over his army corps to the provisional government; at that time people had looked forward with dread to the possibility of a civil war, and Marshal Ney had said to Napoleon: "We want none of it!" He had written to the provisional government: "As there is no other way of avoiding a civil war, we adhere to the acts of the Senate, and we recognize the House of Bourbon." And now, the question was about to be reversed, and, in addition to the germs of discontent which had been sown, as if purposely, in the army against the royal government, defection would ensue from the all-powerful argument that it was the only way of preventing a division in the great military family.

What I am now writing, I told at the time to several persons, among others the Abbé de Montesquiou and M. de Vitrolles, with whom I enjoyed frequent intercourse in those critical days, as both the latter and I resided in the Place Vendôme. As secretary of the ministerial council, he was one of the first to hear everything, and I was in the habit of calling upon him daily to learn the latest news. I must do him the justice of saying that, indulging less in illusions than those about him, he was less despondent than they were, and more able to take vigorous resolutions. He deplored the weakness of the counsels to which the king

seemed to lend an ear, and told me that the ministers were a house divided against itself, that they were indulging in mutual recriminations over the blunders committed, and took delight in thwarting each other in regard to all the measures successively proposed. The Abbé de Montesquiou made the same confidences to me. What could be expected then from such a state of confusion? The only hope of salvation lay in the army commanded by Marshal Ney. If it remained loyal, if even it did not march towards Bonaparte, but held its position in Franche-Comté, it would be difficult for the Emperor to march on Paris, leaving it in his rear; there might then perhaps be time to organize means of defence between Lyons and the capital.

Such was the hope with which they sought to flatter themselves. Withal, it was necessary that the country should second the government, and that public opinion should pronounce loudly in its favor. Were it possible to stir up the feelings of the National Guards and the Royal Volunteers, if the young men eagerly sought a place in their ranks, they might, by their example, powerfully contribute towards retaining the troops in the path of duty, and the combat, once entered into on such ground, might not be so favorable to Napoleon as he might expect. It is certain that his return was far from being, as he flattered himself, desired by half the population. If, on the one hand, frequent comparisons had been instituted between his administration and the royal administration, comparisons not at all in favor of the latter, on the other, a recollection had been preserved of the sufferings and distress of the last years of his reign. People did not care to see the revival of that perpetual war, which seemed inevitable with him. Again, people had begun to taste with pleasure of the many new liberties, which were incompatible with his character and the principles of his government. There was no desire

of sacrificing them to him. Whatever his partisans may have since said or written, not only did his appearance not cause any rejoicing, outside of a few eastern departments, which had preserved a fanatical love for him, but it caused nearly everywhere a very serious fright. Was there no advantage to be taken of these dispositions? Unfortunately, there was no confidence in the ability of the government, and men rarely venture to compromise themselves for a cause which they look upon beforehand as lost.

All the attempts made to rouse the Chamber of Deputies to action, all the propositions submitted to it, all the words uttered in its midst, had for their object to counterbalance this unfortunate tendency. An attempt was made to meet all wrongs half-way, and to give in regard to institutions, and interests of every nature, assurances and pledges most likely to calm public agitation. It is even allowable to believe that signs of repentance and indiscreet avowals went very far, and that royalty's dignity was sacrificed more than was necessary. At all events, it was done to no advantage.

On the 7th there was a first meeting of deputies, but they only numbered thirty-nine; on the 11th, the Chancellor brought down to the Chamber of Peers a lengthy *exposé* of the state of affairs, painted in colors hardly reassuring. The defection of Grenoble was acknowledged, also the surrender of Lyons. It said: "Large numbers of Bonaparte's emissaries are approaching our regiments; some of them have penetrated their ranks. It is to be feared that many misguided men may yield to these treacherous blandishments, and this fear alone would weaken our means of defence. It is hardly possible to arrest the effect of the evil dispositions which fill us with fear without relying greatly on the help of that good and true National Guard, which is for the most part composed in such a

manner as to be impervious to the dangers of seduction. The king has required its services throughout the kingdom. General Dessolles, who is in command of it, will read to you the king's ordinance in this connection. A second ordinance enjoins the general councils of departments and *arrondissements* to hold permanent sittings in order to govern directly this great movement." Further on it is said: "The government is exercising the strictest surveillance over all traitors who might be tempted to seduce or corrupt the troops, and courts-martial are to deal with them summarily. A special care is to be exercised to prevent the publication and distribution of incendiary pamphlets. . . . None of the king's ministers will hesitate taking, upon his own responsibility, any and every measure demanded in so urgent a matter."

The same day, in the Chamber of Deputies, M. Lainé delivered, as its president, the inaugural speech of the session; under the pretext of enumerating all the salutary measures which the royal government had in preparation just as Bonaparte's invasion had come to disturb so ruthlessly the peace of France, he indirectly made promises with regard to several matters about which people felt somewhat uneasy: thus, a proposed measure concerning the re-election of deputies, in which, without the possession of landed property ceasing to be looked upon as the principal qualification for representative honors, deputies appointed by the universities and by commerce should be admitted; regulations by which the full freedom of the press could be granted without danger; a revised customs tariff; reductions in the collection of indirect taxation, especially as regards intoxicating liquors; reforms in the mode of procedure of the Chamber; a proposition presented at the last session of the Chamber and now changed to a resolution to maintain the Legion of Honor, by a permanent endowment;

finally, a law relating to ministerial responsibility, and, in this respect, M. Lainé said: "It is not meet that in the present circumstances the president of the Chamber should develop the reasons which make this measure eminently desirable." Without being official, such language bore all the signs of having been had recourse to in concert with the government.

On the 13th, the Abbé de Montesquiou submitted to the Chamber of Deputies a less awkward *exposé* of the situation than the one made to the Chamber of Peers by the Chancellor. It contained, besides high praise for the spirit animating almost all departments, an enumeration of the military forces set in motion and in which one had every reason to place a confidence which would certainly not be deceived. "Marshal Ney," it was therein said, "is gathering his legions, and is showing in the cause that firmness of character and principles for which he has ever been famed. . . . Marshal Oudinot is at the head of those Grenadiers of France, that illustrious Old Guard so renowned throughout Europe, and which claims the glory of being a model and an example for all armies." Following upon this *exposé* came a proposed measure which was to declare that the garrisons of Lille, La Fère, and Cambrai had well deserved of their country. These were the garrisons which Generals d'Erlon, Lallemand, and Desnoëttes had attempted to stir up to insurrection. The same declaration was made on behalf of the garrison of Antibes, which had closed the town's gates to Napoleon, and again on behalf of Marshals Mortier and Macdonald. Pensions were promised to the soldiers who should be wounded, and to the families of those who should be killed while resisting Napoleon Bonaparte.

The new Minister of War, the Duc de Feltre, laid before the Chamber several particulars in connection with his

branch of the administration. He took no pains to conceal that we had escaped as if by miracle from the machinations woven in the department of the Nord. He viewed them as a ramification of those which had burst forth in the South. "A strong body of the troops," he went on to say, "was to have moved towards Noyon and Paris, and would have been the cause of most serious disturbances; Marshal Mortier's timely appearance on the scene dissipated this danger. Nevertheless, the troops in that portion of the kingdom were ignorant of what they were expected to do, even when they were asked to take the important arsenal of La Fère. They had quickly been undeceived, and had once more returned to the paths of duty. The same could not be said with regard to those of Lyons and Grenoble. Their defection had been as outrageous as it was complete. Steps had at all events been taken to thwart any audacious attempts against French liberty and loyalty. They were being carried out at this very moment, and one might hope that they would meet with the success which the nation had reason to expect of the measures of its government." The reports must have indeed been very deceptive if this confidence was not simulated.

At the close of the sitting, a member moved to add to the draft of the law just submitted the following article: "The Chamber of Deputies declares that the custody of the constitutional Charter and the public liberties is hereby entrusted to the fidelity and courage of the army, the National Guard, and all citizens." The Chamber agreed unanimously to this motion. It acted similarly with regard to one having for its object the payment of the pension of the military members of the Legion of Honor. This was making it clear enough to what a degree the government had acted wrongly in not classing this debt with its most sacred engagements. A secret sitting followed, at which

another deputy, General Desfourneaux, moved that the king be entreated, in conformity with Article 69 of the Charter, to grant to all soldiers in active service on the 31st of August, 1814, their full pay during the term of their natural life. This proposition was referred to the Minister of War. This was attacking the half-pay system. A law was passed by which the *légionnaires* were to receive their brevets forthwith, and another measure regarding national rewards. It will be seen from all this that great was the haste to make reparation for the past. The office of Prefect of Police was once more established and given to M. de Bourrienne; it was doubtless imagined that there could be no reconciliation between him and the Emperor, but this selection was attended with great disadvantages in other respects. I could not refrain from pointing this out to the Abbé de Montesquiou, who replied: "What is to be done? M. d'André is no longer the man for the place, and if the post had been offered you, you would have declined it."

At last, on the 16th, the king made his appearance in the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber of Peers had been summoned to be present in a body at this sitting. The royal speech produced the greatest effect, but it was nothing more than a wail of distress. He had come, he said, to the peers and deputies, to draw closer the bonds which, by uniting them to him, constituted the strength of the state; he came, when addressing them, to express his sentiments and wishes. "I have once more seen my country," he said; "I have brought about a reconciliation between it and all the foreign powers, which will, you may rest assured, remain faithful to the treaties which have restored peace to us. I have labored for the happiness of my people, and I have received, and daily receive, the most touching proofs of their affection. Is it possible for me, at the age of sixty, to better terminate my career than by dying

in its defence?" (How rash a pledge!) "So it is that I entertain no fears regarding myself, but only for France. The man who comes amongst us to kindle the torch of civil war, brings with him the plague of foreign war; he is returning to subject our country to a yoke of iron; and lastly, he comes to destroy the Charter, my greatest title to the regard of posterity, the constitutional Charter which I gave you, which all Frenchmen cherish, and which I now swear to maintain." (Wherein had this oath become necessary? It will be seen further on.) "Let us, therefore, rally around it! Let it be our sacred standard! The descendants of Henri IV. will be the first to rally around it, and all true Frenchmen will follow their lead. Lastly, gentlemen, let the co-operation of the two Chambers give the executive power all the strength it requires, and this truly national war will prove by its happy termination what can be done by a great nation united in the love of its sovereign and the fundamental law of the state."

This speech was received with loud cheers. When they had somewhat subsided, *Monsieur* approached the king, and, making a profound bow to him, said: "Sire, I am aware that I am going beyond the rules governing this assembly, when I venture to speak in presence of Your Majesty, but I beg you will excuse me, and permit me to express on this occasion, both in my name and in that of your family, how we share in our innermost hearts the sentiments and principles animating Your Majesty." Then, turning towards the assembled Chambers, he added, while raising his hand: "We swear by our honor to live and die true to our king and to the constitutional Charter, which is a guarantee of France's happiness." More excitement, more cheering.

The king's oath had doubtless been pronounced merely to lead up to the one taken by *Monsieur*, which tends to prove to what a degree the opinion had generally gained that the

prince was opposed to the constitutional system, and that he considered himself but little bound to it. But when such a belief has unfortunately taken root, something else besides oaths is required to destroy it; deeds, and a consistent conduct of long duration, become necessary. This great and important scene over, the king and *Monsieur* withdrew, when the president, M. Lainé, took the floor. It is necessary to dwell awhile on his speech, one of the most noteworthy of those times. "Gentlemen," he said, "before moving that you should vote an address to the king, permit the president of the Chamber to pass a few cursory remarks on your present state. Just as the king expected that the representatives and the peers should assemble about his person, in order that he should make in their presence the declaration with which he has just reassured the French nation, so did we hope that the greater number of France's deputies should be present, in order to make heard the nation's cry regarding the strange happenings which have come to disturb its tranquillity. From the very outset, those of us nearest at hand have spared no efforts, in the committees, to prepare the means to enable the national representation to declare its sentiments. This is not the time to place blame, and to discover the causes of this unexpected disturbance. France will quickly obtain justice and reparation through its representatives." (It was impossible to point out more plainly to the royal government the errors which had led up to the impending catastrophe.) "All our efforts must now be directed against the man who is seeking to crush even the hopes of civilized man. No, gentlemen, it is no longer the Court which can be charged with causing any anxieties as to recognized liberties and rights."

So, then, these anxieties had originated with the Court? Pursuing, M. Lainé drew a most sombre picture of all the

evils to follow in the train of Bonaparte's invasion, should it be attended by success. "While, on the contrary," he said, "as soon as France shall be delivered of him, we shall enjoy all the guarantees which secure forever a nation's wise liberty. Not only the king, but the princes who sit upon the steps of the throne, have entered into solemn engagements. They will never seek to violate them, nor will it be in their power to do so, the reverses from which they have for so long suffered having taught them that the greater their subjects, the higher is the pedestal on which rests the throne. Thus it is that political crises establish on stable foundations protecting governments, which conform to the rights and to the dignity of the human race."

Following this discourse came words of high praise for the king, and a cursory *exposé* of the great events which, after having for so many years condemned him to exile in a foreign land, had in the end restored him to France, in order that he should bring back with him peace, happiness, and freedom. He then portrayed the man who was coming once more to shake the foundations of all things.

For the purpose of warding off so many dangers, men of all parties should unite and forget their differences, and remember only that they were Frenchmen. "We will settle our quarrels afterwards," said M. Lainé; "let us to-day unite against the common enemy." The Chamber voted that the speech be printed, and that each member should receive six copies of it. It deserves to be read in its entirety even at the present time. From it can be gathered the condition of affairs in the country and the position in which the royal government then found itself; all the sentiments and fears agitating the public mind show in it; it is almost possible to hear the words of recrimination which were spoken in bated tones.

To fully understand such language in the mouth of a man

so deeply involved in the cause of royalism, it is necessary to know that M. Lainé, during the last months of the session, was the centre, not of an opposition, but of a group of men who deplored the errors committed, sought a remedy for them, and hoped for a great change in governmental methods. It was necessary for that to have a change of government, and all their efforts were directed towards this end. M. de Chateaubriand and M. Benjamin Constant belonged to this group, to which M. de La Fayette had been admitted. They spoke and wrote with this object in view; there is little doubt but that they flattered themselves up to the last moment that the evil done could be undone. Napoleon's progress might be arrested, if men able to inspire the country with confidence were but called into the ministry. Such illusions were unworthy of men of experience. Given the existing state of affairs, these men were to be looked upon as political theorists rather than statesmen. This explains how M. Benjamin Constant went so far, on the very last day, as to insert in his newspaper an article signed by himself, wherein he did not scruple to hurl invectives at Napoleon and all those who might go over to him. In those days, he thought himself proof against such weakness.¹

It was during this period that M. de La Fayette reassumed a political rôle which one might have thought he had renounced. The aversion he had always shown to the Empire, as well as to the Emperor, although the latter had rescued him from captivity at Olmütz, is well known.

¹ I have since learnt that the article had been inspired, not to say ordered, by Mme. Récamier. The sway she exercised at that time over M. Benjamin Constant was all the greater that it might be declared of their relations what has so appropriately been said in regard to those existing between Laura and Petrarch:—

“ L'amour qu'elle inspira fut sa seule faveur.”

Faithful to his principles, he had never seen in him but liberty's most deadly foe. On hearing of the Emperor's landing, he hastened to Paris, ready to add his efforts to those which might be made to repulse him; but, at the same time, he was, more than any one, convinced that the primary condition of an effectual and strenuous resistance was to be found in the pledges to be given by the House of Bourbon that it was frankly and sincerely prepared to re-enter upon a constitutional path. His friends had proposed, as the best pledge that could be given, that he should be taken into the Cabinet, or at least have a seat in the Chamber of Peers. This pretension is most clearly set forth in the work published by M. Benjamin Constant on the Hundred Days. They entertained no doubt that such an act of justice, rendered at last to the hero of 1789, would have a universally gratifying effect. I know it as a fact that they succeeded in getting the proposition brought to the king's notice, who probably put but little faith in this means of salvation. I cannot, in this connection, charge him with any lack of perspicacity, for, outside of M. de La Fayette's coterie, nobody in France dreamt of him, and he lived completely hidden from the public gaze.

The addresses of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Chamber of Peers were presented to the king on the 17th. After the usual protestations of loyalty, after the enumeration of the efforts which the nation and all generous minds were prepared to make, came the following sentence: "But, Sire, these heartfelt protestations would not alone suffice, and we beseech Your Majesty to permit us to suggest the means which we consider most proper to revive the hopes of the nation. While the Chambers will bring to the assistance of the government which is to save France the strength of the whole nation, your faithful subjects are persuaded that the government will direct all its efforts to

the common weal, by placing its faith in men both energetic and moderate, whose names alone shall prove a guarantee of the interests of all and calm all anxieties; in men, who, having been repeatedly the defenders of the principles of justice enshrined in the heart of Your Majesty, and which constitute the nation's patrimony, are jointly and severally responsible for the stability of the throne and the principles which the public enemy comes to annihilate."

It would have been difficult to express more plainly the request for a change of ministry; it might even be read between the lines that M. de La Fayette himself was designated in this sentence. The king answered: "I am much gratified at the expression of the sentiments of the Chamber of Deputies and at the co-operation it promises me in these troublous times. For my part, the Chamber may rest assured that the instruments I shall employ will ever be as worthy of the country's trust as of my own."

Is it to be concluded from these words that Louis XVIII. was inclined to derive benefit from the lesson or admonition read him? I cannot say. At any rate, events followed in such rapid succession that the time was not left to him to give any serious thought to the matter.

On the 17th, the *Moniteur* gave the following bulletin: "Most recent news justifies the belief that Bonaparte left Lyons on the 13th, wending his way towards Mâcon and Châlon. The combined dispositions, which we have already made known, are there to prove that this movement had been foreseen. Marshal Ney, who was watching him, is in active pursuit of him."

On the 18th, Marshal Macdonald was appointed commander-in-chief of the army which was gathering for the defence of the capital, under the orders of the Duc de Berry. Then followed a long article, which asserted in the most positive fashion that the demonstrations which had

burst forth in several cities in favor of Napoleon had been promptly suppressed; it was even hinted that Lyons had, subsequent to his leaving it, shaken off the yoke he had temporarily imposed on it, and had returned to its allegiance to the king. It was, moreover, stated as a fact, that his soldiers, especially in the cavalry, were deserting him in large numbers.

On the very eve of the catastrophe, the effect of all these mendacious reports, all these clumsy concealments of the truth, were only to cast into the deepest state of despondency those whom they deceived for a few hours only. Yet I am not prepared to say that marks of mistaken zeal were not given in some few localities by a handful of faithful friends; but their number was small in comparison with the mass, which remained inert, as if plunged in stupor.

In Paris, the National Guard, which *Monsieur* reviewed, received him very well. Some few *légions* responded to the appeals of their commanders, and furnished a good many loyal volunteers. It would, therefore, not have been impossible, if the soldiers of the line had remained loyal, to win over the entire National Guard. This was one of the means of defence which Napoleon had most cause to dread, because it was one which would have jeopardized his position in the eyes of the better part of the community. The greatest amount of zeal was shown by the students; this deserves to be noted. These youths were, at this early date, animated by the sentiments they have since made manifest on so many occasions. If they showed themselves so disposed to repulse Napoleon, it was principally because they considered him incompatible with liberty.

The brief administration of the new Prefect of Police was hardly signalized, except by his clumsy attempt to arrest M. Fouché. This measure was as ill-conceived as it was badly executed. No one was less dangerous than he at that

time; there did not exist a man less likely to enjoy the confidence and reliance of Napoleon or of his friends. He was still in frequent communication with the Court of the Tuileries; if I am not mistaken, he had, three days previously, had a secret interview with M. de Blacas, at the residence of the Duc de Dalberg, in the rue d'Anjou. M. Fouché escaped over the walls of his garden, and sought a refuge in the residence of Queen Hortense, whose mansion adjoined his own. He remained in concealment there until after the 20th of March, and thus found himself, as a matter of course, once more enrolled among the partisans of the imperial régime.

On the 19th, the *Moniteur* informed the public that Napoleon had left Autun on the 16th, continuing to disseminate along his path falsehoods, acts of corruption, and appeals to perjury and calumny. "At one time," it was said, "he impugns the honor of the marshals, whose integrity is too well known and too solidly established, publishing proclamations he alleges to have been made by them; at another, he tells the most absurd fables, such as the departure of the king from Paris, and the uprising of the capital."

The passage on the proclamations referred to those of Marshal Ney, which Napoleon had taken good care to scatter broadcast, and which the government, which was so far without any official confirmation of them, made a pretence of not crediting. Vain efforts! In spite of the addresses and protestations of loyalty which the *Moniteur* continued to record, the defection of Marshal Ney and his army was known beyond all doubt. Which of the two had led away the other? It would, even to-day, be difficult to settle this question with any degree of certainty. Everything became known at Marshal Ney's trial; nothing more serious or decisive could have happened. The official news of it reached the government on the evening of the 18th; it

was also learnt that the Old Guard, commanded by Marshal Oudinot, had mutinied at Troyes, and raised the imperial colors; and lastly, that the army, gathered on the Fontainebleau road, was preparing to follow the example set by that of Marshal Ney; that already several regiments were on their way to join the Emperor.

I learnt these particulars on the 19th, at early morn, from M. de Vitrolles, who also informed me that the king's departure was fixed for the same evening. His Majesty was going to withdraw to Lille, together with *Monsieur* and the Duc de Berry, indulging in the hope that, if the garrison of that town remained loyal to him, he could hold out there long enough for foreign help to come to his assistance. The Duc de Bourbon was to leave for La Vendée, which his presence would contribute to arouse, and which would doubtless on this occasion show itself worthy of what it had been during the days of its heroic struggle with the revolutionary forces. Much was expected from the influence which the Duc and Duchesse d'Angoulême seemed to be exercising in the South. Bonaparte would thus find himself surrounded in the centre of France, the foreign armies would soon cross our frontiers, and he would not be able to prolong his resistance for any length of time.

Such was the plan unrolled to me by M. de Vitrolles on the morning of the 19th! It was, perhaps, tolerably well conceived, but it rested on a hypothesis in which it was hard for me to repose much faith. I knew France too well not to consider as almost a certainty, that all opposition, even that of the most distant departments, would soon be overcome by the occupation of the capital; that all opposition would, moreover, be rendered futile by the defection of the entire army, which would, as a mass, follow the impulse given. In my eyes, the whole question was to know what course would be adopted by the armies of the coalition, and

with what amount of energy they would enter upon the new war. Now, there were, in this respect, only great probabilities, but no certainty.

M. de Vitrolles also imparted to me his personal views. It was his intention to leave at the same time as the king, and to go to Bordeaux, with a view of informing the Duchesse d'Angoulême of all it was proper she should know, then to go and join the Duc d'Angoulême, and direct his efforts towards organizing with him a government in a position to put into operation the resources which were still available. He assured me that he was to receive from the king, previous to his departure, the most extended powers. These powers were never given him. He strongly urged me to accompany him; I declined; in the first place, because I had very little faith in the success of his enterprise, although I was most careful not to tell him so, and next, because if I could be of any service to the royal cause, it would, in all probability, be in the part of France where I was known, where I was held in some regard, and where I had friends. He could not but help admitting that I was right, and pointed out to me that I might be incurring great dangers, as I might be made to feel the weight of Bonaparte's ire. "I do not believe this will happen at the outset," I replied; "at any rate, I possess the means of being informed in time of any such danger."

On leaving him, I felt considerably in doubt as to the course I should pursue. My mind was fully made up on one point only, and that was not to leave France except as a last resource. It was a Sunday. I went to the Tuileries at mass time. A large concourse of people was gathered in the *salon*, some attracted thither by motives of genuine and tender interest, many others from a desire to be informed of the progress of events. Few of those present knew that the departure of the king was fixed for the same

evening; those who were cognizant of the fact kept it to themselves. I saw the king and the princes pass through the *salons*, as was their wont, on their way to the chapel. They bore up bravely in spite of the melancholy overshadowing their faces. The Duc de Berry stopped as he came to where I stood, and grasped my hands in a way which meant good by. There could be no doubt that he knew that I was informed as to what was to happen. M. de Blacas, who was following the king and could not leave him, made very significant signs to me, while, to crown all, the Abbé de Montesquiou begged me to call upon him after mass. I did so, when he repeated to me all that M. de Vitrolles had told me in the morning, with this difference, that, whereas the latter was still dreaming of contesting the ground, the Abbé looked upon the cause of the House of Bourbon as irretrievably lost. He told me to come and see him again in the course of the evening, at the house of his niece, Mme. de Fezensac; he reckoned upon leaving his official residence after dinner-time, and intended to take his departure from her residence during the night.

I was punctual in keeping this appointment; we spoke together for a long time, and quite unreservedly. He laid before me all his reasons for no longer entertaining any hopes; I told him in turn that I did not know what would become of the House of Bourbon, that this would depend on the support it might receive at the hands of the foreign sovereigns; it was entirely within the possibilities, and I would not be surprised thereat, that they might leave it to its fate, but I added that, as to Napoleon, it might well happen that in spite of his early and brilliant success, he might have to contend, when re-establishing himself on the throne, with many more difficulties than people imagined, the public mind having, since his departure, drifted into a channel which he least anticipated; that if he was vigor-

ously attacked by the coalition, I had serious doubts as to any great sacrifices being made to support him. The Abbé de Montesquiou was so fully persuaded that there was nothing more to be done on behalf of the princes whose fortunes he was about to follow, that, when referring to my personal affairs, he strongly urged upon me to retain, if possible, the administration of the *ponts et chaussées*. I replied that this would be neither feasible nor dignified, and that I should consider myself fortunate if I were allowed to pass my days in peace in my humble home.

The Chancellor, previous to leaving Paris, and while passing through the town of Rouen to reach the port whence he embarked, spoke in a similar strain to all the members of the magistracy who approached him, urging upon all of them to remain at their posts. Among them was his brother-in-law, *premier président* of the *cour royale* of Rouen, who was careful to heed advice given in so high a quarter.

I will not undertake to paint the agitation of the public mind during the crisis intervening between the moment the departure of the king was resolved upon and the one when the château of the Tuileries was peaceably occupied by Napoleon. Once more was it necessary to start afresh. The whole of the 19th was spent in preparations for the departure, or rather flight. All the precautions which there was time to take were had recourse to in the ministerial and public departments, to hide from the prying eyes of the new-comers the knowledge of what it was of most importance to conceal from them. But it was so hurriedly done that much forgetfulness was displayed, some of it most regrettable, even to the point of neglecting to remove from the king's closet memoranda and letters which there was every possible reason for burying in the deepest secrecy, and upon which Napoleon quickly laid hands immediately after his arrival.

M. Louis left about fifty millions in the coffers of the treasury. Whether he did this purposely, or inadvertently, he has, nevertheless, been severely criticised from both points of view. There was, according to all appearance, but little coin, while representative values, when once out of the treasury, might not be easy to realize. He doubtless looked upon these funds as the property of the state, and that they should remain at its disposal to meet public expenditures, such as, for instance, the payment of the arrears of the debt; but then, he has been censured for not having anticipated this payment, which would have been one way of leaving less funds at Napoleon's disposal. I do not know whether such a step would have been feasible, the creditors not being prepared for it, and there being no time wherein to warn them. What is not to be denied, is that, with the exercise of a little more foresight, it might at least have been easy, between the 5th and the 19th of March, to cause considerable sums to be transported to any of the towns to which it was likely the king would withdraw, to Lille, for example, or Rouen. This all tends to prove the illusions persisted in to the very eve of the catastrophe. The king took with him nothing but the funds which were in the coffers of his Civil List, and the Crown diamonds. He gave orders that the treasury should pay each of his ministers one hundred thousand francs, to meet the expenses imposed upon them by their flight. The money was refused by the Abbé de Montesquiou. I must not forget to mention among the precautions taken, the one of opening M. de Maubreuil's prison doors. M. de Bourrienne feared that he might make statements which, although mendacious, would have been none the less disagreeable to the royal government.

The king left on the night of the 19th. It is easy to conceive the disorder attendant upon this unlooked-for

retreat of a whole Court, which, only two days previously, was still indulging in so many illusions. At last, all passed away during the night, and, on the morn of the 20th, solitude reigned in the château, in the courtyards of the Tuileries, in the surrounding barracks, in the ministerial offices, and in many of the mansions of the Faubourg Saint-Germain. There was something sinister about this solitude; and anxious expectancy could be read on all faces. Napoleon's partisans were, it is true, beginning to show themselves, but they were not yet in sufficient numbers to stir up the population to any appreciable degree.

In spite of my being firmly resolved upon not leaving France, I thought it advisable to ascertain how matters were progressing, so I wrote to M. de La Valette, whom I had not seen for three weeks, but I was too well acquainted with his character not to feel assured that I could place reliance in him. I therefore asked his advice. My intention was to retire to my estate near Le Mans, but it was absolutely necessary that I should spend a few days in Paris to set my private affairs in order. I asked him if I could do so in all safety. M. de La Valette replied that he would call upon me within a couple of hours. The conversation we had on this occasion is too important for me not to give it as literally as my memory will enable me to do.

Reluctant as he was to assume the responsibility of counselling me in so delicate a circumstance, he had paid a visit to M. de Cambacérès, and being persuaded of the kindly feelings of the latter towards me, had not hesitated showing him my letter. After both of them had given some thought to the gravity of the question which I had put to him, they had both come to the conclusion that it was impossible to foresee what course the Emperor would follow; all the dictates of prudence advised him to make

use of extreme moderation; this would certainly be the advice tendered him by all those he would summon immediately upon his arrival. It was not to be presumed, therefore, that he would, especially during the first days, indulge in any violent measures; hence, both of them were inclined to believe that I could safely remain; besides, they promised me to keep a vigilant lookout for everything concerning me, and to give me timely warning in case of need.

M. de La Valette added that, were I to find myself in the slightest danger, I would ever find a place of refuge in his residence, and that it would subsequently be an easy matter for him to facilitate my leaving Paris. After having thanked him for this fresh proof of his friendship, and frankly told him that I would, if necessary, avail myself of his invitation, I added that I would all the more trust to his protection in that he was about to enjoy the highest influence, that it could not be otherwise, after the part he had assuredly taken in the great events of which we were just witnessing the accomplishment.

"To what part do you refer?" was his reply.—"But it is doubtless you who have kept up an uninterrupted correspondence with the Emperor, and informed him of everything that was taking place; it is doubtless what you told him which has guided his decision in returning?"—"You are entirely mistaken," was his rejoinder; "if such were the case, not only would there be to-day no reason for me to conceal the fact, but I might even boast loudly of it. Well, then, I declare to you on my oath that, since the Emperor's departure, I have written but one letter to him, a New Year's day letter, and that not having any means at my disposal to ensure its reaching him, I forwarded it to the postmaster at Lyons, acting on the supposition that he would find means of sending it to its destination. I cannot say whether the letter was ever received, for I have not

received any answer to it."—"But who, then, if it was not you, can have supplied him with the information with which he has assuredly been furnished?"—"It must doubtless be the Duc de Bassano," he answered thereupon; then he went on to say, smiling the while: "But you must not, for all that, run away with the idea that I was not plotting. It is even for the very reason that I was plotting, and actively at that, that I have ceased seeing you, for I did not want you to penetrate my secret, much less risk compromising you."—"But then, it is all one, or very nearly so. You will enjoy all the more merit for having plotted of your own volition, and without any orders."—"This would truly hold good, if I had plotted to his advantage, as you seem to imagine, but such was certainly not the motive which inspired us."—"How then! Such was not your guiding motive? What the deuce was then the conspiracy into which you went and poked yourself?"—"Into the one of the North, that to which belonged d'Erlon, Lallemand, Desnoëttes."—"What is that you say? Were not all these generals about to go and throw themselves into the arms of Napoleon?"—"Not one bit of it, and it is even the news of his landing and his rapid success that thwarted and upset everything."—"But what was your object?"—"We intended going to Paris, where reliable friends were awaiting us; we should have carried off the king, together with all the members of his family near him at the time, and we should have once more politely transported them across the frontier."—"And then?"—"We should have given France a sovereign who would have held his crown from the nation, and not from the foreigner."—"Where, then, would you have found this sovereign?"—"Who can tell? Perhaps the Duc d'Orléans, if he had only showed proper understanding and reason. Such a sovereign would of necessity have had to be sincerely constitutional, and I do

not think that he would have aroused any alarm in Europe, which would certainly not have rushed to arms for the mere sake of Louis XVIII."

Our conversation here came to an end. The revelations it contains, made as they were at such a juncture, cannot be suspected as lacking in truthfulness; they cast, unless I am mistaken, an unexpected light on the dispositions and events of the period, even on the most difficult aspect of the situation in which Napoleon was soon to find himself.

The *Moniteur* which appeared on the forenoon of the 20th was still the product of the editorship of the royal government; it contained, by way of farewell, a proclamation bearing date of the day previous; the king announced his departure, rendered necessary, it was said, by the defection of a portion of the army, which had sworn to defend his throne. "The present crisis," he was made to say, "will pass away; we are comforted by the presentiment that the soldiers who have gone astray, and whose defection abandons our subjects to such great dangers, will not be long in admitting their mistake. Our indulgence and kindly feeling will be the reward of their return to duty. We will soon return among our good subjects, bringing with us peace and happiness once more."

The Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies were next prorogued until 1815. The peers and the deputies were ordered to meet at as early a date as possible wherever the provisional government should establish its residence. Any and every meeting of either Chamber held anywhere else was declared null and illegal. His Majesty, when signing this document, must have regretted the rash declaration which he had seen fit to make three days earlier, in the Chamber of Deputies, when he had recalled his sixty years, and had bound himself to end his career by dying for his people!

All confidence had now vanished, and deep was the state of discouragement of all! I saw many Royalists and *émigrés* in the course of that memorable forenoon, but I did not come across a single one who did not believe that all was irretrievably lost, and that we should never again see the House of Bourbon. Three months later, many of them felt no hesitation in boasting of their energy, of their attachment, of their loyalty, of their unwavering faith in the ultimate triumph of the cause of legitimacy; had my testimony been then invoked, I could, in all conscience, have testified to their profound dejection only.

It was strongly urged upon me, in the course of the same forenoon, to place a safe distance between Paris and myself without delay, and even to leave France. M. Mounier and M. Anglès, who had both made up their minds to leave the same evening, spared no efforts to convince me that I could not without danger venture to face Napoleon's return. I replied to them that emigration was repugnant to me, and that I would not resort to such an expedient except as a last resource. I knew, moreover, from the experience I had gone through during the worst days of the Terror, that with friends, of which I had plenty, it would be an easy matter to elude the first searches. I nevertheless took advantage of the offer of M. Mounier, who, still convinced as he was that I should soon be compelled to cross the border, was good enough to lend me his aid in procuring valuable letters of credit. With that object in view, he introduced me to a banker with whom he was on excellent terms. This was M. Casimir Périer, like himself a native of Dauphiné. M. Périer showed himself most obliging, and, without my depositing any funds with him, sent me in the course of the day letters of credit for Belgium, England, and Holland. I did not ever have occasion to avail myself of them, but the service was nevertheless rendered in a most gracious manner.

It was for me a matter of duty, ere taking my departure, to call on M. de Cambacérès, and thank him for the friendly sentiment he had displayed towards me in his conversation with M. de La Valette. He received me most kindly, but I found him in a state of great agitation, and the prey of all the anxieties against which as timid a character as his own could not fight on the approach of perilous circumstances. He felt that he would inevitably be compelled to fill some part in the new state of affairs; he was alarmed at such a contingency, and allowed his profound irritation against the royal government to burst forth, with a virulence in proportion to the efforts he had made until then to conceal and repress it. "Would you believe it, that to crown all," he said to me, "they have gone so far as to strike out my name in an ordinance already signed on the composition of the *Académie française*!" What gave him special offence was that this act of severity could only be explained by the qualification of regicide, once more given to him, in spite of his incessant efforts to repulse it. He believed he had cleared himself of the charge. It will be remembered that the Abbé de Montesquiou had been of valuable assistance to him near the king in this respect; and yet, it was the Abbé de Montesquiou who was the author of the ordinance.

The Court, it was plain, had become more severely disposed towards him. It was not difficult for him to convince me that he had been unacquainted with the plans of the Emperor; his prudent circumspection was too well known for the risk being incurred of taking him into one's confidence in the slightest degree; but I clearly saw that his faith in the future was of the weakest. "All may yet go well," he said to me, "if the Empress is allowed to come to him; it will be proof that Austria still stands by him, but if they keep her away from him. . . ." I had nothing further to ask him.

On reaching my official residence, I was inflicted with a call from the notorious Veyrat, whose expulsion from Paris had given me so much trouble, and who had been the cause of a painful scene between *Monsieur* and myself. His protectors at the château had obtained leave for him to return, shortly after I had left the Prefecture of Police; his place had not been restored to him, and he thought the present occasion a good one to recover it. He claimed that he was commissioned by the Duc de Rovigo, Minister of Police, to replace the white flag which flew over the doors of all the public departments by the tricolor flag. When he presented himself at the building occupied by the *ponts et chaussées*, he had already succeeded in having this change made at several of the public offices. With characteristic effrontery, he made his way into my closet, and informed me, with a haughty mien, of the object of his mission. I gave him as my reply that, if the Duc de Rovigo was Minister of Police, I was assuredly no longer director of *ponts et chaussées*, and had no longer any orders to give. The Duc de Rovigo has since then asserted that he had not given any order, but it is hard for me to believe in the truthfulness of this denial.

CHAPTER VIII

Napoleon at the Tuileries—Impression produced at Vienna by the news of his landing at Cannes—Declaration of the powers (November 13, 1815)—It contradicts the assertions of the Emperor, who claimed to have an understanding with Austria—Formation of a ministry—M. Fouché given the portfolio of Police; M. Carnot appointed Minister of the Interior—M. Molé firmly declines a ministerial position, and once more takes the place of director of *ponts et chaussées*—Frequent intercourse between M. Pasquier and M. de La Valette; the latter exhibits considerable anxiety concerning the conduct of General Lion, whose duty it is to exercise surveillance over the march of the king's escort—M. Réal, Prefect of Police, notifies M. Pasquier that he is ordered into exile—M. Regnaud intercedes in the name of the Council of State with the Emperor for his colleague, but Napoleon remains inflexible—M. Pasquier asks M. Fouché for a respite—The latter looks upon Napoleon as a lost man, and reveals his preference for a return of the Bourbons—M. Pasquier writes to the Emperor, protesting against being sent into exile; his letter remains unanswered—He takes leave of M. Regnaud, who confides to him his anxiety in regard to the future—Declaration of the Council of State—MM. Chauvelin and Molé refuse to subscribe to it—M. Pasquier takes leave of the Duc de Bassano, who expresses his dissatisfaction at his appointment of minister without portfolio—M. de Vicence still more pessimistic; he considers the situation beyond all hope—The royal family leaves France—Letter of the Duc d'Orléans to the generals under his command—M. B. Constant, after a short journey through La Vendée, returns to Paris, and rallies to the Imperial Government—M. Pasquier leaves for Maine.

NAPOLEON arrived in Paris between nine and ten o'clock at night. The noisy return of a general borne on the shoulders of his soldiers by torchlight, and the gloomy and silent departure of the aged crowned man, compelled to fly, his only weapons of defence being the tears of his servitors, have been boldly limned by M. Alexandre de Laborde. An

eye-witness, he seems to have felt an equal interest in being present at both these scenes, so diversely emotional. I invite those who are not acquainted with his narrative to peruse it, as there is nothing that can take the place of the vivid picture, painted by a man of wit, who tells on the impulse of the moment of facts which have stirred his heart-strings.

The fresh and last reign of Napoleon dates only from the moment of his reappearance in the capital; from the time of his landing up to that time, he had only had an army; from now on, he had a government.

What was actually his position in the eyes of the foreigner? What was the effect produced by his return to France, and what was the determination the congress had come to in regard to him?

The news of his landing at Cannes had reached Vienna very quickly, by way of Italy. Great was the excitement; it was difficult not to believe that this audacious enterprise had been undertaken in conjunction with the declaration made by Murat, in regard to the eighty thousand men he intended to set in motion. Thus, Italy, as well as France, might at any moment become ablaze. Austria would be more in danger than any other power. A common sentiment soon made all of one mind; all felt equally that were Bonaparte to triumph, that were he to once more be seated on the throne of France, there could no longer be any hope of peace or rest for Europe. The moderation, which he might perhaps display during the first months of his triumph, would necessarily vanish as soon as his army was in proper condition, and the eagle would once more resume its flight. It would, indeed, be fortunate if he should for a while consent to go no further than the bank of the Rhine. Austria, in spite of family ties, in spite of the irritation and dissatisfaction she could not help being a prey to, was

not long in comprehending that the support she had given to the coalition in the two recent campaigns would be all the less forgiven her by the husband of Marie-Louise, that he had for so long reckoned on the effects of this alliance, and that sooner or later the day of vengeance would dawn.

M. de Talleyrand and M. de Pozzo cleverly exploited this idea; on the 13th of March, they succeeded in forcing from the eight signatory powers of the Treaty of Paris a declaration, wherein it was said: "By thus violating the engagement, in virtue of which he was pledged to remain in the Isle of Elba, Bonaparte has destroyed the only legal claim to his existence. By reappearing in France with subversive and troublous projects, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has made manifest to the face of the universe that there can be neither peace or truce with him."

The powers were fully persuaded, it went on to say (it was good policy to make a display of this conviction) that all France would rally to its legitimate sovereign, and would quickly crush this final attempt of a criminal and powerless delirium. They simultaneously announced that if, contrary to every probability, any danger was likely to emanate from this happening, they were prepared to give the King of France, the French nation, or any other government which might be attacked, the aid necessary to re-establish public tranquillity. They would unite against all who should seek to jeopardize it. In consequence, Napoleon Bonaparte was declared an outlaw, as the enemy and disturber of the world's peace, and handed over to public vengeance.

It was necessary that this declaration should be sown broadcast, and so no efforts were spared to introduce it into France. The royal government awaited it with the liveliest impatience, for M. de Talleyrand had notified it about it; but the rapidity of Napoleon's march had thwarted all plans. The document did not reach Strasburg until the

18th, and could consequently not have been known in Paris at the time of the king's departure. Nevertheless, Strasbourg had seen it, the messenger having received orders to circulate it along his route. It was impossible that the whole of France should not know of it in a very short while, and it would constitute a cruel denial of the report circulated by Napoleon that an understanding existed between him and Austria, and that the Empress Marie-Louise was to be sent back to him. In order that this report should gain more credit, he had, during his short stay at Lyons, rendered a decree dissolving the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies. In addition to this, he had summoned to Paris, for the month of May, the electoral colleges of the departments, to sit as an extraordinary assembly of the *Champ de mai*. A modification of the constitution of the Empire, the crowning of the Empress and of the Prince Imperial, were then to be proceeded with.

On the day following his arrival, there appeared in the *Moniteur* his so justly famed proclamations of the Gulf of Juan, his addresses to the residents of the departments of the Drôme and of the Isère, and to the citizens of Grenoble and of Lyons, besides a series of acts dated from the latter city. Nevertheless, I cannot help considering it as certain that several of these decrees were not drawn up until after his arrival in Paris, and that he saw proper to antedate them, in order to inculcate the belief that it had not been necessary for him to reach his capital in order to seize the reins of government.

He was soon beset with difficulties, which he was far from anticipating; they were of a nature to make plain to him what little faith was placed in the fulness of his triumph in the minds of the men whose judgment was of the highest import to him. He had hardly entered the Palace of the Tuileries, when he sent for those men on whom he

thought he could depend, for the purpose of giving them places in his Cabinet. Among them were M. de Cambacérès, the Duc de Vicence, M. Molé, and almost all his former ministers. Part of the night was spent in having a talk with each one of them. M. de Cambacérès declared that the state of his health rendered him totally unfit for attending to public affairs, and urgently entreated that he should not be forced out of a complete withdrawal from public life, a withdrawal which had in his case become an absolute necessity. He had doubtless been strengthened in this resolution by the revelation made, in the first few words uttered by the Emperor, that there did not exist any understanding between himself and Austria, that his hope that the Empress would return did not rest on any formal document, and was merely based on suppositions. I knew one of the persons who were at his house when he returned from the château, and to whom he confided the disagreeable discovery he had made.

In the meanwhile, Napoleon would take no denial from M. de Cambacérès, and had said to him: "We will arrange this to-morrow morning." The next day he saw his name in the *Moniteur* as Prince Archchancellor of the Empire, entrusted with the portfolio of Justice, but a coadjutor had been given to him to relieve him of the cares of the correspondence, and this coadjutor, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, was not the one he would have chosen.

Other decrees appointed the Duc de Gaëte, Minister of Finance; the Duc de Bassano, Minister without portfolio; the Duc Decrès, Minister of Marine; the Duc d'Otrante, Minister of the General Police of the Empire; Count Mollien, Minister of the Treasury;¹ Prince d'Eckmühl, Min-

¹ I am indebted to M. Mollien for a circumstance which is worth recording. At the first conversation he held with Napoleon, he received a proof that a portion of the illusions in which he had doubtless indulged had

ister of War; the Duc de Rovigo, Chief Inspector of *gendarmerie*; Count de Bondy, Prefect of the Seine; and M. Réal, Prefect of Police. Thus it will be seen that the Ministries of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs were still to be filled.

So here was M. Fouché once more Minister of Police! The persecution he had suffered during the past few days had doubtless helped him to obtain this mark of favor; moreover, his appointment, as also that of M. Réal, was a pledge given to the men of the Revolution, just as had been the case on the 18th Brumaire. The Duc de Rovigo was sorely disappointed, but then he was one of those men in whom perfect security can always be felt and who cannot say nay when their services are called for.

The two vacant ministries had been, during the night, the subject of a bootless negotiation between the Emperor, the Duc de Vicence, and M. Molé. The Duc de Vicence, following the example of M. de Cambacérès, declared that he would no longer shoulder the burden of public affairs. He did not conceal from Napoleon, that he considered he had paid his debt to him by the zeal he had displayed in serving him up to the time of his departure from Fontainebleau, adding that he did not consider himself held to encounter the risks of an undertaking as beset with difficulties as the one in which he saw fit to plunge, and one which he would assuredly not have counselled. His resistance must have been of a most pronounced type, for the Emperor for a moment despaired of overcoming it, which is proved by the propositions he made to others. M. Molé tendered the same excuse as the Archchancellor, and fell

vanished. M. Mollien, who was by nature inclined to pay compliments, had not neglected congratulating him on the brilliant welcome shown him on his lengthy journey through France from Cannes to Paris. "Do not make any mistake, my dear sir," was his reply; "they simply suffered me to come, as they suffered the other fellows to leave."

back on the state of his health, which was truly rather poor. "I see what it is," said the Emperor; "the Ministry of Justice would be tedious to you; well then, take the Interior." — "This one is still more fatiguing, Sire, and it would be altogether impossible for me to bear the burden of it." The conversation between them was a long and animated one. Finally, M. Molé was dismissed, with orders to think the matter over, and to call again the following morning.

Next day, as he persisted in his refusal, the Emperor endeavored to tempt him with the offer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the one calling for the least hard work of all, and which would not prevent his going on a vacation to take the waters, if his health required it. M. Molé persisted in alleging that he was not in a condition to undertake any work requiring constant attention. Still, this excuse was not accepted; he was again dismissed, with the order to return on the following day, and an injunction to think the matter well over before giving final utterance to so strange a refusal. I saw him in the course of the forenoon, when he gave me all these particulars, fully determined not to embark upon a career so strewn with peril, and wherein, in the event of Napoleon's downfall, he would be compromising himself finally, and it would become impossible for him ever to be in favor again with the men to whom he was bound by the closest family ties and the most precious social intercourse.

The Ministry of the Interior was given to M. Carnot, who had just added to his former fame by his defence of Antwerp during the campaign of 1814. The Emperor was careful to place his meritorious action on record in a decree which simultaneously created him a Count of the Empire. But the defence of Antwerp was not M. Carnot's principal title to imperial favor; he had addressed to the king, as early as

in the foregoing month of July, a memoir, which had been circulated to an amazing extent throughout the whole of France. This memoir, which was somewhat ably drawn up, had been the signal for all the charges hurled at the royal government. It dwelt especially on the king's unfaithfulness to his promises, and even to the Charter granted by him. M. Carnot complained that the regicides were excluded from many public positions, in spite of the article of the Charter which set forth that no man should be held to account for past deeds. He had taken the opportunity of boldly undertaking their justification; he had plainly cast the blame of the crime of the death of Louis XVI. on the *émigrés* and on the mad war they had declared against France. Recalling the words spoken by Louis XVIII. to the Prince Regent of England, that "To him and to his nation was to be attributed, after divine Providence, the re-establishment of the House of Bourbon on the throne of its ancestors," he reminded him that he had not sought to take his seat on that throne at the call and consent of his people, but preferred holding his crown by right of birth or by divine right.¹ In a word, this document, one of the most curiously interesting of the period, was the justification of the Revolution, as well as an indictment of the government of the Restoration and of the king.

¹ So much was the memoir of M. Carnot considered as an indictment of the House of Bourbon that, during the Hundred Days, a report of it was issued and peddled throughout the streets of Paris on little carts bearing a placard giving its selling price, which was the lowest possible. M. Carnot, in a justificative memorandum which he published after the second Restoration, claimed that this second edition and the means employed to circulate it were not to be attributed to him, but that M. Fouché was solely responsible for it, and that he had not even deigned to ask his consent in the matter. Going still further, he insisted that his memoir had primarily been written for the king only, addressed to him personally, and had only seen the light of publication owing to an act of treachery emanating from the monarch's own closet. If the fact be true, it is at all events so improbable that it would require, in order to believe it, irrefutable proofs, which have never been produced.

The prospect of sitting with such a colleague was not of a nature to alter M. Molé's determination, and could but serve to strengthen him in it, so he persisted in his refusal. When he saw the Emperor next morning, the latter, losing all patience, dismissed him, saying: "Well then, sir, since such is the case, return to your former post, the *ponts et chaussées*." M. Molé did not dare to disobey so peremptory an order, conveyed in a tone which made him feel that Napoleon had fully made up his mind that his name should appear in the new government. He thought that no one, when seeing him descend from a ministerial position to functions of secondary order, could dream of the pressure that had been exercised on him. So it was that M. Molé came to inform me that he was stepping into my shoes.

I was in the habit of calling every morning, at seven o'clock, on M. de La Valette, at the General Post-office, where he had taken up his quarters. He informed me that there was already some talk of a decree of amnesty, from which were to be excluded a certain number of persons, but he believed he was right in stating that these exceptions bore on absentees, upon whom the government well knew it could not lay hands. As to the other persons who were more or less compromised, he still was under the impression that they had nothing to fear for the time being; a few might possibly be exiled to some little distance from the capital, but he thought that even that was hardly probable. He deplored the appointment of M. Fouché as Minister of Police, and could not help regretting that the Emperor should still venture to put his trust in a man of such character; nor did he conceal from me that the Emperor had sent for him on the previous day, in order to tender the portfolio of Foreign Affairs to him; he had declined it, alleging that he did not consider he possessed the qualifications necessary for so difficult a post. Thereupon the

Emperor had again pressed its acceptance on the Duc de Vicence, whose opposition he had succeeded in overcoming. The Cabinet was thus completed, but not, as is seen, without considerable trouble. It was a new experience for Napoleon, and one that must have profoundly disconcerted him, to find the tender of the highest proofs of his confidence so persistently rejected.

One morning, as I was talking with M. de La Valette, it was easy for me to perceive that he was a prey to the most unusual agitation; he had rung twice in the space of a quarter of an hour, enquiring each time if the estafette from the North had arrived. I begged him to explain to me, provided my question was not an indiscreet one, the cause of his impatience. By this time, the king would surely have reached Lille; had anything of importance happened in that town, where the troops had been placed in the position of declaring for or against him? The following is M. de La Valette's answer, which I must place on record, because it furnishes a striking proof of the elevation of his sentiments. "Great heavens!" he said; "I am informed that General Lion, at the head of the Chasseurs of the Guard, has received orders to go in pursuit of the king and his escort. The *compagnies rouges*, I believe, form the rear guard. Should they unfortunately be overtaken by General Lion, whom I know as a slasher incapable of generosity, he will sabre them down without mercy. The young men composing these companies are entirely unable to withstand his onslaught; nearly all of them belong to the best families of France; it will be a fearful misfortune, a general mourning. I will not enjoy a moment's rest so long as I do not know them to be in safety."

Such is the man whose life was furiously called for seven or eight months later by the very men in whose fate he was then exhibiting so generous an interest.

On the 23d, I received a call from M. Réal; I was out; he left word that he intended to come again, as it was urgent that he should see me; from my house, he went as far as the Place Vendôme, to the residence of M. Decazes.¹ I have since learnt that he called on the latter for the purpose of fulfilling towards him the mission he was about to perform towards myself. A quarter of an hour later he again called on me, and informed me that I was ordered into exile. I was free to go whither I pleased, provided it should be at a safe distance of forty leagues from Paris. He showed much consideration and courtesy in acquitting himself of his mission, which really seemed to cause him pain. I asked him if I was compelled to leave immediately, and if I might not be permitted to remain in Paris for a few days longer, in order to seek an apartment where Mme. Pasquier could stay during my absence. He replied that, so far as he was concerned, he would afford me every latitude I might desire, but that it was necessary I should see M. Fouché, who would deliver me my passport, and who alone could grant me a respite.

My former comrades of the Council of State were not slow in giving me proofs of their sympathy. On the following day, after this body had done obeisance to the Emperor, M. Regnaud, who had acted as its spokesman, told him, in the name of the entire Council, that it had learnt with the deepest regret of the severe treatment just meted out to M. Pasquier, an old colleague, towards whom all who had worked with him bore feelings of esteem and attach-

¹ M. Decazes, at that time a councillor at the *cour royale*, had just drawn attention to himself by energetically protesting against this court going in a body to the Tuileries for the purpose of congratulating Napoleon. This action of his is the first which brought him into prominence. Nothing in his past life and career had given any indication of such courageous devotion to the cause of royalty. He had doubtless derived it from the very intimate intercourse established between himself and M. Louis, through the medium of the latter's niece, Mlle. de Ligny.

ment. The Emperor, without showing any too great a displeasure, replied that there were examples it was necessary to make; that my defection had been one of the earliest and one of the most striking. My friends concluded from this answer of Napoleon's that he was not deeply incensed against me; that if I would only come forward of my own accord and offer to take service under him, it was pretty certain that my request would not be denied. M. Molé, more than any other, dwelt most strongly on this point, and undertook either to deliver a letter or to prefer a like request on my behalf; he strenuously urged upon me to adopt this course, and had recourse to all his adroitness of mind for the purpose of persuading me, but I persisted in my refusal.

M. de La Valette, whom I saw subsequently, and who understood me better, advised me not to submit without protest to being exiled. "You must not seem," he said to me, "when submitting to be treated as a guilty person, to admit such to be the case. This might, later on, be productive of the most serious consequences; were I in your place, I should write to the Emperor, and I would enter a strong complaint against an act which affects you most unjustly, and which has the appearance of singling you out from among so many others, to inflict upon you a penalty which you have not any more deserved than those who, like yourself, yielded to the force of circumstances." I told him that I would think the matter over, and I went to see M. Fouché.

The conversation which took place on this occasion, between M. Fouché and myself, is too interesting for me not to give it in full. As he had kept me waiting for some time in the antechamber to his closet, he apologized by saying: "I wished to be rid of a few importunates, before admitting you, as it is necessary that we should be able to

speak freely; let us go into the garden, where we will stand less chance of being interrupted." We had hardly made a few steps in the garden, when he said: "What is your idea of all this?"—"The question is a strange one, and whatever I may think, you do not imagine that I am going to take the Minister of Police into my confidence?"—"You might do worse; but, since you will not speak, I see full well that I must fain open the conversation, so I will tell you that that man has learnt nothing, and that he returns as much of a despot, as greedy of conquests, as mad, to sum up matters, as ever."—"How can you wish me to believe this," I replied with a smile, "after what the *Moniteur* has told us the day after his arrival? Have you not, like myself, read the beautiful words he gave utterance to on passing through Lyons, to wit: 'We must not forget that we have been the masters of nations; my rights are merely those of the nation; I will ever overlook everything that individuals have said or done since the taking of Paris.' In the face of such assurances, how can you expect me to feel the slightest alarm?"—"And nevertheless, following upon these fine words, he hardly reaches Paris, when he sends you into exile, you and many others; for at this very moment, he is perhaps engaged in signing a decree, whereby, as a sequel to the measures which he is taking against the House of Bourbon, — and these are natural enough, — he exiles to a distance of forty leagues from Paris all those who accepted ministerial positions under the royal government, all those who have formed part of the civil and military households of the king and of the princes, and so on. And he would, moreover, exact from all these individuals an oath of allegiance such as, he claims, is required by the laws, as if an oath thus imposed could bind any man of sense! Failing the taking of it, the whole gang will be subject to the surveillance of the political police, and the government will

be free to take against any one of them such measures as the safety of the state may demand. This is indeed, you will admit, a very characteristic way of overlooking the past, and a striking example of his respect for individual liberty.”¹—“These are all weighty matters, and I cannot permit myself to discuss them.”—“Come now, put aside such reserve, I am setting you the example; to crown all, I declare to you that, in spite of his assertion to the contrary, the whole of Europe is going to fall upon him; it is impossible for him to resist the onslaught, and within four months his fate will have been decided.”—“When this happens, you will find me resigned to it; but in good faith, sir, I do not see the object of the confidences you are making to me.”—“Well then, the time has now come for me to tell you. I ask for nothing better than the return of the Bourbons, only matters must be managed a little less clumsily than they were managed last year by Talleyrand; it will never do for everybody to be at their mercy. There must be conditions plainly laid down, and good and lasting pledges.”—“This is all very well, and I am in nowise opposed to all this; it will suit me as well as it does you, but what can I do towards it?”—“Nothing, just at present, but a great deal perhaps in a very short while. When the decisive moment comes, I shall need able and trustworthy men to second my efforts, men who shall inspire everybody, even the royal family, with confidence. Above all, there

¹ This decree was indeed rendered on the 25th, but it did not appear in the *Moniteur* and in the *Bulletin des lois* until the 3d of April. Two days previously, the amnesty decree had been inserted in the *Bulletin des lois*. It was dated from Lyons, but had most assuredly been finally indited in Paris. All the members of the provisional government were excluded from this amnesty, and also MM. Lynch, Mayor of Bordeaux, de La Rochejaquelein, de Vitrolles, Alexis de Noailles, the Duc de Raguse, Sosthène de La Rochefoucauld, Bourrienne, and Bellart, — all together thirteen persons. None of them, it is true, were, as M. de La Valette and myself had foreseen, within the reach of the government.

will be needed a man to carry and direct the city of Paris, for you must fully see that I will be compelled to get rid of that lunatic of a Réal, with whom he has saddled me. To be plain, you are the very man, and I am going to depend on you." — "You do me too great an honor; to tell you the truth, I am not inclined to run such great risks, and at this moment all I sigh for is rest; but since you show me such good-will, I will take advantage of it to inform you that I need, previous to taking my departure, a few days to set my affairs in order; I beg you will grant them to me, together with a passport which will enable me to go to my estate near Le Mans." — "Why, take as many days as you want, but in spite of your having turned a deaf ear, I feel sure that you have grasped my meaning fully; so then, you are free to depart. It cannot be otherwise for the present, but you must hold yourself in readiness to return at the first summons. You are on a footing of intimacy with Mme. de Vaudémont; leave your address with her; I will beg her to write to you, in due time." — "Since you thus pave the way for me, I will avail myself of it in a month's time, not with so serious an object in view, but to beg your permission to pass through Paris, on my way to Mont-Dore, the waters of which my physician advises me to take." — "Splendid! Anything you please; here is our means of corresponding all established. I will send you your passport; take your own time as regards the days you need prior to leaving." — "I shall avail myself of this permission, but in a moderate way, as, in spite of your protection, the Emperor, even according to what you have just told me, might very well arrest me bodily, if my presence, by prolonging itself, gave him umbrage; I have no desire of residing between four walls, for what I need above all is to enjoy full liberty." — "As to that, I am of your opinion, and indeed, I have shown it; but why also do you allow

yourself to be exiled?" — "That is an amusing question! What means have I to prevent it?" — "A very simple one; write to him, and ask him to be allowed to once more take your seat in the Council of State. He will only be too glad to grant your request; do you not think that he hates me still more than he does you, and yet I am his minister!" — "All very well for you, who are clever enough to keep up such a position; personally, it would be totally impossible for me to do so." — "So-so, I see what is the matter with you; you feel scrupulous, and there is the loyalty, with which you at present pride yourself, towards the House of Bourbon, as if, for the purpose of doing something really useful to those whom one seeks to serve, it is not necessary, above all things, to put one's shoulder to the wheel. Of what use would you have been last April, I pray you tell me, if you had not been Prefect of Police?" — "Circumstances, even at very short intervals," I replied, "do not resemble each other, and my present obligations are of an entirely different nature from those of last year; I have fully determined what course to pursue."

After thinking matters over, I did not see anything in the way of following the advice given to me by M. de La Valette, to write to the Emperor. My letter was handed to him by the chamberlain-in-waiting, M. de Beauvau, who was kind enough to render me this service. I told the Emperor that I had served him faithfully up to the day when it had been demonstrated to me that the interests of my fellow-citizens, whose security was entrusted to me, as well as those of my whole country, demanded that I should adopt the only course which, in those days, could ward off from them the greatest evils. I had not indulged in any action which might give him personal offence, and I had never forgotten what I owed to him who had called me to a position of the highest trust.

My letter remained unanswered; I neither expected nor desired any answer. Napoleon expected something totally different from me; he was desirous of seeing me solicit in person the honor of once more serving him. I went and took leave of M. Regnaud, and expressed my gratitude to him. He also suggested that I should take such a step, in order to re-enter the Council of State, guaranteeing that my request would be favorably entertained. On my refusing to take it, he told me that, in his opinion, I was perhaps pursuing the best course, "For, after all," he said to me, "matters are not as bright and as safe as many folks imagine. True it is that the king and his family have been compelled to go across the frontier, and in spite of the troops having respected his person, their attitude conclusively proved to him that it would not be prudent for him to remain in Lille for over twenty-four hours." (I had already received the foregoing particulars from M. de La Valette.) "On the other hand, the Duc d'Angoulême is meeting with some degree of success in the South. Who can tell whether he will not in his turn arrive at Lyons. Again, the Duchesse d'Angoulême is at Bordeaux, while La Vendée and Brittany are threatening to bestir themselves. If for its part the coalition holds together, if it makes a prompt and vigorous attack, God knows what will happen! The Emperor's lines are not cast in pleasant ways, and he will have much to do to render his position secure."

Just as he was finishing speaking, his wife entered his closet, accompanied by one or two women cousins. They had come in an outburst of joy, to inform him that a young man who was related to them had been appointed orderly officer to the Emperor. He received this bit of news with every outward appearance of satisfaction, but looking at me the while in a most significant manner.

I have never regretted for a single moment having pur-

sued the course dictated by reason and delicacy. If the slightest hesitation could have remained in my mind, I should have been completely freed from it by the perusal of the declaration of the Council of State, published in the issue of the *Moniteur* of the 27th. It was assuredly the most bitter and offensive, while at the same time the most skilfully indited, the strongest in deductions, that it was possible to draw up against the House of Bourbon. It was insisted upon that each one of the members of the Council should subscribe to it; for that purpose, it was even taken round to the residences of those who had not been present at the sitting at which the matter had been resolved upon.

Two Councillors of State declined to give their adhesion to it; to wit: M. Chauvelin and M. Molé. The latter had taken part in the debate; he left the Council before its adjournment, and wrote to the Emperor next day to explain his conduct. "The debate of the Council began," he wrote, "with a formal recognition of the principle of the sovereignty of the people; now, I know of none more dangerous and more subversive of all its powers; I rejected it in days gone by, and I can no more countenance it nowadays than formerly, for I consider it equally opposed to the rights and interests of the Emperor and to those of all the sovereigns of the world." The Emperor contented himself with this reason; he did not wish to quarrel with a man bearing the name of Molé, and he limited himself to remarking that M. Molé should have come to an understanding in regard to this objection with the framers of the declaration, that it would have been an easy matter to remove it; as to M. Chauvelin, I am in ignorance as to whether he also thought it necessary to justify his refusal; at all events, the Emperor certainly attached less importance to it than to that of M. Molé.

The composition was not unattended by crosses and disappointments for Napoleon, for he had been subjected to refusals which he must have felt keenly. To name two of them, those of M. Allent and M. Portal. I am not in possession of any particulars with regard to the case of M. Allent, but this is what I know for certain relatively to M. Portal. On being notified by M. Regnaud that he had been appointed a Councillor of State (he had been merely a *maître des requêtes* in 1814), he replied to him that he did not consider himself at liberty to accept the function, and begged him to get the Emperor to accept his refusal. M. Regnaud having complied with his request, M. Portal was summoned to the Tuileries by the chamberlain-in-waiting. On being shown into the closet of Napoleon, the latter broke out with a "What does this refusal mean, M. Portal? Am I to see in it a declaration of war against me?" These words were spoken in a grave and severe tone. "When last year I was in the exercise of the functions you had entrusted to me, Sire, I refused every offer made to me by the Duc d'Angoulême, because I had sworn allegiance to you. Since then, after you had pronounced your abdication, the king appointed me *maître des requêtes*, and I have sworn allegiance to him. He has not abdicated, and I am acting towards him as I did towards Your Majesty." After a moment's silence, the Emperor enquired: "Well then, what do you intend to do?"—"To retire, Sire, to the country."—"You shall be given a passport." The conversation ended there.

A few days later, M. Carnot, Minister of the Interior, sent M. Portal, by order of the Emperor, his appointment as Mayor of Bordeaux. He declined it, and wrote to M. Carnot that he was not the man for the place, which was not the one for him.

I was determined not to abuse the toleration shown me,

and wished to get over the preparations for my departure as promptly as possible. I was fortunate enough to find, in the rue de Suresnes, a little house where Mme. Pasquier could take up her abode at once, and which I rented from General Dumas, a Councillor of State; he had just been entrusted with the organization of the National Guards of France, and no doubt could be entertained that Napoleon intended to avail himself of their services for the defence of fortified towns. My intercourse with M. Dumas afforded me an opportunity of observing the fickleness of a great mind. I had seen him a fortnight earlier, just as he was leaving with Marshal Oudinot to go in quest of the Old Guard and bring it to the king; he had no misgivings then as to the success of his undertaking, and held Napoleon to be a lost man. Now, his confidence in him and his fortunes was unbounded, and he would not listen to any reasoning to the contrary. Men of wit often have ready a host of arguments to justify their desire to accommodate themselves to time and circumstances, and derive therefrom the greatest possible benefit; they end in persuading themselves of what it suits them best to believe.

After what M. Regnaud had told me of the display of kindly sentiments which the Duc de Bassano and the Duc de Vicence had given proof of towards me, I could not leave without calling on them. The Duc de Bassano, in spite of the security he affected, seemed to me to have less assurance than I had expected. He was, moreover, as discontented as his character would permit; the entry of M. Carnot and M. Fouché into the ministerial council was nowise to his taste, and he did not conceal his disgust at it from me. I could also notice that he would have liked to once more have taken his post at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had not even been tendered to him. The position of Minister without portfolio suited him all

the less that the other ministers had plainly given it to be understood that their work was not to pass through his hands for the purpose of being subjected to such modifications and emendations as he might see fit. He received me most courteously, deplored the measure of which I was the victim, and assured me that he would see to it that the newly appointed Prefect of Le Mans should not molest me in my retirement. The prefect was M. Lagarde, a former commissary-general of police. He duly received the most formal injunctions from the Duc de Bassano, and he never diverged from them.

My conversation with the Duc de Vicence was of a far more confidential nature; it took place on the day previous to my leaving Paris. He spoke to me unreservedly and concealed nothing from me. He was heart-broken, and saw nothing but misfortunes of all kinds looming up.

"The Emperor's undertaking is a mad one," he said to me. "You, like everybody else, are now cognizant of the declaration issued against him on the 13th by the powers assembled at Vienna, and you have seen the wretched commentaries we have been reduced to make by way of rejoinder. He is consequently going to have to face the whole of Europe, and no time will be allowed him to make his preparations, nor will anything he says be listened to. The couriers whom we dispatch are not even suffered to cross the frontier. He is therefore doomed, but what is to become of poor France? She will be laid waste, perhaps partitioned, for it is no longer permissible to depend upon any generosity on the part of the sovereigns. The one most friendly last year, the Emperor of Russia, must now be the one most irritated against us. Will the House of Bourbon itself prove a resource? I fear that but little care is felt abroad for its cause. The powers must be greatly displeased with it for having allowed itself to be so easily

sent about its business. Wherein is any safety to be found, and where will the plank be found to cling to amidst all this wreckage? As to the Emperor, it is impossible for him not to perceive that his position is altogether different from the one he had hoped for. Everything has altered in France since his departure, and the public spirit has made strides of which he had at first no conception. Great has doubtless been the discontent with the royal government, but yet the measure of liberty which it has allowed people to enjoy would to-day render intolerable the Imperial Government, such as understood by the Emperor, especially towards the end. Hence, too, you see that he no longer dares to frankly re-establish it. He does not any the more dare to grant that liberty which every one yearns for; he merely promises it, and in the meanwhile his old habits are resuming their sway; hence it is that he sends you and so many others into exile. What then is the path he is entering upon? He does not know himself. He calls upon the men of the Revolution, while fearing them most of all. On the other hand, he no longer dares trust the honorable men whom he had of late years gathered about him; hence, he is following a course which is false, uncertain, and illogical. He is entirely out of his element. In short, how can he not realize that the sentiment with which he inspires the greater number is one of fear, and that this very fear might readily cause the public spirit to revert to Louis XVIII., should some circumstance favorable to this monarch arise? What will be the issue of the terrible war he brings in his wake? The most resolute generals are themselves alarmed; the nation can but be affrighted at its approach, and will cast the blame on him for all the sufferings it will be made to endure."

This is the gist of a conversation which lasted over an hour, and which enlightened me more than ever with regard

to everything I had seen or heard until then. "Oh, how I envy your position," he said in conclusion, when pressing my hands, "and how I begrudge you your exile! I hope you will be left to enjoy it in peace; at any rate, dispose of me if I can be of any service to you."

These conversations with persons so well informed will better enable one to form an accurate idea of the true condition of affairs, of the state of the public mind, and of the progress made during the past week or so than anything I might say from my own point of view. M. de La Valette always showed himself more reserved than the others, and he was somewhat held back by embarrassment from openly confiding to me his feelings of anxiety, which I could nevertheless penetrate. But he did not leave me in the dark as to facts, letting me draw my own conclusions from them. I learnt from him the particulars of the king's, *Monsieur's*, and the Duc de Berry's departure from France. No unfortunate encounter had occurred; General Lion had not succeeded in overtaking any portion of the royal party, and the greater part of the king's household had dispersed itself without a sword having been drawn. Through him, also, was I made cognizant of a most interesting document, of which I have preserved a copy. The Duc d'Orléans had been sent to the North with the title of lieutenant-general representing the king, and he was there in that capacity when His Majesty reached Lille. The following is a literal copy of the letter which the duke wrote to the generals in command under his orders, immediately after the king had crossed the frontier.

"I have to inform you, my dear General, that the untoward circumstances in which we find ourselves, having caused the king to decide upon leaving France at four o'clock this afternoon, I release you from yielding obedience to the orders which I had transmitted to you in his name; I rely on your judgment and on your patriotism

to act in accordance with what you will consider most seemly as regards the interests of France and your duty. I beg you will communicate the substance of this letter to the commandants of such towns as are within your *arrondissement*, as well as to the troops under your orders.

“Signed: LOUIS-PHILIPPE D'ORLÉANS.

“MARCH 23RD, 1815.

“A true copy :

“LAHURE, General,

“Commanding the *arrondissement* of

“Douai and Cambrai.”

The foregoing circular, which so greatly relieved generals, officers, and soldiers, scarcely harmonized with a royal ordinance rendered at Lille the same day, although its publication had not been ventured upon; it disbanded all that portion of the army which had gone over to Napoleon Bonaparte, and, in addition, it forbade all French subjects to respond to the call of any conscription that might be made.

The letter of the Duc d'Orléans doubtless gave great offence to the royal family, and it was sought to destroy the evil results consequent upon it by repudiating it in the *Moniteur* of Ghent. The arguments used to prove its unauthenticity were not very convincing, as they consisted in pointing out that the king had crossed the frontier a few hours only before the Duc d'Orléans, as if it had required many hours to write and send out a circular of such brevity! The disavowal should have come from the Duc d'Orléans himself; I am not aware that he ever repudiated the circular. The king took no pains to conceal his displeasure; it doubtless contributed to the resolution taken by the duke to seek immediate retirement in England, whither the Duchesse d'Orléans and her children had already gone. There was no rupture between himself and the Court of Ghent, and he continued to correspond with

Louis XVIII.; but the circumstance explains the course he found himself obliged to follow at the time of the second Restoration, to wit: of only showing himself in France for a very brief while, and returning almost immediately to England, where he certainly remained much longer than it would have suited him.

I called on the Princess de Vaudémont the evening before my departure. Great was my astonishment to find there M. Benjamin Constant, who had, according to his friends, left Paris on the 20th, and who, after the article which he had published on the 19th, could hardly be anxious to remain in the same city with Napoleon. I enquired of Mme. de Vaudémont for an explanation of this sudden return. "He was desirous," she whispered to me, "of seeking safety in La Vendée. On reaching Angers, he was informed of the flight of the Duc de Bourbon, which completely demoralized him; on the other hand, on learning of the promises of leniency contained in the proclamations of the Emperor, he decided upon retracing his steps. But this is not all," she went on to say, in a much lower whisper; "things are not going to be done by halves in his case, for he is soon to be a Councillor of State."¹

I was greatly surprised at this bit of information; he stood close to us and could not help knowing that he was the subject of our conversation, so he blushed perceptibly. He has since then marvellously overcome this early feeling of shame. He has put in writing that the motives governing his resolution were entirely derived from patriotic devotion, and from the desire of not missing an opportunity, which might never again present itself under such favorable

¹ The negotiation between M. Constant and Napoleon was undoubtedly conducted by M. Fouché, who had been probably introduced to him by Mme. de Vaudémont; I have since learnt for certain that the story of his journey to Angers was entirely drawn from imagination, that he had never left Paris, and that he had merely remained in hiding for two or three days.

auspices, for securing to France the blessings of a liberal government. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that he was carried away by the ambition of at last taking an active part in the management of public affairs, from which he had been for so long a time kept away, and by the desire of showing that his ability as a statesman was no lesser than that as a writer. Time failed him to give a proof of this.

On the 1st of April, I left for Le Mans, departing without regret, but a prey to the deepest melancholy, and my mind filled with anxiety in regard to the crisis in which both the peace of Europe and my country's future were equally jeopardized.

CHAPTER IX

M. Pasquier at the château of Coulans, where he finds himself in a Royalist centre—Talk of an uprising—The Duc de Bourbon embarks at Paimbœuf—The Duchessed' Angoulême likewise compelled to leave Bordeaux—M. Pasquier tones down his brother's zeal for the royal cause—After meeting with some little success in the South, the Duc d'Angoulême surrenders to General Gilly—M. Grouchy refuses to observe the capitulation—By express orders of the Emperor, the Duc d'Angoulême is conducted to Cette, and placed on board a ship bound for Spain—M. de Vitrolles arrested at Toulouse, and taken to Vincennes—The Prefect of the Haute-Garonne, who has given him his support, hands in his resignation, and issues a proclamation calling upon the people to tender their submission to Napoleon—The news of the Duc d'Angoulême's failure cools Royalist ardor in Maine—Free companies raised in the Morbihan meet with no success—The federative movement originating in Brittany spreads rapidly throughout France—Generous behavior of the Prefect of Le Mans towards M. Pasquier's family—Levies of conscripts and recall of soldiers dismissed from service—General Lamarque treats with the Vendean chiefs at Cholet—M. Pasquier leaves Maine and returns to Paris—The treaty of the 25th of March—The *Additional Act to the Constitutions of the Empire*—The electoral colleges of departments and of *arrondissements* convoked—M. Fouché's remarks about Napoleon—His secret negotiations with M. de Metternich—M. Perregaux lays the intrigue bare—M. Fleury de Chaboulon sent on a mission to Bâle, where he meets an Austrian agent—M. de Montrond goes to Vienna for the purpose of pleading Napoleon's cause, while M. de Saint-Léon, dispatched by the Minister of Police, sounds the dispositions of the powers, in regard to a government with the Duc d'Orléans at its head—Letter from Prince de Talleyrand to Louis XVIII.—He notifies the king of the hostile inclinations of the Emperor of Russia, and urges the necessity of a change in the composition of the Ministry—Louis XVIII. summons the Duc d'Orléans and M. de Talleyrand; both give excuses for not responding to his invitation—In France, there is no longer any doubt entertained of the return of the Bourbons.

THE château of Coulans is situated at a distance of three leagues from Le Mans, on the road to Laval. I found my

brother and his family established in it. Prefect of the Sarthe under the royal government, he had resigned office immediately upon hearing of the king's departure, bearing with him the affectionate regard of all Royalists. Hence, I found myself in the midst of all those men for so many years devoted to the cause of the Bourbons, in a province where they were in large numbers and most zealous, since it had been the scene of the war waged by the Chouans. They were less discouraged and downhearted than elsewhere. No sooner had I arrived than I heard plans of insurrection discussed. It was believed that the signal would come from La Vendée, at the head of which the Duc de Bourbon had gone to place himself, and which, it was expected, would rise as a man if he only spoke the word. But it was soon learnt that the prince, without having attempted anything, had left Angers, escorted by a few gendarmes, to make his way towards Paimbœuf, whence he had embarked on the 1st of April on board an English vessel.¹ Shortly afterwards it was learnt that the Duchesse d'Angoulême, in spite of the courage and energy she had displayed at Bordeaux, had been compelled, owing to the defection of the troops, to pursue a similar course, and had embarked on the 2d of April. This news was of a nature to cause considerable uneasiness. Still, there remained in the provinces of the West a few energetic men, the remnant of those who had so long carried on the civil war; they persuaded themselves, doubtless somewhat thoughtlessly, that they could even then, as in the past, dispose of the inhabitants of these provinces and stir them to insurrection at will. Next to them were the less dis-

¹ Information worthy of belief, which was given to me at the time, and confirmed by M. de Barante, then Prefect of the Loire-Inférieure, justifies my belief that had the Duc de Bourbon shown more firmness of character, several generals, among them General Foy, were disposed to go and join him.

interested and sincere men, who seek a chance of making their fortunes out of political troubles. Lastly, there was no lack of individuals whose presence was suspicious, and I quickly received proofs that the agents of M. Fouché were soon to spread through the country, ready to point out to him any rash individuals.

Having, more than my brother, the habit of judging the several parties and penetrating men's motives, I soon discovered these various categories, whereupon I strove to temper his zeal and inculcate a little prudence into him. At the very outset I told him, what was fully proven by subsequent events, that a civil war, considering the paucity of means at one's disposal, could be of no value except as a threatening demonstration, whose purpose would be to divert the attention of the Emperor, fill his mind with anxiety, and perhaps force him to weaken the main body of his army by compelling him to detach a few thousand men from it, but that it would be altogether without any influence on the final issue, as the question could only be settled on a great battle-field. It was therefore useless to multiply the chances of misfortunes. Had this advice been hearkened to and followed in every direction, several men of distinguished worth, among them the eldest of the La Rochejaquelein, whose death is so greatly to be deplored, would not have been sacrificed to no purpose.

The hopes resting on the Duc d'Angoulême were more serious and endured longest. A few bodies of troops and a few generals seemed to have gone over to him in all sincerity, and the movement in his favor in Languedoc seemed to be a most pronounced one. The National Guards and the Royal Volunteers flocked to him. He sought to take advantage of this first impulse by an advance on Lyons, by way of the left bank of the Rhone. His measures were well taken, and were in the first place crowned with suc-

cess; he carried in most brilliant fashion the bridge over the Drôme, and got as far as Valence, which he occupied, but, on reaching that point, fortune failed him. General Grouchy had hastily gathered together an army at Lyons and was on the march to oppose him, when the defection of the troops, which had until then constituted his mainstay, compelled him to beat a hasty retreat in order to escape being cut off. He failed in the accomplishment of his purpose, and was soon reduced to capitulate to General Gilly. The convention to which he subscribed secured his free departure from the kingdom and the disbandment of his army; but it so happened that General Grouchy refused, as general-in-chief, to ratify the convention, and decided that the prince should be held until such time as the Emperor's intentions concerning his fate should be made known. So the Duc d'Angoulême remained a prisoner at Pont Saint-Esprit for six whole days.

Too severe a judgment cannot be passed on General Grouchy's conduct in this matter. It rendered possible a catastrophe similar to the one which had shocked all France at the time of the death of the Duc d'Enghien, for it exposed the Emperor to the dangerous temptation of seeking revenge. Great was the danger, and Napoleon was on the point of ordering that the prince should be brought to Paris; he was, I have good cause to believe, only dissuaded from carrying so fatal an idea into execution, by the unanimous opposition of those about him.¹ I have told elsewhere of the conversation he had on this subject with General Belliard. Generals, courtiers, all those, in fact, who were given the opportunity of declaring their opinion or of al-

¹ Justice compels me to state that, during the Hundred Days, Napoleon found among his *entourage* a constant opposition to the severe measures to which he was on several occasions tempted to have recourse; those which it was impossible to prevent were at any rate tempered in their execution, owing to the unanimous opinion ever shown in this respect.

lowing it to be divined, expressed themselves in the same fashion. Finally, the Duc de Bassano grasped the first indication of assent to send a telegraphic dispatch which he did not speak of until several hours later, and which ordered the capitulation to be observed. Immediately on this order being received, the Duc d'Angoulême was escorted to Cette, whence he embarked with all his suite for Spain.

In the *Moniteur* of the 12th will be found the letter which the Emperor wrote to General Grouchy in order to make him acquainted with his intentions. This letter was evidently written on second thoughts; it is curious to see Napoleon boast of his generosity, when he was merely respecting a capitulation concluded between armed forces; in other words, an act which from its very nature must be held sacred by all men possessing the slightest knowledge of the law of nations, and especially by military men. It is to be regretted that he should have imposed as a condition the restitution of the Crown diamonds. This was contrary to all justice and lacking in dignity.

Thus, by the 16th of April, the French territory had been completely evacuated by the princes of the House of Bourbon, and the plan unrolled to me on the 19th of March by M. de Vitrolles no longer presented the slightest chance of success. He had himself been arrested at Toulouse, on the 4th of April, by General Delaborde, who, by order of the Emperor, had stirred up the garrison and hoisted the tri-color flag. The arrest of M. de Vitrolles was likely to have direst consequences for him, as he was one of those excepted from the amnesty. Had M. de Vitrolles, by virtue of this exception, been placed on trial at Toulouse, it would have probably cost him his life. M. Fouché, who did not want any shedding of blood, yielded without difficulty to the prayers and remonstrances of Mme. de Vaudémont; he ordered that M. de Vitrolles should be

confined in a Paris prison, where he remained forgotten until the crisis was past. In order to be able to do this, M. Fouché impressed upon the Emperor that it was necessary he should himself interrogate M. de Vitrolles, from whom he hoped to obtain most precious information.

The revolution operated at Toulouse by General Delaborde gave rise to an act from which the imperial party thought I could derive much benefit, and to which it most eagerly gave publicity. M. de Saint-Aulaire, a former chamberlain and prefect of the Empire, held the Prefecture of Toulouse from the royal government; he had shown great activity in seconding M. de Vitrolles in everything the latter had attempted toward sustaining the Royalist movement in the South; consequently, he did not believe that he was entitled to hold office under the Imperial Government, and he handed in his resignation. He determined upon such a course in all sincerity and firmness of purpose, for, on having been subsequently appointed by the Emperor to another prefecture, he positively declined to go to his post. He should have remained content with this, but he thought it his duty to address to those over whom he had ruled a proclamation, wherein he told them that the cause of the Bourbons being irretrievably lost, he invited them to submit passively to Napoleon's rule. It was, he told them, the only way to avoid drawing down upon themselves calamities without number, which would not be compensated by any chance of success. The frankness and the generous sentiment which dictated this step to him prove that he little knew men, and that he placed too great a confidence in his own perspicacity. He who, in those days, affirmed that the House of Bourbon was never again to make its appearance in France, was, to say the least, as rash as he who entertained no doubts as to its early re-establishment. Moreover, it was giving way to a most naïve illusion, to believe that it

was sufficient to speak according to one's conscience to disarm or satisfy implacable partisans; this false move was for M. de Saint-Aulaire the source of many mortifications, which had a perceptible influence on his subsequent career.

Napoleon experienced many disappointments when selecting his prefects. His offers met with many refusals, even on the part of persons who had not been well treated by the Restoration, such, for example, as M. d'Houdetot and M. de Tournon. The latter showed a remarkable obstinacy in accepting nothing, for he was twice appointed to different prefectures. He was one of the best administrators France possessed. The royal government had conceived most unjust prejudices regarding him, based, I believe, on the fact that he had been Prefect of Rome. He had nevertheless won universal esteem while at his post, but he was probably considered as more implicated than any other in the usurpation of the sovereignty of the popes. This aversion for a position which had formerly been eagerly sought after was a most significant manifestation of opinion, and it would have been difficult for Napoleon not to have seen in it a most alarming symptom.

The news of the Duc d'Angoulême's failure was a source of deep grief in the department wherein I resided and in the surrounding country. It was of a nature to cause profound discouragement, even among the most zealous Royalists. Their efforts to bring about an uprising and to organize Royalist corps were nevertheless persevered in, but their endeavors were crowned with some little success in the department of the Morbihan only,¹ and in that part of

¹ The insurrectionary corps formed in those days in the Morbihan had for its leader that M. Desol de Grisolles whose unjust and severe detention at Bicêtre under the imperial régime I have narrated. It might have been expected that a man who had been so cruelly treated would show a desire to avenge himself with the weapons now in his hands, but it must be said to his honor that he was, on the contrary, one of the most moderate, humane leaders of the period.

the former Vendée adjoining the sea. Gatherings of sufficient importance to call for the serious attention of the government took place in that vicinity. Still, even in *cantons* where passions ran highest, there existed this great difference between the present dispositions and those of the palmy days of the Vendean insurrection, that, in those days, the peasants sought out their former *seigneurs* in order to call upon them to place themselves at their head and lead them to battle, whereas now the former chiefs were reduced to seeking them out in their cottages, and entreating them to once more flock under their old flags. I gleaned in this connection the most circumstantial particulars from M. Portalis, then *premier président* of the *cour* at Angers, and in an excellent position to know what was taking place in the departments within his jurisdiction. What I learnt from him confirmed the opinion I had formed as to the issue of a commencement, or rather a threat, of civil war.

The movement in the Morbihan, nevertheless, had one consequence which I had not at all foreseen. Every one knows that, during the Vendean war and that of the Chouans, the population of the cities had in general shown dispositions contrary to those of the residents in the country districts. As soon as it was learnt at Rennes and at Nantes that an insurrection was raising its head in a portion of Brittany and in La Vendée, it was sought to take measures to check the disorders likely to result from it, and so a considerable portion of the youth of these two towns conceived the idea of federalizing, in order to preserve the two neighborhoods from such disorders. The real object of this effort in common had much less for its ultimate purpose the defence of the Imperial Government, than to secure the tranquillity of the country; it is even a fact that the dispositions of the moving spirits in this action cared

little for Napoleon. They were simply the warm friends of liberty, and nowise defenders of the Emperor; when, therefore, the news of this fresh rising in arms reached him, it inspired him with great alarm, in the first place, for he did not conceal from himself that it might readily turn against him. His displeasure was still further increased when he heard that the principal towns of Brittany were following the example of the two first named, and that all of them were sending delegates to knit together the several federations. He thereupon grasped that the only way of warding off the danger was to take hold of the movement in order to direct it; such was the origin of the system of federation which extended over such a considerable portion of France, and which resulted in compromising so many persons. It finally came to be generalized to such a point, that where it was impracticable to use it as means of action, it was taken advantage of to compel people to profess their political faith. Old judges, who were at the very least sexagenarians, and who sat in supreme courts, were forced to sign the roll of the federates. The court of Angers was not allowed to escape this necessity, which it was subjected to all the more rigorously because it was closest to the localities where the Royalist insurrection could take root. M. Portalis, who was its presiding magistrate, did not suffer it to act officially in the matter. The members of the court thereupon agreed to federalize as individuals, but the court entered into no engagements as a body. Although this was greatly to be preferred, the Royalists were none the less greatly irritated against M. Portalis, and it was due, at the time of the second Restoration, to a somewhat fortunate combination of circumstances, that he extricated himself from the consequences of the course he had pursued.

I spent the month of April in a perplexed state of mind

and a prey to the most cruel apprehensions, although I had no occasion to feel any anxiety concerning myself individually. M. Lagarde had spared me every possible annoyance, and had shown much consideration towards me. The Emperor had seen fit, in violation of every right, to demand of the leading men who had held office under the king, an oath, which alone secured them immunity from molestation. In case of a refusal, they were placed under the surveillance of the political police, and were in consequence liable to be transported at will from one locality to another. My brother, as former Prefect of the department of the Sarthe, was called upon to send in this oath in writing. He was not in a mood to comply with this request; as for myself, I must fain admit that I attached but little importance to the formality, extorted by violence, and consequently of no value. My arguments failed to convince him. So I went to Le Mans, and called on M. Lagarde, who promised me he would delay for as long a time as possible the reply he had to send to the minister. "He must have plenty of other matters to attend to," he said to me; "and I have at least the hope that he will easily lose sight of this one." He kept his word to me; I had the proof of it when, in July, I took the portfolio of the Interior. Generally speaking, the administration of M. Lagarde was an extremely benign one, and he avoided having recourse to violent measures.

There remained still another very delicate question, which might even become dangerous in that portion of France; it was the levy of conscripts and of the soldiers who had been discharged by the royal government. The orders of the Emperor were formal; nevertheless, a risk would have been incurred, had they been too rigorously executed, of driving many of the recruits into the ranks of the insurgents which were gathering in the province. M. Lagarde

showed the good sense of proceeding with this levy with great gentleness, and closed his eyes to many refractory conscripts. Nearly all the prefects of the Western departments acted in a similar fashion. Hence it was that the levies of men were considerably less strong in these departments than in others.

A little later on, Napoleon resolved upon organizing a real army in the West, the command of which he gave to General Lamarque. The latter, after meeting with a rather decisive victory at La Roche-Servièrre, proposed to the Vendean chiefs to enter into negotiation, and he was adroit enough to induce them to sign peace at Cholet, on June 26th. They never forgave him, not the triumph he had wrested from them, but for having been clever enough to have his proposals of peace accepted at the very time that the battle of Waterloo had made their cause triumphant.

We witnessed the arrival at the château of Coulans of an individual whose suspicious rôle I detected from the very first, and I was on my guard against some treachery. My brother was more than ever implicated in Royalist insurrectionary projects; he was in communication with a man who claimed to be, by what title I know not, commandant of the Royalist bodies of the department. These corps, it is true, hardly existed except in the lists which he carried in his pocket, for they never amounted to more than two or three hundred poorly armed men, at the head of whom he afforded himself the satisfaction of a triumphal entry into Le Mans, on the news of the Emperor's defeat. My brother had to a great extent borne the cost of clothing them. One day when he was engaged in a mysterious conference in the grounds, chance led me to the shady walk chosen as the rendezvous. I quickly recognized the individual with whom he was speaking; it was one Sauquaire-Souligné, whose mad experiments in agriculture had long

since caused his ruin. Reduced to the extremity of selling his property, he was disposing of his services to the police, and I was sure that he had formerly been successively an agent of M. Fouché and of the Duc de Rovigo in the departments of the West. At present, he declared himself to be the most zealous of Royalists, and one of the most active promoters of the insurrection, which he alleged was about to break out in at least thirty departments. Such was the object, he pretended, of his round of visits to all the châteaux, always under a different name.

Immediately after his departure, I hastened to tell my brother all I knew about his dangerous auxiliary. He was already so hoodwinked that it was impossible for me to open his eyes to the true rôle of the scoundrel; he was determined to continue preserving a most dangerous intercourse with him. As I was not desirous of being involved in the consequences of the treachery which I foresaw, I decided upon leaving for Mont-Dore on the 1st of May. M. Sauquaire-Souligné soon justified my foresight. Towards the middle of June my brother learnt that he had been denounced by him, and was notified by M. Lagarde that he must leave the department. He was compelled to seek refuge in Paris, fortunate, indeed, in that he had to deal with a prefect who was fully resolved upon not jeopardizing his interests with the Royalist party.

After the second Restoration, M. Sauquaire-Souligné continued for some time playing the part he had enacted during the Hundred Days, but, finding it was not sufficiently lucrative, he cast in his lot with the opposite party, publishing the most violent screeds against the royal government, and entering into every conspiracy; he was finally compelled to seek safety in flight, and went to Portugal, where he narrowly escaped the gallows, owing to his criminal career.

I intended, when passing through Paris, to make a stay

there of a fortnight, if I could obtain the necessary permission. I was desirous of employing this time to become better acquainted with the course of events. Many serious things had occurred since my leaving the capital; the most important was the solemn alliance of the powers against Napoleon; no doubt could longer be entertained of it, as it had been signed at Vienna on the 25th of March. As soon as Napoleon's entry into Lyons had become known, it had been resolved to fight him to the bitter end. The treaty of alliance of the 25th of March was conceived and drawn up by taking as a basis the engagements entered into the foregoing year at Chaumont, and none could be more threatening for him; thus was France once more compelled to face all Europe, and condemned anew to endure the most terrible of wars. What was she to receive by way of compensation? The blessing of a reform in the Imperial Government such as formulated in the *Acte additionnel aux constitutions de l'Empire*?

This Act, which bore date of the 22d of April, was about to be submitted to the people, as had been all the ephemeral constitutions which had succeeded each other in France during the past twenty-five years. This acceptance, of which there was, as a matter of course, no doubt, was to be proclaimed at the assembling of the *Champ de mai*. Lastly, by a decree, dated the 30th of April, the members of the electoral colleges of departments and of *arrondissements* were summoned to meet at the earliest possible moment, in the chief towns of departments and *arrondissements*, for the purpose of proceeding with the election of members of the Chamber of Representatives, such as constituted by the *Acte additionnel* (amendment) submitted to the acceptance of the nation. This Act was consequently to be executed in one of its most important points previous to its having been accepted as a whole.

All this was already published and known when I arrived in Paris on the 2d of May. Next day I called on M. Fouché, in order to obtain the permission I sought in order to make a stay in Paris. "Why talk to me of a fortnight?" he said to me. "Remain in the city as long as you like. What is there to cause you any alarm nowadays? Who is going to object? Have you not read his *Acte additionnel*, which guarantees individual liberty, and which protects persons from arbitrary exile? As you can well see, we have already drawn our nets about him much more than he expected." — "Granted; but the nation has not yet signified its acceptance of the *Acte additionnel*, so it has not become a law. At all events, I only need a fortnight, as I am leaving for Mont-Dore." — "Well, your simplicity in talking about acceptance by the people, and the *Acte additionnel* not having become a law, is refreshing! Has he not already entered into the engagement as far as he is concerned? What need have you, moreover, of burying yourself in Auvergne? There is no sense in it. He will be compelled to go and join the army ere the month is out. As soon as he has gone, we remain masters of the field. Even admitting that he wins one or two battles, he will lose the third, and then will be the time for us to enter upon the stage. Believe me, all will have a happy termination." — "I have no desire to contradict you," was my rejoinder, "but, at all events, there remains enough time for me to take a course of the waters; the state of my health really demands it." — "So be it, then; but you must call on me again previous to going away."

The treachery of M. Fouché, a minister of Napoleon, is one of the most peculiar incidents of the period. What is still more astonishing is that the Emperor, who could not have been entirely ignorant of it, should have left him in possession of his portfolio, and retained him at a post

affording so many facilities to do him injury! Was it that he dared not rid himself of him? Did he consider M. Fouché as more to be dreaded out of the ministry than in it? Or was M. Fouché protected by his well-known habit of deceiving everybody? He has always claimed that the advances and overtures he ventured upon were naught but a manner of sounding people's intentions, and a means of rendering better service to his master. What is certain is that Napoleon was his dupe; the mistake he made is all the more strange in that the men most devoted to him, M. de Bassano, M. de La Valette, and many others, cautioned him incessantly.

A discovery made at that time should have removed all doubts: a commencement of negotiation between M. Fouché and M. de Metternich had come to the surface. The full story of this intrigue has been told in the memoirs published by M. Fleury de Chaboulon, one of the Emperor's secretaries, so I will only speak of what is not to be met with in these memoirs. Towards the end of April, Count Perregaux, the chamberlain in attendance upon Napoleon, informed him that the head clerk of the banking-house of Eskelès & Co. had just arrived from Vienna, for a settlement of accounts with the firm of Perregaux, Laffitte, Baguenault, and Delessert; M. Perregaux added that this journey was neither urgent nor necessary, and that the reason of it must therefore be explained by some secret mission.¹

Pursuant to an order of Napoleon to M. Réal, Prefect of

¹ M. Perregaux's great zeal must seem extraordinary when viewed in the light of the part he had just enacted near his brother-in-law, Marshal Marmont, on the 30th of March of the preceding year. This requires explaining. His father had died a senator, shortly before the Restoration; had he lived a few months longer, he would undoubtedly have been created a peer, when the son could have flattered himself with succeeding the father. In spite of this untoward death, he sought to derive the benefit of heredity when the Chamber of Peers was created, and preferred an urgent request to be allowed to become a member of it. The indirect part that

Police, a search was made for the clerk, who was arrested. At first, nothing of importance was found among his papers, which had reference to affairs of banking and commerce. No words written in sympathetic ink were revealed on their being subjected to heat, but he had shown deep agitation on learning that his son, a boy of fifteen, had also been arrested. After the danger of his position had been pointed out to him, if it was proved that he had undertaken a secret mission, he was promised his own freedom and that of his son if he would tell the whole truth.

Greatly disconcerted and but little inured to affairs of this sort, he fell on his knees before his questioner, and begged to see his son, promising to reveal everything in his presence. This granted, he declared that Prince Metternich had entrusted him with a secret mission to the Duc d'Otrante; that he had already seen the latter twice, once on the day previous, and again on the day before that, at early morn, at the *hôtel* of the general police, access to which he had gained by passing through the garden adjacent to the Rue des Saints-Pères. He went on to say that the object of his mission was to induce the Duc d'Otrante to send promptly to Bâle, to the inn of the Trois-Rois, a trusted person, who would find there a secretary of Prince Metternich, under the name of Henri Werner. As for himself, his powers consisted in a letter written in cipher by Prince de Metternich (he had left it with the Duc d'Otrante) and in a statement of account by means of which

he had taken in Napoleon's downfall, his great wealth, gave him, at least in his own estimation, uncontested rights. His petition was rejected; great was his ire, which was soon shared by M. Laffitte, who had remained at the head of his father's firm, and who, to carry on the business, could not do without the funds in possession of the family. His enmity therefore engendered a second one, which was to be in due course far more troublesome and sometimes even more embarrassing. When Napoleon formed his Chamber of Peers, M. Perregaux could not fail being admitted to it, and he duly took his seat.

the bearer would make himself known to M. Henri Werner. He told, or pretty nearly so, the contents of that statement of account, which had also been left with M. Fouché. M. Réal, once in possession of this information, hastened to the Elysée and informed Napoleon of his important discovery.

The Emperor's first impulse was to arrest there and then his Minister of Police, who had not told him a word of the affair, and who could, with every show of reason, be considered caught *in flagrante delicto*. But, either from irresolution, or from a desire to go deeper into the facts of the case, he changed his mind, and contented himself with sending M. Fleury de Chaboulon to Bâle post-haste, providing him with a statement of account similar to the one of which the clerk who had been arrested had given a description.

In the memoirs of M. Fleury will be found the curious conversations he had with M. Werner, in the course of the two trips he made in succession to Bâle. It will therein be seen how the Austrian agent, after having sought to ascertain the chances of the Duc d'Orléans, promptly came to the proposition to place the crown on the head of Napoleon's son, without insisting that the regency should be exclusively entrusted to the mother of the infant prince, and consenting to recognize a regency placed in the hands of whomsoever the French nation might select, to the exclusion, of course, of Napoleon.

M. Fouché, during the time taken by M. Fleury for his first journey to Bâle, had found the means of warding off, at least in appearance, the Emperor's fury; all the ruses he employed to that end are very faithfully related by M. Fleury. But what he does not state strongly enough is the fact, of which I have not the slightest doubt, that M. Fouché had been warned of the danger he was incurring by M. Réal

himself, who, on seeing the hesitation which had invaded the mind and resolutions of the Emperor, had not cared to incur to no purpose the hatred and vengeance of so powerful a man, and had therefore resolved upon letting him know all through his daughter, Mme. Lacuée.

There was, in those days, no lack of secret intelligence between Paris and Vienna. M. de Talleyrand was no stranger to it; M. de Montrond, one of his intimates, was the first sent to plead the cause of Napoleon and to give assurances of his entertaining favorably any concessions made to him. M. de Montrond was, more especially, to insist on the return of the Empress Marie-Louise and her son to France. He returned almost immediately, with the most unsatisfactory answers on all points.

He was followed by M. de Saint-Léon, who was dispatched to Vienna by M. Fouché. The object of his mission was to learn what might be gained by taking up the Duc d'Orléans. M. Fouché was anxious to have more strings to his bow than one; he had entrusted to M. de Saint-Léon a letter, which the latter had concealed in the pad of a set of harness; he did not deliver it at first, wishing to play the part of a negotiator, supported by his mere word, but on seeing that what he seemed to say upon his own authority was little heeded, he finally decided to give up the letter of which he was the bearer,¹ and which M. de Talleyrand declined to open except in the presence of M. de Metternich and M. de Nesselrode. All these underhand practices and intrigues were not to lead to anything, the situation being one whose knot was only to be severed on battle-fields.

¹ July, 1835. A copy which has recently fallen into my possession of the letter which M. Fouché entrusted to M. Fleury de Chaboulon, and the contents of which the latter communicated to M. Werner, on the occasion of his second journey to Bâle, fully confirms everything that is to be found in M. de Chaboulon's narrative as well as in mine; it leaves no doubt, in my mind, as to the warning received by M. Fouché, and which served to guide him in his line of action.

A point to be borne in mind in the narrative of M. Fleury de Chaboulon, is the exposition made by M. de Metternich's envoy of the sentiment then governing the councils of the Holy Alliance. What is stated by him is so in harmony with several duly authenticated public acts, that not the slightest doubt is to be entertained as to its veracity. It is therefore an assured fact that the rights of the House of Bourbon weighed but little in the balance of interests which all Europe was preparing to defend. War was about to be waged, this time both against Napoleon and against France, because of the support the latter was giving him, but without anything being yet provided for or determined upon as regards a second restoration of the former dynasty. The royal government was still in existence in France at the time the declaration of the 13th of March had been published; the allies had then promised the reigning monarch, as well as the nation, which was thought to be united to him, their efficient help against the common enemy. But when, on the 25th of March, a treaty of alliance was concluded between the members of the former coalition, the aspect of things was altogether different. The success of Napoleon was looked upon as a foregone conclusion, hence it was no longer a question of going to the rescue of the King of France and of the French people, but one only of fighting Napoleon to the bitter end, and protecting Europe against the dangers with which his return threatened her.

It is true that Article 8 invited the king's adhesion; but when England ratified the treaty, on the 25th of April, she was careful to define her interpretation of Article 8. According to her, it bound the contracting parties, on the principle of their mutual safety, to a combined effort against the power of Napoleon, but the King of England was not to be compelled to prosecute the war with the object of coercing France into accepting any particular form of government.

On the 9th of May, the ministers of the three Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia signified to the British representative the acquiescence of their respective Courts in the interpretation adopted by the British government. Therefore the interests of the House of Bourbon no longer entered, except in a most secondary way, into the calculations of the allies; one even sees the probability of their being sacrificed, should this sacrifice more surely bring about the annihilation of Napoleon's power.

On the 23d of April, M. de Talleyrand wrote from Vienna to Louis XVIII., who had retired to Ghent:¹ "Sire, a matter has occurred here, of which I should have preferred Your Majesty to remain in ignorance as being calculated to give pain, but which it is necessary you should be informed of, in that it is closely connected with your present situation, and which you might, moreover, unavoidably learn, perhaps without the circumstances which act as a corrective and counterweight.

"For some time past, I have had the opportunity of noticing that if the Emperor of Russia had formerly often acted in opposition to Your Majesty's wishes, he was not always governed in this course by the object he had in view, but also because he has, on various occasions, considered himself offended: 1. Because Your Majesty did not offer him the *cordons bleu* (*Ordre du Saint-Esprit*), after bestowing it on the Prince Regent; 2. The inutility of his intervention and entreaties on behalf of the Duc de Vicence, in whose welfare he is deeply concerned, and who has been excluded from the Chamber of Peers; 3. The positive

¹ It will be noticed, above all, that this letter is by two days anterior to the notification made by England of her reservation in opposition to the ratification of the treaty of the 25th of March, a reservation which received, on the 9th of the following month, the adhesion of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. Thus the presentiments and fears of the writer were more than justified.

fashion in which Your Majesty, in the marriage question, has declined to comply with his wishes on the matter of religion; 4. Lastly, in that the constitutional Charter differed in several respects from the views expressed by him on the subject, at the time of his being in Paris, and which his attachment to liberal ideas made him consider as most advantageous and important.

"I was aware that for some time past he had been bemoaning these things among his intimates, and it seemed of little consequence to me then. But to-day I am compelled to entertain the belief that this frame of mind has a considerable influence on his way of judging the situation both of France and of Your Majesty.

"According to the news received from France, and the reports of those who have come from it, Your Majesty has on your side the bulk of the nation, while two parties are opposed to you, that of the army, which is body and soul for Napoleon, that portion of it which is well disposed being subjugated or carried away by the mass, and the party composed of the remnants of the old revolutionary factions. The last-named has only joined hands with the first because, this one having forestalled the other, it had to bow to the inevitable and follow its lead. Their only point in common is that both were desirous of a change, but they desired it neither from the same motives nor with the same end in view. The army, chafing under its inactivity, was sighing for a chief who would restore to it its chances of bold deeds, of fortune, and renown, to which it had been accustomed for twenty-two years. Bonaparte was pre-eminently the man of its heart. The chiefs of the other party know Bonaparte and detest him. They are acquainted with his insatiable thirst for domination, and they know that the liberty of the citizen has no more cruel enemy. They feel full well that where a rebellious army has conferred supreme power, there

can hardly exist the mere shadow of civil government; they will be nothing outside of the civil government, and passive obedience will be their share, as well as that of all others. They do not indulge in any illusions as to the motive which has guided Bonaparte in joining forces with them; they are aware that his union with them is, as far as he is concerned, an enforced union, that the bonds with which they will seek to keep him within bounds, and to which it suits him to submit for the time being, will remain binding only as long as he will not enjoy the power to rend them asunder, and that, should he win victories, such power would be by them conferred on him. They do not conceal from themselves that what the army has once done, it might do twice and thrice, and that in such a state of things, there would be security neither for the master nor for the slaves. Undeceived with regard to their former chimerical views, they no longer dream of a republic; the titles and goods of this world which they have acquired bind them to the monarchical system. They were not opposed to the legitimate dynasty, but they were unable to endure a government, wherein, excluded from participating in the enjoyment of all public offices, they found themselves deprived of all political status and threatened in the future with still greater losses. Their aversion for such a state of things is such as to have made them desire to be rid of it at whatever cost, and rather than fall into it once more, they will again fling themselves back into the horrors and hazards of the revolutionary régime.

“Bonaparte is above all interested in making the war which he is about to face assume the aspect of a national one. What chiefly concerns the powers is to see to it that he does not succeed in this. He knows sufficiently that he cannot attain this end by suasion, and that his only means is to inspire terror. But then his army, which he will have

to assemble along the frontier, and which will be locked in a struggle with the foreign forces, will not be a sufficient instrument for the carrying out of his purpose. He needs others, and he can only find them in the party to which he formerly belonged, on whose ruins he raised himself to power, which he has so long opposed, and whose support he now seeks. The powers are of opinion that this party, should all efforts be directed towards calming its fears, might be induced to desert the cause of a man for whom it has no liking; that this would deprive Bonaparte of his principal resource, and of that which prolongs and renders more dangerous his resistance; the draft of a declaration has been indited with this end in view. All of them were in accord when the only question before them was to declare that Europe was not arming against France, but on behalf of France, that her only enemies were Bonaparte and his adherents, that she would never treat with him, that she would grant him neither peace nor truce, and would not lay down her arms until she had overthrown him; but when the question arose of further expressing in the declaration that the final object of the war was the re-establishment of the legitimate dynasty, they joined issue: If you do not make mention of this re-establishment, said some, those who have taken up arms in the interior of France, and whom the declaration of the 13th of March induced to arm themselves for the king's cause, will believe themselves abandoned to their fate. You will be depriving yourselves of an assured resource to obtain another which is not so certain. If you state that your sole intention is to overthrow the usurper, and to permit it to be understood that, he once overthrown, France will be free to do what she sees fit, you are handing her over to Jacobinism and to factions more dangerous for Europe than the existence of Bonaparte himself. The re-establishment of the legitimate dynasty,

argued the others, is a matter in regard to which no doubt can be entertained as to the intentions of the powers. The declaration of the 13th of March is most explicit on this point. By insisting on it once more, in too absolute a fashion, one would miss the mark, which consists in detaching from Bonaparte men who can only be won back by concessions, of which the powers can truly let them have a glimpse, but which the king can alone promise and grant.

"Matters were in this state, when the Emperor Alexander sent for Lord Clancarty, who, since the departure of Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, is at the head of the British Embassy.

"The narrative of their conversation was told me in part by Lord Clancarty, but much more in detail by Lord Stewart and by M. de Metternich.

"The task of giving an account of it to Your Majesty is all the more painful to me, in that, placed as I am in connection with several of the features of the conversation, between my respect for and my devotion to you, I fear that in giving proper weight to the one, I may seem to forget giving what is due to the other. But Your Majesty, whom it so interests to be fully acquainted with the dispositions of the most powerful of the allies, could judge but imperfectly of them, if not made acquainted with the reasons he gives therefor, and even by means of what reproaches he claims to justify these reasons. The strength of this consideration alone compels me to report them.

"The Emperor, in the first place, asked Lord Clancarty why he did not approve of the declaration which had been drafted, and what was the objection he had to it: 'It lies in the fact,' replied Lord Clancarty, 'that it does not, in my opinion, express all that it should state. It is not sufficient to overthrow Bonaparte; the door must not be opened to the Jacobins, who would suit me far less than

Bonaparte himself.' — 'The Jacobins,' resumed the Emperor, 'are only to be feared as auxiliaries of Bonaparte, and it is for that reason that all efforts should tend to detach them from him; once his downfall accomplished, they are not the men who will reap his inheritance. The first thing to be done is to overthrow him; we are all agreed on this point. As regards myself, I will devote all my energies to that end, and I will not rest until it is reached. Moreover, I am willing to postpone any declaration or proclamation whatsoever, until such time as our troops shall be nearer France; in fact, I am in favor of such a course. But the overthrow of Napoleon is not the only point on which it is necessary that we should come to an understanding. In an enterprise of such magnitude as the one in which we are engaged, it is necessary, at the very outset, to look at the end. The overthrow of Bonaparte represents only one-half of the work to be done. The security of Europe will have to be provided for, for Europe cannot enjoy peace unless France is tranquil, and France cannot be so without a government which will be to the liking of all.' — 'France,' said Lord Clancarty, 'was happy under the government of the king, who carries with him the good wishes of the whole nation.' — 'Yes,' replied the Emperor, 'of that portion of the nation which has never been anything else but passive, which for twenty-six years has endured every revolution, which can only deplore them, and which prevents none. But the other portion, which seems to be the whole nation, because alone it shows its face, alone it acts, and alone is dominant, will it yield with a good will, and be faithful to the government it has just betrayed? Are you going to force such a government on it against its will? Do you propose to wage to that end a war of extermination, which may last forever? And are you sure of success?' — 'I am aware,' replied Lord Clan-

carty, 'that duty ends where impossibility commences, but until impossibility becomes a recognized fact, I hold that the duty of the powers is to give support to the legitimate sovereign, and not even to raise the question of the right to abandon him.' — 'Our first duty,' the Emperor continued, 'is towards Europe and towards ourselves. Even were the re-establishment of the king's government an easy matter, what would be the result of re-establishing it, as long as there was no assurance as to its future stability, except that of engendering fresh misfortunes both for France and for Europe? If what has occurred once were to occur anew, would we be united as we are to-day? Would we have close on a million men under arms? Would we be prepared when the danger burst forth? Moreover, what likelihood is there, given the same elements of disorder, that the government of the king would be any more stable than in the past? At all events, whatever may be the opinion entertained on this score, the re-establishment of the king, which we all wish for, and which I personally desire, is likely to encounter unsurmountable obstacles from the moment it becomes a possibility; it is wise to look it in the face and to agree beforehand what shall be done in such a case. Last year, a regency might have been established; but the Archduchess Marie-Louise, to whom I broached the subject, will not return to France on any condition.¹ Her son is to be given an establishment in Austria, and she asks no more for him. I have also secured the certainty that Austria, for her part, no longer dreams of the regency, and

¹ Nothing is more true than this assertion. Marie-Louise had declared herself most emphatically in this connection, and she was all the more strengthened in her determination in that she held dearly to the new attachment she had contracted, and which did not allow her to entertain any idea of becoming reunited with Napoleon; her *liaison* with M. de Neipperg is a matter of history; she had entered into it almost immediately after leaving France.

no longer desires it. Last year, it seemed to me as if she might conciliate the various interests, but the situation is no longer the same. The matter is therefore one no more to be thought of. In my eyes, the only man who can conciliate all interests is the Duc d'Orléans. He is a Frenchman, a Bourbon, the husband of a Bourbon; he has sons; as a young man he has served the constitutional cause; he has worn the tricolored cockade, which, I repeatedly said in Paris, should never have been doffed; he would unite all parties. Is not that also your idea, my lord, and what would be England's opinion in the matter?' — 'I am unable to say,' replied Lord Clancarty, 'what is likely to be the opinion of my government in regard to an idea which is as entirely new to it as it is to me. As far as my personal opinion is concerned, I have no hesitation in declaring that it would seem to me extremely dangerous to forsake the principle of legitimacy, and endorse any usurpation whatsoever. But Your Majesty is surely desirous that I should write to my government that which you have done me the honor to impart to me.' The Emperor told him to write, and having pointed out to him how essential it was that it should be clearly understood what the end was it was sought to attain when undertaking a thing of such magnitude, he withdrew.

"Lord Clancarty did indeed write, while insisting, however, on the reasons which should bind England to Your Majesty's cause.

"M. de Metternich, to whom Lord Stewart and Lord Clancarty communicated this conversation, was of the opinion that the question raised by the Emperor was ill-timed, that it was not advisable to lose oneself in a maze of hypothetical questions which might never arise; rather, that one should wait until they presented themselves, and treat each in due course. He commissioned the Austrian

ambassador in London to make representations in that sense.

“The Emperor Alexander, who little understands the principle of legitimacy, has, without waiting for the opinion of the British Cabinet, caused to be inserted in the *Gazette de Francfort*, an article, which lies before me, and the purport of which is that the powers seek only to overthrow Bonaparte, but that they in no wise pretend to interfere with France’s inner régime, or impose a government on her; and that she will remain free to set up for herself whatever one she shall see fit.

“Up to the present time, however, he is alone in his opinion. Prussia herself, entirely accustomed as she is to will everything that he wills, is on Your Majesty’s side. She has even gone so far as to express a desire that Your Majesty should issue a proclamation, and that this proclamation should forestall the meeting in Paris of the electoral colleges summoned thither by Bonaparte. This wish is generally shared by the powers. It is looked upon as most necessary that Your Majesty should endeavor to rally all parties to yourself, by assuring to all without exception the advantages of a constitutional régime. The powers look upon a declaration from Your Majesty, conceived in such a spirit, as a powerful auxiliary to the forces which they are about to set in motion. Several of them would further wish that Your Majesty, casting on your ministers the blame of the mistakes that have been committed, should form a new ministry as if you were in France, and in the composition of which all parties would find the guarantees they require. I have even been asked to write to Your Majesty to this effect. I have been notified that such a wish will be conveyed to you in the suggestions which will be made by the ministers which the several Courts are about to send to you, which causes me to hope that Your Majesty will forestall the expression of it,

“I must add to all that was said to Lord Clancarty by the Emperor of Russia, what has come to me about his utterances from sources which I have every reason to believe reliable.

“He has repeated on several occasions that when he was in Paris, a year ago, all that he saw and heard led him to fear that the government would not be able to maintain itself. It seemed to him that the sentiments and opinions of the princes were not sufficiently in harmony with the opinions and habits of a generation born during their absence, and which, in many respects did not entertain the same ideas and manners as its fathers. Now, it is impossible to govern in opposition to the ideas of one’s time, he is continually remarking, fond as he is of generalities. He says that his fears were heightened when he saw Your Majesty summon as ministerial advisers and to the councils men doubtless most worthy, but nearly all of whom had spent the days of the Revolution out of France or in retreat, consequently not knowing France, and unknown to her, and lacking that experience of public affairs of which even genius cannot supply the place. He believes that the harm done by them to the royal cause has been very great; and, although he is of opinion that such an evil would be avoided in future for the reason that Your Majesty would make an altogether different selection, I must state that he points out that the one of all your ministers who has given the greatest cause for complaint to all parties, more than ever enjoys the confidence of Your Majesty. He has gone so far as to say that the greatest harm done has had its origin in the share of power which Your Majesty has granted to or allowed to be usurped by the princes of your family; that the prejudices which have arisen against them seem to him an irremediable evil; that those to which Your Majesty might have been individually subject would have

produced a far less unfortunate effect, from the fact that the discontent felt in regard to him who reigns is tempered and softened by the hope placed in his successor, whereas, when it is the successors who are dreaded, such a hope cannot be entertained. The Emperor says in his everyday conversation, that he is inclined to believe that Your Majesty, if left to yourself, would suit France, and be beloved and respected by her; but that, as Your Majesty can never separate yourself from all your surroundings, he fears that you will never be able to strongly establish yourself.

“It is a source of gratification for me to see that all the powers are deeply concerned in Your Majesty’s welfare. The language even of the Emperor of Russia has its origin rather in bad humor and in the philosophical ideas with which he is imbued, than in any studied design. It would afford me pleasure to be able to add that such concern extends to *Monsieur*, and to the Ducs d’Angoulême and de Berry. But once the power exclusively concentrated in the hands of Your Majesty and responsible ministers enjoying your confidence and that of the nation, the exaggerated impressions engendered at home and abroad by errors or oversight, will gradually disappear. . . .

“I am unceasing in my endeavors to stimulate the zeal of the powers here, and to dwell on the importance of hurrying events forward. But the Duke of Wellington, in a letter written subsequently to the one which Your Majesty has done me the honor to mention to me, sends word that in consequence of the disastrous news received from the South, he feels the necessity of not beginning military operations until a simultaneous attack can be made from every quarter and with large bodies of troops. Now, with the best of intentions, the distance to be covered will not permit of the Austrians bringing one hundred thousand men to the Rhine before the end of May.

"Your Majesty will learn with pleasure that the Austrian troops have met with successes in Italy, which bid fair to be surpassed. Prince Leopold will leave in a few days, to take command of the Austrian forces. The newspapers of Vienna have made such progress as no longer to speak of King Joachim; they simply say Murat," etc.

Everything in this letter is worthy of note. The insight into France's home affairs is as true as can be expected from a man residing abroad. Did M. de Talleyrand actually entertain any illusions as to the dispositions of the foreign cabinets? Did he believe that the Emperor Alexander was the only sovereign from whom evil intentions were to be dreaded? Let it be pointed out that, two days later, the London Cabinet formulated its reservation in regard to Article 8 of the treaty of the 25th of March, and that Austria and Prussia almost immediately gave their adhesion to this reservation. As to the Emperor Alexander, nothing is more curious than the *exposé* of his political opinions, his reasons for discontent, his judgments on the princes of the House of Bourbon and on their behavior; their origin is almost constantly to be found in the follies and faults which I have already pointed out. Finally one clearly reads between the lines of the concluding sentences of the letter the intentions and plans which M. de Talleyrand was to invest with reality two months later, when he succeeded in inducing Louis XVIII. to change his entire ministry, to exclude the princes from his council, and to place him, M. de Talleyrand, at the head of affairs.

But there is a name which occupies a very prominent place in this letter, and on which, before proceeding any further, it is impossible not to dwell for a while. The Duc d'Orléans, who had left France together with the king, and who had gone to England instead of following him to Ghent, was consequently looked upon by one of the sover-

eigns who were to march at the head of the new coalition, as proper to occupy on the throne of France the place of the elder branch of the Bourbons, and even as presenting to the peace of Europe more powerful guarantees than those which could henceforth be obtained from the elder branch. The fact was in itself already serious enough; but it must perforce seem all the more so when it becomes known, — of that I can entertain no doubt, — that a correspondence between the prince and M. de Talleyrand had been carried on. Previous to writing to Ghent his letter of the 23d of April, Prince de Talleyrand had received one from London, wherein the Duc d'Orléans gave him particulars of the letters exchanged between himself and Louis XVIII., and sent him a copy of the one he had just written to the head of his house, entreating him to separate his cause entirely from that of the foreign powers. The advice was doubtless a noble one; but how was it to be expected, given the circumstances, that it would be possible for the House of Bourbon to dream of re-entering France without the aid of these powers? As a matter of course, Louis XVIII.'s reply had been guarded and evasive. A copy of this reply had been sent by the Duc d'Orléans to M. de Talleyrand. When Louis XVIII. received the great letter of the 23d, he had little trouble in understanding how dangerous and to be regretted were these fresh pretensions brought forward and discussed by the great powers. He therefore immediately made up his mind to summon the Duc d'Orléans to his presence, and to order M. de Talleyrand to join him at as early a date as possible. But the Duc d'Orléans did not hesitate to reply to this request with a positive refusal, to which he added bitter complaints in regard to the way in which he had been treated from the time of the Restoration to the 20th of March. As to M. de Talleyrand, it did not suit him to separate himself just yet from the personages

who were about to settle the fate of France and over whose decisions he flattered himself, not without cause, he was to exercise considerable influence; he did not care to reach Ghent previous to seeing the commencement of the great military operations of the coalition. He so manœuvred that he did not join the king until after the battle of Waterloo.

Nothing of all this was known in France; there were very few, not merely Royalists, but men of all parties, who were not convinced that the coalition had no uncertain object in view, that its triumph would mean the triumph of legitimacy, and that it would infallibly result in a second Restoration in the person of Louis XVIII. Opinions were divided on this point only: Was Napoleon in a position to withstand the blow about to be dealt him? Many there were who thought the affirmative, and they constituted the larger number. Many also had their doubts; I was among the latter, and I was absolutely convinced that his downfall could be followed by no other result than the re-establishment of the legitimate power, so often is it a fact that in political affairs the most important point remains unforeseen for a long time even by those best in a position to discern matters.

CHAPTER X

Impression produced in France by the promulgation of the *Acte additionnel* — Convocation of the electoral colleges — M. Pasquier threatened with incorporation in the National Guard — Correspondence between M. Royer-Collard and the Court of Ghent — M. Guizot leaves for that town — M. Pasquier has another interview with M. de La Valette; the latter insists on his again entering the imperial administration; in spite of his optimism, he is compelled to admit that Napoleon's position does not rest on a solid foundation — Assembling of the *Champ de mai* — Gouvion Saint-Cyr, alone of the marshals remaining in France, abstains from taking part in the ceremony — Meeting of the Chambers — Lucien Bonaparte joins his brother; he is elected a deputy by the department of the Isère — Composition of the Chamber of Peers; some of its members refuse to take their seats, while others hold aloof — Napoleon's visit to La Malmaison — M. de Lanjuinais elected President of the Chamber of Representatives — His appointment confirmed with great hesitancy by the Emperor — Opening of the session — The Emperor's speech — Debate on the addresses; their presentation to Napoleon — Napoleon leaves for the front immediately afterwards — The allied troops march towards our frontier — Murat, expelled from Italy, tenders his services to the Emperor, who commands him to remain in the South — Illegality of the elections — Composition and spirit of the Chambers — Presentation by the ministers of an *exposé* of the condition of the Empire — The Committee on the Constitution — M. Pasquier at the château du Marais — He meets there MM. Molé and de Barante — Council of war held at Charleroi — Marshal Soult points out to Napoleon Grouchy's incapacity — M. Pasquier returns to Paris on learning of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo.

THE early days of my stay in Paris were spent in calling upon all persons likely to enlighten me. It was not a difficult matter for me to discover that the *Acte additionnel* gave content to none, although it contained certain dispositions which, when compared with the corresponding articles of the Charter, might be considered preferable. But the most

alarming intentions were plainly perceptible; they consisted principally in the omission of an article to abolish confiscations and that, in spite of the example shown in this respect by the author of the Charter. It was not long ere it was learnt that this omission had encountered considerable opposition in the Council, but that Napoleon had persisted in it with the most significant obstinacy; he was indulging then in mental reservations which can but too readily be divined. There was perceptible in the last article a pretension to have it declared by the French nation that it never was and never would be its intention, to confer the right, even in the case of the extinction of the imperial dynasty, of proposing the re-establishment of the Bourbons or of any prince of that family on the throne of France. Could one do otherwise than comprehend that he who dared to put forward such a pretension was resolved to proceed to the last extremity, and would have recourse to every means whatsoever to maintain himself?

The semblance of acceptance which was to consecrate the re-establishment of the imperial power could not deceive any one; it was simply the readiest way of avoiding any serious discussion of the matter. With the aid of this expression of opinion and of the assembling of the *Champ de mai*, the Emperor flattered himself that he would escape the necessity of convoking the Chamber of Representatives previous to his taking the field. It certainly did not suit his purpose to leave behind him an assembly when not at hand to direct it. But there was no way of evading the difficulty; his intentions were fathomed, and the display of discontent which he was soon made to recognize, compelled him, as early as the 30th of April, to render the decree convoking the electoral colleges. M. Benjamin Constant's work on the Hundred Days is there to reveal all the joy he experienced when Napoleon was thus driven to his last

intrenchment. There was nothing which could prove a greater obstacle to his ulterior plans. Whatever might indeed be the composition of the Chamber of Representatives, it was impossible that it should suit him entirely; his enemies, of whatever kind, had an excellent opportunity of entering into it, and as he no longer dared to have recourse to threats or violence, he had no effectual means of blocking their way. It remains to be said that had it not been for the erroneous system followed by the Royalist course from the very beginning of the Revolution, and which consisted in holding aloof from public offices each time the government was constituted in contradiction to its particular principles, it would have experienced no difficulty in finding its way into the Chamber, in great strength. What a difference in the results, when came the decisive moment! But, in such matters, the most enlightened men are obliged to follow the lead of the greater number, under penalty of incurring displeasure, from which it is a most difficult task to become free. In spite of my exile, many influential electors of Paris came and assured me of the certainty of my election, if I but so wished it. After discussing the matter with some of my friends, I declined.

I had, about the same time, to resist a very strange requisition which I was far from expecting. Great was my surprise one fine morning on receiving a communication from I know not what captain of *fédérés*, informing me that my name was on his muster-roll, and commanding me to report next day at the Plaine Saint-Denis, for the purpose of being enrolled and learning my drill. This afforded me an excellent opportunity of gauging human platitude. The mayor of my quarter was one Lecordier, a stock and share broker, whom I had known in a like capacity, at the time I was Prefect of Police. Desirous as I was of not having my domicile invaded some day by fusileers, if without

more ado I abstained from reporting at the appointed place, I called on M. Lecordier. He received me most ungraciously and told me I would have to join, as my name was on the muster-roll. "What, sir," I replied, "and I at the age of almost fifty, a former Prefect of Police and Director-General of *ponts et chaussées*, and an exile from Paris besides!" He insisted upon my reporting, and I left him, with the remark that the most charitable construction I could place on his conduct was that he was crazy. M. Lecordier blossomed into a most ardent Royalist after the second Restoration. Next day, I called on General Darricau, who was in command of the *fédération* of Paris. He laughed heartily at the mayor's stupidity and caused my name to be immediately erased from the muster-roll.

Among the persons whom I saw more frequently were M. Royer-Collard and M. Becquey. The former confided to me that, resuming his former habits, he had found means of keeping up a correspondence with Ghent, sending thither all information which he deemed useful. His object was to portray truthfully the state of affairs in France and the drift of public opinion, more especially at the capital. As it would have been to the highest degree imprudent to use the mails for such a purpose, his letters, or rather his memoranda, were carried weekly by a reliable emissary, who, in order not to arouse suspicion, did not return for some time after having delivered them, and then by a circuitous route. It required for this a fresh emissary every week, and M. Royer-Collard, who was, owing to his former university professorship, well known by all the students, ever found one eager to devote himself to this perilous mission. Too much cannot be said in praise of the zeal displayed by these youths for the cause of royalty, which, in their mind, was closely allied with liberty.

After the assembling of the *Champ de mai*, at the time of

Napoleon's departure for the front, this correspondence acquired a greater importance day by day; M. Royer finally resolved upon dispatching M. Guizot himself. In spite of my determination to leave Paris, my plans were changed by a dangerous attack of fever, which confined me to my room for nearly a month. During this time, I had another conversation with M. de La Valette. His goodness of heart had finally triumphed over his misgivings; he experienced the need of again feeling confidence in the fortunes and destiny of the Emperor. He pleaded with me, as a sincere friend, with the purpose of conquering my resistance and inducing me to make to the master overtures which would meet with a ready acceptance. "You are laboring under a delusion," he said to me; "the Emperor, you may rest assured, will defeat his enemies. You have nothing to fear for the present; on the contrary, you are in a position to obtain every favor at his hand, but the situation will be an altogether different one when once the hour of his triumph has dawned. Who would venture to assert that the desire and need of vengeance will not then once more take possession of him? Do not place any faith in the liberal constitution which he makes a pretence of granting; once at the head of a victorious army, he will quickly sever the weak bonds with which he now suffers himself to be bound. Is not his refusal to subscribe to the abolition of acts of confiscation a sufficient indication of his secret intentions? So why will you persist in incurring a danger which you can so easily avoid?"

I thanked him as was proper for a zeal so constant and stamped with so much affection; at the same time, I did not conceal from him that his prévisions of the probable character of Napoleon's new reign, should he succeed in firmly establishing himself, did not make me feel inclined to take service under him once more. I added that my resistance

was less meritorious than he might perhaps suppose, because in my innermost heart I could not look upon the probable issue of the war in the same light as he did. This led us to speak about the actual strength of the army which the Emperor was engaged in gathering, and in spite of his desire to get me to look upon it as a most formidable one, there escaped his lips certain admissions which proved to me that his confidence in this respect was not as complete as he made a pretence of displaying. He admitted that the spirit of the rank and file was better than that of the officers, especially of those highest in point of rank; the marshals were worn out, and lacked both energy and high spirits. There were, it was true, a large number of regiments, but it would be better were there less of them, and were they stronger, and so forth. In a word, far from shaking my resolution, this conversation convinced me that I was right in the ideas I had conceived. What had made a special impression on me was the admission of what would have to be feared of Napoleon in the case of his returning victorious.

The assembling of the *Champ de mai*, announced for the 26th of May, did not occur until the 1st of June. Immense wooden stands had been erected in the Champ de Mars. The Emperor, in spite of all his efforts to create enthusiasm, had not been received with any of those explosions of sentiment to which we had been accustomed in the days of his glory and power. He had laid great stress, on the occasion of this ceremony, this both civil and military pageant, upon showing himself surrounded by his old warriors, and particularly those marshals who were known to be the least anxious to once more be by his side. He succeeded in surrounding himself with them all, with the exception of one, whom it was impossible to coax out of his retirement, and that one, Marshal de Gouvion Saint-Cyr, had already signalized himself on the 20th of March by

an extremely remarkable act of energy. Sent by the king, a few hours previous to his departure from Paris, to take command of the troops in the division of which Orleans was the headquarters, he arrived just as they had donned the tricolored cockade, although they were under the orders of General Dupont. He did not hesitate commanding them to at once don the one they had just doffed, and he was obeyed up to the time when M. Ferrand, a fugitive from Paris, saw fit to announce, while passing through Orleans, that the king had fled and that all was lost. Once more did the troops mutiny in favor of the Emperor, and the marshal was compelled to withdraw. He alone, therefore, was absent from the ceremony of the *Champ de mai* of all those who had remained in France. Marshals Marmont and Victor had gone abroad with the king. A few had already taken command of the army corps which were being formed; they did not require to explain their absence.

The returns of the voting in favor of the adoption of the *Acte additionnel* were solemnly announced in the course of the ceremony. At night, there was a general illumination. The two Chambers met on the 3d; the Chamber of Deputies at once proceeded with the scrutiny of credentials. On the 4th, the *Moniteur* announced that the princes, His Majesty's brothers, had taken their seats in the Chamber of Peers; they had previously taken part in the ceremony on the Champ de Mars. Thus did France, so to speak, once more learn of their political existence, for they had up to that time been almost forgotten. All of them had, with the exception of the King of Holland, hastened to the side of their brother. They could not be of any assistance to him, and yet Lucien deserved some credit in so promptly returning, when he had been so greatly and for so long estranged from him in the days when he was all-powerful. Hence Napoleon was truly grateful to him, and, desirous of publicly

testifying to his gratitude, he assigned the Palais-Royal to him as a residence, and intended to give him a household. Lucien showed the good sense of declining this honorific distinction, and lived in great seclusion. It has been pretended, but I think on poor grounds, that he had been sent by the Pope, to whom he was under strong obligations, and who was even then seeking to be on good terms with Napoleon. His Holiness was all the more in need of such a patron, from the fact that King Murat had entered upon the mad undertaking which was to result in the invasion of the greater part of the papal states. A somewhat strange circumstance in connection with Lucien's short-lived presence in France, was his election as a deputy to the Chamber of Representatives by the department of the Isère. As, following upon the *Acte additionnel*, he became by right of birth a member of the Chamber of Peers, he was compelled to resign the seat to which he had been elected.

What would be the composition Napoleon was about to give to his Chamber of Peers? What would be the spirit pervading the Chamber of Representatives? Napoleon could hardly retain the greater part of the former members of the Senate, which had displayed such hostility towards him; it next behoved him to open its doors to the better part of the celebrities of his reign, and he could not do otherwise than call to it some of the prominent men of the old régime, those whom he felt the necessity of rewarding and those whose displeasure he had too great cause to dread. When rendering the peerage hereditary, he had sought to place it on a firmer basis than that of Louis XVIII., and he had thus succeeded in giving satisfaction to many of his faithful servants; but, on the other hand, in thus leaving less room for the gratification of expectations, fewer openings for future pretenders to the honor, he could but add fuel to their vexation. On the other hand, several of those whom he

appointed declined the honor, among them M. d'Aligre, who confidentially told me the reasons which had influenced his decision in the matter. Some few, who did not dare to give expression to a refusal, avoided taking their seats; such was the course adopted by M. Molé, who so timed things as to be at the waters of Plombières at the time of the appointments. He undertook, in those days, to conciliate two entirely opposite lines of action; he had refused a ministerial portfolio, and avoided taking his seat in the Chamber of Peers, and yet he was among the most assiduous to do obeisance at the Tuileries, whither he went nearly every evening, when he would seize upon every opportunity to get near the Emperor and enter into conversation with him. He had so fully entered into his intimacy once more, that Napoleon, to the great surprise of his following, chose him to accompany him on the occasion of the only visit he paid to La Malmaison, previous to his going to the front. The spot must have awakened in him many touching memories, especially the one of Joséphine, the object of his earliest and most tender affection, and from whom he had parted to run the risks of a new and so disastrous fortune. I have been told that he chose on that day to be left alone in the room wherein she had breathed her last. Queen Hortense was of the party besides M. Molé. I have these particulars from M. Mollien, who accompanied the queen.

Strangely enough, it happened that the Chamber of Peers was convoked previous to the list of the peers being made public; it did not appear until the 6th. Such an irregularity was destined to and did call forth loud protests from the Chamber of Representatives, which was not favorably disposed towards a Chamber enjoying privileges superior to its own. Its first act, the election of its president, was almost tantamount to an act of hostility, for M. de Lanjuinais was known for his independent spirit as well as for

his republican opinions. His election required, in accordance with the terms of the *Acte additionnel*, to be confirmed by the Emperor, who was with difficulty persuaded to grant such confirmation. The night of the 4th was employed in attempts to secure M. de Lanjuinais's refusal of the honor, but this he firmly declined to do, and on the 6th there was a scene at the very opening of the sitting, when the oldest member of the House made the announcement that the official report of the election of the president had been laid before the Emperor, and that His Majesty had replied that he would inform the Chamber of his intentions through one of his chamberlains. This method of communication angered all, and it was maintained that the Chamber could recognize no other medium between itself and the Emperor except the ministers. M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, seeing the state of emotion in which the Chamber was, hastened to the palace, and made Napoleon feel the necessity of his confirmation. He returned with the document, and the Chamber consented to receive it at his hands in his capacity of Minister of State (Minister without portfolio).

On the following day, there arose a far more serious discussion on the oath to be taken individually by the members of the Chamber. M. Dupin, the advocate, and M. Roy, since Minister of Finance, maintained that the form of this oath should be governed anew by a special law, that the former oath of obedience to observance of the institutions of the Empire and of loyalty to the Emperor was no longer admissible, and that care must be exercised not to allow it to be deduced from this oath that the *Acte additionnel* and the constitutions which it recalled were practically immutable; that this would be tantamount to renouncing the right to call for such amendments as might be deemed fair and reasonable. They did not carry the day; their opinion was opposed and rejected, owing to the reason that the oath

demanded of the Chamber was prescribed in an unrepealed law. It was agreed that the oath should be taken without prejudicing the right of calling, in conformity with constitutional forms, all amendments considered necessary both to the constitutions of the Empire and to the *Acte additionnel*. It was impossible to manifest in a plainer fashion, in addition to a repugnance to take the oath, feelings of distrust which could not but wound Napoleon's pride.

The opening of the session took place on the 7th of June, in conformity with the usual ceremonial and forms. The Emperor pronounced a speech remarkable especially for the difference between its tone and the one to which France had so long been accustomed. It consisted in the most solemn affirmation of his intentions and of his constitutional sentiments. He laid to the stress of circumstances, and to the confidence of the nation, the necessity in which he had found himself of exercising for the past three months power uncontrolled. Warned by the discussion which had taken place in regard to the oath, he recognized the necessity of cementing all the scattered constitutions and of co-ordinating them. "This work," he said, "will ensure commendation of the present epoch at the hands of future generations. My sole ambition is to see France enjoy every possible liberty; I say possible, because anarchy always leads back to absolutism." Then, after a brief reference to the formidable coalition of kings threatening the independence of France, to the hostilities which had already broken out on the high seas, to the internal dissensions upon which the enemy's hopes partly rested, he added that his ministers would each in turn make known the state of affairs, and that the Minister of Finance would call the special attention of the Chamber to the means of rendering available at the earliest possible moment all the revenues comprised in the budget. He concluded in the following

terms: "It is likely that a prince's first duty will soon call me to the head of the children of the nation in order to fight for our country. The army and I will do our duty. As for you, peers and representatives, give the nation an example of confidence, energy, and patriotism, and, like the Senate of the great nation of bygone centuries, be resolved upon dying rather than to survive France's dishonor and degradation. The holy cause of country will triumph!"

A debate ensued in the two Chambers with regard to the drawing up of addresses in reply to this speech. In the Chamber of Representatives, M. Félix Lepelletier, whose name and presence recalled the most painful memories, proposed to confer on the Emperor the title of saviour of his country. M. Dupin succeeded in getting this proposition shelved. "I hope," he said, "that the Chamber will guard against the impropriety of the adulation which but too much led astray preceding legislative assemblies. The nation has not sent us here to flatter the Emperor, but to assist him by our counsels, and by a legitimate co-operation. If we forestall the march of events, what means do we reserve unto ourselves wherewith to express our gratitude when once the country shall have been saved?" Then there again came up for consideration a proposition already made to the effect that all members of the Chamber enjoying a title of nobility should abstain from wearing it within the House. This very democratic idea did not meet with success. Finally, one Jouve, of the department of the Drôme, succeeded in getting his petition presented against an order emanating from a commissioner-extraordinary of the Emperor, and by virtue of which he had been detained since the 12th of May in the prison of Valence. The Chamber commissioned its president to lay this complaint before the Emperor, so the very next morning M. Regnaud hastened to report to the Chamber that the Emperor had

given orders that Jouve be set at liberty, and even that he should be reinstated in his position as *receveur des domaines* (receiver in the administration of the domain), if there was no special reason to the contrary.

On the 11th, the two addresses were presented to Napoleon by delegations from the two Chambers. There could be noticed in the one of the Chamber of Peers an affectation of dwelling on "the principle that all power emanates from the people, and is instituted by the people." Then followed a formal declaration that if success was to equal the justice of the cause for which battle was about to be waged, if the hopes one was accustomed to conceive from the genius of Napoleon and the bravery of the troops were not deceived, France desired no other price of it than peace. Her institutions should be a pledge to Europe that henceforward the French government could never be led astray by the seduction of making conquests. The Emperor replied: "The struggle in which we are engaged is a serious one. The enthusiastic impulses engendered by prosperity do not constitute the dangers which threaten us to-day. The stranger is now seeking to make us pass under the Caudine Forks! . . . It is in difficult times that great nations, like great men, display all the energy of their character and become an object of admiration to posterity."

The address of the Chamber of Representatives, which was longer than that of the Chamber of Peers, revolved round the same circle of ideas. Care had been taken to recall in it that His Majesty had declared that the duty of uniting the scattered constitutions and of co-ordinating them, was one of the most important matters which was to engage the attention of the legislature. A revision of the *Acte additionnel* could not be announced in less equivocal terms than the following: "While Your Majesty,

opposing to the most unjust of aggressions the valor of the armies of the nation and the power of your genius, will seek in victory nothing but the means of securing a durable peace, the Chamber of Representatives will consider it is tending towards the same goal by laboring unceasingly at the compact, the perfecting of which must cement more strongly the union between the throne and the nation, and strengthen in the eyes of Europe, through the amelioration of our institutions, the pledges of our engagements."

The Emperor replied that all his thoughts were absorbed by the impending war, with the success of which France's honor and independence were bound up. "I am leaving to-night," he continued, "to take command of my armies. The movements of the several corps of the enemy render my presence there indispensable. During my absence, it will afford me pleasure that a committee appointed by each Chamber shall meditate on our several constitutions."

These words said clearly enough that if he tolerated meditation, he at the same time was not in favor of any discussion of the matter. "All public discussion on the Constitution, which would tend," he went on to say, "to diminish, directly or indirectly, the confidence to be reposed in its dispositions, would be a misfortune for the state; we should find ourselves drifting helplessly on shoals without compass and without guide. The crisis in the midst of which we find ourselves is a severe one. Do not let us emulate the Lower Empire, which, pressed on all sides by barbarian hordes, became the laughing-stock of posterity, by occupying itself with the discussion of abstract subjects at the very time the ram was battering down the gates of the city. In all matters, my course will ever be just and firm. . . . Help me to save our common country. As the chief representative of the people, I have contracted the obligation, which I renew, of employing, in more peaceful

times, all the prerogatives of the Crown and the little experience I have acquired, to second you in the amelioration of our institutions."

Such are the last words of the public life of Napoleon. He left on the night of the 11th of June to begin that six days' campaign in which his destiny, while accomplishing itself, determined that of France and of Europe. There can, I believe, be no hesitation in saying that his recent experience of the new representative government had given him little satisfaction, and that he had merely endured the annoyance it caused him from the idea that if victory perched once more on his standards, it would furnish him with the means of getting rid of pretensions which a character like his own could not tolerate for any length of time.¹ There was no time to be lost, as it behoved him, under penalty of being immediately overwhelmed by superior numbers, to deal some powerful blow, ere his enemies could all join hands.

The Congress of Vienna had seen the end of its labors. The final act, in which were embodied all the conventions stipulated during a period of eight months, had been signed on the 9th of June, and the sovereigns had come to an understanding as to their most important interests. With this object in view, they had cast aside all obstacles of a nature to disturb their harmony. There was no longer anything left for them to attend to but the carrying into

¹ M. de Grouchy, in a work published by him during his sojourn in America, with the object of justifying his conduct at the battle of Waterloo, relates a most curious conversation he held with the Emperor after, I believe, the battle of Ligny. Napoleon, under the intoxication of this first success, did not conceal from him that if he succeeded, as he flattered himself he would, in crushing the English within the next two days, just as he had crushed the Prussians, his plan was to return to Paris at once, seize again, by aid of the prestige of victory, the imperial power, and shake off the wretched bonds with which it had been attempted, since his return, to pinion him.

execution of the fresh undertaking which had just united them. All plans connected with it had been duly matured and settled. Hence, desirous of sparing no effort to ensure the success of the campaign, they resolved upon getting as close as possible to the scene of operations. The orders they had given, as soon as they had heard of Napoleon's first successes in the interior of France, had been carried out with incredible rapidity. The Russian and Austrian columns, in spite of the ground they had to cover to reach the French frontier, were but at a few days' march from it. The English and the Prussians, who had started from points much nearer, had been the first to arrive; they occupied in Belgium the positions assigned to them, and were to assume the offensive as soon as they should feel themselves in touch on their left with the allied corps. It was therefore on the English and Prussian armies that Napoleon intended advancing. He flattered himself upon inaugurating the campaign by crushing them, thus throwing consternation into the ranks of the allies.

Murat's mad attempt in Italy had failed; a convention had once more placed the kingdom of Naples in the hands of Austria and England. Murat had been reduced to seek an asylum in France. He had in vain solicited the honor of fighting again under Napoleon's eyes. His treachery of the previous year and his recent defeat did not render him a very desirable auxiliary; it would, moreover, have been difficult to admit him into the ranks of the French army, and still more so to again give him command of the cavalry. He was therefore notified that he must remain in the interior of the country. I have every reason to believe that after the disaster of Waterloo, either from a recollection of his former services, or from a return to a certain partiality which he had always felt towards the man, Napoleon could not resist giving way to some regret at

having dealt severely with him, and more than once allowed the remark to escape his lips that his dashing valor, had he but dared trust him with a command, might perhaps have changed the issue of that fatal day.

Before following Napoleon in the brief campaign which was to decide his fate and that of France, I must give an account of the organization which he left behind him, especially that of the Chamber which had shown him so little sympathy and confidence.

It must be admitted that the elections had almost in their totality been illegally held; there were only seventeen departments, wherein the half, plus one, of the electors had, as required by law, cast their votes; in the seventy-seven others, therefore, the election was radically null and void. The totality of the electors in the colleges of departments should have amounted to 19,976, whereas there had been no more than 7669! This is proven by carefully collected statements, which I caused to be drawn up at the Ministry of the Interior in the following month of August. Much the same had happened in the case of the colleges of *arrondissements*. And yet the prefects and sub-prefects, in so far as lay in their power, had issued a *compelle intrare*.¹ These circumstances had been carefully concealed at the time of the scrutiny of credentials; yet it was generally known how matters actually stood. Great had been the universal repugnance to take a part in the duties of the electoral colleges. Under these circumstances it was difficult that this fact should not cause the Chamber to be looked upon with great disfavor. This impression increased greatly when some of the best known names of the Revolution appeared, such as Barère, Cambon, David, Merlin, and Lepelletier. Many most worthy men sat with them.

¹ "Compel them to come in," words taken from the parable of the great supper, Luke xiv. 23. — TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

Several of them there are who again made their appearance with distinction to themselves in subsequent assemblies and even ministerial offices, such as M. Siméon and M. Roy. M. Siméon had been elected in Provence, without having come forward, without having even made his appearance in the district. He hesitated a long time ere accepting the electoral mandate. He told me that he was uncertain as to what course to pursue, on my meeting him at the house of his nephew, M. Portalis, who, flying from the Angers *fédération*, had sought refuge in Paris.

Notwithstanding the illegality of the elections, in spite of odious selections, there is no doubt that the Chamber contained the elements of a majority full of sense and well intentioned, from which it would have been possible to obtain much that was good, had care been taken to direct it and to take its sentiments into account. Unfortunately, men had had no time for reflection, so that, at the approach of the critical hour, it came about that the only influence in a position to make itself felt was that of M. Fouché. His principal friends were M. Gourlay, M. Jay, and M. Manuel, the most important of all, owing to his rapid development into a speaker of talent. He was a prominent advocate of Aix at the time M. Fouché lived there in disfavor, and it was there that they had become friends.

I must not omit from the men of mark of the Chamber of Deputies M. de La Fayette. Since the days of the Constituent Assembly, he had held aloof from parliamentary life, and he was returning to it with the greatest satisfaction, fully convinced that he was about to play the most important rôle in it. His pretensions were far from being justified; he found himself surrounded by his former colleagues of 1789, who professed the same opinions as himself, viz.: MM. de Lanjuinais, Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, the Duc de Liancourt, and one of the brothers Lameth.

After the Emperor's departure, the Minister of the Interior, Carnot, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duc de Vicence, and the Minister of Police, Fouché, read in succession to the Chamber *exposés* of the situation of the Empire. They merely consisted of statements drawn up for the occasion, and they failed to produce the desired effect. The most important act was the appointment of a commission to which was entrusted the revision of the constitutions of the Empire, the necessity of which had been recognized by Napoleon himself.¹

I had hardly recovered from a long illness, so in the first days of June I resolved upon making a journey to the Marais, ere starting for Mont-Dore. Many memories bound me to Mme. de La Briche, M. Molé's mother-in-law, who, a kindly, good-hearted, gracious gentlewoman, ever anxious for the welfare of others, while heedless of herself, occupied in her lifetime a position in society to which no one was ever better entitled. She had been fortunate enough to pass without hindrance through the horrors of the Terror. The Revolution had respected her person as well as her estates. This was all the more to be wondered at from the fact that the château du Marais, owing to its elegance, its luxurious appointments, and the extent of the demesne, was such as to tempt popular appetite. Troublous days once past, she found herself, more than all others, in a position to gather about her the remnants of the society of by-gone times; after she had married her daughter to M. Molé, her *salon* became the rendezvous of all those who did not care to frequent the *salons* of the Directoire and the society of contractors who had suddenly acquired wealth.

¹ This commission, through some odd combination, was composed of eighty-seven members, scattered, it is true, among nine committees, each one of which was, when sufficient progress had been attained, to appoint one of its members to form a central committee which was to revise and compare the several projects of the committees.

Besides M. Molé, I met at the Marais M. de Barante, who had on the 2d of March left his post of Prefect of Nantes, and had declined another post tendered to him by the Emperor. He joined to a most sound and cultivated judgment a heart in the right place and the charm of an accomplished man of the world. We were all three in unison in all matters; while our fears and hopes were shared by all the inmates of the château. Such harmony of opinion and sentiment, and such mutual confidence, is particularly pleasant in critical political times. It may be imagined with what impatience we awaited the news of the first results of the campaign. The news of the victory of Ligny reached us on the 16th. This brilliant beginning did not prevent us from considering as probable the success of the masses against which Napoleon had to contend, but, at the same time, we thought the struggle would be a protracted one. The battle of Waterloo, with its fatal issue, was therefore a surprise to us.

I learnt at the time particulars which I consider to be accurate, and which demonstrate how men of genius occasionally create for themselves embarrassments to which they fall the first victims. Previous to taking the field Napoleon had held at Charleroi a council of war, to which had been summoned all the marshals who were to fight under him. Among them was Marshal Grouchy, recently elevated to that rank as the price of the devotion he had given proof of against the Duc d'Angoulême. The new marshal received, in the distribution of commands which followed, that of the army corps which was to constitute the right flank, and which was one of the most important in numbers.

After Napoleon had given his instructions, all withdrew, some of them, however, reluctantly, as is the case with men who have something further to say. A quarter of an hour later, Marshal Soult, who exercised the functions of major-

general, returned to the presence of the Emperor, and informed him that he was commissioned by the greater number of his colleagues to lay before him a matter of the utmost gravity, and about which they could not in all conscience remain silent. It was to the effect that Marshal Grouchy had just been entrusted with a command upon which might depend the fate of the army, and which was altogether disproportionate to his military talents. He was assuredly capable of executing in a brilliant fashion, when on the battle-field, such orders as he might receive from the commander-in-chief, but he did not enjoy sufficient ability to direct decisive movements of his own accord; now he was about to be placed in a position where the slightest mistakes could not be retrieved. Struck by these remarks, which were spoken in no hesitating tone, Napoleon, as was his custom, strode up and down for a few moments without vouchsafing any answer, and then said: "You are right, sir, Marshal Grouchy is not endowed with any great ability; but what am I to do? I have just given him his baton, and I cannot refuse him a command. Moreover, I have placed by his side two of the army's best lieutenant-generals; they will guide him, and besides I will constantly have my eye on him."—"After this, Sire, our responsibility ceases," said Soult, as he withdrew.

Everybody knows the history of the battle of Waterloo, the mistakes laid to the door of General Grouchy, his line of defence, and how he has thrown the blame for them on the Emperor himself. However this may be, whether it is that the orders transmitted to him were not sufficiently explicit, or that he did not understand them, or again that he merely lacked the perspicacity and the presence of mind necessary to modify them according to existing circumstances, certain it is that the result was disastrous. If Napoleon sought to reward, by this act of condescension,

the marshal's reprehensible behavior at Pont-Saint-Esprit, he was cruelly punished for it.

On Wednesday, the 21st, one of the inmates of the château received a note from M. Saulty, receiver-general of the department. He dwelt a short distance away in the château de Basville; his note had been written just as he had received positive information to the effect that the Emperor had lost a decisive battle, that the Imperial Guard had been annihilated, that the whole army was routed; in a word, that all was over for Napoleon, who had not a straw to clutch at. My first impulse, as was also that of M. Molé and of M. de Barante, was to return to Paris as quickly as possible, so all three of us sprang into a little travelling barouche which belonged to me, and procuring horses to make the first stage of our journey, we reached the gates of Paris at daybreak.

CHAPTER XI

Napoleon returns to Paris—He attempts to secure fresh resources—The ministers advise him to address his request to the Chambers—At this early date, M. Regnaud has recourse to the word abdication—Resolution adopted by the Chamber of Representatives, on the motion of La Fayette, to take possession of the government—Committees appointed; they meet immediately—The Emperor abdicates—M. Fouché is surprised in his negotiations with the Bourbons, owing to the sudden issue of Waterloo—M. Gaillard, whom he had sent to Ghent, had not yet reached that city—The Royalist party not having had time to organize within the Chamber, M. de La Fayette constitutes himself the leader of the Liberal party—M. Dupin proposes the formation of a provisional government—MM. Carnot, Fouché, and General Grenier appointed by the Chamber of Representatives, and the Duc de Vicence and M. Quinette, by the Chamber of Peers, members of the government commission—Marshal Ney presents to the Chamber of Peers a despairing picture of our military condition—Napoleon lays stress on the fact that he has only abdicated in favor of his son—Angry debate between Prince Lucien and M. de Pontécoulant in the Upper Chamber—M. de La Bédoyère compromises, through a burst of anger, the cause he was seeking to serve—M. Fouché's contentment after the abdication; he pledges himself to bring back the Bourbons, begs for time only, and bends all his energies towards preventing the recognition of the rights of Napoleon II.

THE news of the Waterloo disaster caused great commotion in Paris. I can remember with what anxious curiosity we neared the Invalides, and how we sought to see whether the tricolor flag was still waving over the building. Mme. Pasquier had sent me a messenger, who had crossed me on the road. She informed me that the Emperor, contrary to all expectation, had arrived in Paris on the previous day, following by a few hours the news of his defeat. What had he come to do? How had he found heart to abandon his

army in the presence of a victorious enemy, thus leaving the road into France open, and trusting to his lieutenants to gather together remnants to whom his presence alone might have restored some little energy? I lost myself in conjectures. I was soon to learn what follows.

Hardly had he reached the Elysée, when he revealed his intention of obtaining fresh means of defence from the country, thus defying the discouragement of some, the indignation of others. At the end of a few hours, he had summoned his ministers and held a council. He laid before them his reverses in all their heartrending reality, in the presence of his brothers Joseph and Lucien; he next enumerated his needs, and the resources on which he thought he could depend; but to satisfy these needs, there was the choice of several entirely different ways of proceeding.

Should he address himself to the Chambers? Could he flatter himself with securing their assistance and their co-operation? As there existed some doubt of this, was it not better to seize the dictatorship and declare France in a state of siege, while appealing to all lovers of their country, to all true Frenchmen? It would appear that this opinion was that of his brother Lucien, who maintained it with warmth, and whose opinion was also shared by M. Carnot. M. Fouché advised appealing to the Chambers. The Duc de Vicence stated emphatically that the only way of salvation lay in the most frank and sincere union between the nation and its head, but that it could hardly be hoped for, and that at all events so grand a result could only be obtained through the medium of the Chambers. M. Decrès remarked that, to his personal knowledge, the Chambers were exceedingly ill-disposed. M. Regnaud did not conceal the fact that they would be found disposed to call for the greatest of all sacrifices; and upon the Emperor asking him to speak out more plainly, he boldly uttered the word abdication.

Napoleon was in favor of entering into preliminary negotiations with the Chambers, reserving unto himself to act independently of them, should they show symptoms of hostility. Nothing had been settled, when the conference was interrupted by the news of what was taking place in Parliament. In both Houses, but more especially in the Chamber of Representatives, the proceedings had taken a turn entirely opposed to the wishes and desires of the Emperor.

Following immediately upon the news of his return and of the events which had precipitated it, the Chamber of Representatives had, on the motion of M. de La Fayette, adopted a resolution in four articles, conceived as follows:

"The Chamber declares that the independence of the nation is in danger. The Chamber resolves upon holding permanent sittings. Any attempt to dissolve it is high treason. Whoever should be guilty of a like attempt, shall be treated as a traitor to his country, and be forthwith handed over to justice as such. The regular army and the National Guards, which have fought and which are still fighting to defend liberty, independence, and French soil, have deserved well of their country. The Ministers of War, of Foreign Affairs, of Police, and of the Interior, are hereby summoned to at once take their places in the bosom of the Assembly."

This was plainly seizing upon the reins of government, and if Napoleon had for an instant doubted the formal intention of setting him aside, he would have seen a proof of it, not only in the absolute silence observed concerning his person in that memorable document, but in the few words spoken by the man who had called it into existence.

"Sinister rumors have been bruited abroad," said M. de La Fayette, "which have received unhappy confirmation. The time has come for us to rally around the old tricolor

standard, the one of 1789, the one of liberty, of equality, and of public order. That is the only one which we are called upon to defend against the pretensions of the foreigner, and against machinations at home."

M. de La Fayette is to be found in these words such as he ever was; faithful to his favorite thesis, to the theories of 1789, he was simple enough to consider a disaster of such magnitude, and the vicinity of a coalesced army of from six to seven hundred thousand men, as a propitious opportunity for establishing the reign of liberty such as he conceived it, and he did not hesitate, in order to accomplish so grand a work, to suppress the House of Bourbon, together with Napoleon. The blow he dealt at the latter was none the less terrible. The Chamber of Representatives decided that its resolution should be forthwith communicated to the Chamber of Peers, which promptly passed a similar one, with the exception that it struck out the article summoning the ministers.

Napoleon was in the first instance deeply wounded at the daring pretensions of the Chamber of Representatives. His first impulse was to forbid his ministers to answer a summons so closely resembling an order; but, after thinking the matter over, he determined upon sending them himself, placing at their head Prince Lucien, and entrusting them with a message. This message contained a hastily indited *exposé* of the reverses met with at Mont-Saint-Jean. It exhorted the representatives to unite with the chief of the state, in order to preserve their common country from the misfortune of again falling under the yoke of the House of Bourbon, or of becoming, like the Poles, the prey of the foreigner; lastly, it suggested that the two Chambers should appoint a commission of five members to concert with the ministers regarding measures of public safety and the means of treating for peace with the allies. After a lively debate

in the House as a committee of the whole, wherein the necessity for the Emperor to abdicate was clearly pointed out by M. Lacoste, and by MM. de La Fayette, Manuel, and Dupin, the opinion in favor of forming a commission of five members carried the day, and it was determined that it should concert with the commission of the Chamber of Peers and with the council of ministers. In order to proceed more rapidly, it was resolved that the commission should be composed of the president and of the four vice-presidents. The commission appointed by the Chamber of Peers was composed of Count Boissy d'Anglas, MM. Drouot, Thibau-deau, Dejean, and Andréossy.

All this took place in the course of the 21st; Napoleon had arrived in Paris at eight o'clock in the morning. The committees met during the night, in the presence of Lucien, of the ministers, and even of the ministers without portfolio. If my memory serves me well, the meeting took place at the Elysée, but of this I am not sure.

M. de La Fayette presented the motion for abdication, but his sentiment did not prevail, and it was merely resolved by a considerable majority: 1. That the safety of the country demanded that the Emperor should consent to the two Chambers appointing a commission which should enter into direct negotiations with the allied powers, on the condition that they should respect the national independence and recognize the right appertaining to every nation to adopt whatever constitution it should see fit; 2. That it was meet to give strength to these negotiations by a full development of the national forces; 3. That the ministers should take the proper steps to supply men, horses, and money, as well as measures to check and repress internal foes.

This was the proposition which was to be discussed on the 22d, the day we entered Paris. It was impossible for Napoleon to become reconciled to the idea that the Cham-

bers should enter into direct negotiations with the foreigner, and thus treat of him and without him. It was tantamount to proclaiming his deposition. On the other hand, what hope was there of obtaining peace so long as he did not formally abdicate? An abdication had been forced from him at Fontainebleau the preceding year; why should not the same happen once more? The precedent had been set. This idea was naturally uppermost in the minds of all; no simpler and easier dénouement presented itself.

There was general indignation when the commission reported to the Chamber of Representatives what had been agreed upon during the preceding night. The *rapporteur* hastened to add that, according to information he had just received from the ministers, a council then being held at the Elysée had resolved upon sending a message to the Chamber, whereby the Emperor consented to the appointment by the Assembly of ambassadors who should treat with the allies, declaring that if his individuality was an insuperable obstacle to the nation's treating for its independence, he was prepared to acquiesce in every sacrifice demanded of him.

In spite of the extent to which it went, this explanation failed to calm the state of agitation, his immediate abdication being still considered indispensable. M. Regnaud, perceiving that the irritation of the House was gradually increasing, hurried to inform Napoleon that the Chamber seemed to be in a mood to pronounce his deposition, if he did not of his own accord adopt the course which all expected him to pursue.

Napoleon was already greatly shaken in his resolutions. Everything about him was conspiring to drive him to a decision which seemed to be the only way of salvation. He had been the butt of attacks of every nature for the past twenty-four hours. It would be difficult to conceive an idea of the confusion which, from the moment of his arrival,

reigned in the Palace of the Elysée, whither so many anxious interests, so many compromised existences, brought their contingent of uneasiness and fright. All the members of the imperial family, the ministers, the generals, the most faithful friends, brought every few minutes anything they could gather of the sentiments of the public and of the Chambers; every moment their reports became more and more disquieting.

Queen Hortense, Mme. Mère, and Cardinal Fesch spent several hours in Napoleon's company. They were above all things anxious for his personal safety, and begged him to take the necessary measures to ensure it. Joseph remained in the palace as long as the crisis lasted. It was in the midst of all this that Lucien's daughter arrived from London.

Among military men, Marshal Davout and General Solignac were those who spoke their minds most freely; none more than they contributed towards convincing the Emperor that he could no longer look for help, even from his most devoted partisans. Many forerunners of misfortune were all the time coming in from the Chamber of Representatives. They were MM. Regnaud, Boulay, Defermon, Durbach, Sébastiani, and Vertillac.

Finally, the necessity became patent, and the Emperor, yielding to M. Regnaud's persistent entreaties, resigned himself to it. Nevertheless he sought to gain a little further time by asking that he might at least be allowed to reflect for a few moments as to the best way of accomplishing this sacrifice, looking to the interest of France and of his son.

Convinced as M. Regnaud was, that in spite of this reservation, he had carried the point, he lost not a minute in carrying the news to the Chamber. General Solignac moved that a deputation be forthwith dispatched to the

Emperor to impress upon him the urgency of his coming to a decision. M. de La Fayette was heard to exclaim that if Napoleon did not make up his mind, he would move his deposition. Finally, the Chamber consented to wait for an hour, and the sitting was suspended; thereupon General Solignac and a few more deputies went to the Elysée; his language was that of a man who is giving expression to a peremptory summons. Lucien, who had up to that time been most firmly inclined towards thoughts of resistance, added his persuasion to that of General Solignac, as likewise did Joseph and all the ministers. This united action finally conquered Napoleon's hesitancy. He consented to subscribe to the following document, which was brought to the Chamber of Peers by M. Carnot, and to that of the representatives by M. Fouché: "Frenchmen, when entering upon a war with the object of maintaining the national independence, I reckoned on a unity of efforts and purpose, and the co-operation of all the national authorities. I had grounds to anticipate its success, and so I defied all the declarations of the powers against my person. Circumstances seem to me changed. I offer myself up as a sacrifice to the hatred of France's enemies. May they be sincere in their declarations, and really bear no enmity except against my person! My political life is ended, and I proclaim my son Emperor of the French, as Napoleon II. The present ministry will constitute temporarily the government council. The interest I bear my son leads me to call upon the Chambers to lose no time in passing a law organizing a regency. I urge upon you all to unite for the common weal, and for the purpose of remaining an independent nation."

He had hardly been back thirty hours in Paris, and was already compelled to depose his crown! It is true that his precipitate return had at first somewhat disturbed the plans of his enemies, but it had nevertheless been a serious mis-

take. Had Napoleon remained at the head of his army, no voice would perhaps have dared to make itself heard against him. One of his secretaries, M. Fleury de Chaboulon, has published a narrative of the events of that period. If he is to be believed, Napoleon, when returning so precipitately, yielded to counsels which were not in accord with his personal sentiments; his first impulse had been to gather together between Laon and Reims all the remnants of his army, all the forces which he could dispose of, and with which he flattered himself he was still in a position to arrest the enemy's progress for at least a little while. This course presented better chances of success than was imagined, for, at that time, the army corps of Marshal Grouchy, which he through a happy and unexpected chain of circumstances, brought back almost intact, was looked upon as lost. On the 21st, it was assembled in good order under the fortifications of Namur.

But, M. Fleury notwithstanding, it is difficult for me not to attribute to Napoleon himself a resolution bearing such close resemblance to those already taken by him after the retreat from Moscow and the loss of the battle of Leipsic.

The Emperor, when coupling, as he was doing in his declaration, the idea of national independence with that of the proclamation of his son as Emperor, was setting a trap into which he hoped to draw many, and which was to prove especially seductive to the army. It was a barrier he was erecting between the army and the House of Bourbon, whose return would destroy the hopes to which he could not help clinging.

Nevertheless, it was evident that this return presented the only way of salvation still left open, as it would furnish the means of causing the foreign enemy to disarm. Did not the merest good sense point out, that since the struggle had so promptly come to an end, no other negotiation

was possible except one which, beginning with a formal recognition of the rights of Louis XVIII., would smooth away the very first obstacle to success, and would remove the most specious pretext for the demands with which the allies threatened the country?

The idea was so natural a one that it is hard to understand how it did not come to prevail at once. How did it occur that the Chamber of Representatives did not unhesitatingly pursue the line of conduct which it seemed to have entered upon? Why did it allow so excellent an opportunity to slip past? The course it adopted was to be the source of great embarrassment for it. It fell into the error of allowing itself to be influenced by the counsels of M. de La Fayette and M. Fouché. The latter was determined upon completing Napoleon's downfall, but the idea he had propounded at the time of his first conversation with me must not be lost sight of. "Nothing is better," he had said, "than that the Bourbons should return; it is even necessary that they should, but under good conditions, clearly defined, firmly guaranteed, and which shall prove a safeguard of the rights, the interests, and the positions of all. The mistake committed last year by M. de Talleyrand must not be repeated."

True to this idea, M. Fouché's mind was far less on the negotiation with the foreigners and the means of arresting their progress through French territory, than on preparing the treaty which he would have liked to conclude with Louis XVIII. previous to once more throwing open to him the doors of his kingdom. Now, in order to bring about this result, he needed time; it was necessary that he should accumulate difficulties which would make his co-operation valuable, and thus acquire credit for having removed them. The rapid march of events had already frustrated his combinations; he had reckoned on a war lasting three months

at the very least, and on alternate successes and reverses. In lieu of which, the disaster of Waterloo had, in the space of a week, brought him face to face with a state of things he had not anticipated for two or three months.

I feel certain that at the time Napoleon left to take command of the army, he had dispatched towards Belgium one of his most trusted agents, M. Gaillard, a councillor near the *cour impériale* of Paris, who afterwards was appointed to the *cour de cassation* on the urgent recommendation of M. Fouché. This exceedingly able agent's orders were to gain admittance to the Ghent Court, where he was to lay down the bases of the bargain into which M. Fouché was prepared to enter. But the necessity of taking a circuitous route, in order to avoid falling in with the army corps on the march, delayed him. When he reached Ghent, the king had already left; there was nothing for him to do but to follow the road taken by the royal cortege, which he flattered himself he would overtake. Under such circumstances, facilities for travelling were not great, any more so than the means of communicating with Paris. Hence M. Fouché was without news from his principal agent, at a time when he awaited it with the greatest impatience. It will be readily understood how anxious he was to delay the march of events, in order to remain master of the dénouement.

There existed, it is true, in the Chamber of Representatives, a party entirely composed of determined Royalists, fully convinced that the legitimate royalty was the only port of salvation; but this party, which, if it had but had the time to organize itself, might perhaps have constituted a numerical majority, was not yet in a position to exercise any decisive influence. This influence belonged to the men wedded to the principles of liberty and national independence, who were prepared to admit royalty, even the legiti-

mate royalty, but on condition that both should ally themselves frankly with their principles and convictions. They had no doubt just displayed the greatest zeal in precipitating the downfall of Napoleon; but, this once accomplished, mindful of the grievances they treasured against the former government, they sought the most serious guarantees against the recurrence of the abuses which had so deeply offended them. Hence discussions and debates which could not be ended in a day, as the question at issue was nothing less than to once more build up a constitution; therefore it will be perceived how far this might lead them.

The part taken by M. de La Fayette in the onslaught made against Napoleon, naturally placed him at the head of those who were about to become entangled in the inextricable imbroglio of parliamentary combinations; he flung himself into them with that robust faith which never suffered him to doubt of the triumph of the principles proclaimed in 1789. He had never ceased proclaiming them, at all times, in all places, to all men, and under all circumstances. For him and for some of his most zealous adherents legitimacy was a valueless dogma, above which they placed the sovereignty of the nation. It seemed a matter of course to them that the people should give and take back the crown, and should offer it to the one who would most frankly accept the conditions dictated by them.

Such, then, were the principal elements of the Assembly of which M. Fouché thought he could dispose at will. I do not take into consideration a few miserable revolutionists of the Barère and Félix Lepelletier stamp, who influenced no one.

Outside the precincts of the Assembly, the throng of men came whose position and livelihood were more or less in jeopardy. They were the old servants of the Empire, those who had taken an active part in everything that had

occurred since the 20th of March; there was, lastly, the military party, the principal author of the present crisis. It would be all the more difficult to control this one from the fact that its irritation would increase in proportion to the mistakes for which it must lay blame to itself; but, at the outset, it did not show itself in force in the capital. Had there but been sufficient good sense and courage to revert to legitimate royalty by a decided and prompt resolution, it is probable that the army would not have hesitated to subscribe to it, especially if the semblance of legality had been secured by invoking the intervention of the Chambers. This is demonstrated by the readiness with which the abdication imposed by the Chambers had found acceptance with the army. In that respect alone could the Chamber of Peers be of any service. Its recent creation and its composition gave it no influence over the country, but it could make its action felt in the ranks of the army through the prominent military men which sat in its midst.

The declaration of abdication was at last laid before the Chamber of Representatives. This alone could allay the general effervescence, a result which the report wherein the Minister of War had attempted to prove that the disasters incurred by the Army of the North were less considerable than at first supposed, had not succeeded in accomplishing. The declaration was read by the President, who took care to remind the House that its rules prohibited any demonstration of approval or disapproval.

The document having been read, M. Fouché remarked that it was not in an assembly composed of Frenchmen that he would consider it proper to recommend observance of the consideration due to the Emperor Napoleon and to remind them of the sentiments which his misfortune should inspire. The nation's representatives would assuredly remember, in the course of the negotiations about to be entered upon, to

make stipulations on behalf of the man who for so many long years had presided over the destinies of the country. He moved the appointment of a commission of five members whose mission it should be to approach the allied sovereigns in order to treat with them on behalf of France and defend her rights to independence. He added that the commission should be ready to go on its way the next morning.

This idea seemed to be meeting with general favor, when M. Dupin submitted the following proposition: —

“The Chamber of Representatives, considering that the common weal is the supreme law, declares:

“1. The Chamber of Representatives, in the name of the French nation, accepts the abdication of Napoleon.

“2. The Chamber of Representatives resolves itself into a National Assembly. Delegates shall leave forthwith for the headquarters of the allies to insist on France's right to independence, and in a special fashion on the inviolability of Napoleon's person.

“3. An executive commission of five members shall be appointed, of which three shall be chosen by the Chamber of Representatives, and two by the Chamber of Peers.

“4. This commission shall appoint a generalissimo forthwith. The ministers will remain in office.

“5. A special commission shall be entrusted with the preparation of a new constitution, which shall guarantee our national institutions, and form the bases of the past and conditions on which the throne will be occupied by the prince whom the nation shall have chosen.”

Not a word, it will be seen, in reference to Napoleon II. The right of selecting its sovereign remained vested in the nation. M. Dupin spoke to his motion at some length.

He was followed by M. Mourgues, who asked that the throne be formally declared vacant, the provisional government confided to the ministers then in office, who should act in unison with a commission of five members, all under the presidency of the President of the Chamber. Marshal Macdonald was to be provisionally appointed generalissimo

of the naval and territorial forces; General La Fayette, commander-in-chief of the National Guards of France, and Marshal Oudinot, second in command. Great was the uproar which followed the reading of M. Mourgues's motion, and the order of the day was loudly called for.

M. Garreau rushed up the steps of the tribune and sought to read Article 67 of the *Acte additionnel*. It was the one prohibiting any proposition to re-establish the Bourbons or any prince of that family on the throne of France. He was interrupted by the President, who remarked that the Chamber fully grasped his intention, and that all were familiar with the article.

M. Regnaud next spoke in support of the motion in favor of the order of the day. He did so with no inconsiderable skill, endeavoring to demonstrate the futility, the danger, and the illegality of the propositions just submitted. He asked that the commission charged with revising the constitution should proceed with its labors forthwith, and that an executive council be organized without loss of time. He closed with a somewhat touching peroration, wherein he set forth all the nobleness and generosity of the determination come to by Napoleon, this great man, who had just resigned all power, unreservedly, and without stipulating any personal condition. The Chamber should therefore constitute itself the mouthpiece of the sentiments due him and which the nation would preserve towards him.

It will be noticed that in spite of the warmth of this speech, the name of Napoleon II. was not once mentioned in it. Its deductions were the following:

"I call for the order of the day on the propositions submitted to you; I move that the day be not allowed to close without the executive council being appointed, and I ask that a committee of the House be commissioned to wait upon the Emperor to express to him the gratitude of the

French nation for the sacrifice he has seen necessary to offer up to the national independence."

His proposition having been seconded, the Chamber passed a resolution in conformity with it. The Chamber of Peers passed a similar one. A vote was thereupon taken, accepting the abdication of the Emperor, after which the attention of the House was taken up with further particulars supplied by the Minister of War as to the military situation; lastly, a ballot was taken for the appointment of the three members of the governmental commission to be selected by the Chamber. This operation was not concluded till late in the day. The members selected were M. Carnot, M. Fouché, and General Grenier. M. Carnot received considerably more votes than his colleagues. In the Chamber of Peers the balloting also went on well into the night, the majority of votes being obtained by the Duc de Vicence and M. Quinette. The selection of M. Quinette was a cause for surprise. He had no particular claim to the honor; his only title to notice in the Chamber of Peers had been his quality of regicide. It was assuredly not a circumstance of little importance, — this assemblage of three regicides in the provisional governmental commission composed of five members.

At the sitting of the Chamber of Peers, two scenes had produced a great sensation outside its halls. Following upon the communication by the Minister of the Interior, on behalf of the Minister of War, of documents whose object was to present in a less disastrous light the consequences attendant upon the defeat sustained at Mont-Saint-Jean, Marshal Ney, who had returned to Paris almost as quickly as Napoleon, claimed the attention of the House. He did not hesitate to give, in the course of a brief allocution, a denial of the reports just read and to declare them to be entirely false. According to him, the enemy, victorious in

every direction, was already at Nivelles with eighty thousand men, and could reach Paris within six or seven days. There was nothing to oppose to it; it had been impossible to rally a single private of the Old Guard, and Marshal Grouchy for his own part had been beaten. No other resources were consequently left but the propositions to which one might succeed in securing the enemy's acceptance.

Marshal Ney was mistaken concerning one important particular. Grouchy had not been beaten. This marshal was both discouraged and exasperated; he was aware that the Emperor and his most devoted partisans attributed principally to him the loss of the battle. The Minister of the Interior sought to combat Marshal Ney's assertions, but in vain; the blow had been dealt, and was to be re-echoed afar, as no authority could be thought more competent on such a matter.

The other scene was a still livelier one. I have said that committees of the two Chambers had been commissioned to bear to Napoleon, in the nation's name, an expression of the respect and gratitude with which the noble sacrifice he was making to the independence and happiness of the French people had been accepted. They lost not a moment in fulfilling this duty. There can be seen in the narrative published by M. Fleury how coldly Napoleon received these congratulations, and in what bitter terms he replied to them. His vexation, to say nothing of his annoyance at the pressure to which he was made to submit, was still further increased by the manifest violation of a portion of the conditions embodied in his declaration. For instance, the provisional government was not, as he had wished it, left in the hands of his ministers, and, what must have seemed to him a far more serious matter, no reference had been made to the proclamation of the rights of Napoleon II. He therefore considered it necessary to recur to that article,

and dwelt strongly in his reply to both committees on the fact that "it should not be forgotten that he had abdicated in favor of his son only."

The Archchancellor, President of the Chamber of Peers, considered it his duty, when reporting the result of his mission, to make mention of the matter, whereupon Prince Lucien seized the opportunity to ask that the Chamber should then and there declare in the face of the French people and of the foreign powers, that it recognized Napoleon II. as Emperor of the French. This proposition called forth a passionate retort from M. de Pontécoulant. He went so far as to contest Lucien's claim to French nationality, since he was a Roman prince, and asked him in what capacity and by what right he spoke and voted in the Chamber. Then, dealing with the main question, M. de Pontécoulant declared that he would never recognize as king a mere child, nor as a sovereign one who did not reside in France.

Lucien attempted to reply, but did so in very weak fashion. M. Boissy d'Anglas sought to put off this discussion, for a while at least, exclaiming: "Is a foreign war not sufficient? Is it then sought to kindle a civil war? Let us remain united. The abdication has been unanimously adopted; the only question therefore before us is to appoint a provisional government. I hope that we shall arrest the foreigner's progress, but we must not risk depriving ourselves of the means of treating with him."

M. de La Bédoyère followed, speaking in an angry tone, which resulted in his repeatedly being called to order. "The abdication of Napoleon," he said, "is not to be divided. If it is not the intention to recognize his son, his duty is to draw his sword once more, surrounded by those Frenchmen who have already shed their blood for him. Certain vile generals have already betrayed him,

but woe to traitors! We who have sworn to defend him even in his misfortune, dare declare that every Frenchman deserting his flag shall be branded with infamy, his house shall be razed to the ground, and his family proscribed; no longer will there then be any traitors, nor any of those intrigues, the cause of recent catastrophes, whose authors are perhaps sitting in our midst."

At these words, he was interrupted from all sides, and called upon to retract his utterances. There were several who thought he sought to incriminate Marshal Ney. He vainly endeavored to resume his speech, but he only succeeded in saying: "So it is a settled matter that none but servile voices will ever be heard within these precincts." Tumult thereupon reached its highest; it was plain that M. de La Bédoyère's violent outburst had dealt a most fatal blow to the cause he was seeking to serve. After a rather lengthy debate wherein the Duc de Bassano and M. Rœderer further tried to prove that nothing could be better policy than to proclaim Napoleon II. forthwith, the partisans of that idea were forced to relinquish it, considering themselves content that the Chamber should leave the question open, by taking up the business before it and proceeding with the election of the members of the commission.

It was M. Thibaudeau who made the motion. "Without in any way prejudging," he said, "the question proposed, which it is dangerous either to accept or reject, let us devote ourselves to-night to appointing the members of the government, for are we not indeed without a government? Now, if we are without one, what shall we be able to do at a time when inaction is a matter of congratulation to the various parties?"

His opinion prevailed, and the balloting was proceeded with.

On the 22d, I had occasion to see M. Fouché, who seemed

greatly pleased thereat. "Well, we have secured his abdication at last," he said to me. "You must admit that this is work enough for less than twice twenty-four hours." — "Yes, no doubt, but how are you going to deal in regard to the condition made in favor of his son, whom he still pretends to impose on France? It is not necessary to tell you to what a degree the condition is a dangerous one. What France needs above all things is peace, which can only be enjoyed, both at home and abroad, through the House of Bourbon." — "Do you imagine that I am not as well aware of this as yourself? But we have been so taken by surprise. He has been crushed so quickly that he has not given us time to mature any plans, and it is impossible to convert the public mind in a day. Moreover, we must be careful of the feelings of the army, which we must not frighten away, but which we must seek to rally to our cause, for it might yet do a great deal of harm; if people will only not hurry too much, all things will be settled for the best and to the satisfaction of all."

He thereupon told me how the Chambers would, during the course of the day, organize a provisional governmental commission, that he felt assured of becoming a member of it, and even to meet on it only men sharing his intentions, and with whom he would do as he saw fit. He had already supplied the list of them to his friends in both Chambers, and he felt certain it would be adopted. "So you can judge how strong I am, for there is nothing like collective power in the hands of a single man."

He made an appointment with me for the same evening, so as to inform me of the result of the balloting. With him, I went to the residence of M. Molé, whom we found in his *salon*, in the midst of some sixty visitors. We there conversed together in the embrasure of a window. M. Fouché repeated his refrain: "*Do not hurry me too much.*"

Everything will be spoilt if I am not given the time I need. You must know full well, M. Pasquier," he went on to say, — "you who have been so closely connected with the events of last year, especially in the month of April, — what would have happened, if, on the 2d of April, it had been attempted to accomplish at all risks and perils, and with the chance of compromising everything, that which was done without striking a blow some few days later?"

I readily agreed with him that in matters of this nature, the greatest merit lay in knowing how to select the propitious moment, and no little danger might be incurred in forestalling it. Nevertheless, I would point out to him that the situations between which he drew comparisons were entirely dissimilar. In the foregoing year, the question had been one of reviving bygone memories, and of obtaining the recognition of rights that had lain dormant for over twenty years. To-day, there was nothing to wipe out but the deeds of the past three months. The course to be pursued was clearly marked, success was certain, whereas the preceding year it had been necessary to make the most dangerous experiments. Lastly, at that time, the capital was invaded; the evil was there present, and had to be removed with as little harm as possible. To-day, it was necessary to avert a similar calamity, whose consequences might be more terrible. Not a moment was therefore to be lost in arresting the enemy's progress, and preventing an invasion; there was no more efficacious means than the recognition of the rights of the ancient dynasty. I could not help thinking that the utmost diligence was requisite.

M. Molé supported my arguments with all those his intellect supplied him. We were engaged in this most animated question, when there entered M. Gourlay, a deputy; he had come from the Chamber of Representatives to inform M. Fouché of the two first names taken out of the urn.

They were his own and that of M. Carnot. M. Fouché was visibly disappointed. He had not taken into account M. Carnot, who had nevertheless been the first elected. M. Carnot, a man not easily managed, might prove a somewhat troublesome colleague.

M. Gourlay increased his discontent by informing him that General Grenier was the candidate who after him had obtained the greatest number of votes, which clearly indicated that he would be elected on the second ballot. However impassive the physiognomy of M. Fouché might be, it was impossible for me not to perceive that these were not the selections of which he had told me he was so sure a few hours previously. His candidates were, I believe, Marshal Macdonald and M. Lambrecht or M. Flaugergues.

He was more fortunate in the Chamber of Peers, where he secured the Duc de Vicence, whom he certainly desired, and where M. Quinette was likewise appointed through his influence. He was a man over whom he had gained a great ascendancy, and it could not be otherwise than agreeable to him to have as a colleague a regicide like himself. In spite of the annoyance caused M. Fouché by the selection of M. Carnot, it will be seen that he would still be master of the majority in the governmental commission.

For the purpose of explaining the slowness with which it suited him to proceed, it was perhaps an advantage for him to be able to dwell, when dealing with the Royalists, on the difficulties he would have to surmount with his new colleagues.

There arose at the very outset a question concerning which they all agreed. It was the necessity of having recourse to all means to prevent at whatever cost, in both Chambers, any act of recognition of the rights of Napoleon II. It is certain that all the forces the imperial party could still dispose of would be concentrated in a final effort

to carry a vote on this point. This gave M. Fouché much food for reflection.

When I saw him again early next morning, the subject furnished the staple of our conversation. He informed me that Napoleon, having learnt during the night of the little success which had attended, in the Chamber of Peers, the efforts of his brother Lucien, and MM. de La Bédoyère, de Bassano, Roederer, and his other friends to have his son proclaimed, had given way to a fit of anger; his indignation was such as to cause it to be dreaded that he might stop at nothing to stimulate the zeal of his partisans. Renewed efforts were therefore to be expected in the two Chambers, especially in that of the Representatives, with the object of making this pretension triumph. M. Fouché did not conceal from me that he felt some anxiety on this score.

"Can it ever be foretold," he said to me, "what may happen in a Chamber as poorly organized as that one? A burst of eloquence, a feeling of weariness, and the desire of ending it all, may, when least expected, carry a declaration in opposition to the wishes of the greater number. What would be the consequences of such a declaration? It would certainly rally the army to the cause of Napoleon II., than which nothing more portentous could happen." — "I agree with you that where an assembly is not decided as to its course, it is liable to drift away in a direction least expected. Napoleon wishes that his son should be proclaimed; therefore hasten the proclamation of Louis XVIII.; if you rest satisfied with preventing the recognition of Napoleon II. for the time being, such a contingency will ever remain present." — "It is very easy for you to talk; I doubtless possess a certain amount of influence in the Assembly, but I have not had the time to pave the way for so sudden a transition, and I am taken unawares; were I to attempt to

lead the House too quickly and too far, it might pass altogether beyond my control. You see how they selected Carnot yesterday. My power is at present limited to forestalling calamity, and to ward off the most pressing danger; in that respect, I have neglected nothing, and have given the watchword to my surest and most able friends. Most fortunately I reckon among them a man of the highest talent, on whom I can depend. That man is Manuel. Do you know him? He is the man to sway an assembly at will. I was telling him only just now that it was absolutely necessary to prevent at all costs the recognition of the rights of that child. He told me to make my mind easy, and that the matter was safe in his hands."—"I am not acquainted with M. Manuel," I replied; "but whom have you in the army?"

He informed me that Grouchy had returned with his command, closely followed by the Prussians and English, and that he could not take up any position, even if allowed to do so, except at some great distance from the frontier. Nothing was yet known as to what had taken place at Ghent after the victory won by the allies. He told me that in case of his absence, his secretary, Fabri, had orders to keep me informed of the slightest occurrences. "Now, when and how are we at last going to be able to communicate with those people at Ghent? They are such a bungling lot. How is it that they have no agent here? Should they not already have entered into communication with me? They must be aware of my sentiments, which they must have learnt from more sources than one."

I have reported this conversation because it shows the thoughts that were at the back of M. Fouché's brain, and the actual embarrassments of his position. His means of governing the Chamber of Representatives were far more limited than he would acknowledge.

CHAPTER XII

M. Dupin's proposition in regard to the oath—To whom should allegiance be sworn?—The Chamber of Representatives, in an order of the day, recognizes Napoleon II. as Emperor of the French—M. Fouché's influence over the provisional commission—He selects the commissioners who are to enter into negotiations with the sovereigns—Marshal Masséna given the command of the National Guard of Paris—Demonstration of the *fédérés* in favor of Napoleon—M. Fouché succeeds in inducing him to leave Paris; he retires to La Malmaison—M. de Vitrolles released from prison—M. Hyde de Neuville, secretly dispatched by Louis XVIII., delivers full powers signed by the king to M. Pasquier and other prominent members of the party—M. Pasquier looks upon them as utterly useless, and does not acquaint M. Fouché with the matter—Detective Foudras keeps him informed of what is going on at La Malmaison—A fear that Napoleon may once more place himself at the head of his army—His proclamation to the troops is not inserted in the *Moniteur*—General Becker entrusted with the custody of his person—M. Pasquier and General de Girardin depart on a mission to ascertain the spirit animating Grouchy's soldiers—On their way they learn that the latter has turned his command over to Marshal Soult, and so they decide upon returning to Paris—Preparations made at Havre to convey Napoleon to America—The allied generals refuse him a safe-conduct—On learning of the enemy's march on Paris, Bonaparte tenders his services to the governmental commission—Following the rejection of his offer, he starts for Rochefort—A judgment of his conduct during the Hundred Days—The cause of Napoleon II. irretrievably lost after his departure—The party led by M. de La Fayette persists in the belief that it will be free to confer the crown on the prince who will show himself the most anxious to uphold public liberties.

I PERSIST in my belief that had M. Fouché desired or frankly dared to insist on the recognition of the House of Bourbon, if his friends, and the men of whom he disposed, had joined hands for that purpose with the many deputies

of whose sentiments no doubt could be entertained, it would have been possible to obtain a majority and to enter on this course.

The question was unskilfully brought forward at the sitting of the 23d, by M. Dupin, who asked that the members of the provisional government should be required to "swear obedience to the laws and fidelity to the nation."

M. Defermon seconded the motion, in so far that an oath should be taken, but to whom? "Have we not an Emperor?" he exclaimed, "and is that Emperor not Napoleon II.? It is to him therefore that the oath should be taken." He was supported by MM. Boulay, Bérenger, Garat, Regnaud, General Mouton-Duvernet, and opposed by MM. Maleville, Verrières, Bignon, and Dupin.

The most telling of the arguments employed on behalf of Napoleon II., and one which was likely to make an impression on an assembly, was the following one: "You have accepted the abdication of Napoleon, but it was only made conditional upon his son being recognized. If you ignore that condition, the abdication thereby falls to the ground, and Napoleon resumes his rights."

This was a skilful way of embarrassing timorous men, who dreaded above all things that Napoleon should again seize the reins of power. M. Dupin replied: "Why did Napoleon abdicate? Because we saw, and he himself saw, that in spite of all his talents he could not save France. Had he been in a position to do so, we should be the most insensate of men to abandon the reins of state to a child. I ask you now, will Napoleon II. be able to accomplish that which Napoleon I. has confessed his inability to do? There are those who would seek to decide the fate of a nation by acclamation. To save that nation must be our sole thought. Let us therefore show our wisdom in adhering to the measures taken yesterday consequent upon the abdication."

If any danger still remained of the Chamber being led away, and if the oath to Napoleon II. carried the day, it was impossible to believe otherwise than that the army would take this oath with enthusiasm. It was at this juncture that M. Manuel interfered, in obedience to the promises he had made to M. Fouché. In a lengthy and cleverly conceived speech, he directed his efforts to submit to the Chamber all the difficulties contingent upon any resolution whatsoever. He carefully avoided contesting the rights of Napoleon II., merely confining himself to prevent any too positive consequences being deduced therefrom, and which might thereby alone become dangerous. "Thus, because Napoleon II. was Emperor by right, it did not follow that the regency should at once be constituted, pursuant to the several constitutions of the Empire." This was just at what his partisans had ventured to hint. The result would have been that the power would have fallen into the hands of the brothers of Napoleon. "It did not follow," he added, "that one should renounce the measures taken the day before, and which public safety demanded."

It was therefore necessary that the provisional government should remain invested with all the powers requisite to fight the enemy and treat with him; it was requisite to stand by the resolution by virtue of which the fate and destinies of France had been entrusted to five members composing it. The mission confided to them was doubtless an important one, but there was nothing left but to resign oneself to it, as it presented the only way of salvation.

M. Manuel concluded by calling for the order of the day on the several propositions submitted during the sitting. Thus, there was no longer any mention of the oath to Napoleon II. But, in order to silence the opposition which he dreaded, he moved that the order of the day should be based first on the fact that Napoleon II. had become Em-

peror of the French by the abdication of Napoleon I., and in accordance with the several constitutions of the Empire; and second, on the will and intention of the two Chambers, when on the previous day they had appointed a provisional government, to secure to the nation the guarantees of which it absolutely stood in need in view of its liberty and tranquillity, under the extraordinary circumstances in which it was placed.

The order of the day was adopted almost unanimously. Cries of "Long live the Emperor!" were heard in the hall of the Assembly and from the galleries; then, the message having been carried to the Chamber of Peers, the latter, in spite of some little show of opposition, adopted a similar resolution on the motion of M. Thibaudeau.

Thus, in this critical hour, all efforts made on either side to secure the acceptance or the rejection of the formal recognition of Napoleon II.'s rights proved abortive. If, on the one hand, the Napoleonic party had derived satisfaction from the form, its adversaries had secured the actual triumph, since the second paragraph of the order of the day destroyed almost practically in its carrying out the first clause which recognized a right theoretically. It no longer became possible to derive any advantages from this right, which had been conceded in principle, and two days later the provisional government had no hesitancy in issuing its acts in the name of the French people. But the Chamber of Representatives became none the less compromised in the eyes of the country, and in those of the House of Bourbon, by this concession to the Bonapartist party; it thus lost all the credit it had gained for vigorous action, of which it had given proof when provoking the abdication.

It may safely be said that, beginning with that day, it lost all political influence. M. Manuel, who had doubtless been animated with good intentions for the time being, was

nevertheless to reap during the whole of his subsequent career the consequences of an engagement into which it was not his intention to enter, and to which both men and events compelled him to submit.

It has repeatedly been said that the resolution passed on the 23d, by restoring calm to the mind of the Emperor and his partisans, stopped their execution of a project which amounted to nothing less than the dissolving of the Chamber of Deputies by force. Some little soldiery which was still available in Paris and its environs, and especially the *fédérés*, were to be made use of for carrying out this new 18th Brumaire. It may be that a like project entered the heads of the few fanatics who did not stir from the *salons* of the Elysée, but their number was small. I am even convinced that the better part of the men upon whom they depended would have failed them when the time came for action.

The Chambers gave the provisional government all the necessary powers to govern at home and to render secure the national defence. In spite of generous manifestations, in spite of sacrifices cheerfully assented to, the resources to be disposed of were insufficient to stem the flood of invasion, which was sweeping onwards, and which was about to spread itself over the whole territory between Paris and the frontier.

It has been asserted that Napoleon has said that, had the Chamber seen fit to entrust him with all they were so readily granting to the provisional government, he would not have required more to save France. True to his prediction, the Parlement seemed to take as its models the Greeks of the Lower Empire. It was seen, at the most acute stage of the crisis, to lose itself in a maze of endless discussions on the *Acte constitutionnel*; this debate was hardly terminated at the time the Russians and Prussians

were already occupying the greater part of the capital, and the remnants of the French army were subscribing to a capitulation, pursuant to which all resistance to the foreigner was to cease.

M. Fouché had succeeded in obtaining the presidency of the provisional commission, and his influence was the one which made itself most felt. The Duc de Vicence, who might have disputed him the position, judged the situation too well not to perceive that the only service he could render his country was to carefully pave the way for the transition, and to prepare without too much jarring the return of the only government which could once more restore some little peace to France, and effect a reconciliation between her and Europe. His personal position, his horror of intrigue, and his low estimate of M. Fouché's character, inspired him with a great reserve; so he remained a quiet spectator of his actions, exercised supervision over him, and contented himself with giving him a helping hand, whenever his doings seemed to tend to the only goal which it was of the highest consequence to attain.

When the time came for selecting the commissioners who were to enter into negotiations with the allied sovereigns, the choice was skilfully made by M. Fouché, who designated men proper to inspire with confidence both the party of national independence and his colleague Carnot. He was too well acquainted with the frame of mind of the foreign cabinets not to be convinced that M. de La Fayette was the last person to have any influence with them. His mere presence among the delegates, even supposing the foreigner was favorably inclined towards entering into negotiations, was capable of spoiling everything. M. d'Argenson, M. Sébastiani, M. de Pontécoulant, M. de Laforest, and Benjamin Constant, whom they took with them as secretary, were not in much greater favor with the foreigner, and, with

the exception of M. de Laforest, who had had some practice in diplomatic transactions, but whose personality evoked painful memories, no member of this deputation was in a position to hold his own in a discussion of questions of such magnitude. This was just what M. Fouché desired, as his intention was that nothing should be concluded except through himself. The commissioners started on their journey on the 25th, wending their way in the first place to the English and Prussian headquarters, where they were to ask for safe-conducts for Napoleon, in case he should resolve upon leaving French soil. They likewise expected to obtain the information and passports required by them to reach the allied sovereigns, whom they reckoned on joining on the borders of Lorraine.

It was a great achievement for M. Fouché to have thus ridded himself of the cares of a negotiation from which, as he full well knew, nothing was to be hoped; but, what annoyed him above all things, was Napoleon's presence in Paris.

The first precautionary measure he took was to appoint Marshal Masséna to the command of the Paris National Guard. It was absolutely necessary to place so large an armed force in the hands of a man enjoying sufficient authority to prevent any one from assuming a sudden sway over it; the safety of the capital depended thereon, especially as long as Napoleon resided in it. No doubt could be entertained that he would forever be on the watch to seize again on a power which he had so reluctantly allowed to pass out of his hands, and which had all but forcibly been wrested from him. It was of the highest importance to get him to leave Paris at the earliest opportunity. M. Fouché was just the man to conceive and successfully carry out so delicate an undertaking. He commissioned one of his trusted friends in the Chamber of Deputies to move that

Napoleon be requested, in the country's name, to leave the capital. ^c

This step found its justification in what had occurred during the past forty-eight hours in the vicinity of the Palace of the Elysée. The *fédérés*, supported by a large mob from the faubourgs, had invaded at an early hour the avenue de Marigny, which skirts the grounds of the palace, giving utterance to cries of "Long live the Emperor!" Napoleon considered himself obliged to show himself frequently, and give expression to his thanks. I saw him one day make his appearance on the terrace. I had not seen him since my farewell conversation with him in 1814, on the eve of his departure for the French campaign, and I could not help falling a prey to the deepest emotion, on seeing him reduced to coming forward and replying by repeated bows to acclamations springing from so low a source. There are few more melancholy, more touching, and more heartrending sights than that of a man, so long the centre of so great a glory and of such prodigious power, reduced to such humiliating straits. His naturally grave physiognomy had assumed a sombre aspect; occasionally he endeavored to smile, but the expression of his eyes reflected the sadness which pervaded his soul.

M. Fouché, not satisfied with what he had caused to be said in the Chamber of Representatives as to the necessity of Napoleon's departure, and desirous of precipitating his decision, managed to let the most threatening warnings reach him; thus it was—of this I can entertain no doubt—that official advices reached him from more than one quarter regarding alleged plots against his life. Napoleon's suspicious turn of mind, and, it must be admitted, the dangers he had more than once incurred, rendered him most prone to fears of such a fate; his alarm was, moreover, increased by the display of care made to secure his personal

safety. On one occasion, the palace guard was suddenly doubled in the dead of the night, and, next morning, M. Fouché did not scruple to tell him that this measure had perhaps alone prevented a great calamity. Finally, at noon of the 25th, he resolved to leave for La Malmaison.

I have related how, immediately on my return from the department of La Sarthe, an intimate intercourse had sprung up between M. Royer-Collard and myself. He had spared no efforts to organize a system of correspondence with Ghent; but his letters, which went very regularly from Paris to Ghent, oftentimes remained unanswered. Thus, no instructions, no guidance, no encouragement, was received, and we were left to console ourselves with the idea that this reserve was commanded both by the uncertainty of events and by a dread of compromising us.

On the 22d or 23d, M. de Vitrolles, to whom M. Fouché gave his liberty, joined us, and I unceasingly concerted with him in regard to all the steps which it was proper to take in the interest of the Royalist cause. M. Fouché had resolved upon opening his prison doors, in the first place at the entreaties of Mme. de Vaudémont, and also because he thought he would prove between himself and the House of Bourbon a most skilful and devoted medium in his interest. Nor was he mistaken. Truly grateful, M. de Vitrolles never ceased rendering him every service in his power, and on one important occasion he even overstepped the limits of prudence in serving him.

We sought to impress M. Fouché with the necessity of immediate action, telling him that if he allowed time to forestall him, the march of events would overtake him, and deprive him of the better part of the credit to which he might lay claim. These reasonings were addressed to a man whose character and revolutionary experience led him to place trust only in that of which he held secure posses-

sion, and who required material guarantees; such was still his position and the consideration he believed himself compelled to show to the party opposed to the House of Bourbon, that, while releasing M. de Vitrolles, he had enjoined upon him to keep the strictest incognito, and never to leave his domicile until after dark.

It was at this juncture that I received a high mark of confidence, which I was far from expecting, but which, considering the time it reached me, and the number of persons who shared it with me, could not be of any great service. There came to me very early one morning a man whom I at first recognized with difficulty. It was M. Hyde de Neuville. I was under the impression that he was not in France. He informed me that he had just arrived from Ghent, on a mission entrusted to him by the king. His Majesty, influenced by the reports he had received of the present state of things at home, had deemed it advisable that a certain number of persons enjoying his confidence should be invested with powers by him and empowered to act in his name. He had entrusted M. de Neuville with the conveying of these powers (they were dated June 1st), and to deliver them into the hands of the persons who were to be invested with them, myself among the number. Care must be taken to observe that the mission of M. de Neuville was anterior to the battle of Waterloo, and that this event might have caused an alteration in the king's dispositions.

The difficulty of entering France without being recognized and without incurring the risk of having his papers taken from him, had compelled M. Hyde de Neuville to take a circuitous route. He had first landed in England, then returned to the Continent, and entered France by the Alsatian or Lotharingian frontier. Hence it was that much time had been lost. Moreover, from fear of compromising the persons selected, their names had been left in blank,

and they were to be filled in at the time the papers were delivered to them. This doubtless constituted a high mark of confidence in him on the part of the king, as nothing prevented him from substituting one name for another. He assured me that my name was one on which the highest value was set, and that the Duchesse d'Angoulême had particularly recommended him to spare no effort to find me. As a matter of course, I enquired who were the persons to share the honor with me; the following are those whom I remember; several of them, however, did not receive what was destined for them until several days later: M. de Grosbois, M. Dubouchage, M. de Chabrol, Prefect of Lyons, Marshal Macdonald, Marshal Oudinot, M. le Bailli de Crusol, M. Hyde de Neuville, and M. de Vitrolles; this made nine persons, but I may have forgotten some. I believe Marshal de Vioménil may have been of the number. The name of M. de Vitrolles hardly leaves any doubt that M. Hyde freely used the faculty I have just mentioned; for how could the name have been given him at Ghent of a man who was known to be in jail? And, on the other hand, how was to be explained the omission of M. Royer-Collard's name?

As to the contents of the powers, it was simply therein stated that the bearer was empowered to do what he should deem most useful in the king's service. The document was signed LOUIS, and countersigned BLACAS D'AULPS. But what was there to be done with such powers? What benefit could be derived therefrom? These were the questions which seriously occupied my thoughts from the very first, and I soon came to the conclusion that they would probably be of no use to us. Events had entered upon too rapid a course not to force to the surface decisive acts, which were to dispose of all difficulties and quickly solve matters. There could not be any doubt that the enemy's troops had crossed our border. 'It was known that the king

had left Ghent, and was preparing to re-enter France, if indeed he had not done so already. It was therefore looked upon as a certainty that he would shortly make known his will in an official and positive manner; thus, all uncertainty would be at an end. Under such circumstances, what could say and promise men invested with powers as vague as ours, and which, although recently issued, were already obsolete, so much having happened since the day of their being signed? To this consideration must be added that, with so many persons invested with the same title and right to act, it would have been above all necessary to come to an agreement which would ensure the doings of one not clashing with those of the other. Now, such preliminaries required time, and time was not to be easily gained from people, many of whom were not acquainted with each other. Was I to inform M. Fouché of my newly acquired position? After thoroughly thinking the matter over, I came to the conclusion that there was nothing to be gained by it; he might, perhaps, seek to make use of me and compromise me to no purpose, so I decided on keeping my own counsel as far as he was concerned.

The provisional government had no desire to conceal anything as to the melancholy inefficiency of our means of defence. The Chambers were duly informed of the retrograde march of the French army, and of the progress made daily by the allied troops. The public was likewise made acquainted with everything, nothing was kept back, and every one could indulge in conjectures, with a full knowledge of the facts. The need felt of talking over so many important subjects brought to my house, morning, noon, and night, a number of individuals who all brought with them whatever information they had been able to glean. For my part, I was in the habit of receiving most serious information from the Inspector-General of the Prefecture of Police,

M. Foudras, to whom I had given M. Veyrat's position. He kept me informed day by day, nay, almost hour by hour, of all that was going on at La Malmaison, of the plans revolving in Napoleon's mind, his unceasing inclination to risk all to regain his former power, and of the relations he entertained for this purpose with what remained of his devoted partisans in the army and the Chambers.

The men with whom I enjoyed exchanging views were MM. Royer-Collard, Becquey, Molé, de Barante, de Tournon, Portalis, and Alexandre de Girardin. The latter had at first held a splendid cavalry command in the army which the Emperor was organizing when about entering upon the campaign, but his dispositions having become suspected, owing to certain indiscreet utterances, he had been on the point of being arrested, even, perhaps, of being tried by court-martial. He had been fortunate in that Napoleon had, in his anger, deprived him of his command and sent him back to Paris. He was an enterprising and ambitious man, very familiar with military matters (he had for a length of time been first aide-de-camp to Major-General the Prince de Neufchâtel), and was extremely desirous of distinguishing himself by some signal service which might secure for him the good graces of the House of Bourbon.

One of the subjects of our daily conversations was the fear that Napoleon, becoming alive to the mistake he had committed in forsaking his troops, and aware that a somewhat considerable corps had succeeded in rallying itself, should decide to again place himself at its head and protest against the abdication wrested from him, the principal condition of which, he argued, had not been observed. Already, on his arrival at La Malmaison, he had, in the form of a proclamation, bidden farewell to the army, and the terms of this farewell were evidently conceived with the object of sounding its feelings. This proclamation had not

been allowed to appear in the *Moniteur*, and had been distributed clandestinely only; but the intention remained none the less patent, and engendered the supposition that he was meditating an escape at any moment and throwing himself into the arms of the soldiers.

It was with a view of heading off this danger that the governmental commission determined upon entrusting the command of the château of La Malmaison, and consequently the custody of the Emperor, to General Becker. He was a guardian all the more to be trusted because it was known that a private feud existed between him and Napoleon. It is but fair to point out that this circumstance did not prevent him, even though scrupulously carrying out his duties, from showing his prisoner the consideration due to one in his position. It was on the 26th, I believe, that he received his appointment; on the 27th, it became known that the army had retrograded as far as Soissons, where headquarters had been established, and where the remnants of the several corps were being gathered together under Marshal Grouchy. How could one not dread, with the army so near, that Napoleon, carried away by the desire of placing himself at its head, would perhaps find his way to it?

We were arguing this hypothesis, when M. de Girardin made his appearance. "It is absolutely necessary," he said, "to ascertain the dispositions of the army and its commanders. Here is Marshal Grouchy at the head of all that remains of organized corps between the enemy and Paris; I know him, you all know him as well as I do; it is important to ascertain what spirit animates him." M. de Girardin concluded by saying that if I would accompany him, he was sure of reaching the marshal without hindrance. We would be with him next morning before nine o'clock, and if in the end the step we were taking did not result in anything, no harm could come therefrom. I felt

considerable hesitation; the state of my health was still precarious, and the fatigue incumbent upon the journey alarmed me. Finally, I yielded to entreaty, and at midnight I drove off with M. de Girardin. He had made all preliminary arrangements, had donned his general's uniform, and had provided himself with passports and routes; moreover, all the postmasters along the road knew him, and we could consequently depend on obtaining from them every facility we could desire.

We drove out of Paris with his own horses, and took post-horses at the first stage of our journey. We had travelled very rapidly and were only a few leagues from Soissons, when an estafette came riding towards us. M. de Girardin saw in this an excellent opportunity of learning what was going on, so with the tone of authority which is acquired from the habit of commanding, he hailed the courier, and asked him whether he was not carrying dispatches to the Minister of War; on his answering in the affirmative, he demanded to see the form giving particulars of the packages contained in his valise. M. de Girardin had for a length of time been first aide-de-camp to the Major-General, and was especially well known to the army couriers, all of whom had been in the habit of receiving orders from him. The dispatches were being sent by Marshal Soult.

"So it is Marshal Soult who has sent you?" he enquired of the courier. "Yes, General, it is he who is in command of the town." — "And Marshal Grouchy?" — "He is still at the head of his corps, and it is believed he will move his headquarters to Dammartin; others there are who say that all the troops, even those of his corps, are going to pass under the command of Marshal Soult." "Enough," said M. de Girardin. This information was sufficient to seriously engage our attention.

So we were no longer to find M. de Grouchy, but Marshal Soult. "It would be imprudent for us to proceed any further," said M. de Girardin to me; "should Marshal Soult be displeased at the step we have taken, if he thinks it is of a nature to compromise him, he is capable of arresting us." So we resolved upon returning to Paris. We followed a cross-road which led us to his estate at Ermenonville, a delightful spot with which I was not acquainted. We spent the day most agreeably in visiting it, favored in this by magnificent weather; it was a somewhat different occupation from the one for which we had prepared ourselves. We returned to Paris at nightfall, without having learnt anything of what so greatly interested us, and both of us reached our respective homes at midnight. Hence our journey remained completely unknown except to the friends who had concerted it with us.

Our state of uncertainty was not to last long; hardly had Marshal Grouchy, after resigning his command, returned to Paris, than he sought the means of making known his good dispositions towards the House of Bourbon, and two days later I met him at the house of M. de Vitrolles, whose retreat he had discovered. He was closeted with him, placing himself entirely at his disposal, and entreating him to let the princes know as soon as possible that he could be depended upon, and that he merely wished for an opportunity of displaying his zeal. As to Marshal Soult, his subsequent conduct has demonstrated that he had sought, like his colleague, the opportunity of playing a part, and of acquiring claims to the gratitude of a dynasty which could not fail of reigning over France. We had most uselessly exposed ourselves to the dangers which might arise from our journey in the midst of a retreating soldiery. Orders had just been issued to the troops to direct their march towards Paris with the utmost celerity. This unforeseen

movement had been rendered necessary by the rapid advance of the enemy, whose vanguards had already reached Compiègne, and who could thus, with a very few days' marching, reach the gates of the capital by way of Senlis.

What was taking place at La Malmaison? When conveying Napoleon thither, it was unavoidable that he should be told that he could not be suffered to remain there indefinitely and that there was every reason for him to acquiesce in this, as well as agreeing to any arrangements that might provide him, outside of France, with an asylum where he might live in peace and with due consideration for his former position. America could alone offer him this advantage. He had seemed to understand this, and orders had been sent to Havre to fit out with every possible dispatch two frigates, which were to be placed at his disposal.¹ It is almost certain that if, giving up the idea of waiting for the safe-conducts which the plenipotentiaries had been commissioned to ask on his behalf at the general headquarters of the allies, he had seen fit to avail himself of this means of flying, it would have been possible for him to reach in safety some New England port, as the English had not had time to scatter their cruisers so as to intercept him. But he was still indulging in hopes from which he could not detach himself, and the Duke of Wellington, as well as Marshal Blücher, having replied to the plenipotentiaries that they did not consider themselves em-

¹ I can entertain no doubts as to his thoughts having at times complacently dwelt on settling down in America, with the intention of devoting his time to scientific studies. In order to secure a proper carrying out of this plan, he proposed to M. Arago that he should accompany him. He was the leading astronomer and one of the most able members of the Académie des Sciences. M. Arago having declined (I have these particulars from himself), Napoleon procured information as to the various positions he occupied in France, and, having received it, offered him by way of compensation a sum of 500,000 francs, to be paid down. This offer was also declined, and it may be that other like disappointments were sufficient to divert his thoughts to another channel.

powered by their governments to deliver the safe-conduct asked for, this refusal, far from causing him any displeasure, seemed to him to favor his views, in that it appeared to authorize him to remain quietly at La Malmaison, and await there the course of events.

His hopes received additional strength when he learnt that the enemy was at Compiègne, and was advancing by forced marches on the capital, by way of Senlis. He went even so far as to persuade himself that he could still get his services accepted as general, if not as Emperor, and he commissioned General Becker to carry his offer to the provisional government. If his secretary, M. Fleury, is to be believed, it was the Duc d'Otrante who announced this proposition to the commission. In spite of M. Carnot's suggestion that the offer should be accepted, M. Fouché experienced little trouble in getting it rejected, and the result of this latest attempt was to bring into stronger relief the necessity of removing Napoleon from France at the earliest possible moment, and of conveying him to some place far removed from Paris. In this respect, such was the unanimous wish and intention of all those who still retained their senses. Even Marshal Davout, whose devotion to his cause and to his person had so often manifested itself, did not hesitate formally declaring himself in favor of such a measure.

The reply to the message conveyed by General Becker was, therefore, that the ex-Emperor was entreated to avoid the calamities which a protracted stay at La Malmaison and in France could not fail to draw at any moment on the country and on himself. Thus driven to his last intrenchment, and after complaining of his being forsaken, and of the perfidious conduct of M. Fouché, he determined upon dispatching M. de Flahaut to come to an understanding with the provisional government in regard to his departure

and embarkation. But the idea of his sailing from Havre could no longer be entertained, and it became necessary to convey him to Rochefort. He left on the 29th of June, at five o'clock in the afternoon, in charge of General Becker, who was made answerable for his person, and whose prisoner he actually was. Nevertheless, Napoleon did not make up his mind until the last minute, when it was demonstrated to him that the Prussians were masters of the Seine and might at any moment make him a prisoner.

I will not follow him on his journey; many others have furnished the particulars of it; nothing is better known than the story of his embarkation, of his arrival off the British coast, and of his departure for the Island of Saint Helena. But this is the place, unless I am mistaken, to say, while judging with the impartiality which I have ever sought to preserve when speaking of him, that in my opinion, this second period of his political career corresponds in no respect to the grandeur of the first. It is impossible for me not to consider that he showed himself inferior to himself. From the time of his disembarking in the Golfe Jouan to that of his reaching Paris, he was admirable in his firmness of purpose and in his resources of execution; his proclamations in those days are characterized by a loftiness and grandeur which fire both mind and heart. It would have been impossible to appeal more vividly to every sentiment and to all the passions likely to ensure him a welcome.

Subsequent to this brilliant début, he lost the secret of tuning his utterances to like strains; he no longer felt himself on his own ground, and he no longer knew how to rise superior to men and events. He found it necessary to appeal in the name of sentiments of liberty and independence; he could no longer allow his secret desires to appear of resuming his habits of despotism, which he was com-

pelled to renounce, and which were soon to cause doubts to be entertained as to his good faith. When once he had ventured to indulge in rash assertions as to the return of the Empress, and the friendly understanding about to be arrived at between himself and his father-in-law, he sowed the seed of discouragement in the minds of all those who had yielded to such a hope. Who knows if he was not himself somewhat the dupe of the illusion which he had sought to make others share? Thus might be explained the mistake imputed to him of not having, within a week of his return, attempted an expedition into Belgium; it would not have required more than twenty-five thousand men and might have been attended with great results. Lastly, even as a man versed in war, his conduct in the short campaign which decided his fate cannot escape censure. He lost time after the battle of Ligny, and did not sufficiently follow up the Prussians. Nor did he exercise sufficient control over the command of Marshal Grouchy. During the battle of Waterloo, he directed the operations from too great a distance; hence it was that a cavalry charge which might have proved decisive was made too soon and destroyed his last resource.

After the loss of the battle, everything was deplorable in his resolves and in his mode of executing them. Once back, a fugitive in his capital, he knew not how to command, to govern, or to abdicate *à propos*. He suffered to be torn from his brow a crown which he could have nobly laid down, and the mad thought of preserving it for his son, led him and his followers to unfortunate actions, whose only results were to make him lose time that was precious. It might still have been feasible for him to secure his liberty by reaching American soil. During these three months, so aptly styled the *Century of the Hundred Days*, the force of circumstances was no doubt all-powerful, and

of a nature to break down the strongest mind; but I cannot help thinking that his genius, just like his physical forces, was in a condition of deep decline.

When finally he took his departure, no serious thought could any longer be entertained of the claims of Napoleon II.; and, outside of a very few devoted friends, who professed a veritable cult for this dynasty, and who, by a strange fatality, were in greater numbers in the Chamber of Representatives than elsewhere, I do not believe that any political men could ever have entertained any illusion in this connection. The man who could not see that the return of the House of Bourbon was inevitable would indeed have been blind. Nevertheless, even among those who recognized this truth, there were many who believed that conditions could still be laid down. They would not understand that the crown was about to be reconquered, and flattered themselves that the king would only be too glad to consent to everything that should be asked of him. In their zeal for liberty, they considered the time opportune to demand all the improvements which the Charter of Louis XVIII. seemed to require.

The fixed idea of M. de La Fayette and his followers (for, little did it matter to them who should be called upon to reign) was that the crown of France should be the reward of the prince who would unreservedly accept the pact between the nation and the sovereign. As they placed little faith in the dispositions and good faith of the House of Bourbon, they fondly persuaded themselves that it would be an easy matter for them to induce the several European cabinets to accept, in lieu of those in whom they placed so little reliance, any branch whatsoever of some other sovereign house. Such was, in fact, the basis on which M. de La Fayette did not hesitate to enter into negotiations, immediately on reaching the headquarters of the sovereigns

at Haguenau. But, side by side with these fanatical partisans of the dogma of national sovereignty and independence, were men more practical who, far less occupied with public liberties than with their private interests, were, like M. Fouché, above all, pondering over the guarantees to be secured of these interests.

CHAPTER XIII

A second deputation of commissioners sent to the allies to negotiate an armistice—M. Fouché's letter to the Duke of Wellington—The enemy's armies near Paris; the city declared in a state of siege; Marshal Davout assumes command of the troops—Declaration made by the staff to the two Chambers—Debate on the address of the Chamber of Representatives to the French nation; M. Béranger protests against the ignoring of the rights of Napoleon II.—On the following day M. Bory de Saint-Vincent speaks to the same purpose—The Chambers recognize Napoleon II. as Emperor of the French—The commissioners learn from the Duke of Wellington that the allies are determined to re-establish Louis XVIII. on the throne—They refuse to grant an armistice, notwithstanding Napoleon's departure—Anxious state of the Court at Ghent during the battle of Waterloo—M. de Vicence reveals the existence of the treaty of the 3d of January to one of the secretaries of the Russian embassy—The discovery of a literal copy of the treaty, among the papers of M. Reinhard, dispels all doubts existing in Alexander's mind—He disdains complaining of the matter to Louis XVIII.—On the advice of Wellington, the king leaves Ghent for France—Hatred of the Prussians for our country; they share Russia's rancor towards the Bourbons—M. de Talleyrand joins the king at Mons—For some time he had been urging the necessity of a responsible ministry—Louis XVIII. sacrifices M. de Blacas—MM. de Metternich and de Talleyrand, bent on rendering secure their exclusive influence over the king, seek to prevent his re-entering France until after the complete cessation of hostilities, and suggest that he should reside until then in Lyons—Louis XVIII. adheres to his original resolution—M. de Talleyrand, offended at seeing his advice thus disregarded, remains in Mons, together with a portion of the king's council—But on receipt of a letter from the Duke of Wellington, he resolves upon joining his sovereign at Cambrai—A royal proclamation issued from that town.

It was a matter of utmost urgency to delay the enemy's advance. The provisional government depended little on the negotiation of M. de La Fayette and his colleagues; as early as the 27th, it had resolved upon dispatching new

commissioners to the headquarters of the allies, with special instructions to ask for a suspension of arms and to negotiate an armistice. They had been selected with a view of showing the great importance placed on the success of their endeavors; it was obvious that they would, in case of need, go far beyond their apparent mission. They were MM. Andréossy, de Valence, Flaugergues, de Boissy d'Anglas, and de La Besnardière. Several of them did not conceal the fact; on the eve of their departure, I had it from the lips of M. Boissy d'Anglas himself, that the only way of bringing affairs to an issue was to come to an understanding forthwith with the House of Bourbon; that all attempts not made in that direction would be a loss of time.

M. Fouché had written to the Duke of Wellington a letter the delivery of which he entrusted to the commissioners, and which he also laid before the House of Representatives. It is a most remarkable production. After paying a few rather well-worded compliments to the Duke and to England, he continued as follows:—

“The French nation wishes to live under a monarch. It also wishes that this monarch should reign in conformity with the laws.

“The Republic has taught us the balefulness of the excesses of liberty, the Empire, all that is calamitous in the excess of power. Our wish, and it is an immutable one, is to find at a happy distance from these excesses the independence, order, and peace of Europe.

“All eyes in France are turned towards the British constitution; we do not claim greater freedom, nor will we consent to less than it affords.

“The representatives of the French people are engaged in laboring towards its social pact. The various powers are to be separated, but not divided. From their very separation it is sought to engender their harmony.

“As soon as this treaty shall have received the signature of the sovereign who shall be called to govern France, that sovereign shall receive the sceptre and crown at the hands of the nation.

“In the present enlightened state of Europe, one of the greatest misfortunes of humanity is the division between France and England; let us therefore unite for the happiness of the world.

“My Lord Duke, there is at the present time no man who can more powerfully assist in placing the whole of humanity under a better genius and in a better status.”

The reading of this letter met with the greatest success in the Chamber, and was loudly applauded. Its drift was patent enough. M. Fouché was plainly constituting himself the mouthpiece of those who wished for a new pact between the nation and its sovereign, who desired that the crown should be restored to him only on that condition, but at the same time set aside, no less clearly, Napoleon II.; for there could be no question of such a treaty with a child-king. Louis XVIII. was the only sovereign who could give serious guarantees. After the applause publicly bestowed on this letter conceived in such plain terms, at a time when Napoleon was still at La Malmaison, it was hard to foresee the passionate outburst which took place in the Chamber in favor of Napoleon II., three days later. Assemblies are fickle; it is easy to lead them astray when they have not been broken into discipline by a long familiarity with parliamentary government.

Meanwhile, neither the commissioners appointed to negotiate an armistice, nor the letter of M. Fouché, had succeeded in reaching their destination early enough to prevent the enemy's columns from rapidly advancing until they were dangerously close to Paris. As early as the 30th of June, the governmental commission was compelled to notify the

Chambers that the enemy was within sight of the capital, adding that the reorganized army occupied a line of defence which protected the city, and that this army was animated by the right spirit, and that its devotion yielded in nothing to its valor. The Minister of War, Marshal Davout, had assumed command of it. Marshal Grouchy did not inspire sufficient confidence for him to be allowed to negotiate an armistice, or to open any transactions whatsoever. Marshal Davout established his headquarters at La Villette. This told plainly enough how confined was the line of defence; hence, Paris was proclaimed in a state of siege. Such a critical situation rendered the conclusion of an armistice more desirable than ever.

At this juncture, the party working towards having Napoleon II. proclaimed, renewed its efforts to win over the army, and dispatched commissioners to visit the troops in their cantonments. As a consequence of this, the staff sent to the two Chambers, on the 1st of July, in the form of a letter, an address in which protestations of devotion to the national cause were intermingled with the most virulent declarations against the House of Bourbon. "It is sought," it was said, "to impose the Bourbons on us, when these princes are rejected by the immense majority of Frenchmen. Were it possible to subscribe to their return, bear in mind, Representatives, that it would be tantamount to signing the last will and testament of the army, which has for twenty years been the palladium of French honor. . . . The Bourbons present no guarantee to the nation. We welcomed them with feelings of the most generous confidence; we forgot all the harm they had done us by their persistency in seeking to despoil us of our most sacred rights. How have they responded to this confidence? They have treated us as rebels and as a defeated enemy," etc.

Marshal Davout was the first of the general officers whose

name was to be found at the foot of this document, which was followed by the most serious consequences, in confirming the House of Bourbon in the idea that the army was hostile to it to such a degree that its existence was incompatible with its own.

The Chamber of Representatives drew up and voted an address to the French people. The debate took place on the 30th of June and on the 1st of July, and was the occasion of the last triumph of the partisans of Napoleon II. M. Manuel, who was the framer of it, had made no mention in it of Napoleon II., and had only sought to lay down that no one could ever be recognized as the legitimate chief of the state who, on ascending the throne, refused to acknowledge the nation's rights and consecrate them by a solemn deed. This was nothing else but the development of M. Fouché's letter to the Duke of Wellington.

M. Bérenger, deputy for the department of the Isère, spoke against the apparent disregard of the rights of Napoleon II., Emperor by virtue of the several constitutions. "We do not want," he exclaimed, "any sovereigns who come in the rear of foreign armies. The bases of our constitution are twofold, viz. the exclusion of the Bourbons and the settling of the crown on the head of Napoleon II. and his family," etc. This violent outburst greatly embarrassed the Chamber. M. Regnaud supported M. Bérenger, and M. Manuel attempted, with great adroitness, to make it understood that the omission of the name of Napoleon II. was a measure of prudence, which jeopardized no right, since the object of the address had merely been the laying down of the broad principles of national independence; but he produced little impression.

The Royalist party had been greatly disconcerted by a discussion which had taken place at the beginning of the sitting; it had exhausted its forces in defending an opinion

which M. Maleville, a member of the Chamber, had caused to be printed and distributed, wherein he sought to demonstrate the imperious necessity of France's flinging herself forthwith into the arms of the House of Bourbon. This opinion had been denounced by one Garreau, one of the commissioners sent to visit the troops; he asserted that several soldiers had seemed to him exasperated at this publication, which was producing the worst possible effect. It will be readily understood how much food was thereby supplied for declamatory utterances. A sharp discussion ensued, and the order of the day called for by the friends of M. Maleville had only been adopted after a laborious debate. This was a bad preliminary to the debate on the address. M. Garat replied to M. Manuel. He argued that the Chamber had, at that very sitting, given too positive an adhesion to the principle of the irrevocable proscription of the House of Bourbon, to permit of its retaining in the address a sentence casting a doubt on the determination come to. The address was, on his motion, sent back to the commission, in order that it should alter its phraseology.

The next day's sitting was opened with a speech of the utmost violence by M. Bory de Saint-Vincent, one of the commissioners sent to visit the troops. The occasion of it was the report he was called upon to make on his mission. He concluded by asking that Napoleon II. should be proclaimed Emperor of the French, without further delay, and that the Paris National Guard should be called upon to share the dangers of its brothers of the regular army. Six copies of this speech were ordered printed for each member, after which the House gave its attention to the report of the commission. A sentence had been added to the report, declaring that by virtue of the constitutions of the Empire, Napoleon II., his father having abdicated, was called to succeed him. There was no longer any opposition to the

address thus amended, and it was ordered sent to the army, and placarded in the capital. It was sent to the Chamber of Peers, which adopted it on a report from M. Thibaudeau. "If France," he said, "rejects any chief who would seek to make his rights prevail over those of the nation, what indignation should she not display, if this chief, the avowed enemy of the sovereignty of the people, is borne to the throne by foreign armies, through our devastated country, our destroyed towns, with all the horrors of war, over the bodies of Frenchmen and the ruins of our independence!"

I should like to make as few quotations as possible, but the foregoing words, which found so resounding an echo throughout the country, deserve to be placed on record. To this, then, had the indecision and subterfuges of M. Fouché led us; thus did he bring about one of the things he most dreaded, and the danger of which no one better understood than himself, to wit, the formal recognition of the rights of Napoleon II. by the two Chambers. How much harm he would have protected us from, had he but had the courage to declare himself immediately after the abdication, and if he had, as it would have been easy for him to do, led in his wake the irresolute throng which he abandoned to every kind of pressure!

The commissioners appointed to negotiate the armistice had not been long in reaching the headquarters of the Duke of Wellington, who informed them that he was not prepared to give them a reply ere he had concerted matters with Marshal Blücher, adding that, on the evening of the 29th, it had been agreed between him and that general that no armistice could be concluded as long as Napoleon was in Paris and at liberty, and that in consequence military operations could not be suspended.

In the forenoon of the 1st of July the commissioners nevertheless succeeded in obtaining a second conference; in

the report which they made to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,¹ it will be seen that the Duke of Wellington states formally that Louis XVIII. could alone fill the conditions which would dispense Europe from demanding from France guarantees consisting in more or less considerable cessions of territory. At the same time, he handed to the plenipotentiaries two proclamations of this monarch, informing them that his place of residence was Cambrai, and that Le Quesnoy had, together with several other towns, already recognized his rule.

At the close of this interview, the commissioners received the news of Napoleon's departure; they hastened to inform the Duke of Wellington of the fact, in the hope that this occurrence might have a favorable bearing on the conclusion of an armistice. The Duke informed them that a letter written in the name of the Emperor of Russia and of the Emperor of Austria had reached both himself and Marshal Blücher; that this letter strongly insisted on the following up of military operations; it was even said therein that should any armistice be agreed upon by the generals then near Paris, Their Majesties would not consider themselves bound by such convention, and would continue their advance. The plenipotentiaries understood that no further illusion was possible. And indeed, everything was finally settled on the 1st of July, at eight o'clock at night, at Louvres, where the enemy had its headquarters, only six leagues distant from Paris.²

It is time for me to relate what had happened near the

¹ The Duc de Vicence, on becoming a member of the governmental commission, had handed over his ministerial office to M. Bignon.

² I have read a letter of the Duke of Wellington, wherein he reported to M. de Talleyrand the two conferences he had just had with the commissioners. The manner in which in this letter he spoke of M. Fouché, leaves hardly any doubt that his election to the ministry had already been discussed at Cambrai, and that the matter had been all but decided.

king, what had been his course, and what resolutions he had come to from the time he had heard of the result of the battle of Waterloo.

Great had been the anxiety at Ghent while the struggle lasted; for some hours even, it was held as certain that the English had lost the day; preparations for flight were already being entertained, when the news of the victory of the allies became known. The extent of the success was soon learnt, as well as the fact that the roads leading to France were to be open. There could be no doubt among the advisers of Louis XVIII. as to the necessity of taking advantage of this circumstance for the king to transport himself without delay to French soil, and once there to assert his sovereignty. There were many reasons for prompt action, but especially on account of the little zeal known to have been manifested at Vienna, during the last days of the congress, for the cause of the House of Bourbon.

M. de Talleyrand's letter of the 23d of April, which I have previously laid before the reader, had thrown a most melancholy light on this subject. The dispositions of the Emperor of Russia were specially to be distrusted, all the more so that it was known for a fact that, since the warning of M. de Talleyrand, the grievances of this sovereign had increased in a special fashion; he had learnt — there could no longer be any doubt of it — of the secret treaty concluded during the progress of the congress, between France, Austria, and England. Now, this treaty, in the making of which M. de Talleyrand had so actively participated, was wholly directed against Russia.

How was it, then, that so grave a fact, and which it was necessary, especially at that juncture, to keep secret, should have been revealed to the Russian Cabinet? The earliest information of it was given by the Duc de Vicence to a secretary of the Russian embassy, who was still in Paris at

the time of his becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs. M. de Vicence had not held in his hands the treaty, which M. de Jaucourt had been careful to take away with him,¹ but he knew the tenor of it, as it had most literally been confided to him by a clerk in the Foreign Office, to whom it had been given to copy.

The secretary of the embassy had lost no time in hurrying to Vienna for the purpose of informing his master of such an important discovery. The Emperor Alexander had refused to put faith in the existence of the treaty, and persisted in seeing in this confidential communication nothing but a ruse, a falsehood on the part of Napoleon, for the purpose of embroiling him with a portion of his allies, when a Prussian body of troops, which was scouring the country between Frankfort and the French frontier, arrested on the high road, just as he was about to cross the border at that point, M. Reinhard, the French minister at Frankfort. He was searched with the utmost minuteness, and on him was found a literal and authentic copy of the treaty. How came it that this document had been sent to M. Reinhard? He had undoubtedly received it from M. de Talleyrand, with whom he was on a footing of great intimacy. I think that the latter, when making such a useless communication to him, had, yielding to an impulse of *amour-propre*, been desirous that a work of which he was so proud should be known, and meet with the approval of one of the men by whose ability and judgment he set most store. However this may be, the discovery just made received confirmation, all doubts were dispelled, and the Emperor Alexander was compelled to believe in the, so to speak, treachery of which he had been the object. He did not conceal his

¹ It was repeatedly said in those days that M. de Jaucourt had been so incredibly negligent as to leave this treaty in the dispatch-boxes of his office; but I can guarantee that my version of the story is the correct one.

indignation from those about him, but he showed the delicacy of forbidding M. de Pozzo, his minister near the king in seclusion at Ghent, to utter any complaint. "This is not the time," he remarked, "to make them feel how wrongly they have acted towards me; they are already too greatly overwhelmed." This reticence did not prevent the offence from being deeply resented, and it would have been rash to build in the future any great hopes on the good-will of a prince whom one had so deeply wounded.

Most fortunately, the great military events which had recently occurred in Flanders had transferred the principal influence to the English, and to their general, the Duke of Wellington. This would have been the time to take advantage of the friendly relations entered into at Vienna between the Cabinets of London and of Paris; since these bonds had brought the House of Bourbon into disfavor with Russia, it was only fair that they should procure for it the support of England. When in Vienna, the Duke of Wellington had taken a most active part in all the combinations of the triple alliance; his intercourse had at that juncture become most friendly; he showed himself favorably inclined to make his victory redound to the benefit of the House of Bourbon, and he was the first to intimate to Louis XVIII. that it was meet he should start from Ghent as soon as possible, in the wake of the English and Prussian armies, and establish himself in whatever part of France Napoleon should evacuate. The advice was too good not to be followed; Louis XVIII. left Ghent on the 21st, and reached Mons the same evening.

In spite of the necessity existing in regard to the English and Prussian troops for concerted action respecting military operations, the Prussian general, Blücher, was far from sharing the Duke of Wellington's sentiments towards the House of Bourbon. The Prussians were animated by a

most violent hatred of France; it rankled in their minds that they had not been suffered to profit by the victory of 1814, as they would have wished; they were angered at the opposition which the policy of the House of Bourbon had but recently shown to their plans of aggrandizement at the expense of Saxony, while humbled by their defeat at Ligny, and they wished for nothing more than to complete the abasement, and almost the bondage, of France. They cared little for the cause of the legitimate dynasty, from the moment it was likely to throw the slightest obstacle in the accomplishment of their projects; hence, they were not eager to give it any support. They were intimately bound up with Russia, all of whose grudges they shared.

At the time the king left Ghent, he was accompanied by *Monsieur*, by the Duc de Berry, and all the members of his Council who had for the past three months gathered about his person. They were Chancellor Dambray, M. de Blacas, the Duc de Dalberg, MM. Louis, Beugnot, de Jaucourt, de Chateaubriand, and de Lally-Tollendal, the last named I know not on what grounds. As to M. de Chateaubriand, he had, without any formal mission it would seem, all but taken charge of the Ministry of the Interior, which had been considered vacant in the absence of the Abbé de Montesquiou, who had remained in England.¹

M. de Blacas had, up to that time, been the soul of the Council, but his preponderance, nay, his very status in it,

¹ I cannot avoid recalling here the long and brilliant report which M. de Chateaubriand, who nevertheless figured on the occasion merely in the capacity of Minister Plenipotentiary of the King of France to the King of Sweden, had seen fit to address His Majesty, on the 9th of May, on the inner condition of the kingdom. It was a somewhat bold venture. Hence it had its disadvantages, and the publicity which it was taken care to give to the report in France was certainly productive of more harm than good. But M. de Chateaubriand none the less considered himself invested, by virtue of this act, with the Ministry of the Interior, and when its portfolio was denied him, he felt himself most unfairly treated.

was already greatly threatened. M. de Talleyrand had been in no haste to join the king, and he had found no lack of good excuses for tarrying in Vienna. He had not set out on his journey until after the sovereigns themselves had left the Austrian capital to go to their headquarters. He travelled rather slowly; he was still at Liège, when the retrograde movement of the Prussians after the battle of Ligny closed the road to Brussels and to Ghent. He joined the king at Mons, which he reached on the 22d.

A few days previously there had occurred a long-prepared scene, which his return had doubtless precipitated. Its result may, in some respects, be compared to that of the famous *Journée des Dupes*,¹ for the intrigue turned to the advantage of the man against whom it was principally directed. The views and intentions of M. de Talleyrand as to the organization to be given to the ministry which the king was about to form were clearly understood; quite recently he had dispatched M. Alexis de Noailles to Ghent, for the purpose of making them known in a positive fashion. The letters in which they had been incessantly reproduced had doubtless been communicated to the princes.

That which he more particularly censured the government of Louis XVIII. for was the part which had been thoughtlessly assigned to M. de Blacas, and the influence he had been suffered to acquire. The public, both in and out of France, did not know of any other title he could show for enjoying this exceptional position except the one he held through the king's favor. Hence M. de Talleyrand presented, as a measure calling for immediate action, the appointment of a ministry composed in conformity with the country's tastes, and which would have to face the full responsibility

¹ The *Journée des Dupes* (11 November, 1630) was so called because the enemies of Richelieu, who reckoned on his downfall, saw their hopes completely frustrated.—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

of its acts. In other terms, the princes were to be kept aloof from it, and their presence in the Council was no longer to be tolerated. Such counsels were not of a nature to please them, and had considerably angered them. *Monsieur* in particular was wroth. If he had, in the days of adversity, heeded these plans without too great a display of indignation, he soon made up his mind to be rid of the annoyance they caused him, at a time when fortune and the House of Bourbon seemed to him completely reconciled, and when he believed that there was nothing for him to do but to gather up the fruits of victory. Nevertheless, among the sacrifices demanded, there was one which was not at all repugnant to him; it was that of M. de Blacas, who for some time past had not been *persona grata* to him, and who more than once had stepped in between his brother and himself. He therefore thought it well to sacrifice him to that public opinion, on which M. de Talleyrand was setting such great store. He persuaded himself that once this sacrifice was consummated, he would, together with his son, the Duc de Berry, exercise an all-powerful influence over the king's mind. He felt assured that he could easily succeed in thwarting the plans of the man who had become the object of his liveliest aversion, in other words, M. de Talleyrand.

The carrying of this plan into execution began during the journey between Ghent and Mons, and the king yielded to the pressure put upon him to dismiss M. de Blacas without further delay. It is asserted that this decision cost him tears; but M. de Blacas was none the less ordered on the forenoon of the 22d, at Mons, to leave at once for Ostend, thence to sail for England, and go to Naples as ambassador. He had already left when M. de Talleyrand arrived, and *Monsieur* had already settled with the king on a list of ministers, which was to become official as soon as a foothold had been obtained in France. Pursuant to this arrange-

ment, M. de Vaublanc was to be Minister of the Interior, the Chancellor retained the Seals, M. Louis, the Finances, and the Duc de Feltre, the Ministry of War. M. Capelle was likewise to hold a most important position in the administration.¹

It was not pretended that M. de Talleyrand should be kept out of this ministry; the department of Foreign Affairs still appeared to be reserved for him, but it was well known that this distribution of portfolios would encounter the strongest opposition on his part. The flattering hope was indulged in of soon disposing of his objections, the frontier once crossed. His position would prove less strong in France. That which, however, M. de Talleyrand was coming to combat was the untimeliness of such a decision. His bonds of friendship with Austria had become more closely drawn together. For two months he had, with M. de Metternich's co-operation, combined a plan which was to secure their exclusive influence over the Court of Ghent. Louis XVIII. was not to re-enter his capital until the final termination of the war, and after all the consequences attendant upon it had been completely disposed of.

Pursuant to this system, it was necessary to remove him as soon as possible from the scene of war, and as it was in the North that decisive blows were to be struck, the two diplomats had resolved to make him follow the upward course of the Rhine, and to arrange matters so as to bring

¹ M. Capelle and M. de Vaublanc had gone to Ghent, convinced, on very poor grounds, that they had much to dread from Napoleon's ill-will. And yet, M. de Vaublanc, Prefect of Metz, had, in a most humble letter, tendered him his services, which had been rejected. As to M. Capelle, the unjust severity with which Napoleon had sought to treat him in 1814, when the town of Geneva, of which he was prefect, had opened its gates to the Austrians, will be remembered. His apprehensions were consequently better grounded. Both of them, while at Ghent, showed themselves particularly devoted to the service of *Monsieur*.

him to Lyons, as soon as the roads leading to that town should be open. It was presumed, not without reason, that it would be one of the first to be delivered from the yoke of Napoleon; the disposition of the various army corps belonging to the coalition indicated sufficiently that it would then be occupied by Austrian troops. The King of France, argued M. de Talleyrand, could nowhere be better than in a town of such great importance; from there, he could stretch a hand to the South of France, which was more favorably disposed towards him than the rest of the kingdom, and he would be in a position to keep a watch over everything taking place in the central and northern provinces. Lastly, his situation would be an excellent one for treating with his allies.

This combination had reasons to commend it, in the hypothesis of a prolonged struggle, and, as M. de Talleyrand made gradual progress towards the object of his journey, he became more and more enamoured with it; but circumstances had altered considerably by the time he joined the king at Mons. As nothing could be more fatal to his plan than the immediate entry of Louis XVIII. into France by way of the northern frontier, all his efforts were directed, at a conference which he obtained from him on the evening of the 22d, to point out to him the disadvantages of the course which he seemed to have determined upon. Louis XVIII. did not yield to his arguments, and M. de Talleyrand was intending to renew his attack next morning, when he learnt that the order had been given for the departure. He nevertheless endeavored to make further attempts to influence the king, whom he reached just as he had entered his carriage, and so he had to remain content with an audience of a few seconds, granted to him at the carriage door. This disregarding of his counsels, this precipitancy of acting in such a fashion as to render them useless, offended him

deeply, and he declared on reaching his domicile, that as the king appeared to set small value on his services, he could not do better than to hold aloof, and that he had resolved upon not following him on his journey into France, so he would remain at Mons. With the object of being as near as possible to the headquarters of the allied sovereigns, he commissioned one of his party to secure him a dwelling-place in I know not what town situated between the border and the Rhine.

No sooner did his resolve become known than it brought about a scission in the King's Council, and the party which took sides with him became the most important and most considerable. It was argued that it was against all reason to separate, at that juncture, from the man who for eight months had held the threads of France's negotiations with Europe, from the man who, since Napoleon's landing, had beyond denial contributed more than any other to cement more closely the bonds of the coalition, which was about to triumph. So M. de Jaucourt, M. Louis, M. Beugnot, M. de Chateaubriand, M. de Lally-Tollendal, remained at Mons with M. de Talleyrand. The same feeling was experienced among the public men, who, without occupying a seat at the Council, nevertheless worked side by side with it. Thus, MM. Mounier, Anglès, and Guizot remained behind with M. de Talleyrand, while MM. de Vaublanc and Capelle followed the king, together with the Duc de Feltre and the Chancellor. Hence these four personages were made to constitute, together with the princes, the King's Council. Their extreme haste to seize the reins of government and to assert their power led them, as early as the 25th, to issue in the name of Louis XVIII. the proclamation counter-signed by the Duc de Feltre, and dated from Le Cateau-Cambrésis. The document was poorly indited, extremely barren, and far beneath the circumstances under which it

saw the light of day. It indulged in ill-concealed threats, with which were mingled a few gracious sentences towards the mass of the nation.

The men who had remained behind at Mons with M. de Talleyrand had no intention of being mere idle spectators of the game; assuming rightly that the king would be deeply impressed with the state of isolation in which he was about to find himself, they resolved upon risking a step with him, and even with the Duke of Wellington, in order that the latter should contribute towards enlightening His Majesty. As a matter of course, would not the victorious general, under whose wing the House of Bourbon had sought refuge, feel offended on seeing excluded from the King's Council the only minister with whom he had enjoyed regular and confidential intercourse?

M. de Talleyrand, in spite of the apparent firmness of his decision, was not without feeling some anxiety at its consequences, and he thought perhaps he would have done wisely in not pushing matters so far, from the moment he was not sure of getting his advice not to return to France to be accepted. It was resolved, at a conference held at his residence in Mons, during the evening of the 24th, that M. de Chateaubriand should leave next morning. He had personally volunteered to undertake this mission, and the position in which he was so suddenly placed renders the circumstance a most remarkable one. He was to tell the king to what a degree, when listening to such peremptory counsels, when tolerating the discarding of so important a man, His Majesty was incurring the risk of, at one and the same time, sowing discouragement in the minds of his most faithful adherents, and lively alarm in the minds of the masses. It had been agreed that the negotiator should leave, and every preparation had been made in view of his departure; General de Pozzo, Minister of the Emperor

Alexander to Louis XVIII., and who, I believe, had been present at the conference, had left for the same purpose, when at night there came a dispatch from the Duke of Wellington. No influence had been brought to bear on him to move him to action; the following is the letter he wrote to M.^r de Talleyrand. I give it in its entirety, because it confirms for the most part what I have just related, and because it plainly establishes the various situations of matters.

“LE CATEAU, 24th June, 1815.¹

“SIR,—The king has arrived here, and has, as I expected, been received with the utmost demonstrations of joy by all his subjects, and I only regret that Your Highness did not accompany His Majesty. It was I who recommended to the king to enter France at present, because I was aware of the extent of our success in the battle of the 18th, and because I was desirous of having the influence of His Majesty’s name to give to that success all the advantages which it could derive; and because I was aware that it would occasion a crisis in the king’s affairs, particularly at Paris, to take advantage of which I wished His Majesty should be on the spot, or as near it as circumstances would permit.

“I flatter myself, if I could have seen you, or if you could have known the exact state of affairs when you advised the king at Mons not to enter France, you would have given His Majesty different advice, and would have followed His Majesty. As things are now, I can only enclose you, in confirmation of my opinion of the extent of our success, the *Journal de l’Empire*, of the 22d, in which you will find Buonaparte’s account of the action, the truth of which, as far as it goes against himself, cannot be doubted.

“You will see in the same paper the proceedings in the Assembly of the Deputies regarding this action; and I enclose you copies of letters just received from Prince Frederick of Orange, who is before Valenciennes, in which you will see that Buonaparte has determined in consequence to abdicate the government in favor of his son, and what persons are appointed to the provisional government of France.

“Having this information before you, I conclude that you can have

¹ The original of this letter is in English.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE.—The above is a copy of the original text.

no scruple about joining the king forthwith, a measure which I earnestly entreat you and the other members of the king's Council to adopt without loss of time.

"I have the honor to be, etc.,

"WELLINGTON.

"His Highness,
the Prince de Talleyrand.

"I beg you will observe that, although I have seen the king, I have not spoken to His Majesty on the subject to which this letter relates."

It is certainly permissible not to place faith in the sincerity of the *post-scriptum*, doubtless added to save the royal dignity; for how is it to be credited that the Duke of Wellington could have seen the king and not have spoken to him of so strange a fact as the absence, at such an important juncture, of his Minister of Foreign Affairs and one-half of his Council? How else, moreover, could he have learnt of the advice given at Mons?

On receipt of this letter, M. de Talleyrand quickly resolved upon starting; he was only too glad of finding such a way out of the pass into which he had trodden so thoughtlessly. The persons who had resolved to remain by his side followed his example, and together they reached Cambrai on the evening of the 25th. The town had opened its gates on the 24th, and the Duke of Wellington had hastened to convey the king within its walls, as the provisional seat of the government would be far better situated in that town than in the paltry one of Le Cateau-Cambrésis.

No sooner had the reunion of the Council been effected, than the situation quickly assumed a new phase, and M. de Talleyrand soon assumed the authority which was his by virtue of his being the necessary, not to say indispensable, man. His first care was to give existence, in so far as he could, to the system which he had developed throughout

his correspondence. Unable to organize forthwith a ministry to his liking, knowing full well that this could only be accomplished after reaching the capital, when he would be in a position to get acquainted with all that the situation required, he sought to at least make manifest the spirit which was to guide the coming royal government. As, in his eyes, the proclamation of the Duc de Feltre was more than insufficient, he resolved upon proposing a fresh one. There could be nothing more important and more delicate than the wording of such a document; it was to be expected that it would meet with strenuous opposition on the part of the princes, and especially of *Monsieur*. This obstacle did not stop M. de Talleyrand, who felt sure of the majority in the Council, where he disposed of all those who had made common cause with him.

But for all that, a first draft, which was considered too severe for the government in existence before the 20th of March, was rejected. Was it proper to deal so severely with it, it was argued, when it had been that of Louis XVIII.? It thereupon became incumbent to go in quest of softened terms, less offensive to the past. Three whole days were spent by the Council in framing and discussing the proclamation; the debate was animated, and the result was the proclamation which was ordered published at Cambrai on the 28th of June. M. Beugnot was its principal author.

"I am advised," the king was made to say, "that a door of my kingdom is open to me, so I hasten to enter it. I come in haste to bring back my subjects who have gone astray, to mitigate the effect of evils which I would have wished to ward off, and to interpose myself a second time between the allied armies and the French nation, in the hope that the consideration shown me may turn to their salvation. To such an extent only have I taken a part in

the war; I have not suffered that any prince of my family should show himself in the ranks of the enemy, and I have curbed the venturesome spirit of those of my followers who were able to join me."

Following upon this happy exordium came a confession which was likely to awaken the brightest hopes for the future:—

"Now that I am back on my native soil, I am pleased to be able to address my subjects in full confidence. When first I again appeared among them, I found their minds in a state of agitation, and swayed by conflicting passions. Nothing but difficulties and obstacles met my gaze in every direction. My government could but make mistakes, and perhaps it did commit a few. There are times when the purest intentions are not sufficient to guide men, when they even lead them astray. Experience could alone teach, and its lessons have not been unlearned. I desire everything that will save France." This language was both touching and generous, but it would perhaps have been better, ere uttering it, to feel sure that it would ever be acted up to. Further on it was said: "My subjects have learnt through cruel trials that the principle of the legitimacy of sovereigns is one of the fundamental bases of the social order, the only one on which can be established, in the bosom of a great nation, a wise and well-ordained liberty. This doctrine has just been proclaimed as that of Europe." (A little less so than would have been desirable.) "I had already consecrated it in my Charter, and I intend to add to that Charter all the guarantees which are likely to secure the benefits attendant upon it. The unity of the ministry is the strongest pledge I can offer; I intend that it shall exist, and that the frank and certain course pursued by my Council shall afford a pledge to all interests and allay every alarm."

The favorite idea of M. de Talleyrand is to be found in this passage; it gave rise to the liveliest discussion in the Council, for it embodied the principle of the exclusion of the princes from the Council. A regrettable scene occurred in this connection between the Duc de Berry and M. Louis, who went so far as to say that in all times France's great misfortunes had had their source in the part which the princes had been suffered to take, or had insisted on taking, in the government, which rightly belonged to the king alone.

Then followed a justification, to which it perhaps would have been better not to lower oneself, in regard to falsely created alarms in connection with the reinstitution of titles, of feudal rights, and as to the solidity of the sales of national domains; then an assurance, which was bound to produce a favorable effect, to wit, that it was the king's intention to select from among all classes of Frenchmen those who were to be near his person and his family. "I will banish from my presence," he went on to say, "only those men whose notoriety is a subject of grief to France, and of fright to Europe. I find many of my misguided subjects, and not a few guilty ones, entangled in the treacherous plot which they framed. I promise — I whose promises have never been made in vain, all Europe is a witness to it — to forgive all misguided Frenchmen everything that has occurred from the day that I left Lille, followed by so many tears of regret, until the day I returned to Cambrai amid such acclamations. And yet the blood of my subjects has been shed, through an act of treachery of which the annals of the world do not furnish a counterpart. This treachery has opened the way for the foreigner to the very heart of France. Each succeeding day brings me the news of a fresh disaster. I am therefore compelled, in order to maintain the dignity of my throne, in the

interest of my people, for the peace of Europe, to exclude from forgiveness the instigators and authors of this terrible deed. They will be signalled to the vengeance of the laws by the two Chambers, which I intend to convoke forthwith.

“Frenchmen, it is with such sentiments that I return among you; he, whom time has not been able to alter, whom misfortunes have not worn out, whom injustice has not been able to dishearten, the king, whose forefathers reigned for eight centuries over yours, returns to consecrate what days remain to him to defend and console you.”

It is easy to see all the efforts made to reassure all interests, and to respond to all the sentiments of the country. Indulgence, forgiveness, forgetfulness, all are brought into play, in order to allay and calm every source of anxiety and fear. At the same time, a certain severity is recognized as indispensable to satisfy the needs of public vengeance, and even, for it was also necessary to take them into account, the exigencies of Europe. It could not be pretended to ignore her right to complain of the new dangers to which she had been exposed, and of the laborious efforts she had once more been condemned to make. Such was the twofold good which the authors of the proclamation had sought to attain. How far had they been successful?

The necessity of limiting prosecutions, following upon a crisis wherein it was easy matter to compromise the army, and the most active portion of the nation, had inspired them with the idea of leaving to the two Chambers the designation of those most guilty. This was in accordance with the precedent set by England under similar circumstances. It seemed an apparently simple matter to derive support from this precedent; nevertheless, the consequences of the, so to speak, engagement entered into were most

serious, and were not long in giving birth to embarrassments, which later developed into positive dangers. It was not, as I will proceed to show, impossible to foresee them. The proclamation once published, there was nothing left for the king and his Council but to await the march of events.

CHAPTER XIV

Interview between M. de Vitrolles and Marshal Davout at La Villette—

The officers of his staff refuse to listen to Fouché's emissary, and declare themselves openly against another restoration of the Bourbons—The governmental commission does not allow the Marshal to enter into any parleys with the allies except on strictly military points—Propositions made towards an armistice again rejected—The Prussian troops cross over to the left bank of the Seine—General Exelmans wins a brilliant success over them—They occupy the heights notwithstanding—A council of war presided over by Marshal Davout decides upon capitulating—The capitulation is signed at Saint-Cloud—Its principal articles—M. Fouché dispatches to M. de Talleyrand his brother, M. Archambaud de Périgord—M. Pasquier takes advantage of the opportunity to send certain advices to the king—M. Fouché's cool demeanor amid the tumult of events—Aspect of his *salon*—Indignation of the soldiers at the news of the capitulation—M. Garat proposes to the Chamber of Representatives to adopt *a declaration of the rights of Frenchmen, and of the fundamental principles of their Constitution*—It is debated upon and adopted next day—Another declaration by the Chamber of Representatives—The French commissioners dispatched towards the sovereigns meet them at Haguenau—After a short conference, they return to Paris without having obtained anything from them—Debate in the Chamber of Representatives on the constitutional Act—Retreat of the French troops towards Orleans—The National Guard alone remains to preserve order in Paris—It is well enough disposed towards the Bourbons, but holds to the tricolor cockade—M. Pasquier informs the king of this spirit.

I HAVE left the French army reassembled under the walls of Paris, with headquarters at La Villette, at the time its chiefs had sent to the Chambers a most violent address against the House of Bourbon. It was called forth by an imprudent step taken by M. Fouché. Possessing good reasons to believe that Marshal Davout felt the necessity of ending matters, and that he was disposed to enter into a

negotiation, the basis of which should be the return of the House of Bourbon, he had conceived the idea of dispatching M. de Vitrolles to him, in order to more promptly secure his decision. After all that M. de Vitrolles had attempted in the South for the king's service, he could, better than any other, give the guarantees which the Marshal, the generals, and the officers of his command would require.

Unfortunately, just as the conference had begun at La Villette between himself and the Marshal, the principal officers of the army came to the dwelling-place of their chief to discuss with him what course was to be pursued, following upon the impression which the visit of the representatives had produced on the mind of the soldiers, who seemed truly excited. The Marshal, anxious to learn the opinions of these gentlemen on the idea which was uppermost in his mind, proposed to them, ere they had had time to explain the purpose of their visit, to meet M. de Vitrolles, who was in an adjoining room, and to hear what he had to say. Thereupon some of the more hot-headed officers gave vent to an explosion of wrath which bade fair to have most disastrous consequences. The Marshal had great difficulty in calming them; he explained to them skilfully enough that the duty he had imposed on himself not to conceal from them anything which might come to his knowledge, had compelled him to make such a proposition to them. He protested strongly that he would never separate his cause from that of his comrades, and that together with them he would remain faithful to all engagements; these protestations fettered him to such a degree and carried him so far that it was impossible for him to resist, on the following day, the loud entreaties which caused him to adopt the address, which he was the first to sign.

Now, the Marshal had previously written to M. Fouché requesting him to inform the government commission that

all his scruples had been conquered, that he saw the necessity of a treaty, or rather of an armistice, which could only be obtained by proclaiming Louis XVIII. He begged therefore that the commission would empower him to enter into a negotiation to that end. Everything had been settled between himself and M. Fouché; their respective parts were traced, but both of them had waited too long. The commission granted the required permission, but not as M. Fouché intended it should be, with a latitude which would have left a loophole for propositions of every nature; it enjoined the Marshal to negotiate for the armistice from a military point of view only, and not to introduce into it any political question. As a result, the application which he made on the 30th to the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher, to obtain a suspension of arms, met with no better success than those made by the commissioners dispatched on the 27th.

A somewhat cleverly conceived letter, which M. Fouché wrote on the 1st of July to the two generals of the enemy, was equally unsuccessful, although it was plain to perceive that he was only begging for a little time to direct matters towards the goal which all had in view. He merely sought to secure the support of a formal declaration that the sovereigns would never tolerate the existence of a form of government under which Napoleon II. would legally inherit the crown.

All these attempts having failed, military operations were resumed with renewed activity. As the approaches to Paris were fairly well covered on the right bank of the Seine, while the left bank was altogether without defence, Marshal Blücher directed his main attack on the latter, and crossed the Seine by way of the bridge over the Pecq, which enabled him, by following the Saint-Germain and Versailles road, to reach the plain of Montrouge, where there had

hardly been time to throw up a few feeble intrenchments. This operation was not without its dangers. It separated him from the English army, and compelled him to follow a most circuitous road, whereas the French army, following the chord of the arc, and enjoying the facility of crossing in a very few hours from one side of the river to the other by means of the many bridges of the capital, could surprise him in his movement, sweep down on him in force, and overwhelm him ere any help could reach him.

This manœuvre was so obvious that there was no hesitation in undertaking it. During the night of the 30th, the streets of Paris re-echoed with the tramp of infantry battalions and cavalry, and the rumbling of cannon, passing through them in all haste, and which, on the following day, deployed in the plain of Issy, between Sèvres and Paris. The vanguard was under General Exelmans, who, on the afternoon of the 2d, having pushed forward with a strong column in the direction of Versailles, encountered there a body of Prussians, which he attacked vigorously, driving it back as far as the Saint-Germain road, after having inflicted considerable losses on it. This brilliant action was the last of the campaign.

Marshal Davout, who commanded in chief, had agreed with M. Fouché to avoid a general engagement with the enemy, the success of which could nevertheless not be doubted, and which he consequently avoided. This determination was justified by the consideration that the victory which he might have won on this occasion might, some little time later, when the forces of the coalition should have operated their junction, impel them to take a revenge whose consequences would be incalculable, if, as might happen, the capital was carried by assault.

The enemy having had time to mature their plans, and make their movements secure, Wellington threatened the

opposite side of the city with a diversion, which enabled the Prussian general to occupy in all safety the heights of Meudon. Thereupon, the danger of an assault on the faubourgs became imminent. The possibility of such a contingency had decided the governmental commission on summoning Marshals Lefèvre, Masséna, Soult, and Davout, together with several other generals of talent and experience.

The information in their possession being insufficient, they were invited to meet on the following morning at the headquarters of Marshal Davout as a council of war. There, after having convinced themselves of the situation, after having verified every information submitted to them, after having examined the means of defence, they came to the unanimous conclusion not to expose the capital to the dangers of a siege and of a storming, which it was all the more impossible to escape as the works begun on the left bank of the Seine were worthless.

No other course was open but to frankly renounce a defence, and conclude a capitulation, by virtue of which the city should be surrendered to the allies. This was indeed the decision reached by the governmental commission, on receiving the opinion of the council of war. I have it as a fact that during the night of the 1st, the most prominent soldiers and those whose opinion was to carry most weight, among others, Marshal Soult and Marshal Davout, recognized the fact that the return of the House of Bourbon was inevitable, and that it was preferable to recall it of one's own free will, while stipulating for favorable conditions, than to leave to the allies the care of re-establishing it.

But, while admitting the force of this truth, no one dared to face the consequences of it. No one dared to propose a formal step in this direction. The generals were afraid of their soldiers. Everything had been done a few days before to excite them against the Bourbons; it was most embarrass-

ing to turn back suddenly on the declarations contained in the address which several of them had subscribed to two days previously. The precipitate return of the troops under the walls of Paris was a matter to be regretted, as it had been impossible to remove them from the influence of the wild enthusiasts who preached to them fidelity to the cause of Napoleon II. Had they but remained another week at Soissons, it is probable that they might have been directed into an entirely different channel of ideas.

The council of war and the governmental commission having therefore agreed as to the necessity of treating for the surrender of the city, Marshal Davout notified the general commanding the Prussian vanguard of this decision. So great at the time was the over-excitement in the sentiments of pride and vengeance animating the Prussians, that this important communication was hardly entertained. The general replied that he would not take upon himself to transmit the news to the commander-in-chief, but that if the government delegates would declare to his aide-de-camp that they were prepared to surrender the city unconditionally, and that the French army would, moreover, consent to yield to the enemy, he would agree to a suspension of hostilities; this was tantamount to proposing that the French army should pass under the Caudine Forks.

It was thereupon decided to deal directly with the Duke of Wellington and with Marshal Blücher. M. Fouché dispatched to each of them an agent who bore personal messages. His agent near the Duke was General Tromelin, a former Chouan, well known as having facilitated Admiral Sydney Smith's escape from the Temple. The one sent to Blücher was M. Macirone, who had for long years been attached to the King of Naples, Murat. Both were to impress the foreign commanders with the importance of the army being got rid of and sent to some distant point. This

done, when once the king should have added a few guarantees to the Charter, it would be easy to have him return to Paris in three or four days, amid universal acclamations, nay, even with the assent of the Chambers.

In spite of the wisdom of these propositions, it is probable that Marshal Blücher would have persisted in rejecting them as long as he could, so anxious was he to enter Paris with his troops charging, but his obstinacy was conquered by the Duke of Wellington, whose more elevated mind aspired to a nobler glory. It was decided that the French commissioners should be received on the 3d, at Saint-Cloud, where they would meet commissioners of the English and Prussian generals. The French government sent M. Bignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs *ad interim*, M. de Bondy, Prefect of the Department of the Seine, and General Guilleminot, chief of the staff. General Muffling had full powers from Marshal Blücher, while Colonel Hervey held a similar authority from the Duke of Wellington.

The capitulation, subsequently styled convention, was signed in the evening. It contained eighteen articles. Article 1 stipulated a suspension of hostilities between the English and Prussian armies and the French army under the walls of Paris. Article 2 bore that the French army would, on the following day, leave the capital to go beyond the Loire; that the entire evacuation of Paris was to be completed within three days; that the movement of the troops which were to cross to the left bank of the Loire was to be carried out in the space of a week. Then followed the customary conditions, all conceived in a most honorable spirit, with regard to the arms, material of war, and artillery which the troops were allowed to take with them; as to the wounded, the women, and the children belonging to numerous individuals connected with the army, a general permission was granted to them to remain in Paris. It was

stated in Article 8, that on the following day at noon (July 4th), Saint-Denis, Saint-Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly were to be delivered over to the allied troops; on the 5th, at the same hour, Montmartre; and finally, on the 6th, all the barriers of the city would be given over to their custody.

Articles 10, 11, and 12 call for special attention, owing to the spirit which dictated them and the manner in which they were interpreted later on.

"ART. 10. The commanders-in-chief of the English and Prussian armies bind themselves to respect and to cause to be respected by their subordinates the actual authorities so long as they remain in power.

"ART. 11. Public properties, with the exception of those having any connection with war, whether belonging to the government, or depending on the municipal authority, shall be respected, and the allied powers will in no fashion interfere in their administration or management.

"ART. 12. Shall be similarly respected private individuals and their belongings. The residents, and in a general manner all individuals in the city, shall continue in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties, *and they shall not in any way be molested or called to account in regard to the functions they are exercising or might have exercised, or in regard to their conduct and political opinions.*"

The remainder of the document was in the usual form.

This convention put an end to a conflict which was hourly becoming more imminent.

It will have been seen how far M. Fouché was right, when he assured the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher that, this one point secured, everything would progress without any serious difficulty. But that which it is hard to understand is how these many parleys, discussions, incidents, and serious events which I have, so to speak, merely enumerated, and which were for the most part contradictory, could have grouped themselves in so short a space of time. It must have been seen in order to be realized, and even then all was so hurried along and entangled that it becomes

difficult to recall the number of hours to be assigned to each and every occurrence. Hence does it become impossible to describe the state of agitation and anxiety in which we all passed our lives in those days, happily of short duration, continuously a prey to alternate hopes and fears, dreading the dénouement almost as much as we sighed for it, existing four mortal days in the apprehension of a battle, which might perhaps be fought in the streets of the capital, that a conflagration might destroy, just as had happened scarcely three years before to the city of the Czars.

We had nothing to reassure us but the intentions of M. Fouché, which people thought they knew; we knew his past, and we certainly admitted the profound ability of which he had given proof at many a critical juncture; but what confidence could we place in his morality? I must do him the justice of saying that he kept me most accurately informed of the real state of affairs, and that he did not deceive us as to his steps and hopes. Having gone as far as he had, he felt as well as we did, in the last days, the necessity of ending matters, and acted in consequence.

What mostly preoccupied him at all times, was to have the king's ear; with this object in view, he was continually dispatching new agents to him. He had frequent recourse for this to M. de Vitrolles, and furnished him with all the passports he might require for the messengers whom he found means to dispatch. No sooner did he learn of the position occupied by M. de Talleyrand in the Council than he hastened to send to him at Cambrai his brother, M. Archambaud de Périgord, whom he placed in a position to fully comprehend the true state of affairs, and whom he commissioned to explain, in the first place, how it was possible, according to him, to emerge safely from the crisis, and next, to dwell on the nature and extent of the services he was prepared to render. If the question of the pledges

he desired occupied so prominent a place in the instructions he gave M. de Périgord, if it was ever present in all the parleys entered into with Louis XVIII., I do not think there is any occasion to blame him for it. It was quite natural that he should be anxious on this point, and his anxiety was shared by a great number of persons whose wishes and opinions were entitled to a hearing.

I saw M. de Périgord two hours before his departure, and handed him a few memoranda which I thought it appropriate to lay before the king. I could not help telling him of my anxiety regarding the trouble likely to arise from the resolution announced in the proclamation of the 28th with regard to the guilty ones whose designation was left to the Chambers. "Would it not be preferable," I said, "to state at once who are the very few men whose residence in the capital, or even in the dominions of France, cannot be endured? Might not, for the purpose of giving strength to this resolution, recourse be had to the high-sounding words of public peace so repeatedly violated, and even of the tranquillity of Europe, which has just been so cruelly compromised in order to satisfy the passions of a few ambitious and factious men?" It was deeply regretted a few months later that this course had not been adopted.

M. Fouché required great coolness and impassibility to maintain himself in the position he had attained. He had acquired both in his career as a conspirator and revolutionist. Exposed to every hazard of fortune, his necessarily ambiguous conduct won for him the distrust of all parties; this distrust oftentimes took the shape of insults and threats, especially on the part of the Bonapartists and the revolutionists, his former friends. And yet all flocked to his house; there was a place for all; friends and foes met there alike. As for himself, he went from one to the other with the same ease, as if he held the same language to all. How

often have I not seen him emerge from the embrasure of a window, where his conversation with his old comrade, the *conventionnel* Thibaudeau, had had all the appearances of intimacy, to cross over to the one where I stood with my friends, when I would speak to him of some messenger dispatched to Cambrai! Now, Thibaudeau was known as the most ardent and passionate of all the adversaries of the House of Bourbon. It is true that very shortly afterwards M. Fouché did not feel any qualms in including in the list of men designated to public vengeance, and provisionally expelled from the capital, Thibaudeau!

The capitulation which had been signed during the night of the 3d, at Saint-Cloud, was announced next day to the two Chambers, by a message from the government. It was known since morning both in Paris and in the army, in whose ranks it had made a most painful impression, and by whom it had even been received with rather lively demonstrations of indignation. The transition was indeed rather a sudden one for soldiers who had been incessantly excited for several days past with the most violent harangues, and to whom only the day before it had been spoken of sweeping down upon the enemy. In the Chamber of Representatives the effect produced was also most painful, on those who had persisted in indulging in their illusions. They no longer knew which way to turn; everything failed them at one and the same time; they saw themselves compelled to renounce the constitutional work on which they set so high a value, and the debate which had not even been begun.

Thereupon M. Garat conceived the idea, in order to emerge honorably from this narrow defile, of inducing the Chamber to adopt forthwith something similar to the famed Bill of Rights, from which the English nation derived so much pride. He read to the Chamber a series of articles which he had drawn up, with the title of *Declaration of the rights*

of Frenchmen and of the fundamental principles of their Constitution. It was moved that this proposition should be referred to a special commission. M. Manuel endeavored to have it shelved by announcing that the report on the Constitution was ready, and by asking that it should be taken up in the course of the day. He assured the Chamber that there would be plenty of time wherein to discuss and adopt the *Acte constitutionnel*, which would be much to be preferred to the adoption of a proposition which might only be a most incomplete extract. He was convinced that the enemy would not enter the capital for a week to come. I really cannot say whence he had derived this assurance. In spite of his efforts, the proposition of M. Garat was adopted; ere the sitting was over, a committee had reported on it, and the debate on it was adjourned to next day.

The remainder of the sitting was taken up with speeches on the marks of gratitude and attachment to which the army was entitled, on the importance of retaining and defending the national colors, on the necessity of making public certain documents which had only been communicated to the Chamber sitting with closed doors, and which would open the eyes of the citizens to the faith they should place in the vain promises with which it was sought to delude them. These documents were none other than two proclamations of the king, dated from Le Cateau-Cambrésis and Cambrai, the former countersigned by the Duc de Feltre, and the latter by M. de Talleyrand. As a matter of fact, they were already known to every one; it was almost unavoidable that they should not arouse deep agitation among the men who felt themselves threatened with being excepted from the amnesty. It was impossible not to recognize that they were in great numbers. Hence these proclamations were productive at the time of more harm than good. We had foreseen this in the little circle which gathered at my

house, and hence it was that I had not hesitated speaking of the matter in the memoranda sent by me to Cambrai.

On the following day, the declaration, which contained thirteen articles, was adopted, subject to a few modifications. It consecrated, in the first place, the principle of the sovereignty of the people, composed, it was said, of the union of the rights of all citizens. It would have been difficult to find a definition more vague and more abstract in its consequences. Then followed a certain number of principles generally admitted and which did not furnish any great pretext for discussion; but there had been added to these principles several dispositions applicable only to actual circumstances, and the worth of which were open to discussion. It was sought to have the coming constitution guarantee, in addition to the abolition of nobiliary distinctions and feudal qualifications, — in other words, apparently, the titles of *duc*, *comte*, *baron*, etc., — the abolition of confiscations. (This the Charter had already granted.) The author of the *Acte additionnel* will ever be censured for having refused his consent to this abolition. The maintenance of the national colors was demanded, as well as that of the Legion of Honor and of the rewards granted for civil and military services; lastly, Article 13 stipulated that the prince, whether hereditary or called to the throne by election, should not ascend the throne of France until after having taken and signed the oath to observe, and cause to be observed, the present declaration. Such is the political will and testament left by the Chamber of Representatives to France, as a pledge and monument of its intentions.

This document, still under the title of *Declaration of the rights of Frenchmen and of the fundamental principles of their Constitution*, was communicated to the Chamber of Peers, which could not, or would not, discuss it.

On the following day there appeared in the *Moniteur* another document, bearing merely the title of *Declaration of the Chamber of Representatives*. It began thus: "The troops of the allied powers are about to occupy the capital." Then came a hastily entered into engagement, worded as follows: "The Chamber of Representatives will none the less continue to sit in the midst of the citizens of Paris, where the express will of the people has summoned its mandatories. But in these grave circumstances, the Chamber owes to itself, to France, and to Europe, a declaration of its sentiments and principles. It therefore declares that it makes a solemn appeal to the fidelity and patriotism of the Paris National Guard, which is entrusted with the safeguarding of the national representation."

This same National Guard was two days later to close the doors of its halls to it and compel it to dissolve.

The rest of the declaration contained in succinct terms all the principles more or less laid down in the *Declaration of Rights*; it was insisted that no monarch could afford adequate guarantees if he did not take oath to observe a constitution which had been resolved upon by the nation's representatives and accepted by the people, wherein these principles should be formally consecrated. It stated "that if the bases set forth in this declaration should be ignored or violated, the representatives of the French people, when performing to-day a sacred duty, protest by anticipation to the face of the whole world against violence and usurpation. They entrust the maintenance of the dispositions which they now proclaim to the custody of all good and true Frenchmen, to all generous hearts, to all enlightened minds, to all men jealous of their liberties, and, lastly, to future generations."

This time, it will be seen that the rights of Napoleon II. are entirely left out of the question, and that to become the

legitimate sovereign of France, it is merely necessary to accept the conditions laid down.

These pompous declarations were followed by a proclamation from the governmental commission to Frenchmen. In it was announced the coming occupation of the capital, while the motives which had influenced the decision of the government to submit to this painful necessity were skillfully set forth. Mention was made of the negotiations attempted by the plenipotentiaries sent near the allied powers, and it was hinted that they had afforded the sovereigns of Europe the opportunity of making declarations in which too great faith could not be placed, and which no longer left it to be feared that the liberties and dearest interests of France would be sacrificed.

"We are about to obtain," said the document, "guarantees which will render us secure from the alternating and fleeting triumphs of factions, which have troubled us for the past twenty-five years, which will end our revolutions, and blend under a common ægis all the parties owing their existence to them. These guarantees, which have so far lain only in our principles and fortitude, we shall find in our laws, constitutions, and representative system; for, whatever may be the lights, virtues, and personal qualities of a monarch [Louis XVIII. was clearly meant], they are never sufficient to protect a people from the oppression of the powerful, the prejudices of pride, the injustice of courts, and the ambition of courtiers. Frenchmen, be united, and you will reach the end of your misfortunes. Europe's tranquillity is inseparable from yours! Europe is interested in your tranquillity and happiness."

What follows is a narrative of the doings of the plenipotentiaries dispatched to the foreign sovereigns in seeking to fulfil their melancholy mission. They had arrived on the 1st of July at Haguenau, where headquarters had been

established. The allied powers did not see fit to grant them an audience, and each one of them appointed a commissioner to listen to what they had to say. Austria was represented by Count de Walmoden; Russia, by Count Capo d'Istria; and Prussia, by General Knesebeck. The British Ambassador, Lord Stewart, not possessing any special powers for the occasion, was merely invited to be present at the conference.

Lord Stewart, in spite of the irregularity of his position, did not hesitate declaring peremptorily that he in no way recognized the right of the French Chambers, and of the plenipotentiaries dispatched by them, to select any other sovereign than Louis XVIII. This gave rise to an animated discussion between himself and M. de La Fayette, who advanced in support of his arguments the precedent set by England and the revolution of 1688. To sum up, the French plenipotentiaries, realizing that there was nothing to be done for Napoleon II., contented themselves with rejecting Louis XVIII., going so far as to assert that "France had an unconquerable aversion for that sovereign and his family, and that she would sooner accept any prince whatsoever rather than once more submit to his domination." They gave it to be understood that the Duc d'Orléans might prove acceptable, and they also mentioned a prince of the House of Saxony. I can entertain no doubt as to these facts,¹ as I have them from the Duc de Richelieu, who was, at the time, near the Emperor Alexander, and who, like myself, has often expressed his surprise at the singular patriotism which sought out a sovereign of an alien race, sooner than rally round the one whose family had for so many years been identified with the nation.

¹ M. de La Fayette and his friends have repeatedly denied, even from the *tribune*, the truth of anything approaching this; but it is impossible for me not to believe it, as I place full faith in the veracity of the man from whom I have it.

The conference came promptly to an end; in the evening, the French plenipotentiaries received their dismissal in the following note: "Pursuant to the stipulation in their treaty of alliance, which bears that none of the contracting parties shall treat of a peace or an armistice except by a common accord, the three Courts now together, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, declare that they cannot enter into any negotiation for the time being. Their Cabinets will meet as soon as practicable. The three powers look upon it as an essential condition of peace and of assured tranquillity that Napoleon Bonaparte shall no longer be in a position to disturb in future the quiet of France and of Europe, and the powers are determined, after the events of last March, to demand that Napoleon Bonaparte be committed to their custody."

Napoleon's future fate was written in the last words of that note.

Nothing in this document could justify the honeyed words and the illusions which the plenipotentiaries endeavored to spread on their return, which took place on the 5th. To listen to them, the intentions of the Emperor Alexander were especially of the best, and yet I do not believe that any one of them had been admitted to his presence; they nevertheless assured the Chambers that it was not the intention either of himself or of any one of the allied sovereigns to impose on France its form of government. M. de La Fayette even went so far as to embody this assertion in the report which he made to the Chamber on the 6th. The language of Lord Stewart should at least have made him look with suspicion on the intentions of England.

I will not waste time recording the useless debates which took place in the Chamber of Representatives on the 6th, on the *Acte constitutionnel*, of which M. Manuel was the *rappporteur*. Its draft contained one hundred and twenty-three articles, and on the 7th, at six o'clock in the evening, in spite of

the rapidity with which the debate had progressed, Article 59 had been reached only, and adopted. It was the one granting heredity to the peerage. The principle of this heredity, somewhat skilfully opposed by M. Barère, was defended by M. Manuel, who carried it. The rôle of M. Manuel during this short session was ever a remarkable one; the more it is scrutinized, the greater becomes the conviction that, in spite of a few utterances which found an unfortunate echo, his purpose was entirely opposed to the result which he finally achieved, and his personal position was forever sacrificed to the engagement he had entered into to follow step by step the necessarily sinuous course of M. Fouché.

I have said that the capitulation had caused deep emotion in the army, and it needed a strong display of firmness to have it carried out. This was a quality not lacking in Marshal Davout. As early as the 4th, a portion of the troops was on its way to Orleans. One of the principal obstacles in the way of executing this movement was the impoverished state of the treasury. There were no funds available wherewith to liquidate the arrears of the soldiers' pay, and to make any of the advances indispensable on such an occasion. M. Fouché removed this difficulty by borrowing a few millions from M. Laffitte. As security, the government deposited with him bonds belonging to the sinking fund.¹

Marshal Davout and the generals under his orders displayed the utmost activity in gathering together all the artillery and materials of war which it was possible to

¹ This transaction in public funds gave rise, during the session of 1815, to violent attacks on M. Laffitte from the Royalist party. He defended himself with no little skill and strength, as became a man who had rendered a great service, and who deserved thanks rather than blame. As a matter of fact, his advance of money was hardly meritorious; it was not known at the time how easy it had been for him to procure it. This became known later, and is as follows: On leaving, Napoleon had deposited with him seven or eight millions, which he had undertaken to keep for

remove, and which, come what might, it was important should not fall into the hands of the foreigner. Vincennes, which had become an important depot, was almost entirely denuded. In this connection, it is impossible not to pay a tribute of admiration to the energy and activity displayed by the military administration. The army, which, at the time of its arrival under the walls of Paris, presented an appearance of most deplorable confusion, had been completely reorganized in the space of about a week. It numbered, at the time of its departure, 70,000 men, presenting an excellent appearance, among whom were 14,000 men of the Imperial Guard, which had not been annihilated, as had been stated. These 70,000 men constituted the better part of what remained of the immense and formidable French army, which had for so long laid down the law to Europe. Great was the surprise, after so many disasters, so well calculated to dishearten the stoutest, to see this nucleus, which yet preserved a healthy appearance of strength and life. There was not a regiment which did not present a martial and determined front. I went on several occasions to the Champ de Mars, where was encamped the Imperial Guard. In spite of the sentiments to which it gave vent, and which were so opposed to my wishes, it was impossible for me not to experience a deep admiration for so rare a constancy and fidelity, which were the cause that it soon became necessary to disband it.

At a time when we were about to be deprived of the regular army, and just as the capital was to be invaded once

him, and on which he was to pay four or five per cent interest. Now, it was impossible to find a more advantageous investment for these millions. When taking *rentes* at the rate at which he did, he derived an enormous profit, which was the source of his great wealth. It is also noteworthy that this wealth constantly increased through transactions of a like nature, the opportunity for which was furnished him by the successive loans which the royal government was compelled to contract.

more by foreign soldiery, it behoved us to derive every possible advantage from the services of the National Guard; it could once more act in as useful a fashion as it had the year previous. It could alone preserve order amid so many elements of discord, and protect the city and the citizens from the sufferings and calamities likely to be dreaded. Its patriotism and zeal were appealed to. Its organization had remained intact; the pride it could not but feel in the valuable aid it had already rendered, strengthened it in its generous resolution not to show itself in any way inferior to itself.

Politically, its sentiments were no longer the same. The immense majority grasped the necessity of recalling the Bourbons, and clearly saw that there was no other way out of the crisis through which we were passing. Many others remembered the mistakes which had led up to the catastrophe of the 20th of March; these would have liked guarantees against their being repeated. While recognizing, therefore, and confessing the need that the country had of welcoming back its ancient dynasty, nearly all would have desired that it should give to the nation some indication that it shared its sentiments and aspirations. The preserving of the tricolored cockade was eagerly wished for; this was, towards the last days, one of the sentiments which was most evident in the ranks of the National Guard, and I considered it my duty to lay the matter before the king in a note which I dispatched to him.

CHAPTER XV

The members of the Royalist party, invested with full powers by Louis XVIII., hold a council at Marshal Macdonald's — It is proposed to seize the administration of the city of Paris and provoke a movement in favor of the Bourbons — MM. de Vitrolles, de Crussol, and Pasquier point out the uselessness and danger of an enterprise of this kind — The Royalists bestir themselves immediately after the departure of the troops — The trend of opinion becomes accentuated on receipt of the news that the king is nearing the capital — M. Pasquier goes to meet the king at Arnouville — He is at once asked to take a seat at the council — Strange accoutrement of M. de Chateaubriand — M. Pasquier urges the king to postpone his entry into Paris until the following day — General Dessolles again assumes command of the National Guard — Reinstallation of functionaries in the positions they held on the 1st of March — M. Pasquier learns of his being called into the Cabinet at the issue of the council — He accepts the portfolio of Justice, on condition that M. Molé shall retain the directorship of the *ponts et chaussées* — M. Fouché appointed Minister of Police — First interview of that personage with Louis XVIII. — On his return to Paris, he proposes the dissolution of the governmental commission — The latter, previous to separating, sends a message to the Chambers, a first grievance of the Royalist party against M. Fouché — The king's entry into Paris — M. Pasquier takes charge of the Ministry of the Interior *ad interim* — M. Pozzo di Borgo's name mentioned in connection with this office — M. Decazes appointed Prefect of Police — Preamble of the ordinance appointing the ministers — Culpable negligence of M. de Talleyrand, who does not inform them of the situation abroad.

THE powers with which I was invested, and which M. Hyde de Neuville had brought to me as well as to several other persons, have been mentioned. Regretting to see that no use was being made of them, he conceived the idea of calling a meeting of all those to whom he had delivered them. We were invited to meet on the evening of the 4th at

Marshal Macdonald's. It was discussed whether something could not be done to accelerate the submission of the capital to its legitimate sovereign. Those present were, in addition to Marshal Macdonald, Marshal Oudinot, M. de Vitrolles, M. de Grosbois, M. le bailli de Crussol, M. Dubouchage, and myself. M. de Chabrol had left for Lyons, where he considered his presence might be of great service.

It was proposed to go in a body next day to the Hôtel de Ville, to lay our powers before the prefect, and to ask him to hand over to us the city government. In the case of his complying, we were to issue a proclamation calling upon all good and true citizens to unite, with the object of putting an end to the country's distress. We were to convoke the municipal council, and proposed the sending of a deputation to the king, entreating His Majesty to confer, as soon as possible, on his good city of Paris the blessings of his presence.

This idea was opposed by M. le bailli de Crussol, M. de Vitrolles, and myself. It was easy for us to demonstrate that this was running the chance of creating a great excitement in the city, and of stirring up bloodshed, without gaining thereby any substantial advantage. It was devoutly to be hoped that no act of such a nature should precede or mark the entry of the king into the capital; now, it was perfectly sure that, through the sole force of circumstances, this event would occur ere many days had gone by. Was it meet, in order to make a display of zeal, to run the risk of stirring up trouble, when there was so soon to be a chance of obtaining, at the very least, a semblance of unanimity? I added that it would seem to me an act of folly to make any attempt whatsoever, so long as the whole of the army had not left Paris. MM. de Vitrolles and le bailli de Crussol plainly stated that there would be danger of thwarting M.

Fouché, who alone could take the necessary steps and carry them out in due time. This deliberation is the only use we ever made of the high powers conferred upon us.

Our conference was nevertheless productive of a result which had not been thought of; it occurred to me that something might be obtained from the municipal council, which might be induced to voice a declaration giving a favorable tint to the dispositions and intentions of the capital. I therefore called on the prefect, M. de Bondy, who was one of my oldest friends. I pointed out to him that, aside from his personal benefit, it was in the interest of those under his jurisdiction that he should without delay obtain a manifestation of sentiment of a nature to accelerate between them and the House of Bourbon a reconciliation, the need of which was universally felt. This manifestation could emanate legally from the municipal council alone. He grasped the situation; acting in unison with M. Molé, a member of this council, he caused a meeting which took place on the 7th, and the result of which was such as could be desired. But it came too late; the matter had already been settled. Little credit was therefore given to him for this forward step.

The Royalist party, strongly held in check in Paris, began to bestir itself as soon as it felt sure that no action was to be feared on the part of the military. Many publications, similar to that of M. Maleville, had been scattered broadcast during the past few days; some of the most influential newspapers had openly given expression to their views. The ardent Bonapartists, and those who desired to see a new dynasty, had been angered thereby, and repeatedly called in the Chamber of Deputies for measures which should put a stop to license which was in opposition to their opinions and sentiments. They had complained in vain; the principle of the freedom of the press, which they

had themselves imprudently invoked at the beginning of the session, had recoiled upon them.

The movement of opinion went on increasing, and it acquired a notable impulse when it was learnt, on the 4th, that the king had left Cambrai, and entered Senlis on the 3d. He spent the whole of the 4th there, and arrived in the forenoon of the 5th at the château d'Arnouville, a league distant from Saint-Denis, where he took up his quarters. During the evening of the 5th, and throughout the 6th, great zeal was displayed by the faithful adherents of the royal family, who hastened to give proofs of their zeal, and to do obeisance to the sovereign; but the city's gates were still in custody of the armed force; the National Guard, to whom this duty had been entrusted, displayed forcible opposition to these peregrinations; some lively disputes occurred, and several people were somewhat roughly handled on their return.

A few of the courtiers who had arrived at Arnouville with the king, especially his military household, attempted to precede him into the capital; they had not feared to make their appearance in uniform, or at any rate wearing their white cockade. This gave rise to great disorder; they were made prisoners by the National Guard, and conveyed to the *hôtel* of the Prefecture of Police, where they were detained. This *hôtel* was no longer occupied by M. Réal; M. Fouché, taking advantage of the poor state of the latter's health, had hastened to give his post to M. Courtin, *procureur du Roi*, and one of his creatures. M. Courtin quietly released the prisoners, and afforded them every facility they stood in need of to pursue their way. This was the only event of mark during his short term of office, in the course of which it has always been impossible for me to discover any blameworthy act calling for the treatment to which he was very shortly afterwards subjected by

the man who had brought him forward,— in other words, by M. Fouché himself.

We have now reached the moment when this extraordinary personage had no time to lose if he wished to reap the fruit of all the manœuvres in which he had taken so prominent a part. He had sent more than one emissary to the Duke of Wellington, since the one he had dispatched to him to pave the way for the conclusion of the armistice. This important matter settled, the Duke and himself had been mutually desirous of meeting. He was adroit enough to convince his colleagues of the provisional government that a conference with the English general might be of great advantage in the common interest.

So it was with their consent that he wended his way to Neuilly, where the English headquarters were established. Chance willed it that M. Molé should reach his house just as he was stepping into his carriage; M. Fouché invited him to take a seat in it; so it was that M. Molé became a witness of the interview. The self-reliant and easy manner in which M. Fouché spoke of all things generally, and guaranteed to the king a most brilliant entry into his capital, if he would but let himself be guided by him and leave matters entirely in his hands, imposed on the Duke of Wellington, who undertook to secure the king's acceptance of his services, and to secure to him with His Majesty the influence necessary to give realization to all the good services he promised to render. M. Fouché handed to the Duke a letter he had written to the king, and which the Duke undertook to deliver. I have not seen this letter, and I would not pretend to certify to its tenor such as given in Fouché's *Memoirs*, published in 1814.

On his return to Paris, he promptly informed his colleagues that, pursuant to his conversation with the Duke of Wellington, there was nothing left to be done but to

make the necessary preparations for the entry of Louis XVIII., which would take place in two or three days. At this news, M. Carnot, General Grenier, and M. Quinette insisted strongly on the carrying out of an idea to which they had repeatedly given expression; viz., that of following the army to the banks of the Loire, and transporting thither the shadow of a government. With the support of the Duc de Vicence, M. Fouché succeeded in having this idea given up. It would have merely been the cause of fresh misfortunes.

Having learnt, on the morning of the 7th, that there was no hindrance to leaving Paris by way of the Saint-Denis barrier, I resolved upon doing obeisance to the king, at the château d'Arnouville, which I reached at noon. I found the avenues and the courtyard of the château filled with people and carriages. Marshal Macdonald arrived just as I did. The first person whom we met was General Pozzo di Borgo, who seemed delighted at meeting us, and who asked us many questions as to the state of affairs in the capital, the spirit prevailing in it, and the kind of reception the king might anticipate. After having reassured him on these points, we entered the château. The king was just then holding a council, and the rooms adjoining his closet were so encumbered with people that it was difficult to move a few steps forward.

I noticed that almost all present had the same subject of conversation. Why, it was asked, did not the king leave for Paris forthwith? Was it that he did not feel assured of an enthusiastic reception? And, if indeed a few ill-disposed persons did venture to make their voices heard, would they not be promptly dealt with? There is never, on occasions like this, any lack of persons who are under the impression that matters cannot end well without some display of violence, which they style vigor. I listened in

silence to all that was being said around me, when the Chancellor emerged from the room in which the council was being held. He saw me, made a sign that he had noticed me, re-entered the room, to return a minute later for the purpose of summoning me on behalf of the king, and introducing me into the closet. Here I was, when I least expected it, transported to the very midst of the council, in the presence of His Majesty, *Monsieur*, and the Duc de Berry. I was most graciously welcomed by all of them.

The council was composed of the persons whose names I have already given. It did not require long for me to perceive that M. de Talleyrand held in it, with his customary ease, the first place. I did not, at that time, know anything of what happened at Mons and at Cambrai. I was only aware that M. de Blacas had been discarded. It was impossible for me not to be struck, in the midst of this somewhat numerous assemblage, with the strange appearance presented by M. de Chateaubriand, whom I can still see, whimsically gotten up with a large Damascus sword, which he had, to my knowledge, brought back from his journey to Syria, and which hung at his side, suspended from a long red cordon. The king himself took the pains of informing me of the subject under discussion, and about which he was most anxious to hear my opinion. The question being debated in the room in which we sat was the same as the one being discussed in the adjoining one; to wit, if the king should leave for Paris forthwith, or wait until the following day. In order to reach a decision with some show of reason, it was, above all, important to ascertain the real disposition of the public mind in the capital. His Majesty did me the honor of believing that no one better than myself could furnish him with accurate information on this point.

I frankly replied that it seemed to me preferable that he should defer his departure until the following day. The last detachment of the army, that composing the Imperial Guard, had not started on its journey until late the night before, and its going had been the cause of much agitation. The population had wended its way in large numbers to the Champ de Mars to witness its departure. The leave-taking had been of a most affectionate kind. Fully twenty-four hours would be required to allow people excited by this scene to become calm again. The whole of the National Guard was still wearing the tricolored cockade. Did His Majesty wish the white cockade to be substituted for it? In such a case, it would at the very least require what remained of the day to pave the way to carry out such a change. I could not imagine it was sought to incur the risk of putting these two emblems face to face. Lastly, if it was resolved to take the final step that very day, it seemed to me impossible to give assurances that some untoward incident might not disturb the entry of the king into his capital. If, on the contrary, it was consented to postpone it for twenty-four hours only, I thought I could answer for everything going off satisfactorily, and that His Majesty would be greeted on his way with the liveliest and warmest acclamations.

My opinion was not disputed, and seemed to the liking of the king, who, after a moment's silence, remarked: "Well, then, so be it. So the matter is settled, gentlemen; for to-morrow then."

The king and M. de Talleyrand thereupon engaged in a brief conversation, during which *Monsieur* and the Duc de Berry, near whom I was, showed me every possible mark of kindness. His Majesty resumed speaking for the purpose of commanding M. de Talleyrand to once more read the ordinances agreed to previously to my entering the

council. The one provided that all functionaries of the civil and judiciary order, and commanders and officers of the National Guard who held their positions on the 1st of March last, should at once resume them, while the other had for its special object to restore to General Dessolles the command of the National Guard of Paris, under the orders of *Monsieur*.

On my opinion being sought as to these two ordinances, I replied that, in so far as General Dessolles was concerned, experience had demonstrated how fully he was qualified for this command; hence no better step could be taken than to restore it to him, but that it was necessary to have him informed of the fact forthwith, as there remained much for him to do before the next day. With regard to the one concerning the reinstallation of all the administrative and judiciary officials in the positions they had held on the 1st of March, I remarked that the effect produced would, at the outset, be a favorable one, but that it would soon become necessary to suspend the execution of a measure announced with such great solemnity, owing to the responsibility of retaining a certain number of those officials who had remained at their posts after the return of the Emperor, and who had greatly compromised themselves, and in whom it would be impossible to place, at the outset at least, full and entire confidence.

The council over, all went their way. M. Louis joined me when I was already in the courtyard, seeking for my carriage. He informed me that M. de Talleyrand begged I would come and visit him in his room, as he had something to say to me. "It is to inform you," he added, "that you are a minister, and a minister who has the choice between two portfolios, that of Justice and that of the Interior." I could not have been more greatly surprised, and, hardly knowing what to say, I allowed myself to be led to

a little apartment which M. de Talleyrand occupied in the servants' hall; but his carriage was already at the door, so he invited me to take a seat in it, my own receiving orders to follow. "We can speak as we drive along," he said to me; "I will drop you at Saint-Denis, as I am about to call on the Duke of Wellington at Neuilly." He thereupon confirmed the announcement made to me by M. Louis. Taken unawares, and somewhat alarmed at the burden which was about to be imposed on me, at the same time flattered with a choice which sought me in such difficult circumstances, I could scarcely find words to reply. M. de Talleyrand dispelled my misgivings by telling me that I must make my own selection, saying this to me as if he entertained no doubts as to my acceptance, but only as to my choice. I chose the Ministry of Justice, which seemed to me the easier post of the two. "Well, then," he said, "the matter is as good as settled." — "Yes," I replied, "but on one condition." Thereupon, yielding to an idea which had suddenly thrust itself upon me, I asked him that the post of director-general of *ponts et chaussées*, which I was about to leave, greatly to my regret, should be left to M. Molé, who occupied it. His first movement was one of dissent. "Yes," I resumed, "he occupies that post only because he refused the offer of two portfolios, and it may also be stated on his behalf that he declined to sit in the Chamber of Peers. I can answer for his sentiments, which are excellent. It is necessary that you should reassure a great number of people, and many interests, and you cannot do anything which will attain this object more directly. Moreover, is the name of M. Molé not one which it is important to connect with the House of Bourbon?"

He fully agreed with me on all these points, but remarked that it would be no easy task to get the king to view matters in their right light, as he had, on his first

return to France, conceived prejudices against him. There was the stumbling-block. "Don't forget," I said to him, "that this favor is one I consider myself entitled to in return for the devotion which induces me to forsake a most agreeable and happy position to accept one so full of hazards." He thereupon promised me to direct all his efforts towards having my wish gratified.

M. de Talleyrand next informed me that M. Fouché was Minister of Police. On seeing the surprise revealed by my features, he said: "How could it be helped? Every one conspired to force this condition upon us. The Duke of Wellington, whose head he has completely turned, has declared that this was the only man who could guarantee the submission of the capital; he himself saw the king, and entreated him not to leave him out of his councils. Now we are at the present moment under such deep obligations to the Duke of Wellington, that there is nothing that can be denied him. This is not all; the Faubourg Saint-Germain swears by M. Fouché alone; every letter and every emissary which has reached the king and the princes for the past fortnight, speak but of him and of the great services he has rendered the royal cause. Lastly, le bailli de Crussol, who arrived at Arnouville last night, succeeded so well in winning *Monsieur* over to this way of thinking, that the latter sought the king this morning, and spoke in favor of M. Fouché with a warmth that dispelled all doubts still existing. There is nothing but to be reconciled to the idea; he is, for the time being, a man who cannot be got rid of." — "So I fully see," I replied; "I also know that at the outset his appointment will raise a few difficulties, but I greatly fear that it will ere long become of a far greater number. God forbid that I should not feel that M. Fouché deserves to be considered, but I did not think it necessary that he should be called into the council, and be suffered to

enter into the intimacy of the king. There are certain stains which will not out, certain *rapprochements* which cannot be made without offending that delicacy of sentiment which must ever be cherished. I greatly pity the king for having such a minister, for I pity myself for having him as a colleague. However, since it is a settled matter, since the king is resigned to it, one must needs submit and put a good face on it."

I naturally asked the names of all the personages who were to constitute the new ministry, and learnt that M. de Talleyrand was to preside over the Cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Louis, Minister of Finance; Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Minister of War; M. de Jaucourt, Minister of Marine; the Duc de Richelieu, chief of the king's household; M. Fouché, Minister of Police; and myself, Minister of Justice. With the exception of M. Fouché, I had no objection to make to these names. That of M. de Richelieu afforded me much pleasure, and consoled me somewhat for that of M. Fouché. As to the Minister of the Interior, he remained to be found. M. de Talleyrand informed me that, since I would none of the portfolio, various combinations were being entertained in regard to it, and that he would speak to me about the matter on the following day. This conversation had brought us as far as the road of La Révolte, opposite Saint-Ouen, where I re-entered my carriage to return to Paris, as M. de Talleyrand was to meet M. Fouché at Neuilly, at the Duke of Wellington's, who was desirous that their first meeting should occur at his place of dwelling and in his presence; it lasted but a short while, and was easily gotten over, since everything had been settled beforehand. Immediately after it, M. Fouché was conveyed by M. de Talleyrand to Arnouville, where he took, at the hands of the king, the oath as Minister of Police.

M. Fouché has loudly boasted of having, at this first interview, told His Majesty some plain truths, and of having given him most salutary counsels, which had unfortunately not been followed. I have, for all that, good reasons for believing that he merely blurted out a few words expressive of his fortitude, together with protestations of his loyalty. The happiness he felt at attaining such a position, following upon so many intrigues and perils, certainly did not leave him sufficient presence of mind to make a speech of any length. What has been related to me of his confusion on that occasion leaves me no doubts in this connection.

He was back in Paris before five o'clock in the afternoon, looking upon himself as a minister of the king, but not yet revealing the fact, especially to his colleagues in the provisional government, with whom he had a final decision to take. He summoned them, and informed them that the allies were determined to again place Louis XVIII. on the throne, and that as this prince was to enter Paris on the following day, there was nothing left for the commission to do but to dissolve, and notify the Chambers of its having done so.

The necessity of coming to this decision was made all the more manifest, if it could be so, through a most melancholy circumstance. The barriers of the city had, since morning, been handed over to the stranger, and the Prussians, impatient of entering the city as masters and conquerors, had not hesitated pushing as far as the garden of the Luxembourg Palace, and the palace yard of the Tuileries, which they occupied in a military fashion. All resistance was henceforth impossible. M. Carnot could not refuse signing the message which was sent to the two Chambers, and which ran as follows:—

“Mr. President, we had been led to believe so far that

the allied sovereigns were not unanimously agreed on the choice of the prince who was to reign over France. Our plenipotentiaries so assured us on their return. Notwithstanding this, the ministers and generals of the allied powers declared yesterday, in the course of the conferences which they had with the president of the commission, that all the sovereigns had agreed among themselves to again place Louis XVIII. on the throne, and that he would make his entry into the capital this evening or to-morrow. The foreign troops have just occupied the Tuileries, the seat of the government. Under the circumstances, nothing is left for us but to pray for the welfare of our country. As our discussions are no longer free, we think it our duty to separate."

I give here the very words of this message, because it constitutes the first grievance which the king, the Court, and the Royalists were soon to have against M. Fouché.

As minister of the king, he should never have signed a document which left so greatly in doubt important facts, and gave to the return of the legitimate king the aspect of a calamity, following upon which nothing was left but to pray to Heaven for the country's salvation. His defence was that it was of the highest importance that the governmental commission should consent to dissolve itself of its own volition, a dissolution which he had only been able to obtain by making this concession. The answer to this was that on the following morning, the commission, like the Chambers, would of itself have ceased to exist, and that he had uselessly done an unbecoming thing; but these delicate considerations were not of a nature to make any impression on M. Fouché.

There was, in this message, it would seem, a sentence which was struck out when it was printed, and which gave the impression that fresh guarantees were to be added to

the Charter, and that the national colors were to be retained. He had assuredly not been authorized by any one to promise anything on this latter point. It is true that a falsehood never cost him anything, when he thought he could derive any advantage therefrom. The Chamber of Peers received this message with the utmost indifference, and immediately separated. Its president, M. de Cambacérès, was not the man to attempt any futile resistance. Great was the excitement in the Chamber of Representatives. It was again M. Manuel who undertook to express the feelings of his colleagues. He maintained that a like communication should in no way prevent the Chamber from pursuing its labors in connection with the *Acte constitutionnel*, and concluded his speech somewhat unskilfully by borrowing Mirabeau's famous utterance: "We are here by the power of the people, and will only be driven out by bayonets." It is but a false and cold excitement which, under similar circumstances, borrows the words of another; the more these words are known, the more is the use of them unfortunate. His opinion, nevertheless, prevailed; the debate was continued; it bore on an article relating to the hereditary of the peerage. It was the last one adopted. The president then adjourned the sitting, in spite of the protests of some of the more violent of the deputies, who would have wished the Chamber to hold permanent sittings. It was agreed, amid a scene of great disorder, that the Chamber should meet the next day at eight o'clock in the morning. Thus ended the last day of the life of the provisional government which had taken the place of that of Napoleon.

On the morning of the 8th, the first article of the *Moniteur*, which was issued at an early hour, read as follows: "The governmental commission has informed the king of its dissolution. The peers and the representatives imposed on the nation by the former government have received a no-

tification to this effect. The Chambers are dissolved; the king will enter Paris towards three o'clock in the afternoon; His Majesty will alight at the château of the Tuileries." M. de Vitrolles and M. Fouché were the joint authors of this article. Then followed the two ordinances of the king, reinstating public officials, and restoring to General Dessolles the command of the Paris National Guard. Next came an order of the day worded thus: "By order of the king, Lieutenant-General Dessolles resumes to-day the command of the Paris National Guard. By order of Marshal Prince d'Essling, the Chief of the Staff, Baron BORELLI."

An order of the day of General Dessolles was simultaneously placarded and distributed. It contained adroitly worded congratulations for the National Guard on the excellent spirit it had always exhibited, and on its zeal for the maintenance of order and public peace. A most explicit injunction, in which the motives for resuming wearing the white cockade were assigned in a manner such as would give no offence, caused the cockade to be accepted without difficulty.

A certain number of representatives, pursuant to the agreement reached on the previous day, had not hesitated to present themselves at the doors of the Chamber at eight o'clock in the morning, but they were closed and guarded by a detachment of the National Guard, which, in spite of their protests, denied them admission to the Chamber. There was nothing left for them to do but to separate. The officer in command of the detachment happened to be M. Decazes, a councillor to the *Cour royale*, whom Napoleon had exiled at the same time as myself. He had hastened back immediately on hearing of the disaster of Waterloo, and was desirous of assuming in the Royalist party an attitude inspiring confidence. A very intimate connection

with a member of the family of M. Louis had furnished him the means of keeping up a correspondence with that minister during his sojourn in Ghent. It will be seen, later on, to what an extent he derived benefit from the circumstance.

Great was the excitement in the city during the whole of the forenoon, but it soon became subdued. A single sentiment overshadowed all others,—that of joy at recovering security and peace, after the many dangers so miraculously escaped. When the king made his entry at three o'clock, the welcome which he received at the hands of the immense concourse of people gathered along his route disconcerted all sinister predictions, and went greatly beyond every expectation. It will, moreover, be admitted that the transition must have appeared a prodigious one to him who had on the previous day scrutinized the attitude of all, especially that of the National Guard, which performed its duties with the utmost zeal, preserved the most perfect order, and showed the example of voicing the most desirable sentiments.

At four o'clock, M. de Talleyrand assembled at his residence all the persons who were to constitute his ministry. On my being one of the first to arrive, he took me aside and told me that it was absolutely necessary that, in addition to the portfolio of Justice, I should consent to take charge of that of the Interior for a few days. I protested against being made to shoulder so heavy a burden. He assured me that I was not to bear it for long, and informed me most confidentially of the reason which prevented the king's making known his choice in connection with the Department of the Interior yet awhile. "It is imperative for us," he said, "that we should conciliate the Emperor Alexander, and let him, so to speak, have a say in our affairs. With this object in view, I have an idea which I

believe excellent,—that of giving the Ministry of the Interior to General Pozzo di Borgo. He is French, for he is a native of Corsica; his qualifications as such cannot be denied, as he has been a member of the Legislative Assembly. He is a man of great parts. He has already rendered the greatest services to the House of Bourbon, and no other man possesses so much influence over the Emperor Alexander. If the matter can be arranged, we shall be able to mould the latter to our own liking, but his consent is necessary, as M. de Pozzo, who is attached to his service, and who is his minister near the king, will and can do nothing without his consent, nay, his orders. You can therefore see that it will require a few days to bring this negotiation to a successful issue. I hope it will not prove a lengthy one, and that I will soon know how I stand.”

I raised such objections as naturally presented themselves, but finally I had to yield, and to resign myself to my fate.

I was unacquainted at the time with all that had occurred at the Congress of Vienna; none of the circumstances of which I have made previous mention had as yet come to my knowledge, hence I had no conception of the situation of the French Cabinet with regard to the Emperor Alexander. This dark spot on our political horizon was totally unknown to me. My latest recollection was that of the friendly relations which had existed in 1814 between the Emperor Alexander and M. de Talleyrand. I still continued to build the brightest hopes on this good understanding; hence I was doomed to the most cruel disappointment, which was not long in breaking in upon me. Our first ministerial conference was brief and insignificant. Our appointments to office were not yet officially known,—they had not even been signed,—and yet M. Fouché came and took his seat among us. His presence made all feel ill at ease. There

was some conversation as to important positions which had to be disposed of at once. M. de Talleyrand stated that the king consented to entrust the directorship of the *ponts et chaussées* to M. Molé, which seemed to afford pleasure to all present, and the post-office to M. Beugnot. Something had to be done for a man of real talent, who had been a minister till the 20th of March, had followed His Majesty to Ghent, and who had, moreover, at the time of the crisis at Mons, given active support to M. de Talleyrand.

There remained the Prefecture of Police, which it was important to entrust to safe and experienced hands. All agreed that the man for the place was M. Anglès, who had exercised similar functions for some length of time, and who also had given proofs of his devotion, in joining the king at Ghent. This delicate point settled, the meeting dispersed, to assemble again in the evening at eight o'clock.

In the interval, M. de Talleyrand, having sent for M. Anglès, informed him of the position destined to him, but he had declined it, basing his refusal on his title of minister without portfolio, which, he contended, was superior to the post tendered him. In reality, he did not wish to be under the orders of M. Fouché; this was the only reason governing a refusal which could not be shaken. We found M. de Talleyrand greatly disconcerted and highly offended at this incident. I seem still to hear the dialogue, the result of which was to give birth, ere very long, to so important a career. "Where then are we to find a Minister of Police now?" he said, with evident ill-humor. — "But there is M. Decazes," at once rejoined M. Louis. — "Decazes! who is he? Who knows him?" Thereupon it was M. Louis's turn to say that M. Decazes was a councillor to the *Cour royale*, that he was a man of wit and talent, that he showed great devotion on the 20th of March to the cause of the House of Bourbon, that he opposed in the body of

the *Cour royale* any action having for its object the recognition of the usurper, that the latter took his revenge by exiling him, and, lastly, that throughout the duration of the recent crisis, no more reliable information had been received at Ghent than that transmitted by him. M. de Talleyrand asked me if I knew him. "Very slightly," was my reply; "he is the son-in-law of M. Muraire, who introduced him to me at the time I was Prefect of Police, but I have seen very little of him; I have never held any conversation with him, and all that I know is that he has on several occasions most successfully presided over the assizes." M. Fouché, questioned in his turn, replied: "Why, Decazes is a good fellow; we shall get on very well together." Thus his appointment was decided upon. M. de Talleyrand submitted it for signature to the king during the course of the evening. It appeared next morning in the *Moniteur* with those of M. Molé and Beugnot, together with the ordinance constituting the ministry.

This ordinance was accompanied by a preamble which I had drawn up in the afternoon from data previously agreed upon with M. de Talleyrand. I am going to give it in full, because it gives an excellent idea of the organization it was intended to give to the royal government in these days. "His Majesty has just decided upon the forms which, in the constitutional system of his government, have seemed to him applicable to the administration he has adopted for France. This administration will be composed in its higher elements of a privy council and of a ministerial council. To the former will be admitted the princes, the Ministers of State, and such persons as His Majesty shall see fit to call to it. This council, which will only meet when specially called, will afford a means of discussing certain matters in a more solemn fashion before the king, and will at the same time afford the king the opportunity of rewarding

important services, and also of honoring persons towards whom he shall feel graciously disposed. The number of members of this council is not to be determined. Next to this council will come that of the responsible ministers, in which only ministers holding office will be allowed to take part."

The spirit of this preamble is easy to grasp. By placing the real power in the hands of the ministerial council, it was hoped to find in the privy council a means of satisfying the *amour-propre* of the princes and a few personages to whom it was advisable to show some consideration.

I must not forget a commission of the highest importance which was organized at the same time, and to whom it was seen fit to entrust the management of all matters consequent upon the occupation of a large number of departments by the foreign troops. This constituted a crushing burden which the ordinary organization of the central administration would have been unable to cope with. This commission was composed of M. Corvetto, Councillor of State, MM. Portal and de La Bouillerie, *maîtres des requêtes*; M. Dudon was its secretary, and enjoyed a deliberative voice. They were all appointed by royal ordinance, on the morning of the 9th.

The new ministers were sworn in by the king, and from that moment dates the regular action of the first ministry of the second Restoration. It lasted only two months and seventeen days, but it is none the less to be remembered by a number of deeds conceived in a spirit of fidelity to the principles of the Charter and of the constitutional government. Its mission was to re-establish the king's authority in France, to make it triumph over the prejudices which had arisen against it, and to speak to all parties words of peace and reconciliation. Compelled to subscribe to measures of severity imposed by circumstances, and still more

by the angry passions surging about it, it sought to confine them within the limits of absolute necessity, and ever tempered the execution of them as far as lay in its power. But, it must be admitted, we had not, when accepting this mission, formed a fair idea of the difficulties awaiting us. Especially had we not seen clearly enough from what quarter these difficulties were to originate at home, and we greatly deceived ourselves, in regard to the foreign sovereigns, both as to their conduct towards France, and as to their sentiments towards the sovereign house which they were placing on the throne a second time.

In this latter respect, the mistake made lies at the door of a single man. M. de Talleyrand alone could know what there was to hope or to fear in this direction; he was alone in the secret of the circumstances of his own situation; he alone could know that in lieu of being of use to the king and to France, he would be harmful to them. Did he preserve his illusions in this respect for any length of time? It is difficult for me to believe this to have been the case, but he neglected nothing to avoid lifting the veil from the eyes of his colleagues, who, for the greater part, pursued to the end the path of their ministerial existence, without having the slightest conception as to whence came the difficulties which beset their steps. We were therefore about to pursue the tenor of our way, having to struggle both against the irritation engendered at home by the presence of M. Fouché in the council, and the invincible distaste which the most influential sovereign of the coalition could not help but feel for M. de Talleyrand, and this was the man who was the president of the council, and to whom it fell to open and direct negotiations. The gradual development of the difficulties of so false a position will be seen ere long.

CHAPTER XVI

Outrageous doings of the troops of occupation, especially of the Prussians — Marshal Blicher establishes a bivouac in the Place du Carrousel, and causes the Pont d'Iéna to be mined — Louis XVIII.'s dignified attitude under these circumstances — The public edifices of Paris resume their former names — Excesses perpetrated in the provinces by the troops of Prussia, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden — The Austrians, English, and Russians behave far better towards the population — All the foreign corps go into cantonments on our territory — Entry of the sovereigns into Paris — They declare that they will not treat until Napoleon shall have left France — Anxiety of the ministry lest the ex-Emperor should yet place himself at the head of the army — M. Pasquier appoints as his secretary-general at the Ministry of the Interior, M. de Barante, and M. Guizot at the Ministry of Justice — The situation of the country compels the royal government to assemble the Chamber — As Minister of the Interior, *pro tem.*, M. Pasquier is charged with preparing the elections — The ordinance of the 13th of July, 1815 — Changes in the prefectures: M. de Bondy sent to Metz, M. de Rémusat to Toulouse, and M. de Girardin to Rouen — Surrender of the Army of the Loire — Lille opens its gates to General de Bourmont — Several fortified towns refuse to receive the coalesced troops within their walls — General Bourke's defence at Givet — Napoleon goes aboard the *Bellerophon* — His departure does not accelerate negotiations with the allies, who now demand the disbandment of the army — M. de Talleyrand offers no objection in agreeing to this — Disturbances in the South — At the approach of the Prussians, the free corps of the West show an inclination to join Davout's army, with the object of repulsing them — Bad impression produced in the departments by M. Fouché's entry into the Cabinet — Publication of the final act of the Congress of Vienna — M. de Talleyrand's familiars see in it a great triumph for our diplomacy — Suppression of the special commissioners — Fresh measures adopted in regard to the press — Article 27 of the *senatus-consultum* of the 16th Thermidor, Year X. — The Prussians seize and convey to Germany the prefects of Orleans and of Le Mans.

IN order that the negotiations should assume a serious turn, it was incumbent on the sovereigns or their pleni-

potentiaries to assemble in a spot where general conferences could take place. The sovereigns were shortly to arrive in the city, and there was nothing left but to wait patiently for their coming, and study the questions to be discussed with them. As a matter of fact, the only matters properly open to debate were the conditions of a military occupation subordinate, in the first instance, to the presence of Napoleon on French territory, and in the next, combined with the guarantees which they were justly entitled to demand against the danger of his return. It might also be expected that indemnities would be required to cover the expenses incidental on the transport of troops, and the war, although a very short one, in which the sovereigns had participated. Now, such a question is always a difficult one, when treated as between weak and strong, and it is not easy to foresee whither it will lead.

From the very outset, a most melancholy insight into this was given by the behavior of several generals and the troops of their command. The Prussians especially, who constituted the vanguard of the coalition, manifested a disposition which justified the worst fears. Everywhere, even in Paris, they were establishing themselves as in a conquered country, thus giving the lie, as far as lay in their power, to a proclamation and an order of the day issued by the Duke of Wellington, at the time his command had set foot on French soil. In these two documents, the English general had formally promised to consider himself and act as if in a friendly country, in all localities where there should be no display of resistance, and where, forsaking the cause of the usurper, people should place themselves under the authority of the legitimate sovereign.

This was not Marshal Blücher's view of the case. It has been seen how difficult it was to bring him to treat in regard to the capitulation of Paris, and mention has been

made of his eagerness to occupy the garden and all the approaches of the Tuileries. Although the king had established his residence there, he had not seen fit to spare him the spectacle of a Prussian bivouac installed in the Place du Carrousel; it remained there several weeks, with its guns pointed at the grilles of the palace. Had it not been for the interference of M. de Humboldt, the famed traveller, and a brother of the minister then most in favor with the King of Prussia, there would have been established in the Jardin des Plantes another bivouac, which would have destroyed within forty-eight hours this magnificent place, whither flock all the savants of Europe for the purpose of pursuing their studies to a termination.

At the far end of Paris, the magnificent bridge recently constructed opposite the Military School was threatened with destruction. Its misfortune was to be called the Pont d'Iéna, thus consecrating the memory of one of the severest defeats suffered by the Prussian army. A mine had been laid under two of its piers, and it was to be blown up on the following day, when Louis XVIII. authorized M. de Talleyrand to state that he would go himself and stand over the mine, so that, if it was seen fit, he might be blown to pieces at the same time as the bridge.

Without giving it the semblance of a concession, an ordinance, which was dated the previous day, restored to the public edifices of Paris their former appellations; the most recent ones were renewed. Thus, the Pont des Tuileries became the Pont Royal; the Pont d'Austerlitz, the Pont du Jardin du Roi; the Pont d'Iéna, the Pont de l'École Militaire. Owing to the general attitude assumed by the king, these prudent concessions, and the arrival of the sovereigns, the dreaded insult was not carried out.

But more serious misfortunes were to be deplored; every moment we received heartrending stories of vexa-

tions and acts of pillage committed wherever Prussian troops were cantoned. It was not long ere we learnt that this sorry example was being followed by the troops of the German sovereigns, which were marching onward from the Rhenish frontier. The worst excesses were being committed by the former allies of imperial France, the Bavarians, Würtembergers, and Badeniers.

It must be said in justice to the Austrians, that they preserved a better discipline, and showed a good deal of consideration, imitating in that the example of the English and Russians, who hardly did more than inflict on the country the evils inseparable from the burden entailed by their large numbers.

It seemed as if all Europe were thirsting to trample on French soil; even at a time when the display of so many troops had become utterly useless, it was nevertheless considered appropriate to give the French nation the spectacle of the irresistible power to which it was commanded to bow. Not a single corps, in spite of the rapid success of the Duke of Wellington and of Marshal Blücher, in spite of the occupation of the capital, had paused in its onward march. Every man, from the frontier to the banks of the Rhine, who shouldered a musket, all who were not needed to guard the states and fortified towns, seemed to have made French territory their rendezvous. Over six hundred thousand soldiers, inundating the eastern and northern provinces, soon found their way into Normandy and the provinces bordering on the right bank of the Loire. The invasion of 1814 was vastly surpassed by that of 1815. It was in the midst of all these troubles, and the misery they were to entail, that the new government had to pursue the tenor of its way.

On the 10th of July the Emperor of Russia, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Prussia reached Paris. It had

been expected that their presence would smooth away many difficulties, and greatly simplify the march of events, but this expectation was soon dispelled. It was not long ere a determination to temporize was seen, in both their utterances and actions, and this gave cause to suspect many mental reservations.

In the course of the brief negotiation entered into at Haguenau, between their plenipotentiaries and those of the provisional government, it had been stipulated that Napoleon should be delivered over to them immediately on their entering Paris. His presence on French soil, and the use he could still make of his freedom, constituted the burden of their grievances. They declared that no parleys could be entertained as long as they did not feel protected from the attempts which his audacity caused to be dreaded. There was, no doubt, a modicum of truth in their fears, but it must be admitted that these complaints constituted a most convenient pretext for the display of hostile feelings to which it did not suit them to openly confess. It can therefore be truly said that from the first day Napoleon set foot on French soil in this melancholy year, to the last hour he remained, there was no kind of perils and calamities which he did not draw upon the head of its unfortunate people. It remains to be added that if, after his abdication, he had shown sufficient wisdom to seize in time the opportunity of escaping to America, no one could have said what measures the foreign powers might not have taken in dread of his return.

M. de Talleyrand's ministry was, above all, anxious to hasten his departure. Its senseless hesitation and fortune served us better on this occasion than the calculations dictated by prudence. At the outset, the matter remained in the balance, from dread of what he might undertake, as, after all, the army, in evacuating Paris and withdrawing

to the banks of the Loire, became placed between the capital and himself. The army was on a most respectable footing, and, considering its excited state on its departure, anything and everything might be expected as to the course it would follow. Who could say that Napoleon, who was only a few marches distant from it, would not yield to the temptation of once more placing himself at its head; or that it would not of its own accord anticipate his wishes and go towards him? In that case a series of events, the consequences of which were incalculable, would follow. In this respect the foreigners were, to a certain degree, entitled to say that everything remained open as long as this question was not settled.

I had my share of the difficulties of all sorts with which the government was beset, and it would have been impossible for me to shoulder the burden of two ministerial departments, had I not taken the precaution of associating with myself two able collaborators. I had chosen as secretary-general to the Ministry of the Interior, M. de Barante, and M. Guizot to the Ministry of Justice. The latter had filled the same position in the Ministry of the Interior under the Abbé de Montesquieu; this circumstance was in itself sufficient to inspire M. de Talleyrand with the strongest prejudices against him; hence he would not hear of his returning to that post. I had to insist in a most determined manner to be allowed to avail myself of his services at the Ministry of Justice. I made the president of the council understand that as this was the ministry which was to be mine finally, I was fully resolved not to be interfered with in any way in the matter of its organization.¹

¹ M. de Talleyrand's aversion to M. Guizot was all the more unjust from the fact that he had displayed great zeal in going, as I have already stated, to Ghent, to carry information of the highest value, and that later, at the time of the Mons scission, he was among those who remained attached to his fortunes.

I did not encounter the same opposition in regard to M. de Barante, who had always been *persona grata* to him.

It was impossible to meet the imperative demands about to be made of the treasury, without the co-operation of the Chambers, nor could they, pursuant to the terms of the proclamation of Cambrai, be dispensed with, in regard to the destination of the most guilty leaders. Hence it became necessary to make preparations for their convocation.

We should have greatly desired to again summon the Chamber of Deputies of 1814, but, after mature deliberation, this was adjudged both illegal and impracticable. Indeed, three-fifths of this Chamber were already without a mandate, the period for which they had been elected having expired. Another fifth was shortly to find itself in the same position. There was nothing left but to resign oneself to face the chances of a new election. It fell to my lot, as Minister of the Interior, to submit all the necessary propositions to the council, and to attend to the laborious preparation of the steps attendant upon so important a measure. Many were the difficulties, as previous legislation in the matter was insufficient, or rather impracticable. It gave the Senate the right to select from among the candidates presented by the electoral colleges the members of the *Corps législatif*. Now, the Senate no longer existed; the Charter, when instituting the Chamber of Peers, had not preserved this attribute to it. The law's silence in this respect had therefore to be provided for.

The Charter had dwelt far too superficially upon the electoral question, and it was difficult, as the matter was one to be settled by law, not to go beyond its probable prescriptions. Was this not an opportunity to allow the nation to enjoy such advantages as might be derived from a few modifications introduced in several articles of the Charter, dealing with the question of eligibility, the num-

ber of deputies, and several other regulations concerning the constitution of the Chamber, its rules of procedure, and its part in framing laws? Thus would be made an experiment all the more useful in that it would furnish precious data for framing the law to be passed subsequently. The legislative power would thus resume all its rights, as nothing would have been done but to anticipate satisfying the most pressing needs.

I thought that at a time when the country was about to be called upon to make great sacrifices, too much could not be done to secure its good-will, and to give it all the means of expressing its will which the royal power could grant. The draft of the ordinance, the preambles, as well as all the articles which had been concerted between M. de Barante and myself with the utmost care, was adopted just as I had presented it. The number of deputies was increased, according to a table annexed to the ordinance, from 262 to 395, and the required age was set down at thirty. It was expressly declared by Article 14 of the new ordinance, that Articles 16, 28, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46 of the Charter would be submitted for revision to the legislative power at the next session of the Chambers. This prescription was necessary in order to prevent it being supposed that there had been an attempt to finally dispose of the questions to which these articles had reference.

The ordinance rendered at Arnouville, in regard to the functionaries of the civil and judicial order whom it had been proposed to reinstate in the positions which they occupied previous to the 1st of March, could not be executed. The majority of those who could derive any benefit from it required a new investiture, which would strengthen their hands in the midst of the innumerable difficulties with which they were about to be beset. Twenty

prefects only were thereby sent back to the posts they had occupied on the 1st of March. Thirty-four others were either removed to other departments or recalled to functions which they had not exercised since the Restoration. Among the latter was M. de Tournon, the former Prefect of Rome, and one of the most able of administrators, who was sent to Bordeaux.

It was impossible, in the midst of this great shuffling of the cards, for me to remain unmindful of one of my oldest friends, M. de Bondy. He had been appointed Prefect of Paris on the 21st of March, but he had fulfilled his duties with the greatest moderation, and had been called upon, in the last hours of his administration, to play an important and honorable rôle, since he had been one of the three commissioners sent to conclude the capitulation which had opened to the king the doors of his capital. He had, at my request, provoked, on the part of the municipal council, a debate favorable to the return of the House of Bourbon. I therefore considered I was entering into the spirit of the general reconciliation which was animating the king, in sending him to Metz. M. de Talleyrand, for his part, was most anxious to place advantageously M. de Rémusat, whose services and loyal sentiments, on the 30th of March of the preceding year, had gone unrewarded during the first Restoration. He would have wished to have given him the Prefecture of Paris, but I pointed out to him that it would be difficult to deprive M. de Chabrol of it, who had been driven out of it on the 20th of March, and who had just been reinstated. So M. de Chabrol remained, and M. de Rémusat was given the Prefecture of Toulouse. This was in the department where his estates were situated, and where he resided.

I appreciated to a high degree the services of M. de Girardin as administrator. He had occupied the Prefec-

ture of Rouen, where he had remained until the 20th of March, and during the greater part of the Hundred Days, when he had been appointed by Napoleon Prefect of Versailles. Unfortunately for himself, he had almost made a point of honor of being sent back to Rouen. His intimate friend, M. de Jaucourt, was so pressing in his entreaties in this connection, that it was impossible to deny him his request. What I had foreseen did not fail to happen: the Royalist spirit was in a state of great ferment throughout Normandy, especially at Rouen and Havre. The presence of a prefect who had remained in office during the Hundred Days could but, in these two cities, be the cause of an irritation to which M. de Girardin succumbed in a very short time. He never forgave me a misfortune which I had foreseen, and from which I had tried to shield him.

I incurred yet another enmity, which was quite as unmerited, and which became far more painful. My intercourse in the Council of State with M. Fiévée had always been pleasant. Appointed a prefect in the last days of the Empire, he had retained his position during the first Restoration, in whose service he had displayed great zeal; he had been dismissed on the return of Napoleon. I had met him during the Hundred Days. I made it a duty to ask that his prefecture be restored to him, in doing which I encountered the most strenuous opposition on the part of M. Louis, who was displeased with him because he had, in 1814, constantly opposed the sale of national timber in the department which he administered. M. de Talleyrand agreed with M. Louis, so I was compelled to relinquish the idea of giving him the Prefecture of the Nièvre, one of those in which was to be found the greatest quantity of domanial timber. On the following day, I suggested appointing him to that of the Manche, where this kind of property did not exist. M. de Talleyrand and M. Louis,

to whom he was clearly an object of aversion, renewed their opposition, and, as I remained firm, the matter was brought to the notice of the king, who, after having heard arguments for and against the appointment, decided the matter adversely to me. I did not consider it right to reveal these particulars to M. Fiévée, who henceforward became my enemy, and who remained convinced that I had not been desirous of serving him.

While I was engaged in the organization of the *personnel*, important news came to hand. On the 14th, it was known beyond doubt that the Army of the Loire, commanded by Marshal Davout, had surrendered to the king. General Kellermann, Count de Valmy, and General Gérard had been sent to assure His Majesty of their loyal sentiments. It had been learnt on the previous day that the town of Lille had opened its gates to General de Bourmont,¹ who had presented himself in the king's name, at the head of a small body of troops. The white flag was at last flying over the château de Vincennes, at the very doors of Paris; the château was commanded by General Daumesnil, he of the wooden leg, well known for his energetic tenacity, and whose submission might have been postponed for some time yet.

¹ General de Bourmont belonged to the corps commanded by Marshal Ney at the time of his defection; he had hastened to leave it and to return to Paris, yet he had subsequently succeeded in obtaining from Napoleon, in spite of the opposition of Marshal Davout, Minister of War, a command in the army which was then assembling in Flanders for the opening of the campaign. This favor, due specially to the influence of General Gérard, had not inspired him with any scruples when, on the eve of the battle of Ligny, he decided on deserting the post entrusted to him, crossed the frontier, thence to the enemy's quarters, and from there to Ghent, where he had been welcomed. A man of wit and talent, M. de Bourmont, should he leave memoirs, will have many things to explain. He will especially have to reply to the awful apostrophe hurled at him by Marshal Ney when listening to his testimony against him at his trial: "Did you, sir, raise the slightest objection, in my presence, to the fatal course I was about to pursue, and regarding which I did not come to a decision until after having informed you thereof?"

On the 17th, the Army of the Loire crowned its submission with the very act it was considered most difficult to obtain from it, that of returning to the white cockade and flag. A proclamation by Marshal Davout brought about this determination. All the scattered corps, all the scattered regiments, hastened to send in their submission, and the fortified towns in general hoisted the white flag, which did not prevent several of them refusing to open their gates to the troops of the coalition. Their commandants refused to surrender, together with the towns, the war material which they contained, and thus hand over to the stranger the state's most precious weapons of defence. This wise temporization called forth complaints from the allied generals, and oftentimes afforded them a pretext for having recourse to the most violent and outrageous proceedings. Such was the position of the French government that it was in the necessity, in spite of the apparent orders it gave to a commandant of one of these places,—Givet, if I mistake not,—to secretly send word to him to continue his resistance. It was in that town that, after the battle of Waterloo, all the artillery which had not fallen into the hands of the enemy had been hurriedly parked. It was of the utmost importance to preserve this last resource.¹

After much hesitation, revolving many plans, and following upon blasted hopes, feeling the necessity of coming to some conclusion, and urged thereto by General Becker,

¹ The commandant to whom this secret injunction was dispatched was General Bourke, a brave and gallant officer, and a former aide-de-camp of Marshal Davout. The Duc d'Angoulême had him raised to the peerage after the Spanish campaign. Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr informed us at the council of the precautions he considered himself compelled to take, and showed us the order he was about to dispatch. It was written on a piece of paper the size of a thumb-nail; it will be readily understood how important it was that such an order should not be intercepted. Bourke held out, as ordered to do, and the town was not surrendered until the government had concluded with the strangers such arrangements as would render its occupation less disastrous.

in whose custody he was, Napoleon finally decided to place his confidence in British generosity, and to seek an asylum on the British man-of-war *Bellerophon*. He was received on board on the 15th, and on the 16th the ship sailed for the English coast.

The Emperor Napoleon having left France, and the army having everywhere recognized the king's authority, the belief might be indulged in that the negotiations would be commenced, and that henceforward no obstacle existed to the conclusion of the political transactions of which recent events showed the need. If any fresh guarantees were to be asked of France and of the House of Bourbon, the time had come to prefer them, frankly. This wished-for hour was still far away, and all our hopes were doomed to disappointment. For a long while yet we remained in a state of uncertainty, hardly knowing what to believe or what to hope.

More impatient than any of my colleagues, as I bore a double burden and as the arrangement which was to relieve me of it depended on diplomatic combinations, hardly a day passed but that I questioned M. de Talleyrand as to the progress made in the matter of negotiations, which I believed already opened. His evasive replies were always a matter of surprise to me. He began by telling me that in order to follow up profitably such complicated affairs, he needed a safe go-between, who would devote himself entirely to them who had influence with the foreign ministers, and who would be received by them at all times. Now, this go-between could be none other than the Duc de Dalberg, whose worth he had recognized during the Vienna negotiations. But the Duc de Dalberg had most unfortunately remained behind on his estate in Germany. He had written to him to return, post-haste, and was daily expecting him. The Duke arrived between the 20th and 25th, and yet mat-

ters did not progress any faster. I merely learnt that the refrain of the foreigners had changed. There could no longer be any talk of Napoleon, or of the army's resistance, so the incompatibility of the existence of that army with the public peace of France and of Europe was brought forward. Its defection on the 20th of March proved, it was contended, that it was impossible to place any reliance in it; as long as it existed, the name of Napoleon, the presence of a bit of tricolored ribbon or an eagle, would be sufficient to excite it; it had sufficiently demonstrated that it was irreconcilable with the House of Bourbon. It was imperative to be rid of it, and, to that end, all that was necessary was to carry out the execution of the ordinance rendered by the king previous to his departure from Lille, wherein he had pronounced the disbandment of "all officers and men of the army and navy having participated in the rebellion and gone over to Napoleon Bonaparte or to his adherents."

No more portentous question could be raised; no other course followed could entail such fearful consequences. On the one hand, France would be entirely disarmed, and remain defenceless at the mercy of the foreign soldiery. One half her territory was already occupied; should she in addition incur the hazards of one of the most dangerous operations imaginable? Would all these old corps, of heroic and constant valor, suffer themselves to be disarmed without opposing any resistance? Was such a sacrifice to be demanded of them in the presence of the enemy, and in obedience to his exigencies? Nothing could be more revolting to the noblest sentiments of the human heart; it was an insult to the national pride. Even supposing that full submission could be secured for the time being, what of the future, when so many elements of hatred, discord, and revenge had become disseminated in this fashion throughout

the population? History did not afford a single example of such an undertaking.

This was the subject of the moving deliberations, not of France's Cabinet,—for the question was not once discussed at the ministerial council,—but of the few men who more especially bore the weight of it; on France's side, M. de Talleyrand almost alone with the king; on the stranger's side, the allies, assisted by their ministers, all unanimous in their wishes and exacting demands.

I was the first of the members of the council whom M. de Talleyrand took into his confidence, then Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr and M. Louis. The latter hardly saw in a measure of this kind anything but that it would relieve the treasury of an item of expenditure which preyed heavily on his mind. As to the Marshal, his thoroughly French heart was deeply troubled; he spoke of resigning. M. de Talleyrand dissuaded him from this course, by pointing out to him that the disbandment would be a mere matter of form. Surely the king had a right to create an army unto himself, and so it would become necessary to organize a new one, in which should be included those of every rank and the men whom it was material to retain. This operation would afford the facility of getting rid of those who might be considered dangerous, without giving any one cause for complaint. The army would thus, doubtless, be reduced as to numbers, but it would become a picked corps, perfectly reliable and loyal. This would constitute an admirable basis on which to reconstruct later on, according to the country's needs. The Marshal allowed himself to be persuaded, believing it would be possible for him to carry out the disbandment asked of him.

As for M. de Talleyrand, his extreme levity, his supreme indifference regarding the most serious matters, were never revealed to me in a more melancholy fashion than on this

occasion. I endeavored to enlighten him by dwelling on the political aspect of the question, but he did not seem to pay the slightest heed to it. His mind was only fixed on the difficulties attendant upon its execution; his anxiety went no further; none of the possible consequences in the future appeared to him worthy of engaging his attention. "It cannot be helped; nothing can be done without it; the sovereigns imperatively demand it; there is no way of refusing to agree to it." Such was the invariable text of his replies. It must, however, be added that the king, *Monsieur*, and the Duc de Berry had, in this respect, just as few scruples and just as little foresight and regrets. They were still under the influence of the impressions left on their minds by the prompt and general defection of that army on the 20th of March. As there was nobody to convince them to the contrary, it was difficult for them not to believe that it was irreconcilable towards them. There is consequently no reason to be surprised at the readiness with which the king lent himself to everything proposed to him in regard to this disbandment, one of the great events of the epoch, and assuredly one of the most astounding of modern times.

In these unhappy times, as the days rolled by, troubles seemed to multiply on the one hand, as they decreased in another direction. It was soon learnt how deep the Royalist agitation was in some parts of the kingdom, especially in the provinces of the South, and that great was still the danger of riotous acts. Massacres had taken place at Marseilles, consequent upon the news of the battle of Waterloo. Soon after, the town of Montpellier became the scene of a collision between the troops garrisoning the citadel and a band of Royalists brought up from the country districts by M. de Montcalm, and with whom he had taken possession of the town. Nothing could be more useless than this

engagement, in which several people lost their lives. Had M. de Montcalm only been able to restrain his ardor for three or four days more, the orders dispatched from Paris would have led to the submission of the citadel and of the troops holding it. There exists in the manners and character of Southern people a certain substratum of ferocity over which civilization triumphs with difficulty, and which manifests itself by violent deeds on every occasion when the passions of the masses are stirred up. The history of the years 1815 and 1816 is a living proof of this, while the assassination of Marshal Brune at Avignon in the month of August, that of Protestants by Catholics at Nîmes, and later on those of General Lagarde in the same town, and General Ramel in Toulouse, only too well demonstrated this melancholy truth. I will again refer to each of these incidents further on.

In the West, the corps which had organized under former Chouan and Vendean chiefs had no intention of dispersing. They nobly displayed their patriotism at the time the Prussian troops advanced along the banks of the Loire, and prepared to invade Brittany. They gave vent to their indignation, and manifested the intention of forcibly resisting this useless and unjust invasion. They even went so far as to declare that they would act in concert with the army which Marshal Davout still held together on the left bank of the Loire. This was casting aside their prejudices and old-time hatreds. This demonstration was productive of good results, as it powerfully contributed towards arresting the onward march of the Prussians, who dreaded venturing into a country whose residents had for many a long year been trained to that war of ambuscades, than which nothing more disconcerts regular troops. This much being granted, and while giving tribute to the service rendered, it is none the less true that the undisciplined spirit of these

bands, and their loudly proclaimed determination to undo the work of the Revolution, were a source of embarrassment to the government.

It was evident that the exigencies and passions of the Royalist party would soon prove our most dangerous shoals at home. We were already aware that M. Fouché's entry into the council had been productive of a very bad effect in a number of departments. The provinces knew nothing of the services he had rendered during the time elapsing between the battle of Waterloo and the return of the king to his capital. The motives which had governed the king in having near his person a man who had fallen into disrepute, and a regicide, were past comprehension. Hence his presence in the new administration cast over it a disgrace which was destined to increase in proportion to the growing exaltation of Royalist sentiment. M. Fouché had been adopted in order to calm and reassure the interests of the triumphant revolution of the 20th of March; now, it so happened that these were almost immediately relegated to the background, while the opposite interests, which his presence irritated to the highest degree, acquired a strength to meet which there was no sufficient preparation. Hence the government was perceptibly affected in the quarter where it should have been strongest. This condition of affairs resulted in the most untoward consequences.

On the 19th, it may be stated as a fact, the public and Europe learnt at last the results of the Congress of Vienna; the final act of this Congress was inserted in the *Gazette officielle*. The ordinary course of my occupations and my work had hardly placed me, until then, in a position to form a judgment on the serious questions thus summarily disposed of. I was, above all, struck by the inconveniences which might result for France from the many points of contact in which it was placed with Prussia, as

well as with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, constituted according to ideas so greatly in opposition to those which since the days of Richelieu had prevailed in France's policy. I must admit that my apprehensions were strenuously combated and shaken by the noisy demonstrations of joy affected by the persons surrounding M. de Talleyrand, and by the satisfaction which showed in his manner and his utterances. Were he and his flatterers to be believed, no grander work had ever been accomplished by any French negotiation. The Duc de Dalberg, M. de Noailles, and M. de La Besnardière were never tired of praising the admirable art with which M. de Talleyrand had succeeded not only in extricating himself from the very humble position to which he seemed condemned from the moment of his entering Vienna, but in becoming within so brief a space of time one of the principal actors.

Such praise was doubtless deserved from a certain point of view, but that which remained to be told, and of which I was still in ignorance, was the price at which this advantage had been purchased, and all it was to cost us! I did not acquire any light on the subject until after the return of the Abbé de Montesquiou, who had been in no too great haste to leave England, and who returned to Paris somewhat late. I did not at first pay sufficient attention even to certain utterances which on several occasions escaped his lips in my presence, attributing, as I did, the bitterness of them to the prejudices I knew him to cherish against M. de Talleyrand. In all truth, I remained almost to the end of the existence of the ministry without becoming fully enlightened as to the most unsurmountable of the difficulties of the situation.

When limning the laborious days through which I passed during that period, it will not be taken amiss if I should attach myself in preference to the events to which I con-

tributed in a most special manner, and the governing motives of which I am consequently in a better position to set forth. The administration in the provinces was far from having resumed its regular course. Many of the departments were, as in 1814, occupied, so to speak, by special commissioners, who sprang up in all directions in the name of the king and of the princes, usurping all authority, and oftentimes putting it to most imprudent uses. At the very door of Paris even, in Normandy, this inconvenience was making itself perceived in a most untoward fashion, but it was far more seriously felt in the Southern provinces. The Duc d'Angoulême, who had gone to Spain, invested by the king with most extended powers, had delegated them to a large number of persons, and the zeal of those upon whom he had conferred this mark of confidence oftentimes sinned by the lack of moderation then characterizing the Royalism of the South.

Very soon, an actual government, styled *royal*, but independent of that of the king, would have become established in that portion of the kingdom. The town of Toulouse claimed to be its centre, and it would have extended from Bordeaux to Nîmes and Marseilles. An ordinance rendered on the 19th had for its object to put an end to this irregular state of affairs. It was preceded by a preamble, wherein credit was given for the intentions and even the deeds of "Messieurs the special commissioners," but which ended with these words: "Now that we have again taken the reins of our government, that our ministry is constituted, that it is in correspondence with the administrators regularly appointed by us, the functions of our special commissioners have become superfluous, and would even be harmful to the progress of business, by destroying the unity of action which is the primary requisite of all regular administration."

Then came the enactment, conceived as follows:—

“ARTICLE 1. — The powers of the special commissioners at present exercising authority in our kingdom shall cease immediately upon the publication of the present ordinance, whether these powers have emanated from us, the princes of our blood, or our ministers.

“ART. 2. — All appointments and delegations of powers made by the said commissioners will likewise cease to be in force immediately on the present ordinance being published.”

No act could be more reasonable, nor rest on better foundations in right, and nothing could be urged against it; but this, I here repeat, did not prevent it from being at that time the starting-point of the animadversion of a certain number of Royalists against me, and which, ever since, has pursued me relentlessly.

On the 20th, there appeared an ordinance far more open to discussion, its object being to gratify one of the most ardent wishes of public opinion. I have stated how averse public opinion was to the law which the Abbé de Montesquieu had caused to be passed on the 21st of October, 1814, in regard to printed publications. The principal objection raised against it was the authority invested in the director of press censorship and the prefects to exercise a supervision over works of twenty sheets and under. Hence, during the early days of my term of office, I had suggested to the king that he should renounce this right. I had even given to my proposition the widest possible extension, for I had made no objection in regard to newspapers, to which I wished to restore the fullest freedom, thus renouncing the faculty resulting from Article 9 of the law. This article, which is still in force to-day, is, according to the censorship, the greatest possible impediment inflicted on the periodical press, providing, as it does, that newspapers and periodical publications shall not appear except with the king's sanction.

Was I not somewhat rash in granting so wide a concession, when made under existing circumstances? It would ill become me to deny it, especially after what has since happened, and after the course I was compelled to uphold a very short time afterwards. But, at that time, I was animated by the desire of once more bringing over public opinion to the House of Bourbon, and I was all the more disposed to base hopes on the freedom of the press, even that of the newspapers, in that it could not be denied that during the Hundred Days, it had, generally speaking, been most favorable to the cause of legitimacy. M. de Talleyrand was, moreover, one of the warmest partisans of the entire freedom of the press, and it had no opponents in the council.

The first symptom of opposition, or, to speak more correctly, the first misgivings, emanated from the king himself. On my submitting to him for signature the ordinance, such as agreed upon at the council, he told me that he wished to keep it by him and think the matter over. The result of his reflections was that newspapers should be excluded from the proposed measure, and that prudence commanded that they should be kept in the state of dependence wherein they had been placed by the law of 1814. "This is also," he added, when signifying his will and pleasure to me, "the opinion of the Minister of Police." Thus it will be seen that he had privately consulted M. Fouché in the matter, and I believe that this is the only occasion on which he acted in concert with him in regard to anything. I had to conform to orders so plainly expressed, and so my ordinance was reduced to the following: "The Director-General of the *Librairie* (printed publications) and the prefects shall cease to make use of the powers still remaining to them by Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the law of the 21st of October, 1814. All other dispositions of the law of the 21st of

October shall be executed according to their form and tenor."

Not to revert to the subject again, I must add that a fortnight later a fresh ordinance was rendered, on the motion of the Minister of Police. It was therein enacted that all authorizations granted to newspapers up to that date, of whatever kind they might be, were revoked, and that none of the aforesaid newspapers could issue without a fresh authorization of the Minister of Police. In addition to this, periodical publications were to be subject to the scrutiny of a commission, the members of which were to be appointed by the king, on the recommendation of the same minister. Thus were the attributes which, by the law of the 21st of October, 1814, had been conferred on the Director-General of the *Librairie*, whose functions thereby ceased, his services being dispensed with from the mere fact, without any need of so stating, transferred to the Ministry of Police. The director, it will be remembered, was M. Royer-Collard.

On the 21st of July, another ordinance was published, countersigned by myself, but in opposition to my opinion. The manner in which it was submitted for discussion is strange enough to be recorded. The question was the following one: "Shall use be made of the right conferred on the government by Article 27 of the senatus-consultum of the 16th Thermidor, Year X. (4th of August, 1802)?"

Now, this right, of which no government, whether consular, imperial, or royal, had ever availed itself, consisted in the power of assigning to each and every electoral college of a department, such twenty persons as it should see fit, but of whom the first ten were to be selected from among the thirty most heavily taxed residents in the department, and the other ten from men having rendered services to the state. The power likewise existed of

assigning ten to each electoral college of an *arrondissement*, the latter solely chosen from among those men having rendered services to the state. This power had fallen entirely into oblivion, and was rescued therefrom in the following fashion. At the time of my accepting the burden of the Ministry of the Interior, it had become necessary for me to go in quest of such collaborators as would be likely to second me in my labors. The name of one Labiche was suggested to me. He had for a long while been the secretary to M. de Montalivet, and his signal ability was well known to me. M. Carnot had frequently availed himself of his services during the Hundred Days; since then, being under the impression that this fact would not prove a recommendation in the eyes of the royal government, he had of his own accord gone into retirement. I sent for him and told him I had no idea of reproaching him with the services he had rendered to the previous government, and that if he was disposed to serve me as well as he had served my predecessors, I was greatly inclined to avail myself of his services. He assured me that I might rely on his entire devotedness; that the laborious life he had always led had left him no leisure to adopt any political ideas. He added, and this completed the measure of my confidence in him, that I must be aware of the large amount of gratitude he owed M. de Montalivet, and that he had preserved the habit of rendering him services which nothing would induce him to forego. It was not difficult for me to calm his fears on that point, and I once more placed him at the head of the division previously in his charge. Now this division chanced to be the one which prepared all preliminaries for the elections. M. Labiche devoted himself to it with all the ardor and intelligence peculiar to him, and, in his desire to prove to me the sincerity of his zeal for the triumph of the cause of the Royalists

at the impending elections, he unearthed this Article 27 of the senatus-consultum of the 16th Thermidor, Year X., and triumphantly brought it to me.

I was far from sharing M. Labiche's enthusiasm. In the first place, I did not consider it requisite to take advantage of that article. The Royalist movement appeared to me already so pronounced throughout France that its bearing on the elections seemed an assured thing. Again, it was repugnant to me to avail myself of a power which Napoleon himself had not dreamt of using, and which, to my mind, was of a nature to vitiate the system of elections and bring it into disrepute. To the inconvenience of violating so openly the principle of liberty, would be added the far graver one of not knowing to whose advantage these supplementary electors would redound. We lacked time to make a proper choice. The matter would have to be left to the discretion of the prefects, who would receive *carte blanche*, but would they themselves well understand what they should do? Several of them had barely reached departments altogether new to them, and where they had no acquaintance. Would not the greater part of them be entirely influenced by the ardent Royalists already besieging them? Would it not be incurring the risk of falling into excesses the consequences of which might prove dangerous? However desirable it might be to present to the king a Royalist Chamber, yet it was not to be desired that this Chamber should be so constituted as to impose on him the yoke of its passions, under the garb of Royalism.

I was already in possession of information as to what was to be expected from the intentions by which the public mind was actuated. I had therefore no hesitation in rejecting M. Labiche's proposition. But a scruple came to my mind, and I considered it right to submit the matter to the Council of Ministers, together with my reasons for reject-

ing the proposition. On this first occasion, the council agreed with me without hesitation. Unfortunately, M. Labiche had also communicated his idea to M. de Barante, Secretary-General of the Ministry of the Interior, who had viewed the matter in an entirely different light. He mentioned the subject to M. de Talleyrand, whom he had no difficulty in getting to share his views. I was therefore requested to bring the matter before the council once more. It was discussed for a couple of days; opinions were divided; mine remained the same. M. de Talleyrand decided that the matter should be submitted to the king at the next council. The king, after having heard both sides, pronounced himself in favor of the opinion of M. de Talleyrand, and there was nothing left for me to do but to frame the ordinance prescribing the supplementary electors, and conferring upon the prefects the power to make them. This is how this measure came to be adopted; its results were to be the talk of many a day, as it gave to France the *Chambre introuvable* of 1815.¹

It may be noted as one of the oddities of the period, that it should have been M. de Barante and M. de Talleyrand who caused a measure to prevail so much in opposition to the opinions which they so strongly held later on.

Day by day the foreign occupation brought us fresh difficulties and humiliations; at Orleans, the Prussians indulged in a most outrageous and insolent act. Having met with some resistance on the part of the prefect to their exactions, they did not hesitate to carry him off from his official residence, thrust him into a post-chaise, and dispatch him to Prussia, where it was intended to imprison him in the citadel of Magdeburg. Now this prefect was Count de Talleyrand, a first cousin to the Prime Minister of the King of France.

¹ The name ironically given to this Chamber, which blindly sanctioned every wish of the king. — TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

On the same day, they adopted a similar course at Le Mans, in regard to the person of my brother, prefect of the department of the Sarthe. He also had refused to deliver up to them the public coffers, and to afford them assistance in finding two or three individuals whom they had the pretension to arrest as Bonapartists and authors of the revolution of the 20th of March. In both these cases an insult was plainly intended. In addition to the brutality of such conduct, it could but be noticed that it was directed towards a couple of administrators who were both related to two of the king's ministers. We addressed energetic protests to the King of Prussia, his ministers, and his commander-in-chief. Under pretence of having to investigate the matter, and by shifting the responsibility for the deed from one to the other, they gained sufficient time to convey my brother and M. de Talleyrand's cousin to Prussia. They were not suffered to return until the allies handed over to the government of the king the full and entire administration of the provinces occupied by their troops. Pending this, it was considered appropriate to testify publicly and in a striking manner to the interest which the king could not help feeling in the two prefects, and to set the seal of approval on their conduct. M. de Talleyrand was created a Councillor of State, and my brother, *maître des requêtes*.

CHAPTER XVII

Measures taken against personages compromised during the Hundred Days—Two lists drawn up, discriminating the degree of their guilt—The drawing up of these lists entrusted to M. Fouché, who gives them a wide range—The Council of Ministers reduces the number of persons charged to fifty-six—Among them is M. de La Valette—In spite of M. Pasquier's entreaties, he persists in remaining in Paris, and calmly awaits his arrest—A question arises as to whether the peers appointed by Napoleon are to retain their seats in the upper Chamber—M. Pasquier succeeds in obtaining their elimination—Settlement made with the powers in regard to the occupation of the territory—The Duc de Richelieu declines the Ministry of the King's Household—M. Fouché keeps in the background in the council—M. de Talleyrand's apathy—Curious aspect of the *salons*—The foreigners frequenting them keep to themselves; distant behavior of the Russians and Prussians—Singular position of M. de Vitrolles in the council; he constitutes himself the mouthpiece of the Royalist party in the South and West—All documents of the secret cabinet of the post-office pass through his hands—The allies insist more strongly than ever on the disbandment of the army—Marshal Macdonald is entrusted with the operation—The sovereigns interfere more and more in our home affairs—They ask M. de Talleyrand for a memoir of the political and constitutional institutions of France—Napoleon transported to St. Helena—Incessant increase in the demands of the most fiery Royalists—They secure the dismissal of MM. de Bondy, Prefect of Metz, and de Girardin, Prefect of Rouen—M. Fouché in a new rôle—His circular to the prefects; his report to the king—Effect produced at the council by the reading of this document—Arrest of Marshal Ney—M. Decazes, Prefect of Police, works directly with the king—Assassination of Marshal Brune at Avignon—Deeds of violence indulged in by Catholics against Protestants in the South—The report of M. Fouché to the king becomes known among the public—Indignation of Louis XVIII.—Everything is in readiness to give the Ministry of Police to M. Angéls, when M. Fouché, on hearing of it, seeks the mediation of the Duke of Wellington, who obtains that he shall retain his post.

THERE was nothing left but to make up one's mind to give ear to the persistent demands of the foreign ministers,

and also, it must fain be admitted, of the Royalists, in regard to the men who had played the most prominent parts in the catastrophe of the 20th of March. That they should go altogether unpunished was out of the question; it would be leaving the door open to all manner of reprisals, were some necessary examples not made. The demands for justice kept constantly increasing. In certain respects, the hands of the government were fettered by the proclamation of Cambrai.

After many hesitations, it was resolved to divide into two categories the men most compromised. Those guilty of military treason, who had attacked the government sword in hand, and who had violently usurped power, were to be arrested and brought before competent courts-martial. It was of importance to circumscribe in the narrowest possible limits the number of persons classed in the first list, and to designate them in a precise and definite fashion.

The second category was to include those whom it would be sufficient to punish with more or less severe political measures. It was impossible not to refer the matter to the Chamber, in accordance with the engagements entered into by the proclamation of Cambrai. The list once drawn up, the persons whose names were included in it would be required to leave Paris and take up their residence in towns designated by the Minister of Police.

The delicate point was the drawing up of these two lists; this duty necessarily appertained to the Ministry of Police, and so M. Fouché was entrusted with the task. He had not raised any objection to the measure, and two days later he produced the result of his labors, but what was our surprise on seeing him unroll before our eyes two enormous lists, which included three or four times as many names as was necessary, and in which he had, without any scruple, included both his most intimate political friends and a few

very obscure enemies whom he had determined upon making feel — it was hardly known why — the full weight of his vengeance! The entire council revolted against such unheard-of numbers, and the spirit which had presided over the designations.

What had been M. Fouché's object in thus acting? It was a difficult matter to discover. Personally, I am inclined to believe that he wished to render the measure nugatory, nay, ridiculous, by extending it beyond all limits. However this may be, there was but one voice in favor of severely pruning the lists. Each member of the council called respectively for such erasures as he deemed requisite. After a three or four hours' debate, the lists were reduced to the figures with which they appeared in the ordinance of the 24th. In other words, eighteen individuals were to be forthwith handed over for trial to courts-martial, and thirty-eight were to have their cases submitted to the judgment of the Chambers.

Marshal Ney and General La Bédoyère headed the first list; then followed those who had returned with Napoleon from Elba, and had attacked France sword in hand; lastly, those who, after the 20th of March, had most violently opposed the cause of the House of Bourbon, who had signalized themselves in the South, by marching against the Duc and Duchesse d'Angoulême, viz., Generals Clausel and Grouchy. M. de La Valette and the Duc de Rovigo closed the list. The selection of these eighteen names was a matter of necessity. It must be pointed out that the severity of this rendering was greatly tempered by the fact that, with one exception, the men thus smitten were a long way off from the arm of justice, while several of them were altogether beyond its reach. It was therefore more than probable that most of them would leave the kingdom immediately. Such a consummation was greatly to be desired;

if it did not suffice to calm minds swayed by political passion, it would at least satisfy those who prayed, above all, for the public peace.

I have stated that a solitary man, among those included in the list of eighteen, was already in the clutches of the law. This was M. de La Valette, whose incarceration had happened in the following way. The king had hardly re-entered his capital, when already M. de La Valette became a prey to passionate accusations. No doubt was entertained, in the Royalist party, that he had been one of the most active agents as regards the return of Napoleon from Elba, and that the correspondence which he had kept up with him while he was on the island had powerfully contributed to that return. The affection I bore him, the intimacy and confidence existing in our intercourse, are well known. Better than any one, I knew how false were these allegations, but my opinion was powerless against the general sentiment; the feelings of friendship I entertained towards him rendered my testimony suspicious. I felt myself powerless, and convinced of the danger he was incurring, I repeatedly entreated him to leave Paris, at least for a time. Having failed in my endeavors, I appealed to Mme. de Vaudémont, whom I knew to exercise a great influence over his mind. Strong in his innocence, he went so far, on the 14th of July, as to write a letter to the president of the council, wherein he begged to be allowed to surrender himself a prisoner, and loudly insisted on being brought to trial. M. de Talleyrand, thus challenged, considered he could but yield to a request so preferred, and the police received orders to arrest him.¹ He was taken to the Conciergerie, where, on the 18th and 19th,

¹ Between the giving of this order and its execution, I caused him to be once more entreated to leave Paris. The police agents charged with his arrest went to his residence at seven o'clock in the morning. On learning

he was subjected to two lengthy interrogatories as to his participation in the return of Napoleon.

Matters were in this state when M. Fouché placed him on the list of persons who were to be tried forthwith; it was hardly possible not to include him in it, as he had himself asked as an only favor that he should be tried. As for myself, I objected all the less as, to tell the truth, I could not imagine that he incurred any danger whatever from any regularly constituted tribunal. But it did not occur to me, on first thoughts, that being neither a military man nor in any way attached to the army, the right did not exist of turning him over to a court-martial. He justly protested against being subjected to a like jurisdiction, so in the first days of August I caused an ordinance to be passed which referred his case to the ordinary tribunals, by them to be tried according to the forms prescribed by the criminal code. Such were the preliminaries of a trial which created so great a stir thereafter, in connection with which the angriest passions rose to their highest, and the issue of which attracted the attention of all Europe.

There was yet another delicate question for us to solve. The twenty-nine peers who had received their rank from Napoleon, — were they to preserve all their lives the privilege of retaining their seats in an assembly which they had deserted? M. de Talleyrand had been strongly urged to determine this point. The wishes of the king harmonized with those of the foreign ministers, but the matter was none the less a source of great embarrassment to him. M. de Talleyrand spoke to me about it. "The peers appointed

that he was abed, they withdrew, saying they would return at eleven o'clock. There was no mystery as to their motive in calling; this action on their part was plainly intended to give him time to think matters over. He was quietly breakfasting, when the men, true to their appointment, again presented themselves.

by the king in 1814," he said, "were appointed for life, and everything that has since taken place is to be considered as a dead letter; the existence of the peerage is of such importance to the monarchy that anything infringing upon its inviolability might be followed by the most untoward consequences." — "This would far more be the case," I replied, "if you had, from the very first, rendered the peerage hereditary; but in making it end with the lives of the recipients of the honor, I must confess that I attach far less importance to it. At any rate, give me two or three days to think the matter over." At the expiration of that period, I had no hesitation in telling him that if he would promise me to adopt, and to cause to be adopted by the king, the proposition I would immediately make to render the peerage hereditary, I saw no serious difficulty in the way of taking, against such of the royal peers who had accepted a peerage at the hands of Napoleon, a measure of severity which it would be easy to justify, and the inconvenience resulting therefrom would be amply disposed of by the great development which the king would thereafter give to the institution.

M. de Talleyrand agreeing to this, I read to him the preamble which I had drawn up, and which was conceived as follows. I give it here in its entirety, as every word of it bears on the case: "It has been brought to our notice that several members of the Chamber of Peers have seen fit to sit in a so-called Chamber of Peers created and assembled by the man who had usurped the power in our dominions from the 20th of March until our return in our kingdom. There cannot be any question that the peers of France, inasmuch as they have not yet been granted heredity, were and are free to resign, as in following such a course they merely dispose of interests that are purely personal to them. It is equally patent that the acceptance

of functions incompatible with the dignity with which a man is invested, presupposes and carries with it the resigning of this dignity, in consequence of which the peers, finding themselves in the positions above expressed, have actually abdicated their rank, and have by the very fact resigned from the peerage of France." Then followed a list of the twenty-nine peers who were declared to no longer belong to the Chamber of Peers. An exception was, however, made in favor of those among the foregoing who should prove that they had not sat, or had not wished to sit, in the so-called Chamber of Peers to which they had been called, it being incumbent upon them to supply proof to this effect within one month from the publication of the ordinance. This draft, having proven acceptable as a whole to M. de Talleyrand, was on the same day submitted to the king's council, when His Majesty gave his sanction thereto.

On the 25th we rejoiced at being at last in a position to publish an arrangement entered into with the ministers of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England, in regard to those portions of the territory which the foreign troops were to continue occupying, and which were to contribute to their sustenance. A line had been drawn by mutual accord across the map of France, behind which line were situated all the departments placed in that category, the administration of which was nevertheless left to French hands, which would from that time onward have the care of providing for the expenditure contingent upon the occupation. This latter engagement had, however, only been entered into subject to the condition that the payment of monetary contributions, which had been demanded of several towns and departments, should not be enforced, and that in future no contribution of this nature should be levied. The burden still remained a heavy one, but it would, at any rate, no longer be aggravated by the molestations and exactions

without number in which the commanders and commissaries of the foreign armies had thus far indulged. This alone was a great alleviation.

On the 29th, the English notified our government that, having nothing more to fear from Napoleon, and hence considering themselves entirely at peace with France, their cruisers had been ordered to raise the blockade, and to restore all freedom to navigation.

The cup of my ministerial existence was filled to the brim with disappointments and mortifications. The Cabinet remained incomplete, a Minister of the Interior was still to be found, and the choice of one was postponed from day to day. His place remained unfilled to the end. But the Minister of the King's Household had been appointed. It was the Duc de Richelieu, who was of the greatest importance, owing to the relief which his name and his high reputation would give to our organization. M. de Talleyrand had seen much of him during the Congress of Vienna, and had no doubt of his adhesion, but he had not sufficiently calculated upon the effect which the idea of being in any way associated with M. Fouché would produce on a mind of that mould.

The Duc de Richelieu was still on the frontier when he received the news of his appointment. He enjoyed frequent intercourse with the Emperor Alexander. Now I have sufficiently demonstrated how little kindly this prince felt towards M. de Talleyrand. Under the spell of such an influence, the Duke had no hesitation in declining. Little heed was at first paid to this refusal, as the government thought it would be an easy matter to overcome his scruples when once he had returned to Paris. He could not, however, be induced to reconsider his decision, and the blow thus dealt us found a most fatal echo in the opinion of the outside world. As for myself, I felt it keenly. M.

de Talleyrand was incensed to such a degree that he resolved upon showing his vexation. M. de Richelieu had communicated his decision to him in a politely worded but cold letter, so he saw fit to answer it in a discourteous manner. M. d'Hauterive indited the reply, which was laid before the council and read in presence of the king, who approved of it, and gave his sanction to its being dispatched. I remember that the matter left a painful impression on my mind, and, had the king not shown such extreme satisfaction, I should have renewed my objections.

The ministry of M. de Talleyrand was not in a position to carry matters with so high a hand towards a man of that rank, and of so well established a reputation. The sting of the reply consisted in the irony with which it was noted that the Duke was abjuring his quality of Frenchman, to which he was bound by so many brilliant memories, and was resolving to consecrate himself to a new country. It was hardly foreseen, when thus writing to him, that ere three months had elapsed, we should be compelled to throw ourselves upon his mercy and entreat him to take the helm of state at a most critical juncture. We rejoiced then perforce that in having held himself aloof so *à propos*, he had avoided compromising himself in an administration which had given so few pledges of endurance.

We were thus, as a matter of fact, only six in number, too few, indeed, to discuss and govern affairs of so great magnitude. As no day passed without giving birth to some new incident, we were compelled to hold a council meeting daily; without any call being issued, we met each day at M. de Talleyrand's, between noon and one o'clock. Each one of us would submit that which seemed to him worthy of special attention and calling for immediate solution. As it almost always happens under similar circumstances, each one had in view only that which concerned him particularly,

and outside of a few matters of exceptional gravity, assented in all confidence to everything else brought to his notice. Few indeed are the men, even among those who are entrusted with the management of affairs of the highest import, who can rise to general ideas and considerations!

The Minister of War and the Minister of Finance were both entirely absorbed in matters of detail, and in the difficulties of all kinds with which their important administrations bristled. The Minister of Marine, M. de Jaucourt, who was far less overburdened than they, took a more active part in the discussion of matters of more extended import, and which might be classed as state questions. He brought to them a mind that was upright, diligent, and enlightened by an extreme delicacy of conscience. As to M. Fouché, his attitude in our midst could but confirm me in the opinion which M. de Cambacérès had in days gone by sought to impress on me. This mind, so trenchant, so active, so enterprising when engaged in the throes of a revolution, in a crisis, when weaving the threads of an intrigue, relapsed into an utter nullity, into a sort of either feigned or real apathy, from the moment that the march of affairs resumed a regular course. Impassable when the time came to discuss matters coolly and judiciously at the council table, I do not recollect his ever having taken a prominent part at our debates except when it came to drawing up lists of those who should be brought to trial or temporarily exiled.

As to M. de Talleyrand, it is difficult to believe, without having witnessed it, that at the very time when he ought to have devoted himself exclusively to affairs, the burden and responsibility from which the most consummate statesman, and one most sure of his means, would have recoiled with fear, was precisely the one in which, at past sixty years of age, he selected to become the slave of a sentiment the ardor of which absorbed him to such a degree that it left

him no liberty of mind. I am compelled to mention the matter, because it proved a source of deep embarrassment to us, and was not without its influence on public affairs. When he realized that the lady whose presence was so precious to him had left him to take up her abode in Vienna, he fell into a state of indescribable dejection, both morally and physically. This happened during the first fortnight in September, just as negotiations were about to be opened. It is difficult not to attribute in part to the unfortunate state of mind into which he fell, the little care he took, and the few efforts he made, during that period, to improve his relations with the Emperor Alexander. Therein lay, nevertheless, the knotty point of his political situation; but it would not seem that this ever dawned on his mind, nor that he should have had conscience of the consequences of so powerful a hostility. And yet, the nature of M. de Talleyrand's mind, his suppleness of character, the ability which he displayed in turning obstacles, furnished him, better than any one else, with the means of removing this stumbling-block.

I am also under the impression that for a long while, especially in the first days of his return from the Congress of Vienna, he let himself believe far too much that France and even Europe could not do without him. So he reposed a blind faith in the march of events and force of circumstances to fix and retain in his hands the influence which the services he had rendered, his ability, and his exceptional talents had secured to him. All this may, perhaps, account for the apathy which he displayed for nearly two entire months, the state of stagnation in which he suffered public affairs to remain — for it is certain that nothing troubled him less — at a time when each day was priceless.

I was all the more struck by this that he had, at the outset, given signs of being animated with altogether different

intentions. He entertained in those days the idea of making his residence a meeting-place, a centre, to which would flock all the important personages of Europe, whereby he would regain the high position he had managed to create for himself at Vienna during the last months of the Congress. When making it known that the doors of his *salon* would be thrown open every evening, he had taken care to issue an invitation to all foreigners of distinction, who frequently availed themselves of it; it was for them a ready found club. He begged me to come as often as I could. "You will see," he said to me, "that our affairs will make better progress by means of the informal chats which will grow spontaneously, than we could possibly accomplish by the most solemnly conducted conferences. I have had some experience with all this gentry, and I know how to handle them."

I was in the habit of availing myself of this invitation, when the public service left me any leisure. The assemblage afforded a most curious spectacle, which I delighted in studying. All diplomatic Europe was represented in it, together with the leading officers of the foreign armies; but I was not long in perceiving that these men talked much more among themselves than with us, and that they were very reserved in their conversation with us. Those who most indulged in familiar intercourse with M. de Talleyrand were the English, the Duke of Wellington especially. This was not to be wondered at, after the engagements entered into at Vienna, and after the zeal the Duke had displayed by placing him at the head of affairs — in company, to be sure, with M. Fouché! When M. de Metternich arrived, he, together with a few of the Austrians, seemed to follow the English lead, but the Russians and Prussians became even more frigid. Alone M. de Pozzo sought to bring about a *rapprochement*. He would venture on certain re-

marks, occasionally even proffer counsel, but in a timid way, and in evident fear of causing displeasure to his master.

I must mention M. de Vitrolles among the most assiduous frequenters of M. de Talleyrand's *salon*. Although not enjoying the privilege of a vote, he was present at all sittings of the ministerial council, even those presided over by the king. Secretary to the council previous to the 20th of March, he had not precisely retained the position at the time of the constitution of the new ministry, and still he continued performing the duties connected with it. Nothing could be in more formal contradiction to the existence of a responsible ministry, whose members were severally and jointly liable, than the admission into its bosom of a man who incurred no responsibility, and who yet knew everything taking place in it. Such an anomaly is only to be explained by the habitual heedlessness of M. de Talleyrand, and also by the natural high favor which M. de Vitrolles enjoyed with the king. He knew the secret of making himself useful, even agreeable; he displayed a fair knowledge of public affairs, possessed information of everything that was going on, and kept up a very extensive correspondence, whence he often derived information which was not without its interest. Again, those having business with the king found in him a convenient intercessor. M. de Talleyrand was in the habit of getting him to be the first to broach any subject which it was feared might be somewhat distasteful to His Majesty. It was not seen that the man who was able to render such services might also become an obstacle when it was least expected.

In addition to his devotion to M. de Talleyrand, M. de Vitrolles was on a footing of great intimacy with M. Fouché, to whom he declared himself to be greatly indebted for the services he had rendered him during the Hundred Days. I

was on good terms with him. He lived in the Place Vendôme, in a house adjoining the official mansion of the Chancellor; he would drop in several times during the day, and keep me informed of everything he thought likely to be of interest to me. Moreover, he stood in need of my services in order to get the king to fix the emolument to which his functions entitled him, and also to receive the balance of a credit that had been opened in his favor at the time of his departure for the South. It was the least that could be done, — to grant him some compensation after all the dangers he had incurred. His means were at that time very limited. It was not long ere I discovered that his relations with the Royalist party throughout France, and more especially in La Vendée and in the South, were assuming a character which called for serious attention. As the self-constituted mouthpiece of this party at every opportunity, he was plainly aspiring to become one of its leaders. His intimacy with *Monsieur* gave cause for fear that he would be far more prone to wield his influence according to the views and inclinations of his early protector, than to follow sincerely in the paths trodden by the king's government. I gave repeated warnings of this to M. de Talleyrand. I even went so far as to speak seriously to him regarding the excessive confidence reposed by the king in M. de Vitrolles. After perusal of them, he was in the habit of handing over to him all documents emanating from the secret closet of the post-office. I could entertain no doubts as to this, having repeatedly seen them in his possession. It had always been an accepted principle that these documents, which it is so easy to misuse, should not be communicated to any one, except in a case of absolute necessity. All the ministers did not see them, their secret being generally confined to the king, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Police. M. de Talleyrand seemed

struck by my remarks, but he did nothing to put a stop to so dangerous an abuse, which endured to the end of his ministry.

M. de Vitrolles had assuredly more daily intercourse with the foreigners than any of us. He told us how urgently they insisted on the disbandment of the army. It daily became more and more evident that there was no longer any means of putting off this terrible measure. It had, since the first days of the constitution of the ministry, been the almost exclusive subject of the thoughts and labors of Marshal de Gouvion Saint-Cyr. It could not enter his mind to separate the dissolution from the immediate and complete reorganization of a new army strong enough to ensure the independence and security of the country. Desirous, at all events, of avoiding the semblance of an act of trickery in remaking with one hand what was undone with the other, it was, above all, necessary to pursue a system differing somewhat from the one about to be done away with. An ordinance inserted on the 11th of August in the *Bulletin des lois*, as well as the ordinance enacting disbandment rendered at Lille on the 23d of March, had laid down the bases of the new organization.

Marshal Macdonald was charged with its execution; he relieved Marshal Davout of his command, and fulfilled the distressing mission of discharging his former comrades in arms, those old bands of veterans who had reaped such glory on the battle-fields of Europe. He acquitted himself of this painful task in such a manner as to win the good opinion of all. I am not aware that a single complaint was uttered against him, but it must be confessed that he was seconded by an admirable sentiment of resignation. From his headquarters at Clermont, he dispatched in all directions his orders, which nowhere encountered even a semblance of resistance. To the very last day of its existence, the army

covered itself with honor by its magnificent display of patriotism, and by its complete self-denial.

This admirable discipline and abnegation of its rights and interests did not produce on the allied sovereigns the effect that one was justified in expecting. They continually interfered in our home affairs, and unceasingly formulated fresh demands. Their ministers, in the daily conferences which they held together, were forever discovering new pretexts to prolong the negotiations. When they were requested to make known the bases of the fresh conventions which they considered as necessary, they would reply that they could not submit any propositions until such time as the powers were fully satisfied of the firm establishment of the House of Bourbon. They added that so numerous were the mistakes it had committed at the time of the first Restoration, that it was quite permissible to entertain some anxiety as to its future line of action.

That for which it was at that time censured by the representatives of the four Courts, viz., Lord Castlereagh, Prince Metternich, Count Nesselrode, and Prince Hardenberg, was not to have adopted in a sufficiently sincere manner the governmental system instituted or promised by the Charter, and not to have given effect to it. This system, by conciliating all interests, was the only one likely to ensure the public peace of the kingdom. Such were the reasons assigned in, and the tenor of, a note which, in the last days of July, the ministers of the four Courts jointly dispatched to M. de Talleyrand. By way of conclusion, they asked for a detailed memorandum on the "political and constitutional institutions of France, such as the king proposed to establish definitely."

M. de Talleyrand commissioned me to draw up this memorandum, but, owing to the multiplicity of my occupations, I was compelled to place the matter in the hands of M. de

Barante. In order to give still further weight to what was practically a defence, M. de Talleyrand saw fit to annex to it a diplomatic note, which was delivered to the allies on the 31st of July.

On the 3d of August, we learned of a convention just signed by the ministers of the allied powers, pursuant to which Napoleon was to be conveyed to St. Helena, and committed to the custody of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, who answered for his person to the allies. Austria, Russia, and Prussia were to appoint commissioners, who should dwell in St. Helena and exercise supervision over the carrying out of the convention. The King of France was to be invited to send thither a commissioner for the same purpose. We had no objection to make, as the odium of this decision, which embodied a breach of faith, could not be laid to our door. For all that, little or no progress was made in the negotiations, and the time when a solution would be reached was as far off as ever.

And yet the foreign ministers met daily for purposes of deliberation. They deliberated about us, but without us, although in our own country. During this time the difficulties in the interior continually increased. The exigencies of enthusiastic Royalists multiplied, and became more imperious in all directions. It was necessary to deal with them cautiously, for the reason that the elections were close at hand, and that it was important not to lose one's grasp of anything that might at that time have sown division in the ranks of the party. Hence was I compelled to yield to the Royalist clamor of the Royalist party of the towns of Rouen and Metz against the prefects recently given to them.

At Rouen, charges had continued to be brought in against M. de Girardin. An article extremely insulting to the House of Bourbon had been unearthed, which had been printed during the Hundred Days, by order of the prefect, in the

Journal de Rouen; it was forwarded to M. de Talleyrand. How comes it, it was asked of him, that one should once more have imposed on a department a prefect who not only authorized, but even went so far as to order, the insertion of so infamous an article in his newspaper? M. de Jaucourt himself, in spite of his friendship for M. de Girardin, could not help seeing that it was impossible to retain him, so his place was given to M. de Kergariou. This done, it was discovered that M. de Girardin had fallen a victim to an altogether unfounded accusation; for he proved that the article had been sent from Paris by the Minister of the Interior, with orders that it should be inserted in the journal of the town. A similar order sent to several departments had in every case been obeyed. As to M. de Bondy, whom I had sent to Metz, his dismissal was still more unjust. It had been insisted on by the most zealous Royalists of the town, who had come to Paris as a delegation to declare that it was impossible for them to answer for the result of the elections if a prefect whose manœuvres evidently tended to secure the triumph of the Bonapartist and Revolutionary cause was not removed.

Three weeks later, Marshal Beurnonville was sent to preside over the electoral college of the department, when he found it incumbent upon him to declare that M. de Bondy had most honestly taken every step likely to ensure the triumph of the Royalists. As a point in case, the injunctions he had given to the electoral colleges had all been conceived in such a way as to be favorable to it. No more deplorable state of affairs can be imagined than that in which it becomes a necessity to yield to partisan pressure. We may be open to a charge of weakness in both the cases I have just recorded; yet I think even now that it would have been impossible for us to have acted differently.

Added to all these mortifications, were the unforeseen

troubles which constantly arose in the very bosom of the council. M. Fouché, desirous doubtless of rousing himself from the inertness for which his friends blamed him, and yielding to the pressing arguments of M. Manuel, his trusted agent in the Chamber of Representatives, and of M. Huet, a somewhat zealous patriot during the Revolution, and who had been dismissed from his post as Secretary of the Prefecture of Nantes under Napoleon, wished to perform some act of a nature to reassure those who held the same political tenets as himself. They did not tire of repeating to him that France had reposed her faith in him at the time of Napoleon's final abdication; that, trusting in his word, she had consented to the Second Restoration; and that to-day she looked to him alone for the support she stood in need of in the midst of the troubles and disappointments with which she was harassed. It was for him to compel the king to place himself resolutely between the foreigners and his people, and to see to it that the former should no longer be allowed to trample with impunity on a powerful nation, whose indignation was aroused, and which was soon to be driven to the utmost limits of desperation. The king should not suffer a handful of Royalists to dictate to the country, taking, in so doing, advantage of its misfortunes. In case no heed were paid to the truths he laid before the king, if the step taken by him did not bring forth any result, it would then become necessary for all France to learn from his lips how useless his warnings had been.

M. Fouché showed no hesitation in following this course; in the first place, he sent a circular to the prefects. This document, it must be admitted, was most cleverly indited. "Your relations with me," he wrote to the prefects, "have a twofold and important object, viz., the preservation of public order, and the pacification of the kingdom." Then followed, in the king's name, promises of forgiveness and

forgetfulness, and, as a natural consequence, the most formal condemnation of any reaction whatsoever. "At a time when we are bowed down," he went on to say, "under the weight of all Europe leagued against an ambition of which we were the first victims, let us at least enjoy the consolation of knowing that not a drop of blood, not a tear, is shed which can be laid at our doors. The public interest must be paramount to all others. Who is there who would give a thought to personal revenge in the midst of public misfortune?"

There was nothing in these words which was not perfectly appropriate to the circumstances. The following well-expressed sentence is likewise worthy of notice: "The advantages which France may hope for depend especially on our being in close communion with the king. Should the nation not be united to the king, we should receive no guarantee of our independence from the sovereigns; for we should ourselves be giving none of our union." He concluded in these terms: "Our real duty and true patriotism consist to-day in gathering round a monarch whose enlightened mind and virtues of a high order have long since been demonstrated. Our country, when resuming its rank among the states of Europe, will find in its loyalty an enduring prosperity." Such language coming from M. Fouché could but have good results. It appeared to be conceived in such a manner as to act most efficaciously on the minds of those whom it was most necessary for him to persuade; but his efforts did not stop at this.

On the 5th of July, the council having assembled at the king's, M. Fouché, in violation of the custom of not submitting anything to His Majesty without — if it had ever so little importance — previously communicating it to his colleagues, took out of his portfolio a report of which none of us had any knowledge, and begged the king's permission

to read it aloud. This report, which was most ably indited (it was since learned that M. Huet was its author), dwelt wholly on the deplorable condition of the kingdom, mercilessly trampled under foot, and pillaged and harassed by the foreign troops. The outrageous conduct of the foreign sovereigns, the state of desperation likely to seize upon the country consequent upon the prolongation of the misery which bore down upon it, and the consequences of this desperation, were therein depicted most forcibly. The report concluded as follows: "It may happen that a nation of thirty millions shall vanish from view, but in this war of man against man, more than one grave will close over the oppressed and the conqueror laid side by side."

This pompous utterance was plainly the work of a rhetorician rather than that of a statesman; the intention to exaggerate was clear amidst a mass of truths. What was M. Fouché's object? What did he mean by it? He had daily occupied his seat at the council, where his silence alone had caused him to be noticed. He could not be in ignorance that the ills which he deplored had all the time been uppermost in the thoughts of his colleagues, and that all their efforts had been devoted to putting an end to them. And besides, it was impossible for him to be ignorant of the convention concluded a week previous with the foreigners, by which the administration of the provinces occupied by them was to be delivered over to the representatives of the royal power. This measure had hardly had the time to be carried into execution; it was therefore proper to await its results; and, previous to their being known, nothing justified the sounding of such a note of alarm.

When he had concluded, M. Fouché announced that what he had just read was merely the first part of a work, the continuation of which he begged the king's permission

to bring before the council as soon as it was completed. During the whole of the time the reading of this document had lasted, we had all looked in others' faces in profound astonishment, which the king had not failed to perceive. Desirous of avoiding the discussion which to all appearances was about to be opened in his presence, he uttered with much dignity the following words, which I am certain I am here reproducing faithfully: "The picture just painted by the Duc d'Otrante is certainly a sombre one; but since things have appeared to him in such a light, he has but done his duty in laying them before me such as he sees them. This frankness can, moreover, not be attended with any inconvenience, for the walls of this closet have no ears. All of us firmly believe that everything said in it under the seal of secrecy can never transpire to the outer world." His words cut short all discussion, and the council adjourned shortly afterwards.

The same evening, I had occasion to work with the king, who spoke to me of the morning's incident, doing so with a repressed but none the less poignant tone of displeasure. I could not help remarking to him that the incident was unfortunately not yet a thing of the past; that the document which M. Fouché had read had been indited neither for the king nor for the council; that it was destined to the public, and that I was greatly mistaken if its author did not, within the next few days, bring it to its knowledge. "What! After the words I gave utterance to? It cannot be; it would be unpardonable."—"I agree with you, Sire, concerning this latter point, and I greatly dread that Your Majesty will ere long be compelled to show just severity."—"Impossible, impossible," rejoined the king. Our conversation ended there for the present. It will soon be seen on what good grounds my conjectures rested.

Two items of most serious import reached us on the 9th.

The first was that of the arrest of Marshal Ney. It took place in the mountains of Auvergne, near Figeac. No man was more profoundly compromised, and his position was fraught with peril. It was indeed an extraordinary happening, that of the appearance before a court-martial, to be followed perhaps by the sentencing, of a marshal of such high renown. When finally drawing up the lists, we had not supposed that, with the exception of M. de La Valette, who had surrendered himself a prisoner, any of those whose names were on it would, when it could so easily be accomplished, hesitate leaving the kingdom; I am very certain that no special order had issued in regard to Marshal Ney.

M. Decazes has, in my opinion, been most unjustly accused of having dispatched such an order. The growing favor of the Prefect of Police was giving umbrage. The distrust with which M. Fouché inspired the king augmented daily. The latter never saw him come into his presence but with disgust; however much he might seek to repress his sentiments, it was difficult for M. Fouché not to become aware of them. He therefore seldom availed himself of his right of working in private with His Majesty. Now M. Decazes, in his capacity of Prefect of Police, was plainly designated as his successor, and he was not the man to allow the opportunity to slip by him. I can recall that one day — it was in the second or third week of his incumbency — he consulted me at M. de Talleyrand's on the latitude it was allowable for the Prefect of Police to enjoy in his relations with the king. I told him, without attaching any importance thereto, what had been mine in the beginnings of the First Restoration; that in those days I enjoyed the privilege, every time that I saw fit to avail myself of it, of presenting myself at the door of the king's closet at eight o'clock in the morning, and that it had never been closed

to me. I all the more willingly advised him to attempt to place himself on the same footing, in that I felt the necessity of giving the king, in regard to police matters, in which I knew he was always greatly interested, a sense of security, which he could not feel from his intercourse with M. Fouché. Such was the beginning of the fortunes of M. Decazes. He soon succeeded in ingratiating himself with the king, and it was not long ere he enjoyed his fullest confidence.

Simultaneously with the arrest of Marshal Ney, came the news of the assassination of Marshal Brune at Avignon. The particulars of the popular demonstration which had resulted in this catastrophe were horror-inspiring. I do not record them here, as they are to be found everywhere. The new prefect whom I had just dispatched to that department, M. de Saint-Chamans, arrived just at the outbreak of the demonstration. He displayed the greatest courage, and for a long time defended, at his personal risk, the door of the house wherein the Marshal had sought safety. Unfortunately, he was yet unknown to the people, and his fine bearing did not have all the effect it ought to have produced. The first account related that the Marshal, in order not to fall into the hands of the rabble, had killed himself with his pistol; but it was soon clearly proven that his assassins had reached the roof, and had from there approached him. This atrocious deed coincided with the disturbances in the department of the Gard, more especially those in the town of Nîmes, where deeds of violence daily increased in virulence; for in that locality religious animosity joined hands with political dissent. The old hatred between Catholics and Protestants had revived in all its intensity. The former, more generally reputed Royalists, took advantage of the triumph of their cause to crush the others, who, during the Hundred Days, had displayed much

zeal on behalf of Napoleon. Following upon the reverse met with by the Duc d'Angoulême, their treatment of the Royalist volunteers returning to their homes had been outrageous. Among others, two had been murdered, when passing through the market town of Arpaillargues. Even admitting these happenings, it is impossible not to recognize that the reprisals were immeasurably in excess of the original aggression, and for that over two months Protestant blood was shed in the streets of Nîmes and throughout the whole department of the Gard with awful unmercifulness.

This politico-religious civil war was all the more a serious matter and a subject of alarm for the royal government, in that the foreigners themselves were deeply affected by it. The English especially complained bitterly and repeatedly of such doings. They made it a point of honor that there should be no grounds of accusing them, when exercising so great an influence over France's affairs, of having remained indifferent to religious persecution. Eloquent and indignant protests soon made themselves heard in the British Parliament. Our zealous endeavors to repress such excesses did not need stimulating. Our colleague, M. de Jaucourt, a Protestant, was an impassioned defender of those professing the same faith as himself. But what could we do? What means, what public forces, could we dispose of? These foreigners, who so loudly complained of our inactivity, were clamoring for the disbandment of the army; we could not, without incurring the greatest dangers, appeal to a divided and over-excited population. It was the Royalist party which, by its violence, jeopardized public peace and order. I believe that it has rarely happened that a government has been placed in so critical a position.

It was at this juncture that the prediction I had made to the king in regard to M. Fouché's report became realized,

It was, just as I had foreseen, widely disseminated throughout France. It was, in the first place, distributed in the departments. The first news of this came to us from the *Procureur du Roi* at Moulins. He had learnt that the document was being circulated within his jurisdiction, and, considering it to be apocryphal, procured a copy of it, which he hastened to forward to me, at the same time enquiring of me whether he should not prosecute those distributing it. After having laid the copy before the council, I carried it to the king, who was greatly indignant over the matter. It constituted a manifest breach of faith on the part of M. Fouché; it was a violence of the secrecy which should be preserved regarding all subjects discussed at the council, and which the king had especially urged on the present occasion. He was evidently seeking to obtain credit for his personal endeavors, at the expense of the remainder of the ministry and even of the king, and was desirous of appearing to the people at large as the only one actively engaged in defending its interests. He reckoned upon thus creating for himself a party, and thus placed himself in a position to alone direct affairs in whatever channel he saw fit. As for myself, I am especially inclined to believe, together with all those who well knew M. Fouché, that in his incredible thoughtlessness is to be found the most plausible explanation of his conduct on this occasion.

I must not omit saying that seven or eight days after the reading of the first part of his report, he had not failed in bringing the second, which the king and his council had likewise been obliged to hear read. If, as he stated in the second portion of his report, the Royalist reaction was such that it would kindle a civil war ere long, he might have reflected upon the fact that when a government has cause to fear a similar danger, that which it must most sedulously provide against is the proclamation of its existence, as

there is no surer means of precipitating its outbreak, or even of giving birth to the thought of it, in the case of its having no existence.

Granting that he had certain more delicate and more important truths than others which he wished to bring to the king's notice, the solemn formality of a report was by far the less favorable way of attaining this object than a confidential and private conversation with His Majesty. But he had certainly other views, which so simple a course would not have helped on. Moreover, it would not be to the liking of those whose advice he had sought, and in particular, to M. Huet. Could such an excess of treachery in any possible way be condoned? Could the king retain any longer in his council the man guilty of it? It became incumbent upon His Majesty to make up his mind to part with him, ere he had time to crown his treachery. I had a very decided opinion in this respect, and I submitted it to the king, who entirely agreed with me. M. de Talleyrand made no difficulty in following suit, nor did the rest of the members of the council. All considered M. Fouché's conduct without excuse, and that this opportunity should be seized upon to break with him, and to rid the ministry of a member who had already inflicted so much harm on it in the eyes of public opinion.

The principal difficulty apparently lay in the selection of a new Minister of Police. There was no one who seemed to be the man for the place. After a day's deliberation, the choice fell upon M. Anglès, who had already filled the position, and whose honest and reliable character deserved every confidence. The king having given his assent to this choice, it was settled that I should take him the ordinance for signature next morning. I can never forget the words uttered by His Majesty under the influence of a feeling of relief, and when giving me his final orders. The Duchesse

d'Angoulême chanced to be absent. "God be praised, the poor Duchesse will no longer be exposed to see that odious face."

The resolution come to by the council had not been kept secret. Something of it had transpired, and M. Fouché had been warned. This is what he imagined to save his position. The Duke of Wellington was, more than any one else, responsible for his appointment, so nothing was simpler than to claim his support, and to persuade him to take up the defence of his work. Mme. de Vaudémont, who was in constant communication with both of them, was entrusted with the negotiation, in which she displayed so much diligence and ability that, as early as eight o'clock in the morning of the very day on which I was to present the ordinance to the king for his signature, the Duke of Wellington was at His Majesty's side, entreating him to retain M. Fouché in his council, and even going so far as to assert that his dismissal would be a great blunder. "He constitutes the only link," he said to Louis XVIII., "between yourself and a great portion of your subjects. There are many who see in him the only guarantee of their personal safety, and, should Your Majesty determine upon dismissing him, they would fall into a state of alarm bordering on despair. On the other hand, the Royalist party, which already displays so much unreasonableness, will break all bounds." Louis XVIII., according to what he did me the honor of telling me on the same day, was very little impressed by this specious reasoning, but he could not resist the entreaties of a personage who played so important a part in the coalition, and to whom he believed he was under special obligations. Moreover, it might still happen that he would stand in need of his good services. So he yielded, and sent for M. de Talleyrand, who informed us of our discomfiture.

Henceforth our situation was as painful as possible; we were now compelled to sit at the council face to face with a man who could not be ignorant of the fact that we had done all that lay in our power to expel him from it, and in the presence of whom we could no longer speak in all confidence. This position was so false that it could not last for any length of time, but as it could not remain entirely unknown, it cast the greatest discredit on the council. M. Fouché, retained almost by force in the council, also assumed an importance which was not calculated to secure to him the good-will of the Royalist party. The motive he perpetually alleged to justify his opposition, was the little confidence with which the ministry inspired the party. It was plain that the publication of the reports of M. Fouché, and his retention after this act of indelicacy, were not calculated to modify his sentiments.

I therefore have no hesitation in saying that the act of condescension extorted from the king by the Duke of Wellington was one of the most fatal of the period, and that its consequences were in every respect most disastrous. It brought about the dissolution of the ministry. M. de Talleyrand, as well as his colleagues, could not help suspecting M. de Vitrolles's discretion. He repeatedly told me that he had no doubt that it was he who had warned M. Fouché. I never had any positive proof to that effect, yet I am inclined to believe it. M. de Vitrolles was probably led away by the gratitude he believed he owed M. Fouché, for the great services he had received at his hands during the Hundred Days, and which had perhaps saved his life. Blinded by this sentiment, he probably persuaded himself that M. Fouché was even more useful than was generally believed; but this mistake of his heart cannot excuse his forgetfulness of a duty as sacred as the one in which he failed, if the accusation brought against him rests on any foundation.

CHAPTER XVIII

Reorganization of the University — The Commission on Public Instruction — Extraordinary taxation amounting to over one hundred millions — M. de Talleyrand strenuously opposes the measure — Violent scene between him and M. Louis — Creations in the Chamber of Peers — The king shows himself little inclined to admit the principle of heredity — M. Pasquier's report on the question decides him in its favor — Arrest of General La Bédoyère, who is sentenced to death — It falls to the lot of M. Pasquier to draw up the report on his petition for mercy — The petition is rejected, and La Bédoyère is executed — Marshal Moncey refuses to sit on the court-martial which is to try Marshal Ney — Measures of severity taken against him — Composition of the court-martial — Disorders at Nîmes — Assassination of General Ramel at Toulouse — A proclamation of the king stigmatizes these outrages — The Spanish troops of Castaños threaten to invade our Southern provinces — The Duc d'Angoulême succeeds in surprising this movement — New organization given to the king's military household — Marshal de Gouvion Saint-Cyr seeks to reduce its effective force to the lowest possible limits — Louis XVIII. submits to the council a counter-project elaborated in the closet of the Emperor Alexander; convinced that this change in the king's opinion is due to the Marquis de Vitrolles, the Marshal excites M. de Talleyrand against the latter; both of them harangue him in the harshest terms as he enters the council — The king's project is none the less adopted — In the course of a conversation with M. de Nesselrode, M. Pasquier acquires a suspicion that M. de Talleyrand's presence in the ministry weakens rather than gives prestige to it.

DURING the time intervening between the elections of *arrondissement* and the end of the departmental elections, the government performed several deeds of importance, of which I must all the more render an account as I took a prominent part in almost all of them.

On the 15th of August the king, following upon a report

made by me, rendered an ordinance concerning the University. The Abbé de Montesquiou, previous to the Hundred Days, had, to a great extent, undone the system governing the imperial University; but time had failed him to again give execution to his plan, and with the exception of the appointment of the Bishop of Alais as Grand Master, together with a few others, everything still remained to be done, when, as Minister of the Interior, it fell to my lot to provide for the needs of public instruction. What course was I to pursue? Should I attempt to give effect to the ordinance of the Abbé de Montesquiou, or was it preferable to suffer the University to fulfil its mission on old lines? We were not in a position to face the difficulties attendant upon a new organization which would have carried with it a considerable increase of expenditure. The Abbé de Montesquiou had found means of providing for it out of the funds of the Civil List; but the Civil List was probably to have fresh demands made on it, and to suffer a considerable reduction of income; it was therefore out of the question to think of aid coming from that quarter, although it might have been taken into account six months earlier.

All these considerations determined me to propose to the king and council to preserve temporarily that which existed, merely substituting, in order to better characterize this state of affairs as provisional, the former Grand Master, the council, the Chancellor, and the Treasurer, by a commission on public instruction, which would perform in a most economical fashion the duties of these respective powers. The members of the commission were M. Royer-Collard and M. Cuvier, both Councillors of State, and already members of the Royal Council of Public Instruction; M. Silvestre de Sacy, member of the *Institut*, professor at the *College royal*, and rector of the University of Paris (there were few names better known among scientists through-

out Europe than his and that of M. Cuvier); then the Abbé Frayssinous, M. Guéneau de Mussy, and M. Petitot, who was appointed secretary-general. The three last named had already filled with much distinction the functions of inspectors-general of studies, while M. Frayssinous had acquired great celebrity by his religious discourses at the Church of Saint-Sulpice.

As M. Royer-Collard had assisted me in my work, I caused him to be appointed president of the commission. This was compensating him deservedly for the abolition of the *Librairie*, whereby he lost the general directorship.

M. Louis finally succeeded in securing the adoption of a resolution which for some days past had furnished the subject of a most animated discussion between M. de Talleyrand and himself. The point at issue was an extraordinary imposition of taxes of one hundred millions, which sum was indispensable to meet the expenditure occasioned by the military occupation of a portion of France, and all the other difficulties of the situation. In order to understand the disagreement which arose in this connection between M. de Talleyrand and M. Louis, it should be borne in mind that the Minister of Finance, in spite of his close connection with the President of the council, and the high esteem in which he held his political talents, entertained the worst possible opinion touching his delicacy in money matters. In the early days of our organization, he had said to me: "It is, above all things, necessary, in order to enjoy the confidence of the nation, and even to shield our responsibility, that we should devise means of preventing Talleyrand from taking a part in any financial transactions. Let his emoluments as President of the council be placed at a very high figure, 500,000 francs, if you will — it matters little to me, provided one be not at the mercy of the crowd of intriguers surrounding him."

This was easier to say than to accomplish. In proportion as the demands on the treasury increased, the necessity of meeting them by some extraordinary means became more pressing, and financial schemers accustomed to risky enterprises, flocked round the President of the council. At their head was M. Ouvrard, a particular friend of M. de Montrond, one of M. de Talleyrand's most intimate confidants. M. Ouvrard, who, during the Hundred Days, had concluded a bargain with Napoleon, the result of which had been the furnishing of some fifty millions against five millions of *rentes* entered on the public ledger, asked for nothing better than to engage in a similar transaction with the government; nay, according to him, it was still the best and most economical means of procuring the money which was absolutely needed. The only point at issue was to determine the rate at which he was to take the *rentes*, and to derive the utmost possible profit from them. M. de Talleyrand became the mouthpiece of the proposed transaction in the council, while M. Louis opposed it with all his might. He maintained that the right did not exist of creating and selling *rentes* without special legislation, and, moreover, that no worse moment could be chosen to attempt such an operation, as it would be jeopardizing in the highest degree the credit of the state.

A few days later he presented his project of extraordinary taxation, which M. de Talleyrand opposed in his turn, — in many respects an easy task. He declared it to be entirely impracticable. Subsequent events have demonstrated that he was entirely mistaken. The discussion of the matter was adjourned to the following day. I reached the council chamber early, only to find the two antagonists already embroiled in a quarrel. The scene had already reached a stage of the utmost animosity. M. de Talleyrand once more made reference to the offers of M.

Ouvrard, when M. Louis went so far as to tell him that if the propositions of such a man were once entertained, it would be difficult to say whither they would lead, or be answerable for one's own judgment. As for himself, were the door of his closet to be opened for a half-hour only to M. Ouvrard, he would not swear that the adroitness and ability which he well knew the latter to possess, would not suffice to lead him into some trap, and to make him take a resolution which he would have cause to repent.

M. de Talleyrand was too sharp-witted not to perceive that he was being censured indirectly; his vexation thereupon changed to fury. He apostrophized M. Louis as the most boorish and insolent of men, who was not fit to be received in good society, much less admitted to the council of a king of France. It would be impossible for me to recall and repeat the insulting words that passed between them. I entreated them to compose themselves, and not to give our colleagues, who were about to arrive, the spectacle of such a scene. It was with the greatest trouble that I succeeded in making them feel the necessity of this. When the council met, it was easy to perceive that they were both in an extreme state of excitement. M. Louis, once more gave a reading to his project, regarding which M. de Talleyrand did not speak a single word. It was therefore adopted, and submitted to the king for his signature. From that day, the relations of these two men were irrevocably embroiled. Such is the cause of the estrangement which they both displayed on every occasion, and the reason for which the public could not conceive.

As to the extraordinary taxation of one hundred millions, of which M. Louis secured the adoption, it might more properly be denominated a forced loan, since the principal capitalists and owners of real estate in each department were compelled to advance the money in the first place,

subject to being reimbursed with the proceeds of the final assessment to be made later according to a special law. The principal objection to such a method of collecting taxes lay in the unavoidable arbitrariness of a first appointment among the departments, to be followed by another among the capitalists. As regards the latter, it is true that the prefects, who were entrusted with it, could proceed in the matter only with the assistance of a committee of seven persons all selected from among those whom their social position designated as best qualified. In spite of this precaution, the use of so exorbitant a power was none the less most dangerous, and was open to the most crying abuses.

Fortunately, however, things passed off infinitely better than had been anticipated. In many of the departments, the prefects made the appointments by means of addition *pro rata* to the quota of taxes already in force, and this was, generally speaking, accomplished without encountering too many difficulties. As a final result, the hundred millions required soon found their way into the coffers of the treasury, and saved it at a fearfully critical juncture. M. Louis had therefore good cause to be proud of his success. It cannot be denied that any other method of procuring money would have been far more onerous. The taxpayers showed an excellent spirit on this occasion; their ready response to the government's and consequently to the country's appeal for assistance showed in a fashion most worthy of honor the excellent sentiments animating them. If to this example be added the one given by the army, it must fain be admitted that France honored herself no less in the hour of her misfortune than she had in that of her prosperity.

M. Louis, it will be seen, possessed the necessary qualifications for the situation in which he was placed. I think it would have been difficult to have found a man with more

activity and firmness of purpose, or one who could more bravely face obstacles, and defy all opposition. When the work he performed during his brief tenure of office is examined, when it is seen how much he had to do to again place in proper working order the collection of various revenues, to bring back into the coffers of the treasury the funds diverted from them, in order to meet so many imperative demands, it must be admitted that he rendered to his country the greatest and most valuable services, and that he gave it powerful aid at a most critical moment.

The elections were shortly to give us a Chamber of Deputies, so it became urgent to proceed with the reorganization of the Chamber of Peers. The king was to use his prerogative to fill the places of the eliminated members. The number of newly appointed peers was ninety-four; the names of twenty-nine only had been expunged from the roll.

The ordinance touching upon heredity was of necessity to follow that on the creations, and it was indeed rendered two days later, but not without encountering many difficulties which we had not anticipated, as we had not feared, when replying to the note of the foreigners, to place this heredity among the guarantees which it was the king's intention to grant for the greater stability of the new institutions. At the last moment His Majesty, influenced doubtless by counsels the source of which was unknown to us, raised many objections against a resolution which he had at first seemed prepared to adopt without hesitation. I was commissioned by M. de Talleyrand to draw up a report which might induce him to accede, by dispelling his doubts. This report, which I indited most hurriedly — for I read it next day — met with far more success than I had hoped for. The king, after having heard it read, was gracious enough to say that its arguments had convinced him,

and the ordinance which I had framed was signed by him then and there. Thus, although this document was countersigned by M. de Talleyrand, and his name remains bound up with it, I can in all truth say that it is my work. I therefore claim the credit of it, and I do so all the more on account of the importance of the service I believe I rendered to the monarchy on this occasion, not to say to the peerage.

The reorganization of the great bodies of the state was completed by the ordinance of the 23d of August as to the *personnel* and attributes of the Council of State.

Over and above the crushing amount of labor involved in the preparation and discussion of all these reforms, and the numerous cares of the routine work of the two ministerial departments in my charge, most painful emotions fell to my lot. General de La Bédoyère could consider himself one of the most compromised among those whose names appeared on the list of officers to be tried by court-martial, so he had resolved upon leaving France, — every preparation had been made for a journey to America. He thought it would, without too great a risk of danger, be possible for him to spend a few days in Paris previous to his departure. The desire of seeing his wife once more, and to put certain matters in order, seem to have been the origin of this determination. The public conveyance in which he took a seat contained two or three persons who recognized him, and who, on reaching Paris, hastened to notify the police of his presence. He was arrested the same night, and almost immediately brought before a court-martial. The result of the trial and the sentence could not be doubtful. His defection had preceded that of all the other military men. He was condemned to suffer death, and the sentence of the court-martial was confirmed by the Court of Review. His last resource lay in a petition for mercy. Up to that time, the matter had appertained to the Minis-

try of War. The petition fell within my attributes, and it became my duty to report thereon to the king. Of all the functions of a Minister of Justice, there is none more distressing. During twenty-four hours I had to listen to the entreaties of his unhappy wife. Never have I heard any more touching. She went to plead with M. de Talleyrand, making every possible endeavor to obtain permission to throw herself at the king's feet. The most heartrending part of it was that she was persuaded that her supplications would succeed in moving him. Could she not invoke numerous proofs of the devotion of the family of de La Bédoyère, of her own family especially (she was Mlle. de Chastellux), whose zeal and loyalty had been admirable during the *émigration*? She asked for no other reward than to be permitted to go with her husband to some distant foreign land, never to return.

On the 20th, I presented the report at the king's council. The discussion was a short one; it had, as a matter of course, nothing to do with the charges. Were M. de La Bédoyère pardoned, none of the other accused could be sentenced. The only question at issue was if, in presence of the passions by which the government was surrounded, absolute impunity was permissible. The king alone could impose it. The petition was rejected. The Minister of War sent orders that the execution should be proceeded with. On returning to my residence, I found there Mme. de La Bédoyère, who had been received by Mme. Pasquier in my absence. She was waiting for me, to learn her fate. I lacked the courage to inform her of it, so I told her that no decision had so far been reached. I was so agitated that I did not know what to say to her. I have seldom experienced such heartrending sufferings.

Soon after reaching home, Mme. de La Bédoyère learnt of her misfortune. The news was borne to her by a priest

who had, I believe, presided over the education of the unhappy young man, and who was with him to the end. He had been charged by him to bring back to his wife a portrait of hers which he had always worn and was still on his bosom when he was shot unto death. When carrying out this request, the priest noticed that the portrait was blood-stained. Mme. Bédoyère bore herself with dignity, and increased the sympathy felt for her by nobly leading a life of retirement, devoting herself wholly to the education of her son.

Marshal Ney was also to appear before a court-martial, but its composition presented serious difficulties. It had to be constituted of four marshals of France, of whom one was to preside, and four lieutenants-general.

Marshal Moncey, who had been summoned as president, as being the *doyen* of the marshals, declined. His example was liable to be contagious. Marshal de Gouvion Saint-Cyr did not hesitate calling into requisition all the rigors of the military code. Taking the ground that the veteran marshal could not, in order to dispense himself from taking his seat at the Court, invoke the solitary excuse which, pursuant to the law of the 13th of Brumaire, Year V., could be considered valid, he passed an ordinance depriving him of his functions, and which condemned him, in accordance with the same law, to suffer a three months' imprisonment. If my memory serves me well,—although I am not sure of the fact,—this ordinance was simply comminatory, and was followed by a mere semblance of execution. It had, nevertheless, the desired effect, and the court-martial, composed of Marshals Masséna, Augereau, and Mortier, and of Lieutenant-Generals Gazan, Claparède, and Villatte, was presided over by Marshal Jourdan. This is not the place to speak of the issue of the trial, and how Marshal Ney committed the serious mistake of denying the juris-

diction of this tribunal, and in obtaining from it its own declaration of incompetence. This all took place under the ministry which succeeded the one whose history I am now writing.

The 1st of September was made memorable by a royal proclamation, which was countersigned by me, and which I had called forth in the hope that it would somewhat strengthen the hands of the authorities in arresting the course of the Royalist reaction which was daily signalizing itself in the South by fresh excesses. At Nîmes, and indeed throughout the whole of the department of the Gard, assassinations were following close upon one another in rapid succession, evidently deriving encouragement from a powerful source; they were committed by men almost all of whom belonged to the National Guard, and who were thus legally armed. They obeyed both their furious passions and the impulse given by leaders in whom were blended religious fanaticism and the most ardent political passions. The Protestant churches were closed at Nîmes, and it would have been worth a man's life to show himself at their doors.

Such a state of things could not be tolerated any longer. The evil kept growing apace and propagating itself. A proof of this was afforded by the abominable crime perpetrated at Toulouse on the 18th of August. Under pretext of laboring in a more special fashion in favor of the Royalist cause, there had been organized in the National Guard a company whose soldiers, owing to their green uniform, had assumed the name of *Verdelets*. Out of its ranks emerged the assassins of General Ramel, the king's commandant in that city. It would be a difficult thing to say what were the secret motives of this crime. General Ramel could lay claim to the confidence of the Royalists, for on the 18th Fructidor he had been among those transported to

Cayenne. No one had been more reputed to have been engaged in the Royalist plot which had served as a pretext for the Revolution accomplished on that day. I am not aware of his having compromised himself during the Hundred Days, but he sought to preserve order, and in this he was determined. He constituted an obstacle in the way of the omnipotence which the ultra-Royalist party sought to acquire, and which had vowed to have his life. It is not within my scope to relate the horrible scene which endured for twenty-four hours, and which culminated in the death of the General. Wounded in the first place in the street, he was dispatched as he lay abed, in the dead of the night, by assassins who succeeded in breaking into his house. M. de Rémusat was the prefect at the time, and M. de Villèle the mayor. The former has repeatedly made it understood that he had been only feebly seconded by the latter, while the uprising lasted. On the day following it, the mayor issued a proclamation displaying more energy on his part than could be anticipated from his behavior during the night. Sedition had done its work, and its object had been accomplished. It behoved the king to speak wise and moderate words. Too great care could not be bestowed in drawing up the proclamation about to be issued in his name.

“Great crimes and infamous deeds of treachery have been committed in the past few months; they have wrought fearful harm in France; a persecution which cannot be tolerated has been waged against those of our faithful subjects who, when following the banner of our well-beloved nephew, have with him bravely sought to save France.¹

¹ This had more special reference to the murder of two royal volunteers in the village of Arpaillargues; they had been murdered on their return from Pont-Saint-Esprit, at the time of the dispersion of the army of the Duc d'Angoulême, and the avenging of their death was one of the pretexts the Royalists most frequently invoked to justify their excesses.

The punishment of these crimes shall be solemn, national, and regular; those guilty shall be made to feel justice's sword, and not fall victims to the effects of private revenge. This would constitute an outrage upon justice, perpetuate discord, and open the door to numberless disturbances. It would amount to an upheaval of the social order, should each one be suffered to constitute himself judge and executor of his injuries, even in the case of outrages committed against our person. We hope that this guilty procedure of forestalling the action of the law and of our authority has already ceased; its continuation would constitute an outrage against ourselves and against France; however painful it might be to us, we should spare no efforts to mete out due punishment to such crimes. Our trusted nephew, whose name is henceforth linked with the sentiments of affection and devotion manifested by our provinces of the South, and who, by his display of obedience, conciliation, and firmness, has preserved and still preserves them from the horrors of an invasion, would in such a case be invested with full powers to save them from civil discord, and to repress and cause to be punished those venturing to make an undue use of our name as well as of his own."

It will be seen that the Duc d'Angoulême was the representative of ideas of moderation. An allusion is moreover made to an invasion which had threatened the provinces of the South. A few words of explanation become necessary.

At the time when Europe was setting itself in motion to advance against Napoleon, Spain should, less than any other power, have been the last to hesitate entering into a movement which was so likely to have a wide influence on her own destiny. She made her preparations with a dilatoriness characteristic of her habits of life, and which could also be explained by the low state of her finances. Her

troops were still at some distance from the French frontier, when the king reascended his throne. Still, they persevered in their onward march, and in the latter half of August it was learnt that the Spanish army, under General Castaños, was on the point of crossing the Pyrenees and of invading the bordering provinces. No news could be more alarming and more distressing. Were it to be realized, acts of devastation might be looked for with a certainty, all the greater that no discipline reigned in the ranks of that army, composed as it was of men accustomed to all the licentiousness and excesses which had, in the last few years, characterized the Peninsular War. It was also to be expected that the commanders of the Spanish forces and the hot-heads of the South would soon join hands; in a word, the worst evils were to be dreaded.

No time was to be lost in averting the peril. The Duc d'Angoulême was happily at Bordeaux. The king wrote to him to leave immediately for the frontier, and to do his utmost to prevent the Spaniards from crossing it. The prince carried out these orders with rare promptitude and success. He arrived just as General Castaños was making his final preparations, and obtained from him their suspension, thus securing time to communicate with the Madrid Cabinet, and obtaining from it the recalling of the orders it had given for an invasion. The important service thus rendered by the Duc d'Angoulême could not help being appreciated by all France, but especially in the provinces of the South, where the popularity he enjoyed already could but be greatly increased. It was therefore natural that the royal government should seek his support, in the interests of order and public peace. The course of events has shown that confidence could not have been more worthily bestowed. He returned to Paris on the 8th of September, and was followed by the Duchesse d'Angoulême on the 12th. She had

found, in the welcome she had met with in Bordeaux, one of the rare enjoyments which fell to her lot in her lifetime.

Serious difficulties arose when it came to determine the effective force and the pay of the king's military household. The reforms proposed by the Minister of War were distasteful to the princes and to those about them. Marshal de Gouvion Saint-Cyr was more of a soldier than a politician; he had firmly grounded ideas of his own regarding what constituted the proper organization of an army. He was, for instance, systematically hostile to privileged corps, arguing that to constitute them was enervating to the rest of the army, as the privilege granted to them discouraged all branches of the service. It was therefore his desire that such corps and their privileges should be circumscribed as much as possible. His work having been conceived in such a spirit, he had calculated that the French army, already so weak under its new organization, did not admit of a Royal Guard of over 6000 men. I am not sure that the cavalry was included in this estimate. I do not believe so. It was pointed out to him at the council that the above figure was a somewhat low one; that under existing circumstances the new army could only be formed slowly and with some difficulty; that it would therefore be an advantage to organize forthwith a picked corps of respectable magnitude, into which would be drafted men who could be depended upon, and who, gathered forthwith in the capital, would give the throne and the royal family, in addition to desirable guarantees for their safety, a certain lustre which would produce a favorable effect in the eyes of the foreigners. It was impossible to overcome his determination, in which he persisted all the more because M. de Talleyrand — I know not why — fell in with his views.

The ordinance was presented to the king for signature,

at a meeting of the council; but after the marshal had read it out, the king, to his great astonishment as well as to our own, told him, without opening the way to a discussion, that the matter seemed to him of great importance, and that he wished to think it over. A few days went by ere the matter was again referred to; at the end of that time we saw, at the opening of the council, the king make his appearance with a somewhat large bundle of papers, which comprised the file delivered over to him by the marshal, supplemented by a number of notes and a counterproject. The king told us that he had conversed about the creation of a Royal Guard with persons best in a position to form an opinion on such a matter; that all of them, while approving the primary idea, thought that the plan of the marshal should be so extended as to bring this Guard up to a strength of 25,000 men, including 6000 cavalry, and give it greater advantages in the matter of pay and promotion. The king developed briefly, but in a most positive fashion, the political and military advantages of such an institution; it was evident that the principal military arguments had been supplied to him.

The marshal begged, in his turn, that sufficient time be granted to him to examine and judge of a proposition so different from his own. This satisfaction could not be denied him. Nevertheless, he was far less interested in studying the new plan than in discovering how it had come into the king's hands. He soon discovered the names of the persons who had been consulted, among whom was Marshal Marmont. That which gave him the greatest offence was that he learnt, beyond any possible doubt, that this report as well as his project, had been conveyed from the king's closet to the Elysée-Bourbon, into the closet of the Emperor Alexander, and that thence had emanated the project endorsed by the king. He was at once convinced

that M. de Vitrolles had been the artisan of this intrigue; that it was he who had prevented the king from signing the ordinance in all trust, as His Majesty had done heretofore in regard to all matters connected with the army. Having acquired this certainty, he called one morning at M. de Talleyrand's shortly before the hour of the council's meeting, and complained justly and energetically of this indiscretion, which entailed the most serious consequences. M. de Talleyrand shared his sense of injury, and informed each one of us as we arrived of what had happened. M. de Vitrolles duly made his appearance, when the storm broke loose about his head. It is impossible for me to repeat all the harsh and humiliating invectives which M. de Talleyrand hurled at him. He could hardly stammer out a few meaningless words in his own defence. That which is most surprising is, that after having been thus treated, M. de Vitrolles was suffered to retain his seat at the council-table. I have never been able to understand how, after such wrongful conduct on his part, and after his having been treated so unmercifully, and in a manner ever to be remembered by him, certain persons could still consent to sit face to face with him. The imperturbable patience of M. de Vitrolles, under such circumstances, made me conceive a very poor opinion of him.

As to the ordinance concerning the military household, after having thought the matter well over, the marshal saw that he must fain yield, so with but a few slight alterations, he framed it according to the new project handed to him by the king. The influence of the Russian Cabinet was all the more remarkable in this case, in that it did not make itself felt through any of the customary direct channels. No communications passed between the Russian Ministers and the French Cabinet. M. de Talleyrand was in nowise let into the secret, at which he showed marked

displeasure. It proved, indeed, to what a degree his present position as regards the Emperor Alexander differed from the one he had enjoyed in 1814, when the most intimate confidence reigned between them, and when the Emperor did not take the slightest step in France's affairs without consulting him.

I was afforded, about this time, a special opportunity of judging what a point this change had reached. M. de Nesselrode, with whom I had remained on excellent terms, especially since our relations of the preceding year, invited me one evening at M. de Talleyrand's to go out riding with him next morning. He came to take me at six o'clock. It was a Sunday morning. We rode rather rapidly for four or five hours. I had no difficulty in discovering that the promenade had been a mere pretext. Hardly were we outside when the conversation turned on France's affairs and internal situation, more especially that of the ministry, and on the means at our disposal for effecting any good.

My interlocutor evidently felt little confidence. He dwelt at length on our unfortunate association with M. Fouché, and of the harm it did us in the eyes of all parties. He could see that the Royalist faction distrusted us. I reminded him of the fact that M. Fouché had been imposed on us, and how we had quite recently been prevented from getting rid of him. "The inconveniences of so unfortunate an association would have been," I said to him, "greatly counterbalanced by the entry of the Duc de Richelieu into the Cabinet, had the latter not declined." In this connection I allowed myself to complain that the Emperor Alexander had not made use of his influence to induce him to accept, as it had seemed to me that we were entitled to this much help, of the good-will of which he had given us so many proofs, and to which I could testify on so many occasions, hardly more than a year ago. Thereupon, M. de

Nesselrode remarked that circumstances had altogether changed. "In what respect then?" I rejoined. "Is it not still the same France? Is it not still the same House of Bourbon? A fearful storm has passed over both of them, but is it their fault? Why was Napoleon suffered to remain so near to them? Moreover, this danger is forever averted. Do you not find at the head of affairs the men with whom you were formerly in such good accord?" I named M. de Talleyrand. Absolute silence in response to the mention of this name. I spoke of the generosity of the Emperor, which it was impossible for us not to continue reckoning on. "Yes, this is doubtless so, but it is necessary that he should be inspired with confidence; he has learnt to be distrustful."

M. de Nesselrode evidently supposed that I was far better acquainted than was really the case with the doings of the Congress of Vienna. I read his thoughts, but without knowing precisely their extent, and I thought it prudent to reveal the state of uncertainty I was in. It was plain to me that M. de Nesselrode's intention had been to sound me as to the bonds which might attach me to M. de Talleyrand, and as to the possibility of constituting a ministry from which he would be omitted. As for myself, I returned from this ride fully convinced that there was at the bottom of our affairs some mystery, the solution of which I could not find. It was then that I suspected that M. de Talleyrand, far from being a source of strength and a prop, had become an obstacle, especially in the case of the Emperor Alexander.

CHAPTER XIX

Results of the elections—Consequences of the supplementary elections and of the suppression of the parliamentary indemnity—The majority of the new Chamber hostile to the ministry—In spite of the entreaties of M. Pasquier, M. de Talleyrand does not make up his mind to appoint a Minister of the Interior—Grand review of the allied troops in the Plaine des Vertus—Notwithstanding his dislike to the Bourbons, the Emperor Alexander boldly defends France against the exorbitant demands of Prussia and Austria—Unfortunately, M. de Talleyrand does not enjoy his confidence—M. de Talleyrand manœuvres to secure M. Fouché's elimination from the council—The ministers feel that the position is no longer tenable—They consult together at M. de Jaucourt's—M. de Talleyrand's singular optimism—All are agreed as to the necessity of dissolving the ministry—M. Pasquier is commissioned by his colleagues to inform the king of their decision; the king is most gracious to him, and expresses his intention of securing his services in the next Cabinet—The allies resolve on preferring their claims—They brutally remove from our museums the works of art brought by our soldiers from various parts of Europe—M. de Talleyrand's reply to their notes—The king calls upon the Duc de Richelieu to form a Cabinet—Difficulties with which the latter has to contend in the execution of his task.

THE elections were over. In nearly all the colleges, not only had the men of the Revolution and the Empire been cast aside, but, for the greater part, the selections had fallen on the most hot-headed Royalists. The course pursued in spite of my opinion of increasing the number of electors by giving them supplementary colleagues, had, generally speaking, borne evil fruits, from the fact that men of moderate views had been ignored. Another circumstance had been fatal to them. Up to that time the members of the *Corps législatif* had been in receipt of an indemnity

of 10,000 francs. It was thought in the council, that by suppressing it, deputies belonging to a class less likely to be swayed would be secured. It therefore fell to my lot to inform those who were eligible that the *Charte* had not provided for the payment of a salary or indemnity to deputies. A certain number of men in politics, who had formed part of the former Chamber, and who perhaps stood chances of being re-elected, were not in a financial position to meet the expenses of a lengthy sojourn in the capital, and withdrew their candidacy. Thus was the country deprived of the services of several men of worth who were animated with an excellent spirit.

The Chamber was convoked for the 25th of September. It was to be expected that difficulties all the more serious would arise from the fact that the pressure we should have to encounter would meet with strong approval at the Court and among the adherents of the princes. Were we in a position to face the struggle? After a sincere consideration of our position, could we place any confidence in the authority of the ministry? It was then that we were enabled to fully measure the extent of the mistake we had committed in not getting rid of M. Fouché.

There could be no doubt of the hostility of the newly elected deputies; it was certain to make itself felt during the very earliest sittings, in spite of the success achieved by M. Fouché, who had been returned by two departments.¹ This triumph did not deceive any one; for it was only too well understood that he had had recourse to his numerous agents to secure it. Moreover, he was not the only minister elected by two constituencies. M. Louis was elected both in the Meurthe and in the Seine. I was likewise elected both in the Seine and in the Sarthe. M. Decazes was elected the second on the list of the Seine.

¹The departments of Corrèze and Seine-et-Marne.

The reassembling of the Chambers made it impossible for me to still bear the crushing burden of two ministerial departments. It was in all sincerity that I renewed my entreaties of the king and M. de Talleyrand to be relieved of the portfolio of the Interior. From M. de Talleyrand's evasive reply, I feel certain that he saw the necessity of dissolving his ministry, and hence considered it altogether useless to give himself the trouble of going in quest of a colleague to fill that post. In order that I should have no cause to reproach myself, I even went so far as to submit to him a list of the persons from whom the king might make a selection.

First in order came the name of M. de Chateaubriand, in whose favor could be mentioned his stay at Ghent, during which he had held in the council the place I was desirous of restoring to him. I still believe to-day that it would have been good policy to have made this selection, but it seemed that it did not meet with the slightest favor in the eyes of M. de Talleyrand. And yet, the Duchesse de Duras spared no efforts to bring about a *rapprochement* between the two personages. I never knew why she did not succeed. She devoted to the undertaking all the warmth of a friendship of which she has since given so many proofs to M. de Chateaubriand. I was enabled to see for myself how active were her solicitations. She had undertaken to get admitted into the Council of State, as *maître des requêtes*, M. Laborie, a friend of M. de Chateaubriand's, and who had also been at Ghent. I was unfortunately compelled to refuse granting her her wish. This was the primary cause of the ill-will shown me for several years by the *Journal des Débats*, M. Laborie being one of its principal shareholders.

A great military ceremony took place on the 11th of September, in the Plaine des Vertus. We did not, in the

first instance, attach to it all the importance it really possessed. The Emperor Alexander saw fit to review nearly the whole of the troops he had in France, and which constituted an army of a hundred and eighty to two hundred thousand men. He invited to it the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, and the Duke of Wellington, together with all the most famed leaders of the armies of the coalition. If my memory serves me well, *Monsieur* and the Duc de Berry attended it. It has been said that it would have been hard to see anywhere as fine a military spectacle. It was believed at the time that it was a mere parade, a sop to *amour-propre*, but I have learnt beyond doubt that a political object was at the bottom of it.

While the French Ministry was almost altogether denied the discussion of matters of policy and of foreign affairs, such argument was none the less animated between the Cabinets of the sovereigns, and although the dispositions of the Emperor Alexander were far less favorable towards France than in the foregoing year, his natural generosity, to which Louis XVIII. had, I believe, secretly appealed, finally rebelled against the pretensions of Austria, Prussia, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Secretly encouraged by England, in spite of the hope which M. de Talleyrand urged us to repose in the friendly inclinations of the Duke of Wellington, these three powers had no other object in view than to deprive France of a notable portion of her frontier provinces. Thus, the newly created Kingdom of the Netherlands laid down the principle that France should surrender her ancient possessions, Alsace, Lorraine, Flanders, and Artois. Prussia claimed the cession unto herself of Montmédy, Longwy, Metz, Thionville, and Sarrelouis. M. de Metternich was prepared to demonstrate, on behalf of Austria, that even after all these cessions and restitutions, to which was to be added that of

Savoy, she would still retain quite sufficient strength and power.

Fully determined upon not countenancing so flagrant an abuse of might, a dismemberment of France so contrary to the intentions expressed at the time of the formation of the new coalition, and noways inclined to co-operate in any fashion to the spoliation of a monarch whom the coalesced sovereigns styled their ally, the Emperor Alexander had already made it most clearly understood that were such outrageous views to be persisted in, the least he could do would be to take himself and his troops off, as he no longer intended to give the countenance of his strength and power to combinations he did not approve of. Under the circumstances, he considered it appropriate to have his army file past the eyes of his allies, in order that they might witness the strength and power which were to be denied them.

When such threats are had recourse to, wise politicians do not take long to understand that a sovereign who, at such a juncture, separates his cause from that of his allies, may not stop at that, and is likely to become very shortly an avowed enemy. The great review in the *Plaine des Vertus* was therefore of a nature to instil salutary reflections in the minds of the sovereigns present, and such was indeed its result.

What was then necessary in order that the French Cabinet should benefit by so favorable a disposition? In the first place, that it should be cognizant of it: M. de Talleyrand was only partly informed of the circumstance; and secondly, that the Emperor Alexander should find in the leader of that Cabinet a man inspiring him with confidence, one with whom he would feel disposed to act in concert, and M. de Talleyrand was no longer the man. Regarding this latter truth, how could he be otherwise than penetrated with it, when the intimate intercourse formerly

existing between himself and the Emperor had given way to a coolness and reserve which none of his tardy attempts had succeeded in overcoming. But that which he could not conceal from himself he was not disposed to reveal to his colleagues. I am not aware that he ever unbosomed himself on the subject to any of us, unless, perhaps, to M. de Jaucourt. As regards the latter, I am loth to believe that having had in his hands, during his provisional occupancy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the treaty entered into at Vienna between France, Austria, and England, and having at least cause to suspect, if he did not know it formally, that the Emperor Alexander was cognizant of it, he did not, from the very outset, realize the consequences of a like discovery. Although M. de Jaucourt never mentioned the matter to me, I have no doubt that he soon came to recognize that our position was no longer tenable. What confirms me in this idea, is the readiness, not to say the eagerness, with which he bowed to the idea of dissolution; he even, in so far as his gentleness of character permitted, provoked it.

As for myself, there came to me in the first days of September, information which, although it did not enlighten me absolutely, confirmed the misgivings and suspicions which haunted my mind, and strengthened the idea that our ministerial association could not endure for any great length of time.

I have previously stated how the Abbé de Montesquiou, on his return from England, where he had sought refuge after the 20th of March, had revealed to me a bitterness and hostility far more pointed than ever against M. de Talleyrand. I had at first set them down merely to the vexation he naturally felt at seeing one of the men whom he least liked and esteemed, called upon to play the most prominent part in French affairs; but shortly afterwards,

I learnt through members of his family, that he never ceased dwelling on the mistakes committed by M. de Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna. This accusation was at first a cause for surprise to me, accustomed as I was to hear of nothing but the admirable talent he had displayed on this occasion; still, it was my greatest desire to discover the basis of the censure emanating from a man who, I could not deny, had good grounds for speaking thus, and who could but possess every means of being thoroughly well-informed. I very soon learnt through the same source that, according to the Abbé de Montesquiou, M. de Talleyrand had committed the wrong, while at Vienna, not only to quarrel personally, but also to embroil the House of Bourbon with the Emperor Alexander; that this mistake deserved all the less to be overlooked in that it presupposed a forgetfulness of services rendered quite recently, and displayed most flagrant ingratitude. He had offended the Emperor of Russia, not only by running counter to all his views, but by allying himself secretly against him with England and Austria. How far-reaching had been the engagements thus entered into? Had they been committed to any formal act? Had they existed merely *de facto*, and had they only become manifest by their results? This is what I did not succeed in unravelling at the time. One thing, however, remained in my eyes certain, and not admitting of dispute, and that was the existence between the Emperor Alexander and M. de Talleyrand of an incompatibility, the consequences of which might prove disastrous.

The uneasiness of the President of the council began to appear towards the 8th or 10th of September. His habitual calm was evidently disturbed. He made frequent references to the results of the elections, to the best way in which the ministry could meet the Chamber, and informed us that it was to be expected that it would be brought face

to face with serious difficulties. It was then that the idea recurred to him of dismissing M. Fouché. Whenever I spoke to him of the necessity of appointing a Minister of the Interior, one of his excuses was that it was in the first place necessary to be rid of the man whose presence stood in the way of the most proper and useful selections. In that respect he was entirely right. "At present," he would say, "it is not sufficient that he should leave the ministry, he must leave France." He was most anxious to send him as Minister of France to the United States of America, but he wished the request to come from him personally, and did all in his power to suggest the idea of it to him.

I was occasionally present at this bit of comedy-acting. As we were assembled in his closet one fine day, two or three of us ministers, among whom was M. Fouché, awaiting the opening of the council, M. de Talleyrand, dwelling the while with emphasis on every word, said to me: "You are well aware, M. Pasquier, that we must soon dispose of one of the finest possible posts."—"Which one?" I replied.—"Why, that of Minister of the king to the United States, of course. In the present state of Europe, in this general state of confusion, I do not know of any more desirable. A position on a grand scale, a highly esteemed position, perfect repose, an opportunity of observing and studying this large and entirely new country, which already fills so important a place in the world. What more could be wished for? It is on a par with any position. What more could we wish for one's most intimate friend?"

M. Fouché remained deaf to all this, and the hint had no sequel. And yet, it would have been well for him to take the offer into consideration. Had he forgotten the advice which, if he is to be believed, he had given to Napoleon in 1814, at the time of his first abdication? Every one knows the letter which he boasted of having written to

him at the time. I would not care to guarantee its genuineness, but it was certainly not made public except with his consent. It is gathered therefrom that he endeavored to demonstrate to the Emperor that the sovereignty of the Isle of Elba, to which the latter seemed to be resigned, was, above all, unworthy of him, and that it would prove a source of great embarrassment. America, on the contrary, could and would offer to him the only place of sojourn suitable to his position, and where he could still live with dignity, and surrounded by the show of consideration to which he was entitled. When it came to M. Fouché's turn to lay down, at Dresden, the title of Minister of the King of France, in which capacity he had entered that city, when he was thereupon reduced to live in obscurity in a retired spot in Germany, under the surveillance of Austria, he must have more than once reflected that it would have been better for him to have transferred his penates to Washington, when given the opportunity of doing so by M. de Talleyrand.

When political situations reach a certain point, their *dénouement* is generally precipitated with greater rapidity than anticipated. This is exactly what happened to us. Between the 10th and 15th of September, it became manifest that we could no longer remain in power. Each one of us respectively had become thoroughly convinced of the fact, and felt the desire of unbosoming himself to his colleagues. It soon reached the point when there merely remained for us to come to a decision and then announce it to the king. This necessitated talking the matter over together, and, as M. Fouché's presence was undesirable, M. de Talleyrand prevailed upon M. de Jaucourt to ask us to a dinner to which he would not be invited. After dinner, the doors being closed to all visitors, we might speak freely. M. de Talleyrand briefly reviewed the situ-

ation, whence it was clear that, in order for us to meet the Chambers with a perfect sense of security, we stood in need of a strengthening which we had hardly time to go in quest of successfully, and that the departure of M. Fouché, even if it took place on the following morning, would cause an excitement which would not have calmed down by the time the Chambers met. "And yet," he went on to say, "there may be a resource in this quarter. The Duchesse d'Angoulême must wield a powerful influence over the new Chamber of Deputies. It might not be beyond the possibilities to win her over to our side. I know of a means likely to prove successful." This means he did not reveal, and he seemed to pay no attention to our requests that he should express himself more plainly.

Then arose the question of the negotiations still remaining to be concluded with the foreigners. I think I may surely say that he had received only on the very day before, or on the one previous to that, their final propositions, and our dinner took place on the 16th. He was doubtless alluding to them when he uttered the following words, of which I have preserved a faithful recollection: "These folk seem to me to be altogether too much inclined to exorbitant demands. In two or three days, gentlemen, I will probably be able to lay before you documents relating to this matter, and which will leave no doubts in your mind. But this may also place us on excellent footing. I will make replies to them which in case of need will prove to the satisfaction of all France how determined we were not to tamely submit to the outrageous manner in which it is sought to treat her. When we shall have gone our way, sacrificed to this cause, public opinion will follow us in our retirement, and attach itself to us with enthusiasm. If our successors consent to accept that which we would have rejected, they are irretrievably lost, and will not last three

months. If they seek to resist, I do not see, among those who are likely to be chosen, any one possessing sufficient strength to sustain the struggle. It will then become necessary to call in the services of experience and of tested talents. The man most hostile to us will be compelled to call on us for help once more, and we shall again make our appearance at the head of affairs with an influence and authority that cannot be disputed. All that remains for us to do is to remain perfectly united. If we are to go out of office, let us all do so together, thus giving a valuable example of the political faith which statesmen are held to observe towards each other when professing the same principles and opinions. It is this political faith which in England gives such strength to ministerial association, and it is absolutely necessary that it should be introduced in France, for it will have the effect of consolidating our new form of government."

The question being thus defined, each one of us commented on it in his own way, but all agreed as to the necessity of resigning of one's own free will, and not waiting till one was driven to do so. The conversation lasted some time, but without M. de Talleyrand taking any further part in it, maintaining the indifferent attitude habitual to him. When it finally came to taking a determination, it was seen that he had fallen asleep in his armchair. In a man who, like himself, cared so greatly for the exercise of power, who has since shown how deeply he regretted the loss of it, this apparent apathy would be inexplicable to him who did not know, as perfectly as I do, to what a degree he was at the time persuaded that his retirement would be only temporary, that his services could not be dispensed with, and that it would be necessary to recall him ere long.

This also goes to show to what a degree this mind, so perspicacious in some respects, was incapable of serious

and sincere thoughts, when they were of a nature to lead him in a direction contrary to his inclinations and disturb his hopes. He did not perceive that he never would again find a concourse of circumstances more propitious towards establishing himself in favor and in power than the one he had enjoyed for the past few months. After having so materially contributed a first time to place the House of Bourbon on the throne, it had fallen to his lot to bring it back a second time from foreign soil. In order that it should be enabled to return to its capital, it had been necessary, so to speak, that it should be led by him. What could he then expect from the future, when the recent souvenir of so great a service had not helped to smooth away the difficulties in his path, and assist him in surmounting every obstacle? Once off the stage, if only for a moment, could he entertain any doubts that this moment, however short, would be taken advantage of by his enemies to compass his ruin? And he had determined and formidable foes, among whom were *Monsieur* and the princes, who, since their exclusion from the council, had become irreconcilable. So much, at home.

As to his position with regard to the foreigner, he was retiring for a while, he said, in order not to give his sanction to unjust and excessive pretensions. He did not reflect that these pretensions were principally put forth by the power with which he had, at Vienna, contracted the closest intimacy, to wit, by Austria; that they were secretly endorsed by England, the other member of the Triple Alliance to which he had bound France. How could he conceal from himself that no other resource was left to fight and thwart such hostile intentions but in the support of Russia, with whom he had irrevocably quarrelled, and which nourished against him personally a rancor only too well justified? Russia alone could obtain from Eng-

land an analogous line of action, and Austria would relinquish her ambitious designs when brought face to face with the danger of having to part so promptly from an ally whose strength and power had just manifested themselves in so striking a fashion.

What could be, I ask, M. de Talleyrand's place in the conduct of negotiations likely to arise from such a situation, and, were they concluded without him, was it not evident that those who had learnt to dispense with his services at so difficult a juncture, would soon come to look upon him as not so very necessary? I have previously stated that the ten days of his life, dating from the 30th of April, 1814, had been the most brilliant and best employed of his long career; and I have no hesitation in saying that the two months and seventeen days he spent at the head of the ministry, in 1815, must be looked at and judged in an altogether different light. He constantly showed himself inferior to his position, which he did not even seem to realize. His thoughtlessness, his indifference, together with his self-pride, inflated by his alleged successes at the Congress of Vienna, had completely blinded him. He did not reveal himself as a statesman either in home or in foreign affairs. Either from physical wear, or from moral fatigue, he proved himself incapable of shouldering the burden with which he made pretence of toying.

On the day following the conference at M. de Jaucourt's, M. de Talleyrand begged me to be the first to inform the king that we had come to the conclusion that it was necessary that the ministry should be dissolved. The king heard me without manifesting any surprise, and seemed to me fully prepared for a like communication, which was in no way unpleasant to him; but, at the same time, he was most gracious towards me. "Well then, so be it," he said to me; "let us dissolve the ministry, but as for you, you must remain; I intend to keep you."

After expressing my gratitude, as I was in honor bound to do, I explained to him as best I could that the honor he sought to confer on me would not redound to the advantage of either his service or of myself. Were I alone to remain of the retiring ministry, I should look like a deserter and should inspire no confidence to any one. My new colleagues would ever see in me a man of the former administration, with which they would readily suppose I preserved relations. If ever I should, in certain respects, not be completely in accord with them, this dissent would soon assume in their eyes the character of a calculated opposition; my position in the council would thus be entirely false, and might, from the same cause, be hardly looked upon more favorably in the Chamber of Deputies. Hence it seemed to me infinitely better to reserve myself the honor of serving His Majesty in some other fashion, — a thousand times happy, should circumstances arise which would permit me to be some day recalled near his person, and reinstated in so honored a position as the one which I was now compelled to relinquish.

The king seemed to appreciate my reasons, so I took leave of him, feeling confident that he could preserve no other than favorable impressions concerning me; yet, when engaged next morning in working with M. Beugnot, the Postmaster-General, and telling him of the occurrence of the previous day, he said to him: "Would you ever have believed that M. Pasquier would have preferred M. de Talleyrand to me?" I had this a short time after from M. Beugnot's own lips. So true is it that princes are endowed with a sensitiveness the extent of which it is hard to measure, and, in order never to give offence to them, it would forever be necessary to make the sacrifice of one's dignity and independence.

The first move having been made, M. de Talleyrand spoke

in his turn with the king in regard to the decision which had come to be looked upon as unavoidable, and to which the king did not raise any objection. It was merely agreed between them that the decision should remain a secret as long as possible. The king was seeking for time to think over the constitution of the new ministry. In so far as we were concerned, everything being irrevocably decided, we merely busied ourselves with settling in our respective departments matters which still remained open, and obtaining the king's signature to such ordinances as were needed. The Minister of War, who was anxious to put the finishing touches to the organization of the army, issued regulations governing all the branches of the service, and completing the ensemble of his great work. As for myself, I caused to be inserted in the *Moniteur* an ordinance instituting the *Cour royale* of Paris, and appointing its members, together with one relative to the constitution of the Privy Council.

The most important happening during the last few days of our incumbency was the communication to us of the diplomatic documents which M. de Talleyrand had promised us. The pretensions of the allies were embodied in a couple of notes. The first consisted in the draft of a treaty transmitted by their plenipotentiaries with the following note attached to it: "The document here presented is the result of the duties which the allied sovereigns owe their subjects, and of the desire of conciliating these duties with the sentiments they have vowed to His Majesty the King of France. As such it presents an ensemble of the demands they have agreed to make of France."

The second note had been dispatched by Lord Castlereagh as early as the 11th of September. It demanded, in the name of all the plenipotentiaries, the restitution of the works of art carried off by the French in the course of their conquests in Europe. This reclamation was not made on

behalf of the four great powers alone, but also on behalf of the Pope, of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the King of the Netherlands, and all the other sovereigns who had been despoiled. M. de Talleyrand replied on the 19th of September. From what I have stated of the dispositions and views of M. de Talleyrand, he must have refused to accede to this demand and have replied to it with a certain degree of haughtiness. It was, moreover, couched in terms justly irritating to the French heart. Among other offensive sentences was the following one: "There will still remain to the King of France sufficient means for adorning suitably the capital of his dominions. He can therefore relinquish possession of articles of value which he owes to an *unclean source*, without dealing a blow at the cultivation of the fine arts in France."

At the time of the occupation of Paris, in 1814, the allies might perhaps have preferred a claim of this kind, but the generosity of the Emperor Alexander would not suffer it. Was it then at a time when they returned as the allies of the King of France, when Louis XVIII. was, so to speak, at their head, at a time when they once more passed through the gates of his capital, the proper thing to despoil it of property which they had respected under circumstances, when they might with a better show of justice have invoked the right of conquest?

Among the articles claimed, there were some — and they were perhaps the most valuable — which had become French property by virtue of formal conventions, notably those which the Pope had ceded at the time of the first treaties he had entered into with Napoleon. Nothing, therefore, could be easier than to defend our right to them. M. de Talleyrand did indeed point out in his counter-note, a distinction which presented itself so obviously, but he declined to agree to the concessions which it would have been neces-

sary for us to resign ourselves to; the part to be retained possession of in any and every case, could be saved only by the sacrifice of the part whose retention could be less easily defended. Unfortunately, he thought it would serve his interests to yield on no point, at least in appearance. The day would come when it would suit him to claim credit for such action. He therefore concluded his reply with a most absolute refusal.

Thereupon the allies had no hesitation in adopting the brutal course of doing what they styled justice to themselves. A detachment of Prussian troops stood guard over the museums. Under the protection, and with the aid of this detachment, each one was allowed to carry off that which he pretended to have the right to claim. Great was the indignation in the capital, but however widespread it might be, its helplessness to resist was no less evident.

The proposed treaty was submitted to us on the 20th only. A reply to it was sent without delay on the 21st. The opposition of the Emperor Alexander had brought about the elimination of the greater part of the insane and outrageous pretensions whereof I have previously spoken, and the existence of which cannot be denied; for the Emperor Alexander gave later on to the Duc de Richelieu, as a title of honor which he should always preserve, the map of France on which had been traced the line showing the provinces of which it had been intended to deprive France.

Had then the Emperor of Russia forgotten his grievances? Had he altogether reverted to the sentiments of good-will towards France, and especially towards the House of Bourbon, from which we had reaped so much benefit in 1814? I am not inclined to believe it. His natural generosity rebelled at the idea of an act of excessive spoliation which would have deprived France of all the aggrandizement dating from the reign of Louis XIV. After the way

in which his helpful intervention had been so promptly repaid, he no longer considered himself under the obligation of preserving her from detriments which were merely the natural consequences of the great reverses she had just encountered. He did not think it was his right to deprive his allies of the indemnities to which they might lay claim, provided, however, they were confined within the limits of just reprisals. His ideas and sentiments had been embodied in a note which was submitted in his name by Count Capo d'Istria, to the conference of the foreign ministers held in the first days of September. According to this note, the Treaty of Paris, of March, 1814, was still to be regarded as the basis of the fresh negotiations, and it was only to be diverged from in so far as it might be judged indispensable for the safety of the allied powers, — safety also to be sought for in the defensive portion of the Treaty of Chaumont. It would be most unjust not to give Count Capo d'Istria a considerable share of credit for the important action of his sovereign. More than any one did he contribute to it, thus rendering to France the greatest of services.

Thereupon the leaders of the coalition were fain to content themselves with demanding "a cession of territory equal to the two-thirds of what had been added to ancient France by the treaty of the 30th of May, 1814, and which shall include the towns of Condé, Philippeville, Mariembourg, Givet, Charlemont, Sarrelouis, Landau, and the forts of Joux and of L'Ecluse, together with the demolition of Huningen." They demanded, in addition, an indemnity of six hundred millions, plus two hundred millions to be applied to the construction of fortified towns in that portion of the Netherlands adjoining France. Finally, they reserved the right of garrisoning for the space of seven years, Valenciennes, Bouchain, Cambrai, Maubeuge, Lan-

drecies, Le Quesnoy, Avesnes, Rocroy, Longwy, Thionville, and Bitché, plus the front entrance of the bridge of Fort-Louis. All these towns were comprised in a line drawn along the Northern and Eastern frontiers. The army of occupation, placed in rear of this line, was to be composed of 150,000 men, maintained at France's expense, and placed under the orders of a general appointed by the allied powers.

Lacking strength, there were reasons sufficiently good for rejecting such heavy demands, all the more severe from the fact that no one in France expected them. M. de Talleyrand felt it all the more keenly as his personal responsibility was involved. France's only representative at the Congress of Vienna, at the time of Napoleon's landing, having continually presented himself as moving spirit of the coalition formed against him, had it not, it was asked, ever entered his mind to defend, at least hypothetically, the interests of France? Had he made no stipulations on her behalf? Had he delivered her, bound hand and foot, without any safeguard against the consequences of the invasion which he was provoking? Herein lay food enough for the most embarrassing censure. He persevered, none the less, in pursuing the course he had traced for himself, and of rejecting distinctly that which he considered excessive, and leaving no loophole for any subsequent concession in regard to matters likely to offend the pride of the nation. It mattered little to him that negotiations should henceforward become much more difficult, since he had decided on leaving office, and was not desirous of facilitating the task of his successors.

The principal strength of this reply lies in the advantage so easily to be derived from the indisputable assertion that the allied powers, never having ceased to recognize His Most Christian Majesty as King of France, had thereby

admitted the rights appertaining to him in that capacity; that they had not for a single instant ceased entertaining relations of peace and friendship with him; and that this alone carried with it the obligation of respecting all his rights and possessions. "The powers," wrote M. de Talleyrand, "took this engagement in a formal although implied manner, by their declaration of the 13th of March and their treaty of the 25th. They confirmed it when admitting the king, as an accessory to the treaty, into their alliance against the common enemy. Now, if it is not allowable to conquer in the case of a friend, *a fortiori*, is it not allowable in the case of an ally?" He went on to demonstrate most ably that the king had not been an impotent and useless ally to the coalition. It was on his behalf and through him that the Royalists had operated diversions in the South and in the West, diversions which had compelled the usurper to scatter his forces, and had consequently rendered easier the task of defeating him where he commanded in person.

This document is worthy of being read in its entirety, but it will be seen therefrom in a special fashion that notwithstanding the strength of the remarks and arguments contained in it, it concludes as follows: "In spite of the inconveniences inherent to any cession of territory under existing circumstances, His Majesty will consent to the re-establishment of the ancient limits on the points to which territory has been added to ancient France by the treaty of the 30th of May. He will likewise consent to the payment of an indemnity which shall, however, leave means sufficient to meet the needs of the inner administrations of the kingdom, failing which it would be impossible to achieve the restoration of the order and peaceful state which have been the object of the war. He will also acquiesce in a provisional occupation, the duration of which, the number

of fortified towns, and the extent of country to be occupied will be the subject of negotiations; but the king does not hesitate to declare at this juncture that a seven years' occupation being entirely incompatible with the inner tranquillity of the kingdom, is altogether inadmissible. Thus, the king admits in principle, territorial cessions of lands which did not form part of old France, the payment of an indemnity, the provisional occupation by a number of troops, the time of such occupation to be subsequently agreed upon."

Thus, M. de Talleyrand peremptorily refused all cession of territory having belonged to France prior to the Revolution. With regard to all other matters, there remained to be discussed the quantity and extent of the sacrifices the bases of which were admitted. The last words of the note were the following: "If the bases proposed by His Most Christian Majesty are not adopted, the undersigned have no authority for entertaining or proposing others." The signers of this note were M. de Talleyrand, the Duc de Dalberg, and Baron Louis. M. Louis had doubtless been included merely on account of the indemnities to be fixed, for there never existed a man less qualified to take part in a diplomatic debate. Of this, M. de Talleyrand could not be ignorant.

A most important fact to be noticed is that M. de Talleyrand, in spite of his ostentatious display of patriotic firmness, had recognized as acceptable, in the propositions of the allies, everything, with the exception of the cession of any part whatsoever of the ancient territory. What is far more serious is that one might consider as granted the cession of all those portions of territory which did not form part of old France, and notably that of Savoy, which it was so useful to retain possession of. Such a concession, made at the very outset, and by a minister who was about to

resign office, and who was firmly resolved upon it, did not reveal any great uprightness, and its effect would be to render all future negotiations infinitely difficult for his successor. The latter, indeed, no longer able to attribute to himself the merit of a sacrifice already accepted, could but endeavor to save a few fortified towns, in greater or smaller number, among those demanded, although situated in the old territory. He was likewise reduced to the mere discussion of the amount of the pecuniary indemnity, and the duration of the occupation.

I have seen fit to place these remarks on record, as the application of them will shortly be found, when we come to pass judgment as to the conduct of the Duc de Richelieu in relation to the treaty of the 30th of November. He has always maintained, with some show of reason, that M. de Talleyrand's note had rendered that treaty unavoidable, and such as he was compelled to sign it. I have on several occasions heard him say that Savoy, had it not been already ceded, was, of all the allies had asked for, that which might have been denied them with the greatest chances of success.

The reply of the allies to the note of the French Ministry was received on the 22d. It does not behove me to speak of that document, since, to speak the truth, we were no longer ministers when it came into M. de Talleyrand's hands.

From the very first, the king's choice of a successor to M. de Talleyrand had fallen upon the Duc de Richelieu. If this selection had not become known earlier, it is because the Duke's resistance had taken much time and pains to conquer, but it had finally been overcome by the Emperor Alexander, who ardently desired to see him at the head of France's affairs. He had, beyond doubt, greatly contributed to have him called to it, and in order to influence his

decision he made him hope for, if indeed he did not promise him, his support in the negotiations the responsibility of which was going to weigh so heavily upon him.

It was already a great deal to have found a President of the council so suitable in all respects, but there was left for him the extremely difficult task of constituting a ministry. This was no light undertaking for a man who had been absent from France for over twenty years, and who knew nobody in it. No surprise is therefore to be felt at the fact that it required several days for the Duc de Richelieu to accomplish it. It was not brought to a termination until the 26th, by the appointment of M. de Marbois to the Ministry of Justice, and of M. Corvetto to the Ministry of Finance.¹ The appointment of the other ministers had been made known on the 24th, viz. the Duc de Richelieu, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Duc de Feltre, Minister of War; M. de Vaublanc, Minister of the Interior; M. Dubouchage, Minister of Marine; and M. Decazes, Minister of Police.

In order to explain the rapid headway made by the latter, it is necessary to state that fate had, in 1814, thrown him in the path of the Duc de Richelieu, to whom he had tendered his services for the recovery of certain still unsold parts of the Duchy of Fronsac, which his small estate adjoined. Happening to be Prefect of Police at the time when the Duke was wrestling with the stupendous difficulty of forming an entire administration, he hastened to make him an offer of his services. He was active, obliging, and able, enjoyed the favor of the king, and, as the Duke needed a Minister of Police, it seemed simple to him to select a man who already occupied the highest post in that branch

¹ On the 26th, was signed in Paris the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, called forth by the Emperor Alexander, and which, during a certain number of years, held so singular a place in the history of European diplomacy.

of the administration. Under the circumstances, the post of Prefect of Police became vacant, and it was not one easy to fill. It was again offered to M. Anglès, who accepted it this time, in spite of his title of *ministre d'État* (minister without portfolio). This was showing sufficiently why he had declined it in the foregoing month of July.

It might be considered that M. Anglès was giving proof of great humility, in expressing readiness to serve under a new man like M. Decazes, when he had filled important functions, and even under the provisional government held the portfolio of Minister of Police, and also when he could not be ignorant of the fact that this ministry had been destined for him only recently, at a time when it was believed that M. Fouché would take his departure. As to the latter, M. de Talleyrand had succeeded in getting his acceptance of a post abroad, that of French Minister at Dresden. His credentials had been signed as early as the 20th.

All the retiring ministers, except M. Fouché, were appointed *ministres d'État*, while those who did not possess it received the grand cordon of the Legion of Honor. M. de Talleyrand was appointed Grand Chamberlain, a dignity which he coveted, representing as it does the highest of the great posts in the gift of the Crown. M. de Richelieu made it a point of honor to obtain it for him. As for myself, I proceeded to consecrate myself to the new duties imposed on me by my election to the Chamber of Deputies.



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